Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A field consultant for a public teachers’ union brought a lawsuit after a school board held a closed executive session during a grievance hearing involving a teacher’s transfer and removal of extracurricular duties. The board’s attorney presented the school district’s legal position and rationale in an open meeting before the board entered executive session to receive additional legal advice. The board later voted in public to deny the grievance, and the plaintiff, who was not the aggrieved teacher, claimed the executive session violated North Dakota’s open meetings laws. She sought disclosure of the executive session recording as a remedy. The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment to the school district, finding no waiver of the right to enter executive session, that the requirements for the attorney consultation exemption were met, and that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated by her lack of access to the executive session transcript. The court declined to review the executive session recording, relying instead on declarations from board representatives and the parties’ stipulation that no material facts were in dispute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the school board did not waive its right to an executive session by publicly stating its legal position and that the statutory requirements for entering executive session were satisfied. The court also found no due process violation from not providing the plaintiff access to the transcript. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the executive session recording before granting summary judgment. The judgment of dismissal and the award of costs to the school district were reversed, and the case was remanded for the district court to review the recording and proceed accordingly. View "Haskell v. Grand Forks Public Schools" on Justia Law

A group of residents and an association challenged actions taken by the Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1 (CID) in Boise, Idaho. The dispute arose after the CID’s board adopted resolutions in 2021 authorizing payments to a developer for infrastructure projects—such as roadways, sidewalks, and stormwater facilities—and issued a general obligation bond to finance those payments. The residents objected to the projects, arguing they primarily benefited the developer, imposed higher property taxes on homeowners, and allegedly violated the Idaho Community Infrastructure District Act (CID Act) as well as state and federal constitutional provisions. Previously, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District reviewed the matter after the residents filed a petition challenging the board’s decisions. The district court ruled in favor of the CID and the developer, concluding most of the residents’ claims were either time-barred under the CID Act’s statute of limitations or had been waived because they were not preserved before the CID board. The court also found that the remaining claims failed on their merits, holding that the challenged projects qualified as “community infrastructure,” the stormwater facilities satisfied ownership requirements, and the CID was not the alter ego of the City of Boise. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court clarified that, given the lack of formal administrative proceedings under the CID Act, the preservation doctrine did not apply to bar the residents’ arguments. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any challenge to the CID’s original formation and the 2010 bond election was time-barred. The court further held that the roadways and stormwater facilities qualified as community infrastructure, the CID’s actions did not violate constitutional requirements regarding taxation or lending of credit, and the CID was not the alter ego of the city. The Supreme Court awarded costs on appeal to the CID and the developer but denied attorney fees to all parties. View "Doyle v. The Harris Ranch Community Infrastructure District No. 1" on Justia Law

Christopher and Jennifer Atkinson purchased a lot in the Ridgeview Trails Major Subdivision in Livingston, Montana, in 2012. The City of Livingston had approved the subdivision in 2005 and 2006, and a geotechnical report identifying problematic soils was created for the subdivision developers but was not provided to the Atkinsons when they purchased the lot. The Atkinsons received a building permit from the City to construct a residence, which was substantially completed in June 2013. In 2021, the Atkinsons began to observe cracking and structural problems in their home. After later discovering the existence of the geotechnical report, they sued the City in April 2024, alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation for the City’s failure to disclose known soil issues during the permitting process.The case was heard in the Montana Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County. By agreement, the parties proceeded directly to cross-motions for summary judgment to address threshold legal issues before discovery. The District Court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that the claims were barred by Montana’s statute of repose for construction-related claims, found in § 27-2-208, MCA. The District Court also found that the City owed no duty to the Atkinsons, that the public duty doctrine barred the claims, that the Atkinsons had disclaimed claims relating to permits and inspections, and that the geotechnical report was for the developer’s exclusive use.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Atkinsons’ claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose in § 27-2-208, MCA, because their claims arose from the City’s planning and inspection activities and were filed more than ten years after substantial completion of the home. The Court also held that the statute applies to municipalities and that no statutory exception applied. View "Atkinson v. Livingston" on Justia Law

Eight residents of Boothbay and Boothbay Harbor challenged a school board’s refusal to put their petition for a new referendum before the voters. The underlying issue concerned a voter-approved bond to renovate local schools. After the bond passed, the residents submitted a petition containing two articles: one seeking to reconsider and repeal the prior vote, and another proposing a new, smaller bond for a different renovation project if the repeal succeeded. The school board rejected the petition, reasoning that it did not present a proper reconsideration question as required by statute and that the second article was unrelated to reconsidering the original referendum.The residents sought judicial review in the Lincoln County Superior Court under Rule 80B and also filed independent claims for a declaratory judgment and attorney fees, alleging a First Amendment violation. The Superior Court found that the petition was not a proper reconsideration petition because it included an additional article and that the independent claims were barred by the exclusivity principle. The residents then appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the statute governing reconsideration petitions imposes a ministerial duty on the board to initiate a referendum if the statutory requirements are met; thus, the Superior Court had jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the residents’ petition did not comply with the statutory requirements for a reconsideration petition, as it sought affirmative repeal and included a second, unrelated article, making it ineligible for submission to voters. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the independent claims, holding there was no First Amendment violation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Minerich v. Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District" on Justia Law

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

A political action committee comprised of residents and registered voters in Richland, Washington, submitted a valid petition in October 2024 to amend the city charter. The proposed amendment would change the composition of the city council to be partly elected by district and partly at large. The Benton County Auditor, upon receiving the petition, scheduled the proposed amendment for the November 2025 general election ballot. The committee, however, sought to have the measure placed on a special election ballot in either February or April 2025.The committee filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Benton County Superior Court, seeking an order to compel the auditor to place the amendment on the special election ballot. The superior court judge denied the writ, ruling that the amendment would appear on the November 2025 general election ballot instead. The committee obtained direct review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington unanimously concluded that the case was moot because the relevant special election dates had passed. Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretion to address the issue as one of continuing and substantial public interest. The majority of justices held that the phrase “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 includes both special and general elections. However, a majority also agreed that mandamus was not appropriate in this case because the petitioner did not establish a nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to call a special election. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the writ of mandamus. View "A Better Richland v. Chilton" on Justia Law