Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts in Wisconsin, seeking access to Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms under Wisconsin’s public records law. These forms document when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote. The Alliance argued that they needed this information to ensure the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) was updating voter records accurately.The Walworth County Circuit Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition, agreeing with the register in probate, Kristina Secord, that the NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75. The Alliance appealed to the Court of Appeals, District II. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, District IV, had already ruled in a similar case (Reynolds) that NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under the same statute, affirming the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition.In the current case, the Court of Appeals, District II, issued a split opinion. The majority held that the Alliance was entitled to the NVE forms, possibly with redactions, and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that District II violated the precedent set by Cook v. Cook, which mandates that the Court of Appeals must follow prior published opinions unless overruled by the Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that District II was bound by the Reynolds decision and should have either certified the appeal to the Supreme Court or adhered to the prior opinion while expressing its disagreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, District II, and remanded the case with instructions to follow the precedent established in Reynolds. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law

A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney filed a complaint against Experian Data Corp. on March 6, 2018, alleging a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) due to Experian's failure to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The complaint sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. Experian demurred, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the claim.The trial court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence of civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint. The parties then stipulated to dismiss the entire complaint, and the City Attorney appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The court also vacated the order denying the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "P. v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim, stating it was not presented within six months of accrual as required by section 911.2. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which the County also denied. He then filed a petition for relief from the notice requirement in the trial court, arguing his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misadvised by three attorneys about the claim period.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and fell under the six-month claims period in section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

Dr. Judith Robinson, a former employee of HealthNet, a federally qualified health center in Indiana, brought a qui tam action against HealthNet, alleging fraudulent billing practices, including improper Medicaid billing for ultrasound readings. She claimed that HealthNet billed Medicaid for face-to-face encounters that did not occur. Dr. Robinson initially filed a suit in 2013 (Robinson I), which was settled in 2017, excluding the wrap-around claims. These claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing for future litigation.In 2019, Dr. Robinson filed a new suit (Robinson II) to address the wrap-around claims. The United States declined to intervene, but Indiana did. Indiana moved to dismiss all claims except for the wrap-around claims from October 18, 2013, to February 28, 2015, as the rest were time-barred. The district court dismissed Count III of Dr. Robinson's complaint, which sought to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement, due to lack of standing, as Dr. Robinson failed to provide competent proof of the agreement's existence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count III, agreeing that Dr. Robinson lacked standing because she did not demonstrate any breach of the alleged oral agreement by HealthNet. The court also upheld the district court's approval of the settlement between Indiana and HealthNet, finding it fair, adequate, and reasonable. The court noted that the reduction in the relator’s share was due to Dr. Robinson's own actions, including the failure to obtain a tolling agreement, which led to many claims being time-barred. The court also agreed with the application of the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) in calculating the settlement amount. View "Robinson v. Healthnet, Inc." on Justia Law