Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a non-profit organization, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the United States Park Police for information about legal actions against the agency. After the Park Police failed to respond within the statutory period, HRDC filed a FOIA lawsuit. The Park Police eventually produced documents but withheld the names of officers involved in three tort settlements, citing FOIA Exemption 6, which protects against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Additionally, the Park Police inadvertently disclosed names in some documents and sought to prevent HRDC from using or disseminating this information.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Park Police correctly withheld the officer names under Exemption 6 and issued a clawback order for the inadvertently disclosed names, invoking its inherent authority to manage judicial proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Park Police failed to meet its burden under Exemption 6 to show that releasing the officer names would constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. The court found the agency's justifications to be generic and conclusory, lacking specific details. Consequently, the court did not need to balance the privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.The court also determined that the district court's clawback order was not a valid exercise of inherent judicial authority, as it aimed to fill a perceived gap in the FOIA statute rather than protect core judicial functions. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Park Police, vacated the clawback order, and remanded the case for the release of the non-exempt officer names. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. United States Park Police" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts in Wisconsin, seeking access to Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms under Wisconsin’s public records law. These forms document when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote. The Alliance argued that they needed this information to ensure the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) was updating voter records accurately.The Walworth County Circuit Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition, agreeing with the register in probate, Kristina Secord, that the NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75. The Alliance appealed to the Court of Appeals, District II. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, District IV, had already ruled in a similar case (Reynolds) that NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under the same statute, affirming the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition.In the current case, the Court of Appeals, District II, issued a split opinion. The majority held that the Alliance was entitled to the NVE forms, possibly with redactions, and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that District II violated the precedent set by Cook v. Cook, which mandates that the Court of Appeals must follow prior published opinions unless overruled by the Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that District II was bound by the Reynolds decision and should have either certified the appeal to the Supreme Court or adhered to the prior opinion while expressing its disagreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, District II, and remanded the case with instructions to follow the precedent established in Reynolds. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law

A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney filed a complaint against Experian Data Corp. on March 6, 2018, alleging a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) due to Experian's failure to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The complaint sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. Experian demurred, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the claim.The trial court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence of civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint. The parties then stipulated to dismiss the entire complaint, and the City Attorney appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The court also vacated the order denying the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "P. v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim, stating it was not presented within six months of accrual as required by section 911.2. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which the County also denied. He then filed a petition for relief from the notice requirement in the trial court, arguing his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misadvised by three attorneys about the claim period.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and fell under the six-month claims period in section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law