Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A former dancer at two adult entertainment clubs in Manhattan filed a class charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging pervasive sexual harassment and a hostile work environment affecting herself and other female dancers. She claimed that the clubs’ policies and practices fostered this environment, including being forced to change in open areas monitored by video and being pressured to engage in sexual acts with customers. After receiving the charge, the EEOC requested information from the clubs, including employee “pedigree” data such as names, demographics, and employment details. The clubs objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant and burdensome, but the EEOC issued subpoenas for the information.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the EEOC’s petition to enforce the subpoenas, finding the requested information relevant to the investigation and not unduly burdensome for the clubs to produce. The clubs appealed and, while the appeal was pending, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to the charging party, who then filed a class action lawsuit in the same district court. The clubs argued that the EEOC lost its authority to investigate and enforce subpoenas once the right-to-sue letter was issued and the lawsuit commenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the EEOC retains its statutory authority to investigate charges and enforce subpoenas even after issuing a right-to-sue letter and after the charging party files a lawsuit. The court also found that the employee information sought was relevant to the underlying charge and that the clubs had not shown compliance would be unduly burdensome. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s order enforcing the subpoenas. View "EEOC v. AAM Holding Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former police officer in Dermott, Arkansas, alleged that he was forced to resign in retaliation for reporting a fellow officer’s excessive use of force. The incident in question involved the other officer grabbing an arrestee by the neck while the arrestee was restrained. Subsequently, the officer accused the plaintiff of taking money from a parolee, which the parolee confirmed in a statement. The police chief referred the matter to a prosecutor, who initiated a state police investigation. During this period, the plaintiff’s employment status became unclear, with conflicting statements about whether he was fired or resigned. The plaintiff ultimately resigned after a job offer from another police department was rescinded due to the ongoing investigation. He was later charged with abuse of office and witness bribery, but the charges were dismissed when the parolee could not be located.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned and had not suffered an adverse employment action, which was necessary for his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court also determined that the plaintiff was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for his malicious prosecution claim, as a summons to appear in court did not constitute a seizure. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and found that they failed on the merits, including claims under the Arkansas Whistle Blower Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s voluntary resignation did not amount to an adverse employment action, and that he was not seized under the Fourth Amendment. The court also agreed that the state law claims failed as a matter of law. View "Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas" on Justia Law

A former federal employee alleged that her union mishandled an arbitration proceeding and discriminated against her based on sex and disability. She claimed that the union’s local president made unwanted sexual advances, disparaged her status as a nursing mother, and ultimately withdrew union support for her grievance against her employer. The employee filed several unfair labor practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), some of which were dismissed as untimely, and also filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which issued her a right-to-sue letter. She then brought two lawsuits in federal district court: one alleging violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the union and its local, and another, pro se, alleging retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the union, its local, and two union officials.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) precluded the employee’s claims, holding that her allegations were essentially claims for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which must be pursued exclusively through the FLRA’s administrative process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that the FSLMRS does not preclude federal employees from bringing Title VII and ADA claims against their unions in federal district court, even when the alleged conduct could also constitute a ULP. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to displace these specific statutory discrimination remedies with the FSLMRS’s more limited scheme. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA retaliation claim, finding no indication that Congress intended for such claims against unions to proceed in district court alongside the FSLMRS process. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII and ADA claims. View "Lucas v. American Federation of Government Employees" on Justia Law

An employee of a California corporation, who was represented by a union and covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), brought two lawsuits in state court against her employer. She alleged violations of various California labor and business statutes, including claims for unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, sick leave, wage statement inaccuracies, expense reimbursement, and retaliation. The CBAs included provisions regarding pay, leave, breaks, and a dispute resolution process for grievances.The employer removed both cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing that the employee’s claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which would create federal jurisdiction. The district court determined that only the claims related to untimely wage payments were preempted and thus converted to federal claims under § 301. These federal claims were dismissed because the employee had not exhausted the grievance procedures required by the CBAs. The court found that the remaining state law claims were not preempted, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and remanded those claims to state court. The employer appealed the remand orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because the district court’s remand was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining state law claims were not preempted by § 301, as they arose from California statutes rather than the CBAs and did not require interpretation of the CBAs. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the non-preempted claims to state court. The judgment was affirmed. View "RENTERIA-HINOJOSA V. SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC." on Justia Law

Kevin Rhodes, a former employee of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission, was terminated in December 2019 following an investigation into allegations of workplace misconduct, including the use of a racial slur. Rhodes filed grievances about his treatment during the investigation and, after his termination, brought charges of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. He subsequently received notices of right to sue and filed a lawsuit in circuit court alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Missouri Human Rights Act.A jury in the Circuit Court of Jackson County found in favor of the commission on the sex discrimination claim but ruled for Rhodes on his retaliation and hostile work environment claims, awarding him various damages. The circuit court applied a statutory damages cap and entered judgment accordingly. The commission moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied. Both parties appealed: Rhodes challenged the constitutionality of the damages cap, while the commission argued that Rhodes had not made a submissible case. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri due to the constitutional issues raised.The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the circuit court’s judgment was not final because it failed to address Rhodes’s requests for equitable relief and prejudgment interest. The court explained that a final judgment must dispose of all claims and forms of relief sought. Because the judgment did not resolve all aspects of Rhodes’s claims, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, declining to address the merits of the parties’ arguments. View "Rhodes v. Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission" on Justia Law

Monica Richards, a long-time employee in her early fifties, applied for a promotion at Eli Lilly & Company after serving as an interim District Sales Manager. The promotion was instead awarded to a younger, less experienced candidate. Richards filed suit in federal court, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Massachusetts law. She sought to proceed collectively on behalf of all Eli Lilly employees aged 40 or older who were denied promotions since February 2022, claiming a companywide bias favoring “Early Career Professionals” over older employees.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Richards moved for conditional certification of a collective action and requested that notice be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The parties disputed the appropriate standard for issuing such notice. The district court applied the Lusardi “modest factual showing” standard, declined to consider the employer’s opposing evidence, and granted conditional certification, agreeing to send notice. Recognizing uncertainty in the law, the district court certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case to clarify the standard for issuing notice in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and ADEA collective actions. The court held that, before notice may issue, plaintiffs must present evidence raising a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated. Both parties’ evidence must be considered, and the district court retains discretion to manage the process, including authorizing limited discovery or narrowing the scope of notice. The court rejected both the lenient Lusardi standard and heightened standards requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence or a strong likelihood of similarity. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings under the clarified standard. View "Richards v. Eli Lilly & Company" on Justia Law

Dorothy Seabrook, a black woman, was the Family Programs Manager for the U.S. Army Reserve Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2013, she was involved in disciplinary actions against an employee, Scott Hamilton. Subsequently, the Army investigated Seabrook for creating a toxic work environment and making inappropriate comments and physical contact. In 2014, she was suspended for two weeks and reassigned to another division. Seabrook filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in January 2015, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and sex. She received a poor performance evaluation in February 2015, which she believed was retaliatory, leading her to file a second EEO complaint.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated and found no discrimination. Seabrook then filed a pro se complaint in federal court, which was construed as alleging disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Seabrook failed to plausibly allege that the Army's actions were motivated by discriminatory bias. The court found that Seabrook's allegations did not support claims of disparate treatment, as her comparators were not similarly situated. Her hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged actions were not objectively abusive or severe. Lastly, her retaliation claim was dismissed due to a lack of causal connection between her EEO activity and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that Seabrook's complaint did not meet the pleading standards required to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Seabrook v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Latonia Lister, the first African-American female firefighter in Las Vegas, sued the City of Las Vegas for employment discrimination under Title VII, alleging sex- and race-based discrimination and retaliation. The case stemmed from an incident on April 7, 2019, where her supervisor, Captain Michael Benneman, made offensive comments while feeding a dog. Lister reported the incident and later experienced additional incidents she considered discriminatory and retaliatory. She eventually requested a transfer out of her station.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the case. At trial, the jury found that the April 7 incident was severe or pervasive and objectively and subjectively offensive but was not motivated by race or gender. The jury concluded that the City did not discriminate against Lister or retaliate against her in violation of Title VII. Despite finding no liability, the jury awarded Lister $150,000 in damages. The district court reconciled the verdict by setting aside the damages award and entered judgment for the City. Lister's motion for a new trial was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions were not erroneous and did not contain prejudicial errors. The court found no conflict between the instructions and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not resubmitting the verdict to the jury. The court determined that the district court acted within its discretion by polling the jury to clarify the verdict and reconciling the verdict on its own. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the City and the denial of Lister's motion for a new trial. View "LISTER V. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

John Baldwin sued Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging he was unlawfully removed from his position following a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Baldwin, who had degenerative arthritis and underwent a double hip replacement, experienced a bursitis flare-up while working, leading to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Despite being cleared by his orthopedic surgeon and a physical exam, Union Pacific's Chief Medical Officer imposed work restrictions based on Baldwin's exercise tolerance test results, which showed low aerobic capacity and mild hypertension. Baldwin was ultimately prevented from returning to his job.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied both parties' summary judgment motions. Baldwin voluntarily dismissed his disparate impact and ADEA claims, proceeding to trial on the ADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. The jury found that Union Pacific discriminated against Baldwin based on a perceived disability but concluded he posed a direct threat to himself. The district court entered judgment for Union Pacific and denied Baldwin’s motion for a new trial, which challenged the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Baldwin argued that the jury instructions misallocated the burden of proof and omitted essential elements of the direct threat defense. The court found that while the direct threat instruction was incomplete, it did not affect the trial's outcome. The business judgment instruction was deemed appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the instructions, taken as a whole, did not mislead the jury or affect Baldwin's substantial rights. View "Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the management of an ERISA fund, specifically the Southern Ohio Painters Health and Welfare Plan and Trust. Plaintiffs, including union-appointed trustees and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 6, allege that two union-appointed trustees, Smith and Clark, have engaged in actions that violate their fiduciary duties. These actions include procedural changes that benefit themselves and undermine the union's authority, such as amendments to the Trust Agreement that make it difficult to remove trustees and provide benefits to retired trustees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the employer-appointed trustees and denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to remove Smith and Clark as trustees, terminate their employment with the Fund, and prevent the Fund from paying their legal expenses, among other relief. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not show they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court noted that the plaintiffs' concerns about self-dealing and the inability to exercise fiduciary duties were speculative and could be addressed through monetary damages. The court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the district court's dismissal of the claims against the employer-appointed trustees, as the issues were not inextricably intertwined with the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial. View "Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith" on Justia Law