Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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John D. Whitfield's application for a job as a Youth Development Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) was rejected. Whitfield alleged that the rejection was discriminatory and violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He initially challenged the decision in New York State Supreme Court through an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed. He then initiated a federal court action, which was also dismissed by the District Court on res judicata grounds. The District Court determined that the state court proceeding was a “hybrid” proceeding where Whitfield could have pursued the claims he raises in the federal action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the state court adjudicated the matter as a pure Article 78 proceeding, not as a hybrid. Therefore, the state court lacked the power to award Whitfield the full scope of relief he now seeks in this action, and the District Court erred by dismissing the amended complaint on res judicata grounds. The judgment of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Whitfield v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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In this consolidated appeal involving two cases from the Western District of Michigan and the Southern District of Ohio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled on how pizza-delivery drivers should be reimbursed for the cost of using their vehicles for work. The main dispute lay in the reimbursement method: the Michigan court sided with the drivers, stating they should be reimbursed based on a mileage rate published by the IRS, while the Ohio court agreed with the employers, stating a "reasonable approximation" of the drivers' costs suffices. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with both courts and vacated their decisions.The central issue involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requirement that employers pay each employee at least a minimum wage. The court found that if an employer required a minimum-wage employee to provide his own "tools" for work (in this case, their own vehicles), the employer must reimburse them for 100% of the cost of doing so. The court emphasized that the FLSA mandates that each employee be paid at least the specified minimum wage, not a "reasonable approximation".The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that they should be reimbursed using the IRS's standard-mileage rate for business deductions, as it is a nationwide average and does not consider the individual costs of each driver. The court emphasized that the statute entitles a minimum-wage employee to reimbursement of actual costs incurred on the employer's behalf, neither more nor less. The case was remanded back to the lower courts for further proceedings. View "Parker v. Battle Creek Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Joshua Young, an employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections, claimed that mandatory Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) training he was subjected to created a hostile work environment. Young resigned from the Department and filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. He alleged that the training program violated Title VII by creating a hostile work environment and violated the Equal Protection Clause by promoting race-based policies. The district court dismissed both claims without prejudice. Young appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined Young's allegations and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Young's claims. The court found that while Young had plausibly alleged he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, he failed to adequately allege that the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered the terms of his employment and created an abusive working environment.The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Young's equal protection claim, agreeing that Young lacked standing to pursue the claim since he was no longer employed by the Department of Corrections and had not asked for reinstatement as part of his equal protection claim.Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant Young leave to amend his complaint, noting that Young neither requested leave to amend in his briefing nor filed a separate motion to amend. View "Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's judgment in favor of a police officer who filed a lawsuit against the city of Omaha and the chief of police of the Omaha Police Department. Katherine Belcastro-Gonzalez had filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment by a coworker in 2010, and in 2017, she discovered that her complaint wasn't adequately investigated. She alleged that her subsequent applications for promotions were denied due to her complaints about sex discrimination. A jury found in favor of Belcastro-Gonzalez and awarded her $700,000 in damages. The lower court also awarded her attorney's fees.The city appealed, arguing first that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. The appeals court held that it could not review this decision after a trial on the merits. The city should have raised these issues in a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The city also argued that the district court erred in admitting evidence from proceedings before the Nebraska Employment Opportunity Commission. However, the appeals court found that the admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The city's last argument was against the size of the attorney’s fees award. The appeals court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the fee, including fees incurred during the administrative proceedings. View "Belcastro-Gonzalez v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

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This case concerns an employment discrimination action filed by Alyssa Jones against her former employer, Riot Hospitality Group and its owner-operator Ryan Hibbert. During discovery, Riot Hospitality Group discovered that Jones had deleted text messages exchanged with her coworkers and had also coordinated with witnesses to delete messages. In response, the District Court for the District of Arizona ordered Jones and other parties to hand over their phones for forensic analysis.However, Jones and her attorney failed to comply with multiple court orders to produce the relevant messages. Subsequently, Riot Hospitality Group filed a motion for terminating sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), citing intentional spoliation of electronically stored information (ESI) by Jones.The court found ample evidence that Jones intentionally deleted relevant text messages and collaborated with witnesses to do the same. It concluded that Jones' actions impaired Riot Hospitality Group's ability to proceed with the trial and interfered with the rightful decision of the case. The court therefore dismissed the case with prejudice under Rule 37(e)(2) due to intentional spoliation of ESI by the plaintiff.The court's decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found no abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the case or the district court's consideration of an expert report on the deletion of ESI.The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Jones and others to hand over their phones for forensic search, and in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Riot Hospitality Group. View "JONES V. RIOT HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

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The case being summarized involves two subclasses of current and former tipped employees at two New York City restaurants, who filed suit against the restaurants and their owners for violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Prior to the trial, the parties agreed to present only the NYLL claims to the jury. The defendants appealed the partial final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ NYLL claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that because the plaintiffs’ federal claims were never formally dismissed, and the partial final judgment did not contain a disposition as to the federal claims, the matter had to be remanded to the district court. The purpose of the remand was to allow the district court to clarify the record as to the status of the FLSA claims. The court concluded that the lack of clarity concerning the FLSA claims impaired its ability to review the defendants’ challenges, leading to questions about the validity of the district court’s judgment certifying the appeal. The mandate was issued forthwith, with jurisdiction restored to the panel without the need for a new notice of appeal if, within thirty days, either party informed the court by letter that the district court had supplemented the record to clarify the status of the FLSA claims. View "Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by Marianne Wayland against her former employer, OSF Healthcare System. Wayland alleged that OSF violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by failing to adjust performance expectations to reflect her reduced hours while she was on approved medical leave, and subsequently firing her. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of OSF, concluding that it fired Wayland for justifiable reasons based on her performance.Wayland appealed this decision arguing that there was a genuine dispute of material fact over the amount of approved leave she took. The Circuit Court agreed, finding that if Wayland's testimony about the amount of leave she took is believed, a jury could find that OSF unlawfully failed to adjust its performance expectations by properly accounting for her leave when evaluating her.The Circuit Court also noted that a jury could potentially find that OSF interfered with or retaliated against Wayland's use of leave by holding her to the same standards as when she worked full time, and then firing her for falling short. It found that there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine question about whether OSF's reasons for firing Wayland were pretextual, highlighting that OSF did not tell Wayland that poor performance would lead to discharge and set goals that were potentially impossible to meet.The Circuit Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayland v. OSF Healthcare System" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the plaintiff, Cindy L. Moll, who made allegations of gender-based discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment against her former employer, Telesector Resources Group Inc., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. She also claimed she was paid less than her male co-workers for similar work, violating Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated parts of the district court's judgment and remanded for trial.Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals noted the district court's failure to take all the circumstances into account and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.In relation to the retaliatory transfer claim, the Court of Appeals held that the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the transfer of the plaintiff's job site to Syracuse was not an adverse employment action and found that the district court ignored evidence that could support a finding of causation.As for the discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment claim, the Court of Appeals found that the district court did not adhere to the summary judgment principles. It concluded that the record revealed genuine issues as to all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's decision to transfer her job site to Syracuse violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.Finally, concerning the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried. It pointed out that the district court failed to adequately account for the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of some of the plaintiff's other claims but vacated the judgment as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment, and the Equal Pay Act claim as to one of the plaintiff's identified comparators. The case was remanded for trial. View "Moll v. Telesector" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Dana Hohenshelt, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Golden State Foods Corp., alleging retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, failure to prevent retaliation, and violations of the California Labor Code. Golden State moved to compel arbitration in accordance with their arbitration agreement, and the trial court granted the motion, staying court proceedings. Arbitration began, but Golden State failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the 30-day deadline. Hohenshelt then sought to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in court, citing Golden State's failure to pay as a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California's Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The trial court denied this motion, deeming Golden State's payment, which was made after the deadline but within a new due date set by the arbitrator, as timely.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court had ignored the clear language of section 1281.98, which states any extension of time for the due date must be agreed upon by all parties. Golden State's late payment constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement, regardless of the new due date set by the arbitrator. The court also rejected Golden State's argument that section 1281.98 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, following precedent from other courts that held these state laws are not preempted because they further the objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act. Therefore, the court granted Hohenshelt's petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to lift the stay of litigation. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bikachi Amisi, a contract nurse, sued Officer Lakeyta Brooks and Officer Roy Townsend for violating her Fourth Amendment rights when she was mistakenly strip searched on her first day of work at Riverside Regional Jail. Amisi also brought several tort claims under Virginia state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity and good-faith immunity under Virginia law. They also argued that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Amisi's claims. The district court denied their motions and the defendants appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that both officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, a legal protection that shields officers who commit constitutional violations but who could reasonably believe their actions were lawful, because their actions were not reasonable and Amisi’s right to be free from unreasonable strip searches was clearly established. The court also held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act did not bar Amisi's state-law claims because her injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Court further held that Officer Townsend was not entitled to immunity under Virginia law as his belief that his conduct was lawful was not objectively reasonable. View "Amisi v. Brooks" on Justia Law