Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by defendant and, as a condition of employment, electronically signed both an offer letter containing an arbitration provision and a separate nondisclosure agreement (NDIAA) on the same day. The offer letter required arbitration for most employment-related disputes, while the NDIAA included terms such as a waiver of bond for injunctive relief and a heightened burden of proof for public domain information. Plaintiff’s employment ended in March 2023, after which she sued defendant in Alameda County Superior Court for disability discrimination, retaliation, and related claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as wrongful termination. None of her claims involved confidential information or sought injunctive relief.Defendant moved to compel arbitration, asserting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed and that plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The trial court found the arbitration agreement and NDIAA should be read together under California Civil Code section 1642, determined that certain NDIAA provisions were unconscionable, and concluded that unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement. The court declined to sever the NDIAA’s unconscionable provisions and denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court’s refusal to sever. The appellate court held that the FAA does not preempt section 1642, and even assuming the NDIAA’s challenged provisions were unconscionable and properly considered alongside the arbitration agreement, those provisions were collateral to the arbitration agreement’s central purpose and did not affect the claims at issue. Applying Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., the appellate court determined that the unconscionable terms should have been severed and the arbitration agreement enforced. Consequently, the order denying arbitration was reversed. View "Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

A public hospital in New York contracted with a new parking management company to provide valet services, replacing a previous vendor whose employees were represented by a union and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After winning the contract, the new company considered retaining the existing unionized valet attendants but ultimately did not hire any of them, despite initially recruiting them. Instead, the company posted job listings for the same roles and hired other workers, leaving the former unionized employees without jobs. Evidence suggested that the new company’s refusal to hire was motivated by the employees’ union affiliation.After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The requested injunction would have required the company to reinstate the discharged employees, recognize the union, and bargain in good faith. The district court denied the petition in a brief text order, finding no cognizable irreparable harm and noting the delay in seeking relief. Meanwhile, an Administrative Law Judge found that the company violated the Act by refusing to hire the unionized employees and failing to recognize and bargain with the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court’s order violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to provide adequate findings and conclusions. The Second Circuit further found that the Regional Director had met all four prongs required for a § 10(j) injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for entry of the requested injunction. View "Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

Two individuals worked as delivery drivers for a transportation company for over a decade, primarily out of the company’s New Jersey terminal. Their work mainly involved picking up and delivering goods in New Jersey, with occasional deliveries in neighboring states. Each driver had a contract with the company that included a forum-selection clause requiring any disputes to be litigated in Memphis, Tennessee, and a choice-of-law clause providing that Tennessee law would govern any disputes. The company is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in Illinois, and has operations nationwide, including in Tennessee, but neither the drivers nor the company’s relevant activities were based in Tennessee.The drivers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the company violated New Jersey wage laws by withholding earnings and failing to pay overtime, among other claims. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee pursuant to the forum-selection clause. The company then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision applied and that Tennessee law did not recognize the claims brought under New Jersey statutes. The district court agreed, upheld the choice-of-law provision, and dismissed the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the enforceability of the choice-of-law provision under Tennessee’s choice-of-law rules. The court held that the contractual choice-of-law clause was unenforceable because there was no material connection between Tennessee and the transactions or parties. As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not reach the question of whether Tennessee law was contrary to the fundamental policies of New Jersey. View "Andujar v. Hub Group Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who worked as a truck driver for the defendants for approximately nine months in 2018, brought claims alleging that the defendants failed to provide required meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse necessary work-related expenses, and violated California’s unfair competition law. The plaintiff also filed a representative claim for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), all arising from his employment as a driver.The Superior Court of Sutter County denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on the meal break, rest break, expense reimbursement, and unfair competition claims. In particular, the court found that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of a common policy of discouraging breaks or of a community of interest among the proposed class members. The court relied on declarations from other drivers indicating they were not discouraged from taking breaks and noting variability in their experiences. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to strike the PAGA claim on manageability grounds, reasoning that adjudicating the claim would require individual testimony from 75 drivers and would be unmanageable.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the denial of class certification for the rest break and expense reimbursement claims, finding insufficient evidence of commonality. However, it reversed the denial of class certification for the meal break and derivative unfair competition claims, holding that the trial court failed to apply the burden-shifting framework required by Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC when time records show missed or unrecorded meal breaks. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the order striking the PAGA claim, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike PAGA claims solely based on manageability concerns, as clarified in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the PAGA claim is preempted by federal law. View "Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co." on Justia Law

A former hourly employee brought a class action lawsuit against his former employer, a large wood products company, alleging various wage and hour violations under California law. The proposed classes included both employees who had signed arbitration agreements and those who had not. While some nonexempt employees had signed arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration and waiving class actions, the named plaintiffs had not. The employer did not initially assert arbitration as a defense and, when ordered by the court to produce copies of signed arbitration agreements for putative class members, failed to do so for several years.During the course of discovery in the Superior Court of Shasta County, the employer repeatedly resisted requests to identify or produce arbitration agreements for employees who had signed them, leading to multiple discovery sanctions. The employer participated in extensive discovery and mediation involving employees who had signed arbitration agreements, without distinguishing them from other putative class members. Only after class certification did the employer finally produce thousands of signed arbitration agreements and immediately moved to compel arbitration for those employees. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the employer had waived its right to arbitrate by years of litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and sought evidentiary and issue sanctions for delayed production.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Applying the California Supreme Court’s standard from Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc., the appellate court held that the employer waived its right to compel arbitration by clear and convincing evidence. The employer’s prolonged failure to produce arbitration agreements and its conduct throughout litigation was inconsistent with an intention to enforce arbitration. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the appeal from the order granting evidentiary and issue sanctions was dismissed as nonappealable. View "Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

An employer engaged in the cybersecurity industry hired an employee for a marketing and sales position after recruiting him away from a competitor. The parties signed a written employment agreement that described a specific role and compensation structure. The employee alleged that the promised position did not actually exist and that he was instead given an entry-level sales role. Although the employee changed employers, he remained at his existing residence in Las Vegas throughout his employment.The employee sued the employer, claiming a violation of Nevada's employment-luring statute, NRS 613.010, which prohibits employers from inducing workers to change locations under false pretenses regarding employment terms. The employer moved for summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court, arguing that the statute did not apply because the employee had not physically relocated his residence. The employee countered that the statute applies when an employee changes their place of employment, not necessarily their residence. The district court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute’s civil cause of action provision supports the employee’s interpretation. The court also denied the employer’s later motion to strike the employee’s jury demand, ruling the employer had waived the argument by waiting too long to raise it.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 613.010 authorizes a civil cause of action when an employee changes their place of employment in response to false or deceptive representations by an employer, even if the employee does not change their place of residence. The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the jury demand. Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied the employer’s petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Field Effect Security, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization operates several Zen Buddhist temples in California, providing residential training programs where participants, known as Work Practice Apprentices (WPAs), live and work at the temples. Participants perform various tasks, including cleaning, cooking, and guest services, as part of their Zen training. Upon completing the WPA program, individuals may become staff members, continuing similar duties while residing at the temple. The plaintiff participated as a WPA and later as a staff member, performing duties such as guest services, food preparation, and facility maintenance. She received modest monthly stipends and room and board, but ultimately challenged the compensation as inadequate under California wage-and-hour laws.After her affiliation with the organization ended, the plaintiff filed a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner, seeking unpaid regular and overtime wages, meal period premium wages, and liquidated damages. The Labor Commissioner ruled in her favor against the organization and two individual leaders, holding the individuals personally liable as employers under Labor Code section 558.1, and awarded her $149,177.15. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of San Francisco, posting an undertaking only on behalf of the organization, not the individual defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeals by the individuals for lack of undertakings and granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding the ministerial exception under the First Amendment barred the wage-and-hour claims.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed. It held that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers unless such claims would require judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters or religious doctrine. Because there was no evidence that adjudicating the plaintiff’s wage claims would entangle the court in religious concerns, the exception did not apply. The court also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ appeals due to their failure to post the required undertakings. View "Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a labor claim against her employer and the employer’s business, seeking unpaid overtime and other compensation. The Labor Commissioner awarded her over $74,000. The decision was served by mail, triggering a 15-day deadline for the employer to appeal to the superior court and to either post an undertaking or seek a waiver of that requirement. The employer retained a third-party filing service, which attempted to file the appeal and waiver motion electronically on the last permissible day. The filing was rejected by the court clerk, and the documents were filed in person the following day, one day late.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco determined that the employer’s appeal and waiver motion were untimely. The court found that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the late filings. The employer argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled due to the filing service’s error, but the trial court rejected this argument.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for seeking a waiver of the undertaking requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be extended for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The only exception is for fraud, which was not alleged. The court also held that the tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 does not apply to notices of appeal from Labor Commissioner decisions. The court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the appeal as untimely. View "Dobarro v. Kim" on Justia Law

An employee began working at a foundry in Minnesota and, after developing back problems, was placed on a lifting restriction by her doctor. She informed her employer of this restriction, but the employer terminated her employment without attempting to provide accommodations. The employee then applied for unemployment benefits, prompting the employer to complete a questionnaire for the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) regarding her termination and disability. In the questionnaire, the employer indicated it had not tried to accommodate her condition.The employee subsequently filed a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate. During discovery, the employer sought to exclude the DEED questionnaire from evidence at trial, arguing it was absolutely privileged under Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c). The District Court agreed and excluded the document, reasoning that information created solely for unemployment insurance purposes was inadmissible in other civil proceedings. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled in favor of the employer and dismissed the employee’s claims. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the questionnaire was absolutely privileged and inadmissible.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case to determine whether section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), bars admission of such documents in civil cases. The court held that the phrase “absolutely privileged” in the statute provides immunity from liability for information submitted to DEED, but does not create a general rule of inadmissibility for such evidence in unrelated civil proceedings. Because the employee’s discrimination claim was not based on the content of the DEED questionnaire, its exclusion was erroneous. However, the court found the error was not prejudicial, as the excluded evidence was cumulative of other admitted evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "McBee vs. Team Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

North Mountain Foothills Apartments (NMFA), a company managing a large apartment complex in Phoenix, Arizona, hired Jasper Press as a maintenance technician during a period of increased workload due to a heatwave. Press discussed his compensation and the poor conditions at the complex with several coworkers. Management became aware that other employees knew about Press’s pay and housing benefits, leading to a meeting where Press was reprimanded for these discussions and told not to talk about pest issues with residents. The day after this meeting, Press was terminated, allegedly for failing to complete work orders. Press filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing and found that NMFA violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating Press about his wage discussions, issuing overly broad directives restricting such discussions, threatening reprisals, and discharging Press for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB adopted these findings and ordered remedies including reinstatement and back pay for Press. NMFA appealed, raising for the first time constitutional challenges to the NLRB’s structure and process, and also contested the Board’s factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider NMFA’s unexhausted constitutional claims because such structural challenges are not suited to agency resolution. The court rejected NMFA’s Article II removal protection challenge for lack of demonstrated harm, found no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in NLRB proceedings, and held that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions within the NLRB does not violate due process. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that Press was discharged for protected activity and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. NORTH MOUNTAIN FOOTHILLS APARTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law