Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case. As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellants' action for a writ of prohibition against Appellees - Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas Judge Marianne Sezon and Clerk of Court April Daniels - and denied Appellants' motion for oral argument, holding that Appellants failed to state a claim upon which a writ of prohibition could be granted.In a forcible entry and detainer action Judge Sezon ordered Appellants to vacate the premises at issue. The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement, but Appellants did not vacate the premises by the agreed-upon date. The underlying plaintiff subsequently moved for a writ of restitution. Appellants filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied and dismissed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Sezon did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings before her. View "State ex rel. Allenbaugh v. Sezon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's claims seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus against Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Judge Kimberly A. Melnick, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on its claims of error.Appellant had been declared a vexatious litigator by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant and its co-relator filed an original action seeking writs of prohibition preventing Judge Melnick from ruling on a motion for contempt and sanctions and a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Melnick to hold a jury trial in a case in which Judge Melnick was presiding. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's claims on the action for failure to seek leave to proceed as a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments on appeal lacked merit. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. Melnick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering Judge John P. O'Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and to dismiss the underlying case, holding that the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation was entitled to the writs.The City of Cleveland and the City of Parma sued the Bureau in separate actions. The Supreme Court held that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland's action. Judge O'Donnell then dismissed Parma's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, Parma filed the underlying lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment. Judge O'Donnell denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss. Parma also filed an action against the Bureau in the court of claims, which dismissed the complaint on limitations grounds. The Bureau then brought this action against Judge O'Donnell, arguing that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the underlying case. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding that the Court of Claims Act, Ohio Rev. Code 2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

In this civil suit against Ottawa County, an uncharted county, the Supreme Court held that the County was not sui juris and therefore must be sued in the name of its board of commissioners.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ottawa County for negligence, wrongful death, and violation of a nursing home resident's rights. As defendant, Plaintiff named "County of Ottawa d/b/a Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home" but did not name the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners. Riverview was owned and run by the County, and its employees were employees of the County. Riverview moved for summary judgment, arguing that the County may be sued only by naming its board of commissioners as the defendant because an uncharted county is not sui juris. The trial court granted summary judgment without addressing the sui juris issue. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Riverview's sui juris argument. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Ottawa County is not sui juris, and the court of appeals erred in determining otherwise. View "Estate of Fleenor v. Ottawa County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio's antiblocking statute, Ohio Rev. Code 5589.21, which prohibits a stopped train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes, is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., and that the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., does not exempt section 5589.21 from the Termination Act's preemptive force.The State charged CSX Transportation, Inc. with violating section 5589.21 on five occasions. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted section 5589.21. The court of appeals reversed, holding that federal law did not preempt the antiblocking statute. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's dismissal of the charges brought against CSX, holding that section 5589.21 is preempted by federal law and therefore may not be enforced against CSX. View "State v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In these two original actions the Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt certain paragraphs of its order.Two brothers, who were coexecutors of their deceased father's estate, sought writs of prohibition to prevent the judge of the general division from enforcing her order memorializing a settlement in a judicial-dissolution action, arguing that they were not bound by the order because the general division lacked both subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the general division patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt the paragraphs of its order directing the brothers to take actions as coexecutors. View "Neiman v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition against Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).Appellant, a defendant in a divorce case pending before Judge Paschke, brought this petition alleging that Judge Paschke's procedure for issuing orders in his case violated Civ.R. 53 and seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the judge from issuing entires in violation of Civ.R. 53. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a valid claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the petition was based on an alleged error in Judge Paschke's exercise of jurisdiction and not a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, prohibition was not an appropriate remedy. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide certain records that Relator requested under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling DRC to produce inmate master file documents.After Relator's request for documents was denied he commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling DRC to provide a copy of his inmate master file and all kites, grievances and appeals filed by him through the electronic-kite system. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relator failed to show a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to compel the produce of the grievance-related records; (2) the DRC must produce the requested records; and (3) Relator was entitled to an award of the statutory maximum of $1,000 in damages. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Beachwood to terminate special prosecutor Stephanie Scalise, holding that this case was moot.Burkons was charged with one count of interfering with civil rights. City Prosecutor Nathalie Supler moved for leave to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict of interest because Burkons was a city council member. Supler asked the trial court to appoint Scalise as special prosecutor in this case. The municipal court judge granted the motion. Burkons eventually filed a complaint in mandamus against the City challenging Scalise's "unauthorized representation of the City." The court of appeals dismissed the mandamus action. The days earlier, a writ of prohibition was issued halting the criminal case against Burkons based on improper venue. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's mandamus complaint, holding that this action was moot. View "State ex rel. Burkons v. Beachwood" on Justia Law