Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a public-records request submitted by David Armiak and the Center for Media and Democracy to the Ohio Attorney General. The request sought documents related to the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA) and the Rule of Law Defense Fund (RLDF). The Attorney General refused to produce the documents, arguing they were not public records as defined by Ohio law. Armiak then filed a mandamus action to compel the production of the documents.The Tenth District Court of Appeals handled the initial proceedings. During discovery, the court allowed Armiak to conduct broad discovery to test the Attorney General's claim that the documents were not public records. This included deposing the Attorney General and obtaining extensive documents and interrogatories. The Attorney General sought a protective order to limit this discovery, arguing it was overly burdensome and interfered with his constitutional duties. The Tenth District denied the protective order and allowed the broad discovery to proceed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the discovery order was appealable. The court found that the order met the criteria for a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), as it determined the action regarding the discovery dispute and prevented a judgment in favor of the Attorney General. The court also found that the Attorney General would not be able to obtain effective relief through an appeal following final judgment, as the discovery process itself would cause irreparable harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied Armiak's motion to dismiss the appeal and set the matter for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Ctr. for Media & Democracy v. Yost" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in April 2017 between Ryan McCullough and Joseph Bennett, where McCullough alleged Bennett was at fault. McCullough initially filed a lawsuit on January 15, 2018, but it was dismissed without prejudice on February 28, 2018, due to unclaimed service. He refiled on June 27, 2018, and obtained service by publication, but the court dismissed this second complaint without prejudice on November 27, 2018, for failure to prosecute. McCullough filed a third complaint on September 12, 2019, after the statute of limitations expired but within one year of the second dismissal.The trial court dismissed the third complaint, agreeing with Bennett that it was time-barred since the statute of limitations had expired. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the saving statute applied by its plain terms, allowing McCullough to refile within one year of the second dismissal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Second District's decision. The court held that under the plain language of Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), McCullough’s third complaint was timely. The statute allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year after a previous action fails otherwise than on the merits. The court rejected Bennett’s argument for a “one-use” limitation on the saving statute, noting that the statute’s text does not support such a restriction. The court also dismissed Bennett’s argument that the saving statute could not apply because the second complaint was dismissed before the statute of limitations expired, clarifying that the current version of the statute does not include this requirement. Finally, the court found that the saving statute applied despite the service issues with the second complaint, as the third complaint was filed within the statutory period allowed. View "McCullough v. Bennett" on Justia Law

John H. Mack Jr., serving a life sentence for aggravated murder, filed a mandamus action to compel the Richland County Sheriff’s Office to produce records responsive to his public-records request. Mack also sought statutory damages. His request included eight categories of records related to the seizure of his property and a separate incident.The sheriff’s office argued that three of the eight categories were exempt under R.C. 149.43(B)(8), which restricts incarcerated individuals from obtaining public records related to criminal investigations or prosecutions without a finding from the sentencing judge. The sheriff’s office also claimed to have provided records responsive to the remaining categories, rendering those parts of Mack’s request moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It found that Mack’s claim was moot regarding five categories of records that had already been provided. The court agreed with the sheriff’s office that Mack had not complied with the statutory requirements for obtaining records related to his criminal investigation or prosecution for two categories. However, the court found insufficient evidence to support the sheriff’s office’s claim that no records existed for the eighth category. The court granted a limited writ ordering the sheriff’s office to either produce records responsive to the eighth category or certify that no such records exist. Mack’s request for statutory damages was denied due to lack of argument in his merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ as moot for five categories, denied the writ for two categories due to noncompliance with R.C. 149.43(B)(8), and granted a limited writ for the remaining category, ordering the sheriff’s office to produce the records or certify their nonexistence. The request for statutory damages was denied. View "State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Kimani E. Ware, currently incarcerated, filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the Stark County Prosecuting Attorney to produce records in response to a public-records request. Ware claimed he sent the request by certified mail in April 2022, asking for the prosecutor’s office’s employee roster and budget reports from January 2019 to January 2022. The prosecutor denied receiving this request, asserting that the certified mail contained a court filing from another case, not a public-records request.The Fifth District Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment, denied Ware’s motion for summary judgment, and ruled the writ request moot since the prosecutor provided the requested records after being served with the mandamus complaint. The court also denied Ware’s request for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Ware did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered the public-records request in April 2022.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that the prosecutor’s office did not act in bad faith by providing the records after the mandamus complaint was filed, as there was no clear evidence that the public-records request was delivered in April 2022. The court also upheld the denial of statutory damages and court costs, agreeing with the lower court’s findings and procedures. The court concluded that the prosecutor’s response time of 11 days after receiving the mandamus complaint was reasonable. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Stone" on Justia Law

The relator, Jumaane Scott, filed an action requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Toledo Correctional Institution (TCI) to produce public records. Scott claimed that between April and July 2023, he made four separate requests for public records, including body-camera footage from three different correction officers and a vegetarian diet menu. He alleged that TCI staff denied his requests or failed to respond. Scott sought the production of these records, statutory damages, and court costs.The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. TCI filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, leading to the issuance of an alternative writ. TCI conceded most of Scott’s factual allegations but argued that the requested body-camera footage did not exist. TCI’s evidence included an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the warden’s assistant, stating that the footage was not saved and therefore did not exist. Scott did not provide contrary evidence to rebut this claim.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Scott’s request for a writ of mandamus, finding that the body-camera footage did not exist and that TCI had no obligation to produce nonexistent records. The court also denied Scott’s request for the vegetarian diet menu because his petition did not explicitly seek relief for that request. Additionally, the court denied Scott’s requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Scott failed to demonstrate that TCI did not meet its obligations under the Public Records Act or acted in bad faith.In summary, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that TCI had no duty to produce nonexistent records and that Scott was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs. The court denied the writ of mandamus and all associated requests for relief. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

A labor dispute arose between the City of Cleveland and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (the union representing dispatch supervisors) over overtime scheduling. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the arbitrator denied the union's grievance. The union then sought to vacate the arbitration award by filing an application in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, serving the city but not the attorneys who represented the city in the arbitration.The Common Pleas Court initially denied the city's motion to dismiss the union's application, but later reversed its decision after the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled in a different case that failure to serve the adverse party's counsel deprived the court of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Common Pleas Court dismissed the union's application and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of the city. The Eighth District affirmed this decision, citing two defects: the union's application was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion, and it failed to serve the city's arbitration counsel.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2711.13, a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must serve either the adverse party or its counsel, not necessarily both. However, the court also held that the union's application did not meet the statutory requirements because it was filed as a pleading (a complaint) rather than a motion. The court emphasized that a motion must state with particularity the grounds for the requested order, which the union's filing failed to do. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's decision regarding the service requirement but affirmed the decision that the union's application did not meet the statutory form requirements, leaving the arbitration award in favor of the city intact. View "Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a public-records request dispute between Kimani Ware and Glenn Booth, the public-information officer at the Trumbull Correctional Institution. Ware alleges that he personally handed over a request for public records to Booth, who signed for it and promised to process it the following week. However, Ware claims he never received the records and, after sending three follow-up letters to Booth, decided to sue him for a writ of mandamus and statutory damages. Booth, on the other hand, denies receiving any follow-up letters from Ware and asserts that Ware has submitted fabricated evidence to the court.Previously, Booth filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ware failed to verify his mandamus complaint with a proper affidavit and that the evidence of delivery of Ware's public-records request is at best "evenly balanced". However, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion, stating that a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not allow a court to weigh the evidence; instead, it simply tests the sufficiency of the complaint.The Supreme Court of Ohio decided to grant an alternative writ and refer the case to a master commissioner for a full evidentiary hearing. This decision was made due to Booth's allegations that Ware has committed fraud and submitted a fraudulent document. The court noted that either Booth or Ware is lying, and the best way to determine the truth is to conduct an evidentiary hearing where witnesses can be called to testify and be subject to cross-examination. The hearing will also allow the court to decide whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate and if Ware should be sanctioned for presenting fabricated evidence. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Booth" on Justia Law

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alphonso Mobley Jr., who filed a writ of mandamus against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose, seeking a certified copy of a document in response to a public-records request. Mobley also sought statutory damages and court costs under R.C. 149.43(C). The document in question was the "Certified Bond of Director of Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections for year 2021-2022." Mobley had initially received an uncertified copy of the bond, and upon his second request, he enclosed a check for $5 for a certified copy. However, he alleged that the secretary had not responded to his request for a certified copy, leading him to file this action.The secretary's office sent Mobley a certified copy of the bond six business days after he filed the action. The secretary denied liability under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43 et seq., and stated that he had provided the requested record. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and set a schedule for the parties’ submission of evidence and merit briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the mandamus claim was moot as the secretary had provided Mobley with a certified copy of the record he had requested. Mobley argued that the record was incomplete, but the court found no merit in his argument. The court also denied Mobley's request for statutory damages, stating that the failure to provide a certified copy within a reasonable time is not a failure to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). The court also denied Mobley's claim for court costs, as he had filed an affidavit of indigency and therefore had no obligation to pay costs. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Jeffery Woods, who filed a legal malpractice lawsuit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The defendant in the lawsuit filed a motion to dismiss the suit. Woods then attempted to remove the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. However, a United States magistrate judge recommended denying Woods's petition for removal and remanding the matter back to the state court. The federal court eventually adopted this recommendation. Meanwhile, before the federal court had ruled on Woods's objections, Judge Heekin of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to dismiss Woods's legal malpractice lawsuit.Woods then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus against Judge Heekin in the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over his legal malpractice lawsuit once he filed his notice of removal to federal court. He sought an order for Judge Heekin to vacate the judgment of dismissal. Judge Heekin filed a motion to dismiss Woods's mandamus complaint, arguing that Woods did not perform the necessary steps for effecting removal to federal court, and thus the common pleas court still had jurisdiction. The court of appeals dismissed Woods's mandamus complaint, but not for the reasons set forth in Judge Heekin’s motion. Instead, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the basis that “mandamus cannot be used to compel a particular ruling from a judge.”The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' judgment, but disagreed with its reasoning. The Supreme Court held that if Woods was correct that Judge Heekin patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the legal-malpractice action, a writ of mandamus would be an appropriate remedy. However, the Supreme Court found that Woods did not complete all the necessary steps for removal to federal court, and thus the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to dismiss the legal-malpractice action. Therefore, the dismissal of Woods's mandamus complaint was correct. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Heekin" on Justia Law