Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Jewetts obtained a mortgage loan in 1999, which was later assigned to U.S. Bank. The Jewetts stopped making payments before March 2016. U.S. Bank sent a notice of right to cure in July 2018 and initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Jewetts in September 2018, also naming Unifund as a party due to its judgment lien on the property.The District Court (Newport, Larson, J.) conducted a bench trial and dismissed U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action without prejudice, finding that U.S. Bank’s notice of default and right to cure did not comply with statutory requirements under 14 M.R.S. § 6111. The court’s order barred U.S. Bank from recovering attorney fees, costs, and certain charges in any future action, but did not expressly bar claims for unaccelerated amounts due under the note. Unifund then moved to alter or amend the judgment, seeking a judgment in favor of the Jewetts to preclude future claims for unaccelerated amounts, but the court denied the motion.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo. It held that when a foreclosure action is dismissed due to a defective notice of default and right to cure, the dismissal is not on the merits, but claim preclusion applies to any amounts that could have been litigated in the action. The court concluded that the District Court was within its authority to dismiss the case without prejudice and was not required to enter a judgment for the Jewetts or explicitly bar future claims for unaccelerated amounts. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Jewett" on Justia Law

The case concerns three heirs of Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a Jewish German art collector persecuted by the Nazi regime, who seek to recover Vincent van Gogh’s painting “Sunflowers.” Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was forced to liquidate his art collection in the 1930s due to Nazi policies. The painting was sold through a Parisian dealer, later purchased at auction in London in 1987 by Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which subsequently became Sompo Japan Insurance. The painting was exhibited briefly in Chicago and Amsterdam in 2001–2002 before returning to Japan, where it remains on display.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Sompo Holdings and its affiliates, seeking the painting’s return or compensation, alleging various state and federal claims. The district court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims because the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act) does not create a federal cause of action, and the plaintiffs had not shown a conflict between state law and federal policy to justify federal common law claims. For the state law claims, the district court held (following a Pennsylvania district court’s reasoning in Holtzman) that the HEAR Act’s extension of limitations periods could confer federal question jurisdiction, but ultimately dismissed these claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, finding insufficient connection to Illinois.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the federal claims failed for lack of a federal cause of action or basis for federal common law. As for the state law claims, the Seventh Circuit declined to address subject matter jurisdiction and instead affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding the defendants’ contacts with Illinois were unrelated to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a further amended complaint. View "Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A Maryland real estate investment trust with over 12,000 shareholders entered into an advisory agreement with UMTH General Services, L.P. and its affiliates to manage the trust’s investments and operations. The agreement stated that the advisor was in a fiduciary relationship with the trust and its shareholders, but individual shareholders were not parties to the agreement. After allegations of mismanagement and improper advancement of legal fees surfaced, a shareholder, Nexpoint Diversified Real Estate Trust, sued derivatively in Maryland. The Maryland court dismissed the claims for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Nexpoint then transferred its shares to a subsidiary, which, along with Nexpoint, sued the advisors directly in Texas, alleging corporate waste and mismanagement, and claimed the advisory agreement created a duty to individual shareholders.In the 191st District Court of Dallas County, the advisors filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a verified plea in abatement, and special exceptions, arguing that the claims were derivative and belonged to the trust, so the shareholders lacked standing and capacity to sue directly. The trial court denied these motions. The advisors sought mandamus relief from the Fifth Court of Appeals, which was denied, and then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while the shareholders alleged a financial injury sufficient for constitutional standing, they lacked the capacity to sue individually because the advisory agreement did not create a duty to individual shareholders, nor did it confer third-party beneficiary status. The agreement benefited shareholders collectively through the trust, not individually. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its order and dismiss the case with prejudice, holding that shareholders must pursue such claims derivatively and in the proper forum as specified by the trust’s governing documents. View "IN RE UMTH GENERAL SERVICES, L.P." on Justia Law

RTI, LLC and RTI Holdings, LLC sought to construct a specialized clinical research facility in Brookings, South Dakota, designed for animal health research trials with stringent air filtration and ventilation requirements. Acting as the general contractor, RTI hired designArc Group, Inc. as architect and several contractors, including Pro Engineering, Inc., Ekern Home Equipment Company, FM Acoustical Tile, Inc., and Trane U.S. Inc., to design and build the facility. After completion in April 2016, RTI experienced significant issues with air pressure, ventilation, and ceiling integrity, leading to contamination problems that disrupted research and resulted in financial losses.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Brookings County, reviewed RTI’s claims for breach of contract and breach of implied warranties against the architect and contractors. All defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that RTI’s claims were based on professional negligence and required expert testimony, which RTI failed to provide. The circuit court agreed, finding RTI’s CEO unqualified as an expert, and granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court also denied RTI’s motion to amend its complaint to add negligence claims, deeming the amendment untimely and futile due to the lack of expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the summary judgment for designArc, Pro Engineering, and FM Acoustical, holding that expert testimony was required for claims involving specialized design and construction issues, and that RTI’s CEO was not qualified to provide such testimony. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Trane and Ekern, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding Trane’s alleged faulty installation and Ekern’s potential vicarious liability. The court also reversed the denial of RTI’s motion to amend the complaint, concluding the proposed amendments were not futile and would not prejudice Trane or Ekern. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "RTI, LLC v. Pro Engineering" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Abbey Coyle brought a civil trespass action against Kenneth and Kelli McFarland, alleging that a portion of the McFarlands’ driveway and vehicles encroached on the Coyles’ property, Lot Q1, in Belle Fourche, South Dakota. The dispute centered on whether a public right-of-way (Walworth Street) extended along the entire southeastern boundary of the McFarlands’ Lot 25A, which would affect the property boundaries and the alleged trespass. The Coyles claimed the right-of-way ended at a certain point, while the McFarlands argued it continued along the full boundary, relying on subdivision plats, improvement agreements, and city ordinances.After the Coyles filed their complaint, the McFarlands answered and asserted their defense based on the Subdivision Improvements Agreement and city records. The Coyles then moved for partial summary judgment before any discovery had occurred. The McFarlands failed to respond within the statutory deadline and subsequently moved for a continuance under SDCL 15-6-56(f), submitting affidavits explaining the need for additional discovery and citing personal circumstances for the delay. The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Butte County, denied the continuance and granted partial summary judgment to the Coyles, finding the right-of-way ended as the Coyles claimed and ordering the McFarlands to remove their assets from Lot Q1. The court later denied the McFarlands’ motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the McFarlands’ motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court found that the McFarlands’ affidavits met the requirements for additional time under Rule 56(f), that excusable neglect was present due to counsel’s personal circumstances, and that no prejudice to the Coyles was shown. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Coyle v. Mcfarland" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a residential property in Vermont after the defendant defaulted on a $365,000 loan originally issued by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff, and the bank alleged it was the holder of the note. However, the copy of the note attached to the complaint was made out to the original lender and lacked any indorsement. Over the years, the case was delayed by mediation, bankruptcy, and various motions. At trial, the plaintiff produced the original note with an undated indorsement in blank, but could not establish when it became the holder of the note.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff’s initial summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff had not established standing under the Uniform Commercial Code. A later summary judgment was vacated due to procedural errors. After a hearing, the court found the plaintiff was currently a holder of the note and that the defendant had defaulted, but concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, as required by U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Kimball. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff’s post-judgment motion to designate the judgment as without prejudice was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that a foreclosure plaintiff must demonstrate standing by showing it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, declining to overrule or limit Kimball. The Court also declined to address whether the judgment should be designated as without prejudice, leaving preclusion consequences to future proceedings. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Quinn" on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

After a series of chemical explosions at an industrial plant in Crosby, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey, property owners and lessees in the affected area experienced contamination and property damage. These individuals, including the appellants, initially participated in a federal class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief for the harm caused by the explosions. The federal district court certified a class for injunctive relief but declined to certify a class for monetary damages. Subsequently, a class settlement addressed only injunctive relief, leaving monetary claims unresolved.Following the settlement, nearly 800 class members, including the appellants, filed individual lawsuits in Texas state court seeking monetary damages for their property-related claims. The appellants acknowledged that their claims accrued in September 2017 and were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but argued that the pendency of the federal class action tolled the limitations period under Texas law. Arkema, the defendant, removed the cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and moved to dismiss, asserting that Texas does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling—meaning a federal class action does not toll the state statute of limitations. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed the claims as untimely, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under its binding precedent, Texas law does not permit cross-jurisdictional tolling of statutes of limitations based on the pendency of a federal class action. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments for exceptions to this rule and found no intervening Texas authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claims as time-barred. View "Ackerman v. Arkema" on Justia Law