Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, owners of two condominium units, obtained a judgment against Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC for damages due to mismanagement. The judgment awarded Maples $134,900 and Brown $106,801, along with specific performance, declaratory relief, and attorney fees. The judgment prohibited the defendants from imposing special assessments to pay for the judgment. The judgment was affirmed in part by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but specific performance and the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim were vacated.Maples and Brown recorded writs of execution, obtaining liens against the LLC's and Association's properties. However, the LLC's units were foreclosed by The First, N.A., extinguishing the liens. Maples and Brown then filed a new action in the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the judgment against the remaining seven units not owned by them or foreclosed upon. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, where the court dismissed their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the lower court erred in dismissing the claim to enforce the judgment lien against the seven units under the Maine Condominium Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117. The court held that the proper procedure for enforcing such a lien requires a disclosure proceeding in the District Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket did not cure the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Maples and Brown’s claims, as the Superior Court and the Business and Consumer Docket lacked jurisdiction to issue the necessary turnover or sale orders under the disclosure statutes. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Linda Lee owned a motel in Pascagoula, Mississippi, which had deteriorated significantly and was being used improperly, attracting vagrants and drug users. The city council ordered the demolition of the motel after a hearing, citing it as a menace to public health and safety. Lee did not attend the hearing, but her son did. The city council decided the motel was beyond repair and ordered its demolition.Lee appealed the city council's decision to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing that the city failed to provide substantial evidence and did not comply with statutory notice provisions. The Circuit Court affirmed the city's decision. Lee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the city’s notice was insufficient and reversed and remanded the case for further determination.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the appeal was moot because the motel had already been demolished by a new owner, as admitted by Lee in her appellate filings. Additionally, Lee lacked standing to pursue the appeal because she had transferred the property to her son on the day of the city council meeting and no longer had any interest in it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed Lee's appeal. View "Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi" on Justia Law

James Smith Jr. initiated a civil action against Rufus and Merle Rivers in magistrates court, claiming to be their landlord and seeking their eviction. The Rivers contended that Smith did not own the property where they resided. The magistrates court sided with Smith and ordered the Rivers' eviction. The Rivers appealed, and the circuit court upheld the eviction order. However, the court of appeals reversed the decision, citing a South Carolina Code provision that barred the magistrates court from handling the eviction due to the Rivers' challenge to Smith's property title.The magistrates court initially ruled in favor of Smith, determining that he was the lawful owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Rivers filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to a pending circuit court case challenging Smith's ownership. The magistrates court denied these motions, and the Rivers appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the magistrates court's decision, finding no evidence to dispute Smith's ownership and confirming the landlord-tenant relationship.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the magistrates court had the authority to conduct the eviction proceeding because it had determined that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Smith and the Rivers. The court emphasized that the existence of such a relationship precludes the tenant from challenging the landlord's title in an eviction proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the magistrates court's eviction order. View "Rivers v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system through eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructure Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action, and Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment for Liberty, awarding attorney’s fees. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty only needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the public necessity elements were not met, and that the administrative record (AR) was irrelevant. The trial court allowed Liberty to present any evidence it deemed relevant, including post-RON evidence, and found in favor of Liberty.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by not using the gross abuse of discretion standard. The trial court also erred by not admitting the AR, failing to start its analysis with the RON’s findings, and improperly allowing Liberty to rely solely on post-RON evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the rebuttable presumption in favor of TAV’s findings should have been the starting point for the trial court’s analysis.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the trial court to determine whether to permit TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct standards. The judgment and attorney’s fees award were reversed, and TAV was allowed to recover its costs on appeal. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

The Garretts owned 5,200 acres of farmland in Sully County and faced financial difficulties, leading them to sell the property to the Stocks. The Stocks agreed to lease the land back to the Garretts for five years, with an option for the Garretts to repurchase it. The Garretts failed to make timely lease payments, prompting the Stocks to initiate an eviction action. The Stocks alleged that the Garretts had not only failed to pay rent but also committed waste on the property.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Sully County held a two-day trial, where the jury found in favor of the Stocks, granting them immediate possession of the farmland. The Garretts appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss, their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for a new trial. They also contended that the court erred in denying their proposed jury instructions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the Stocks had complied with the three-day notice to quit requirement and that the mandatory mediation provisions did not apply as the relationship was that of lessor and lessee, not creditor and borrower. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Garretts' proposed jury instructions, as the instructions given adequately covered the applicable law. Finally, the court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and the circuit court did not err in denying the Garretts' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The Supreme Court also awarded the Stocks $5,000 in appellate attorney fees. View "Stock v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Gerard A. Kirsch, a member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc., was injured while building a storage barn on the church's property. Kirsch fell from a ladder and sustained a severe arm injury. He sued the church, alleging negligence for failing to provide safe equipment and proper supervision.The Vanderburgh Superior Court denied the church's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 limited the church's liability. The court held that a jury must decide if the church breached any duty to Kirsch. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting the statute narrowly to apply only to parts of the premises used primarily for worship services, thus allowing Kirsch's claim to proceed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the term "premises" in Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 includes the entire parcel of land owned by the church, not just the areas used primarily for worship services. Since the church's entire property is used primarily for worship services, the statute applies, limiting the church's liability to warning of hidden dangers and refraining from intentional harm. Kirsch admitted the church breached neither duty, leading the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the church. View "Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

Scott and Karen Larsen purchased two adjoining lots in the McGuiness Tracts subdivision in the late 1980s, intending to build a house and retire there. Keith and Danielle Sayers, who bought a lot in the same subdivision in 2012 and another adjoining lot in 2016 or 2017, built a freestyle motocross course on their properties. The Larsens, disturbed by the noise and dust from the motocross activities, sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Sayerses, which was ignored. Consequently, the Larsens filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief for breach of restrictive covenant, nuisance, and trespass. The Sayerses counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Second Judicial District Court held a bench trial and ruled that the Sayerses' motocross activities did not violate the restrictive covenants of the subdivision, denying the Larsens' claims for injunctive relief and nuisance. However, the court granted the Larsens' request to enjoin Keith from hitting golf balls onto their property. The court also denied the Sayerses' counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Larsens' motion for attorney’s fees was not ruled upon by the District Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the Sayerses' freestyle motocross course constitutes a breach of the restrictive covenants limiting the use of the property to residential or agricultural purposes. The court reversed the District Court's ruling on this basis and remanded the case for the District Court to award the Larsens reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's determination that Keith's ramp-building activities did not violate the covenants' restriction against commercial activity. View "Larsen v. Sayers" on Justia Law