Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures.Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

The case concerns efforts by the City of Baltimore to redevelop 13.8 acres in the Poppleton neighborhood through an agreement with a private developer. To facilitate the project, the city used eminent domain to acquire hundreds of properties, which were then transferred to the developer at an allegedly favorable price. Over the years, the project was beset by delays and amendments, resulting in only minimal development and leaving much of the area vacant and in disrepair. Plaintiffs, consisting of neighboring property owners and a community organization, claimed the city’s actions reduced their property values and exposed them to environmental nuisances.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. It found they lacked Article III standing for their Fifth Amendment takings claim because their own properties were not subject to eminent domain, and held that their private nuisance claim failed to state a claim under Maryland law. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ injuries, stemming from the taking of their neighbors’ properties, did not give them standing to challenge the use of eminent domain, and that their allegations of nuisance were insufficiently specific or actionable under state law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that both claims must be dismissed but for different reasons. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing for the takings claim because they alleged concrete injury through diminished property values. However, it concluded the takings claim failed on the merits since the plaintiffs did not own any property actually taken. The court also ruled that, because all federal claims were dismissed at an early stage, the district court should have declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law nuisance claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The declaratory judgment request failed as all substantive claims were dismissed. The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and remanded with instructions. View "Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. La Cite Development, LLC" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law

A county entered into a contract in the late 1970s with various firms for the construction of a new jail, which was completed in 1981. Decades later, during a renovation in 2021, a construction defect was discovered: the original roof was not properly attached to the masonry walls. The county paid for repairs and, in 2023, sued the original architect, the general contractor, and the masonry subcontractor for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, and breach of contract. Each defendant raised the statute of repose in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536 as a defense, arguing the claims were filed more than 12 years after completion of the jail.The Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County sustained the defendants’ preliminary objections, finding the statute of repose applied because the jail was completed in 1981, and the defendants had performed the qualifying construction services. The court further held that the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, which sometimes allows government entities to avoid statutes of limitations, did not apply to the statute of repose. The county appealed.The Commonwealth Court affirmed, assuming for argument's sake that nullum tempus could apply to statutes of repose, but concluding the county failed to meet the requirements for invoking the doctrine because constructing the jail was not enforcing an obligation imposed by law.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that nullum tempus cannot preclude the application of the Section 5536 statute of repose. The court concluded the statute of repose is a legislative judgment eliminating liability for construction professionals after 12 years, and its purpose cannot be undermined by the common law doctrine of nullum tempus. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order upholding dismissal of the complaint. View "Clearfield County v. Transystems Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff acquired property in Exeter, Rhode Island, in 1997 and later sought to develop a solar farm on it. To proceed, he needed legal access from a public road. A town map suggested such access via an extension of Estate Drive, but in reality, no road existed there—only undeveloped woods, which the town considered a “paper street.” The plaintiff attempted to clear and gravel the area without town approval, prompting the town to block access and send a cease-and-desist letter. The planning board denied his development application, and the zoning board affirmed. The plaintiff then filed multiple lawsuits, including one seeking a declaration that the disputed area was a public road, and later, claims for due process violations and, after losing on the road status issue, for adverse possession and related theories regarding ownership and access.The Superior Court first denied the town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the due process case and then denied the town’s motion to dismiss the adverse possession case. The trial justice reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because, in her view, the facts and legal theories in the new cases were different from the previously litigated issues, such as whether the area was a public road. She further concluded that the town had acquiesced to separate lawsuits and that Davis was not barred from asserting inconsistent or alternative claims in later litigation.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed both cases on certiorari. The Court held that res judicata barred the plaintiff’s claims because all arose from the same set of facts concerning access to the disputed area and could have been raised in the initial litigation. The Court further concluded that collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel also precluded the plaintiff’s adverse possession and related claims, as key factual issues had already been determined. The Court quashed the Superior Court’s orders and remanded for dismissal of both cases. View "Davis v. Wood Estates, Inc." on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Shirley R. Hulsey and her husband purchased a residence in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which was adjacent to a vacant lot owned by Yellow Hammer Capital Management, LLC. In 2017, Build Art, LLC was retained by Yellow Hammer to construct a residence on the adjacent lot, which was at a higher elevation and sloped toward Hulsey’s property. After construction began, Hulsey observed water and debris flooding her property, which she attributed to changes in the grading and runoff from the construction. She alleged that the construction caused damage to her home’s foundation and sought damages and injunctive relief against Build Art, Yellow Hammer, and unnamed defendants, claiming trespass, nuisance, negligence, wantonness, emotional distress, and violation of her common-law rights concerning surface water flow.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Build Art on all claims against it, while the claims against Yellow Hammer and other defendants remained pending. Hulsey moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The court subsequently certified the summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing Hulsey to file an appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court’s order was a final judgment suitable for appeal. The Supreme Court determined that the claims against Build Art and Yellow Hammer were so closely intertwined, arising from the same operative facts, that certifying the summary judgment as final was improper. The Supreme Court held that such certification posed risks of inconsistent results and wasted judicial resources. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the order was not a final judgment capable of supporting appellate review. View "Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC" on Justia Law

Cuevas Machine Company entered into a subcontract with O’Neal Constructors for fabrication and machining work at a filtration plant owned by Calgon Carbon Corporation in Mississippi. Under the subcontract, Cuevas was to be paid after Calgon paid O’Neal. Despite nonpayment from O’Neal, Cuevas continued its work. In October 2023, Cuevas recorded two construction liens totaling over $1.2 million against Calgon’s property, but the lien documents did not explicitly state the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied—a statutory requirement. Instead, Cuevas attached invoices to the liens, which included dates, but it was unclear whether these dates satisfied the statutory requirement.After Cuevas filed suit to foreclose on the liens in Mississippi state court, Calgon removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss. The district court granted Calgon’s motion, dismissing Cuevas’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded, making an Erie guess, that the liens were unenforceable because they did not clearly specify the required “last date” in the manner demanded by Mississippi law, and found that the attached invoices did not sufficiently cure this defect.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Finding Mississippi law ambiguous on whether attachments that do not plainly state the “last date” can satisfy the statutory requirement, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: whether attaching invoices that do not explicitly state the “last date labor, services or materials were supplied” satisfies the requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-405(1)(b) that a lien “specify the date the claim was due.” The Fifth Circuit did not decide the merits, instead certifying the question for authoritative resolution. View "Cuevas Machine v. Calgon Carbon" on Justia Law

Two former tenants sued the owner and manager of a residential apartment complex, alleging that they were charged unlawful rental application fees and excessive lock change fees, in violation of the Massachusetts security deposit statute and consumer protection laws. They sought to represent a statewide class of similarly situated tenants. After contentious discovery, the Superior Court sanctioned the defendants, precluding them from contesting certain liability facts. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the security deposit claims but denied summary judgment on the consumer protection claims. Before trial, the parties reached a proposed class action settlement that established a fund for class members, with unclaimed funds to be distributed partly to charities and partly returned to the defendants.The Superior Court, after scrutiny and required revisions, approved the settlement. The court capped the amount of unclaimed funds that could revert to the defendants and required that a portion go to designated charities. However, the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee, a nonparty potentially entitled to notice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), was not notified prior to settlement approval. After final approval and claims processing, the committee received notice for the first time and objected to the final distribution of unclaimed funds, arguing that the lack of timely notice violated the rule and that final judgment should be set aside. The motion judge agreed there was a violation but declined to vacate the settlement, finding no prejudice.On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the IOLTA Committee had standing to appeal the denial of its procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the disposition of residual funds, but lacked standing to challenge the overall fairness or structure of the settlement. Assuming a violation of the rule occurred, the Court found no prejudice because the committee ultimately received the opportunity to be heard before judgment entered. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ortins v. Lincoln Property Company" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law