Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A member of the governing board of a public water district was the subject of internal investigations after allegations of misconduct by district staff, as well as allegations made by that board member against staff. Two lengthy confidential reports, prepared by outside counsel, documented the results of these investigations. The board member was permitted to review, but not remove, the reports from a secure location at the district’s offices. Contrary to these restrictions, the board member took the reports without permission, later making extensive annotations on them. Repeated requests for their return were unsuccessful, leading to her censure by the board.The Santa Clara County Superior Court, upon the district's application under California’s claim and delivery law, granted a writ of possession and a turnover order directing the board member to return the reports. The board member stayed enforcement by posting a counterbond as allowed by statute. While the turnover order was stayed, the district sought a preliminary injunction under the general injunction statutes, again seeking return of the reports. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring turnover of the reports, permitting the board member to redact her handwritten notes.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the claim and delivery statutory scheme does not preclude a party from seeking injunctive relief for the recovery of personal property, even after a writ of possession has been issued and stayed by a counterbond. The appellate court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a likelihood of the district’s success on its conversion claim and in concluding that the balance of harms favored the district. The order granting the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited liability company entered into an agreement to purchase real property in Jefferson County, Alabama, from an Alabama limited partnership. The agreement included provisions for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party in litigation arising from the contract. Disputes arose regarding whether the buyer satisfied conditions to extend the closing date, leading the seller to declare the agreement terminated. The buyer sued the seller, the seller’s general partner (a California corporation), and various individual limited partners (in both their personal capacities and as trustees of family trusts), seeking among other relief, damages for breach of contract and a declaration of rights under the agreement. The contract also provided for reimbursement of transaction costs and attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances.The case proceeded in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The court granted summary judgment for the buyer on liability, finding the seller had breached the agreement, and set the issue of damages for a jury trial. Subsequently, disputes arose about whether attorneys’ fees should be decided by the jury or the court. The circuit court ruled that attorneys’ fees recoverable by the prevailing party under the contract would be determined by the court after trial, not by the jury. The seller, general partner, and limited partners sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing they were entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a jury determination of prevailing party attorneys’ fees under the contract, because they did not adequately show that the Alabama Constitution or statutes provide such a right for this type of claim. The Court declined to overrule the circuit court’s decision to reserve the issue of attorneys’ fees for judicial determination following the trial on damages. View "Ex parte Vestavia Hills, Ltd." on Justia Law

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the sale of property located at 301 Harris Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, 1100 North Main LLC, sought to purchase property from the Providence Firefighters Realty Corp. (the Firefighters), contingent on the Firefighters acquiring replacement property. The Firefighters entered into negotiations with the defendant, Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc., to purchase the Harris Avenue property. After several communications, the Firefighters signed a draft purchase and sales agreement for the property, but the defendant refused to execute it and reportedly accepted another offer. The plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking declaratory, equitable, or monetary relief based on the alleged contract, and recorded two notices of lis pendens against the Harris Avenue property.In the Providence County Superior Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, quash the lis pendens, and sought sanctions. The plaintiff argued that the attorneys’ communications constituted assent and that a purported assignment from the Firefighters gave the plaintiff standing. Before the Superior Court justice issued a decision, the plaintiff attempted to amend its complaint to add factual allegations and clarify standing. The trial justice dismissed the complaint and quashed the lis pendens, finding that the allegations failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and did not establish standing. The motion to amend was denied as futile, as no enforceable contract was found.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether a binding contract existed under the statute of frauds and whether denial of the motion to amend was proper. The Supreme Court held that the unsigned purchase and sales agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds and no binding contract existed. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint, quashing of the lis pendens, and denial of the motion to amend. View "1100 North Main LLC v. Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Rebecca Eisenberg, a director of the Santa Clara Valley Water District, was permitted to review two confidential investigation reports at the District’s facility in January 2024. These reports, prepared by outside counsel, addressed allegations of misconduct by Eisenberg and complaints she raised against staff. The District explicitly instructed Board members not to remove the reports from the premises. Eisenberg nevertheless left the facility with the reports, later admitting her actions at Board meetings. After repeated requests for their return and a formal censure by the Board, Eisenberg refused to return the reports.The District filed suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting claims including conversion and seeking prejudgment recovery of the reports. It successfully moved for a writ of possession and a turnover order, which Eisenberg temporarily stayed by posting a statutory undertaking. The District then sought a mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the return of the reports. Eisenberg opposed this, arguing that the claim and delivery law’s remedy (the writ of possession, now stayed) precluded further injunctive relief and that the District did not meet the requirements for an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050 expressly permits a party to seek injunctive relief for possession of personal property, even after pursuing relief under the claim and delivery law. The court further found no abuse of discretion: the District demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on its conversion claim and showed that the harm to the District from denial of the injunction outweighed any harm to Eisenberg. The appellate court affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction, requiring Eisenberg to return the confidential reports. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are trustees who own a property in Kīhei, Maui, which they use as a vacation home for personal use. In 2021, Maui County reclassified their property as a “short-term rental” based solely on zoning, not actual use, resulting in a higher property tax rate. The plaintiffs paid the assessed taxes but did not utilize the administrative appeals process available through the Maui County Board of Review. Instead, they filed a class action in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, seeking a refund and alleging that the County’s collection of the higher taxes was unconstitutional, violated due process, and resulted in unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted the County’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 232 and Maui County Code chapter 3.48, the proper procedure for contesting real property tax assessments—including constitutional challenges—requires first appealing to the County Board of Review and, if necessary, then to the Tax Appeal Court. Because the plaintiffs bypassed these required steps and missed the statutory deadline to appeal, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Appeal Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding real property tax assessments, including those raising constitutional issues, and found that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred due to their failure to timely pursue the established administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Piezko v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

A restaurant operated by PFPCO.’s Noble Pie Parlor leased space in the El Cortez Hotel in Reno, Nevada, which was owned by El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC. After initially peaceful relations, the parties’ relationship deteriorated due to disputes over property maintenance and incidents such as a gas leak and a stolen camera. Tensions escalated when El Cortez locked Noble Pie out, resulting in litigation that ended largely in Noble Pie’s favor, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. Later, Noble Pie permanently closed its restaurant, prompting El Cortez to allege breach of the lease’s agreed-use provision and file a new complaint. Noble Pie moved to dismiss; the district court granted the motion but allowed El Cortez to amend its complaint. After further procedural exchanges, El Cortez filed an amended complaint, and Noble Pie again moved to dismiss.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, presided by Judge Egan K. Walker, reviewed El Cortez’s late opposition to the motion to dismiss and its request for an extension of time. El Cortez’s request, based on “professional courtesy,” was submitted just before the deadline. The district court denied the extension, finding no good cause for the delay and noting El Cortez’s pattern of tardiness in filings. The court treated El Cortez’s failure to timely oppose the motion as an admission under DCR 13(3), granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, denied leave to further amend, and awarded attorney fees to Noble Pie as the prevailing party under the lease.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension, granting the motion to dismiss, refusing leave to amend, and awarding attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or err in any of these rulings and affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural rules in litigation. View "El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO.'s Noble Pie Parlor" on Justia Law

Timothy Hale and Sonja Ringen constructed a storage building on their commercially zoned property in Laramie without first obtaining a building permit. When the City of Laramie discovered the construction, it issued a stop work order and a cease-and-desist letter. Despite these notices, Hale and Ringen continued building and subsequently applied for a permit, which the City denied due to deficiencies in the application. After further unsuccessful permit attempts and ongoing disputes over the City’s requirements—including requests for disassembly of the structure—the City sought and obtained a permanent injunction from the District Court of Albany County, restricting use of the building until permitting was complete and compliance was achieved.The District Court of Albany County conducted a bench trial in May 2022 and granted the City’s request for a permanent injunction. The court outlined a process for inspections, identification of code violations, and corrective actions, but continued conflict between the parties hindered progress. Multiple rounds of correspondence, inspections, and motions ensued, with the City insisting on structural disassembly and Hale/Ringen providing documentation to support their position. Hale and Ringen eventually moved to vacate the injunction, arguing it was no longer equitable given their efforts and the City’s refusal to issue a permit. The district court denied their motion, citing only the parties’ lack of agreement, and provided no substantive analysis of the evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the evidence and arguments presented before denying the motion to vacate or modify the injunction. The Supreme Court held that a court must exercise discretion and decide motions on their merits, rather than requiring agreement between adversarial parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for full consideration of Hale/Ringen’s motion in light of all relevant facts and equities. View "Hale v. City of Laramie" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a large tract of land in Cumberland County, North Carolina. In 1992 and 2006, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed official corridor maps under the Map Act, which imposed restrictions on portions of the plaintiff’s property, limiting development and affecting value. In 2002 and 2010, NCDOT initiated two direct condemnation actions to acquire parts of the plaintiff’s land—some of which overlapped with the previously restricted areas—resulting in two settlements and consent judgments. After the 2010 settlement, 28.041 acres of the plaintiff’s property remained subject to Map Act restrictions until the maps were repealed in 2016.Following the repeal and a 2016 North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, which held that Map Act restrictions constituted a taking, the plaintiff filed an inverse condemnation action in Cumberland County Superior Court in 2018. The plaintiff sought compensation specifically for the Map Act restrictions not addressed in prior settlements. The Superior Court dismissed some claims but allowed the action to proceed for the remaining 28.041 acres. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the Map Act restrictions were not barred and could proceed as an independent interest not covered by the earlier condemnation actions.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes, the plaintiff was required to raise claims related to the Map Act restrictions as part of the answer in NCDOT’s 2010 direct condemnation action, since those restrictions were pertinent to determining just compensation for the partial taking. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, he could not pursue a separate inverse condemnation claim for those restrictions under N.C.G.S. § 136-111. The Court’s disposition was to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law