Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
FLEUREME v. CITY OF ATLANTA
Roodson Fleureme alleged that he was injured when struck by a City of Atlanta vehicle driven by a city employee. Before filing a lawsuit, Fleureme sent several timely ante litem notices via Federal Express, including one addressed to "City of Atlanta Office of the Mayor" at the correct address of Atlanta City Hall. The notice inside the envelope was addressed to "City of Atlanta, Office of the Mayor" with the salutation "To Whom it May Concern." Fleureme later sued the City for negligence.The City moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Fleureme's ante litem notice did not comply with OCGA § 36-33-5 (f), which requires service on the mayor personally or by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the notice must be served on the mayor individually by name. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that strict compliance with the service requirement was necessary and that the notice addressed to the "Office of the Mayor" did not meet this standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory requirement to serve an ante litem notice on "the mayor" could be satisfied by mailing it to the correct address of the mayor's office, addressed to the "Office of the Mayor." The court held that such a notice does satisfy the service requirement. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to ensure that the governing authority of the municipality is aware of the claim, and addressing the notice to the office of the mayor at the correct address fulfills this purpose. The court also clarified that "strict compliance" with the statute does not necessitate a hyper-technical interpretation that would require the notice to be addressed to the mayor by name. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "FLEUREME v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Georgia
WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE
Bettie Leverette was shopping at a Walmart store in Conyers, Georgia, when two Walmart employees moving a 2,000-pound box on a pallet jack backed into her. Leverette initially reported no significant injury but later went to the hospital with head pain, blurred vision, and nausea. She was diagnosed with a mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Leverette sued Walmart, claiming her symptoms were caused by the employees' negligence. At trial, Leverette's family and expert witnesses testified about her injuries and the projected costs of her future care, estimated between $2 million and $3.5 million. Walmart argued that Leverette's symptoms were due to pre-existing conditions and presented expert testimony to support this.The trial court gave a jury instruction on nominal damages at Walmart's request. Walmart suggested in closing arguments that nominal damages could be as low as $10 or as high as $500 but should not be $3 million. Leverette's counsel argued for over $5 million in damages. The jury awarded Leverette $1 million in nominal damages, leaving other damage categories blank. Walmart moved for a new trial, arguing the award was excessive, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that nominal damages have no maximum limit.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the $1 million award exceeded the limits on nominal damages under Georgia law. The court concluded that nominal damages, as adopted from English common law, are intended to be a trivial sum, important for the fact of the award but not meaningful in amount. The court overruled the Court of Appeals' precedent allowing large nominal damages and vacated the judgment. The case was remanded for the lower courts to resolve case-specific issues, including whether the error was invited by Walmart and the appropriate remedy. View "WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE" on Justia Law
DATES v. CITY OF ATLANTA
Kierra Dates filed a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta after her minor son was injured by a falling tree branch on City property. Dates sent an initial ante litem notice to the City within the required time frame, claiming a nonspecific amount of loss. Over a year later, she sent a supplemental notice claiming a loss of $1,000,000. The trial court dismissed her complaint for failing to comply with the municipal ante litem notice statute, and Dates appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Dates's first notice was not specific enough and that her second notice was untimely. The court also ruled that the tolling provision for actions brought by minors did not apply to municipal ante litem notices.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the minor tolling provision applies to the municipal ante litem notice statute. The Court concluded that the tolling provision does not apply. The Court reasoned that the municipal ante litem notice statute is a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit, not a statute of limitations, and therefore is not subject to tolling under the minor tolling provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Dates's supplemental notice was untimely and not tolled by the minor tolling provision. View "DATES v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law
Arnold v. Alexander
Petitioner Deandre Arnold, an indigent pro se litigant, attempted to file a civil complaint with an affidavit of indigence through the Fulton County Superior Court’s mandatory e-filing system. His complaint was rejected because it lacked an order authorizing him to file using a waiver payment account. The Clerk’s office informed him that he needed to obtain an order authorizing indigent status by presenting the complaint in person before a superior court judge. Arnold, unable to travel the 25 miles to the Clerk’s office, argued that the Clerk’s policy violated OCGA § 9-15-2 and his constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after Arnold filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Clerk. Arnold contended that he had no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in the Supreme Court because he could not appear in person to present a writ of mandanus and affidavit of indigence, and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant the relief Arnold sought, as its authority to issue writs of mandamus is limited to matters related to its appellate jurisdiction. The Court determined that the case did not fall within its appellate jurisdiction and transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals has the authority to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction and will decide whether to require the Clerk to accept Arnold’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint by mail. View "Arnold v. Alexander" on Justia Law
LOVE v. MCKNIGHT
John McKnight filed a lawsuit against Anthony Love seeking damages from a vehicular accident. On November 13, 2019, both parties were driving on I-20 in DeKalb County when traffic slowed, and McKnight stopped his vehicle. Love, driving behind McKnight, failed to stop in time and collided with McKnight's vehicle. McKnight sustained injuries and his truck was damaged. Love was cited for following too closely and pleaded guilty to the offense. McKnight sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11, alleging that Love acted in bad faith by being distracted, possibly using his cell phone at the time of the accident.The trial court denied Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding bad faith. The evidence included Love's cell phone records and McKnight's testimony suggesting Love was distracted. The trial court also denied Love's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence per se but granted it on claims for punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness. Love did not challenge the negligence per se rulings, and McKnight's appeal on punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness was rejected by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. The Court held that mere violations of traffic laws do not constitute bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11. Bad faith requires intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard of known harmful consequences, which is more than mere negligence. The Court found insufficient evidence of bad faith to support a claim for litigation expenses and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of bad faith litigation expenses. View "LOVE v. MCKNIGHT" on Justia Law
WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE
In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law
OSKOUEI v. MATTHEWS
Dr. Armin Oskouei, owner of two medical facilities, filed a defamation lawsuit against defense attorney Zachary Matthews. Oskouei alleged that Matthews made defamatory statements suggesting that Oskouei performed illegal surgeries. Matthews moved to strike the lawsuit under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, which allows for the dismissal of claims that infringe on free speech when there is no probability of the plaintiff prevailing. The trial court denied Matthews’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Oskouei could not establish a probability of prevailing because he had not shown that Matthews acted with actual malice.The trial court found that Matthews’s statements arose from protected activity but concluded that Oskouei had a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. The court noted that a reasonable jury could infer that Matthews did not have a good faith basis for his statements. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Matthews’s statements were conditionally privileged and that Oskouei had not shown actual malice, as required to defeat the privilege.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to address whether a plaintiff must show actual malice to defeat a conditional privilege defense. The court concluded that the actual malice standard does not apply in such cases. Instead, under OCGA § 51-5-9, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used the privilege as a pretext for private malice, meaning the statement was made with ill will or intent to injure. The court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also overruled several other cases that had incorrectly applied the actual malice standard to conditional privilege defenses under Georgia law. View "OSKOUEI v. MATTHEWS" on Justia Law
NELSON v. STRICKLAND
Henry Strickland contested the results of a city commissioner election in Waycross, Georgia, after losing to Alvin Nelson. Strickland argued that the election used an outdated 2005 map of voting districts instead of the correct 2011 map, resulting in 32 voters casting ballots in the wrong districts. The trial court agreed, finding that the use of the 2005 map could have affected the election outcome, which Nelson won by 18 votes. Consequently, the court vacated the election and ordered a new one to be held in November 2024 using the 2011 map.The trial court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss Strickland's petition for insufficient process and service of process and rejected Nelson's argument that the petition should be dismissed for lack of expeditious pursuit. The court found irregularities in the election due to the use of the 2005 map and ordered a new election. Nelson appealed the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted his request for a stay pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court held that the 2011 map was never effective because the required filings with the Secretary of State and the clerk of the superior court, as mandated by OCGA § 36-35-5, were never made. Since the 2011 map was not effective at the time of the election, there was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that enough illegal or irregular votes were counted to change or cast doubt on the election outcome. Therefore, Strickland's petition was rejected, and the trial court's order vacating the election was reversed. View "NELSON v. STRICKLAND" on Justia Law
WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY
Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law
COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC.
The plaintiffs filed a premises liability suit against Waffle House, Inc. and WH Capital LLC in October 2019. In April 2021, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. In July 2021, the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice. In September 2021, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees, arguing that the plaintiffs dismissed their lawsuit to escape sanctions. The plaintiffs then filed a renewal action. In July 2022, the trial court awarded the defendants $101,082 in attorneys' fees in the dismissed case.The plaintiffs sought to appeal the attorneys' fees award by filing an application for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application, concluding that because the plaintiffs had filed a renewal action, the case remained pending below, making the fee award a non-final order. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to obtain a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals relied on the case Eidson v. Croutch in its analysis.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the renewal action was a new case, not a continuance of the dismissed case. Therefore, the dismissed case was no longer pending below. The court held that under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), the order awarding attorneys' fees was a final judgment, and no certificate of immediate review was required. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the discretionary application and remanded the case for consideration of that application. View "COOK-ROSE v. WAFFLE HOUSE INC." on Justia Law