Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Mark Hamilton, the former Chief of the Fire Department of Wilmer, Texas, was terminated after testifying at a probation revocation hearing for a former employee, Craig Lawrence, who had hidden recording devices in fire station bathrooms. Hamilton testified in uniform, drove a city car to the hearing, and did not take leave from work. He claimed his termination was in retaliation for his protected First Amendment activity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Hamilton's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court found that Hamilton did not state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, as his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. Hamilton appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hamilton did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, as his testimony was given pursuant to his official duties as Fire Chief. The court also found that even if Hamilton's speech were protected, the City of Wilmer had adequate justification for treating him differently from any other member of the public due to his use of city resources and uniform during his testimony. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hamilton's claims and denied his request for leave to amend his complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile. View "Hamilton v. City of Wilmer, Texas" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton rear-ended Caleb Crabtree, causing significant injuries. Cotton, insured by Allstate, faced potential liability exceeding his policy limit. Allstate allegedly refused to settle with Crabtree and failed to inform Cotton of the settlement negotiations or his potential liability, giving Cotton a potential bad-faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees sued Cotton, who declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the personal-injury action to proceed, resulting in a $4 million judgment for the Crabtrees, making them judgment creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. Cotton’s bad-faith claim was classified as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the Crabtrees to purchase Cotton’s bad-faith claim for $10,000, which they financed through Court Properties, Inc.The Crabtrees sued Allstate, asserting Cotton’s bad-faith claim. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the assignments of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties and then to the Crabtrees were champertous and void under Mississippi law. Consequently, the court found that the Crabtrees lacked Article III standing as they had not suffered any injury from Allstate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding the validity of the assignments under Mississippi’s champerty statute. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute prohibits a disinterested third party engaged by a bankruptcy creditor from purchasing a cause of action from a debtor’s estate. Based on this ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties was void, and thus, the Crabtrees did not possess Cotton’s bad-faith claim. Therefore, the Crabtrees lacked standing to sue Allstate, and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property" on Justia Law

In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

Dow Construction, L.L.C. leased property within a forced pooled drilling unit operated by BPX Operating Company. Dow received proceeds from the unit but disputed the deduction of post-production costs by BPX. Dow sought a judgment to recover these costs, while BPX sought dismissal and summary judgment on various grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that Dow had standing to sue and that the Louisiana doctrine of negotiorum gestio allowed operators to recover post-production costs. The court also ruled that the forced-pooling statute’s forfeiture provision included post-production costs and that claims under this statute were subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. BPX's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were partially granted and denied, leading to an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s interpretation that La. Rev. Stat. § 30:10(A)(3) applies to mineral interest owners unleased by the operator. However, it vacated the district court’s ruling that negotiorum gestio allows operators to recover post-production costs, following a Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Self v. BPX Operating Co. The court affirmed that post-production costs are included within the forfeiture provision of La. Rev. Stat. § 30:103.2. Finally, the court reversed the district court’s finding on the prescriptive period, holding that claims under § 30:103.2 are subject to a one-year prescriptive period, not ten years.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Dow Construction v. BPX Operating Co." on Justia Law

Anna Palova, a flight attendant for United Airlines since 1992, was terminated in February 2020 for allegedly engaging in "parking," a prohibited scheduling tactic. United Airlines claimed that Palova manipulated flight assignments, violating the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Palova, however, argued that her termination was due to age discrimination, as she and two other older flight attendants were fired while younger attendants who committed similar infractions were not.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines. The court concluded that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) precluded Palova's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim and preempted her Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) claim. The court reasoned that resolving Palova's claims would require interpreting the CBA, which falls outside the court's jurisdiction under the RLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the RLA does not preclude or preempt Palova's age discrimination claims. The court found that Palova's claims of age discrimination were independent of the CBA and did not require its interpretation. The court noted that while the CBA might be referenced, it was not dispositive of the discrimination claims. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Palova v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

Raymond Vuoncino, a corporate-finance professional, worked for U.S. Pipe Fabrication, LLC (Fabrication). After Fabrication implemented new accounting practices for inter-company sales, Vuoncino objected to these practices as potentially fraudulent. Subsequently, he was fired by an executive of Fabrication’s parent company, Forterra, Inc. Vuoncino sued Fabrication, Forterra, and two Forterra executives, alleging violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s anti-retaliation provision.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Vuoncino’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint, and denied reconsideration of those orders. Vuoncino appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Vuoncino’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, finding the proposed amendments were time-barred and did not relate back to the original complaint. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of reconsideration, noting that Vuoncino’s motion rehashed previously rejected arguments and did not present newly discovered evidence.However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claim against Fabrication, concluding that Vuoncino’s first amended complaint plausibly alleged that Fabrication employed him. The court found that Vuoncino’s allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to raise a plausible inference that he was a Fabrication employee. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claims against Forterra, Bradley, and Kerfin, as Vuoncino failed to sufficiently plead that these defendants were his employer’s alter ego or that he could sue Forterra directly without establishing an employment relationship.The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vuoncino v. Forterra" on Justia Law

Karen Orr tripped on a soft drink display at a Dollar General store in Ackerman, Mississippi, and subsequently fell. After Orr's death, Sandie Keister, on behalf of Orr's estate, sued Dolgencorp for premises-liability negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. During discovery, Dolgencorp failed to produce security camera footage, data from the store’s daily planner, and safety-check data. The district court found that Dolgencorp lost or could not access this evidence. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and Keister also filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for Dolgencorp on all claims and denied Keister’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions. Keister appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Dolgencorp on her premises liability claim and in denying her motion for sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the decision. The court held that Keister failed to provide evidence that Dolgencorp breached its duty to warn Orr of the dangerous condition. Keister's arguments, including the mode-of-operation theory and the duration of the dangerous condition, were insufficient to establish Dolgencorp's liability. The court also affirmed the denial of Keister’s motion for sanctions, finding no evidence that Dolgencorp intended to deprive her of the missing evidence and noting that the request for a jury instruction became moot after summary judgment was granted.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Keister v. Dolgencorp" on Justia Law

AllService Plumbing and Maintenance, Inc. is a small, family-owned plumbing company in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In 2009, a union organizer named Charles LeBlanc began efforts to unionize AllService’s workforce. An employee, Joe Lungrin, opposed the unionization and informed the company’s Vice President, Luke Hall, about LeBlanc’s activities. The union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hold an election among AllService’s employees. After agreeing on an election date, AllService laid off three employees. The union lost the election, and subsequently filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging that AllService violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by surveilling, threatening, and interrogating employees, and by laying off employees due to their union activities.An NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in 2011 that AllService violated the NLRA and ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off employees with backpay. AllService did not file timely exceptions, and the NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings in 2012. A second ALJ calculated damages in 2013, and the NLRB ordered AllService to pay over $100,000. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning in 2014 invalidated the NLRB’s quorum, leading the Board to set aside its decision and dismiss its enforcement petition.In 2022, the NLRB issued a notice to show cause for re-adopting the 2013 ALJ decision, blaming administrative oversight for the delay. AllService objected, citing significant business losses due to floods in 2016 and 2021. The NLRB ignored these objections and adopted the 2013 decision. The NLRB then applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for summary enforcement of its 2022 order.The Fifth Circuit denied the NLRB’s request for summary enforcement, finding that the Board failed to prove that enforcement would be equitable. The court held that the Board’s delay and administrative neglect were extraordinary circumstances excusing AllService’s failure to exhaust specific objections. The court also granted AllService’s petition for review, finding that the Board lacked substantial evidence to attribute Lungrin’s activities to AllService and to find that the pre-election layoffs were related to union activity. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Allservice Plumbing" on Justia Law

John Bludworth Shipyard, L.L.C. (JBS) performed nearly $3 million in services to combine three vessels into a single dredging unit for a project along the Gulf Coast. The vessels involved were the Captain Frank Bechtolt, the CIT-103, and the Idler Barge. T.W. LaQuay Marine, L.L.C., which owned the Idler Barge and leased the other two vessels, requested the work without the knowledge or consent of the owners, Manson Construction Company and Caillou Island Towing Company, Inc. JBS asserted maritime liens on each vessel for the services provided.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied JBS’s motion for interlocutory sale of the three-vessel unit and JBS’s motion for summary judgment to confirm the validity of its maritime liens. The court granted Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103, finding that JBS did not provide necessaries to the CIT-103 and that there were fact issues regarding the Bechtolt and the Idler Barge. The district court focused on the CIT-103’s old function, disregarding any new function that JBS’s work might have equipped it to perform.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by considering only the CIT-103’s former function and not its new function after the alterations. The appellate court vacated the district court’s grant of Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103 and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether JBS’s work constituted necessaries for the CIT-103’s new function. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the remainder of JBS’s appeal challenging the denial of its motions for summary judgment and interlocutory sale. View "Bludworth v. Manson Construction" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over a class of underground carbon sequestration wells. Three environmental organizations, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and Alliance for Affordable Energy, petitioned for review of the final rule granting that authorization, arguing that the rule would harm their interests.The petitioners claimed that the EPA's approval would force them to reallocate resources from their usual activities to oppose the Class VI well program. They also argued that the program would lead to increased energy costs, health risks, and environmental damage. The organizations asserted both organizational and associational standing, with Deep South claiming direct injury to its operations and Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy claiming injury on behalf of their members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the petition, finding that all three organizations lacked standing. The court held that Deep South's claimed injuries were not cognizable under Article III because they were self-inflicted and amounted to a setback to abstract social interests. The court also found that Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy's alleged injuries were too speculative and attenuated to meet the requirements of imminence and traceability. The court emphasized that the petitioners' theories of injury relied on a chain of speculative events that were not certainly impending.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that was fairly traceable to the EPA's action and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Therefore, the petitions for review were dismissed. View "Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law