Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves multiple plaintiffs who sued Khalifa Hifter under the federal Torture Victim Protection Act for his actions as the commander of the Libyan National Army. The plaintiffs sought to hold Hifter liable for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings of their family members in Libya. The lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia over a 15-month period.In the district court, Hifter moved to dismiss the first two cases, and the court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. Hifter later moved to dismiss the third case, and the court again granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court eventually consolidated all three cases for discovery and pretrial matters. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all three suits with prejudice, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over Hifter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Hifter’s cross appeals in Nos. 24-1425, 24-1427, and 24-1429, as they merely sought affirmance of the district court’s judgments on alternative grounds. In Nos. 24-1422 and 24-1426, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, finding that Hifter waived his personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely assert it in his pre-answer motions. The cases were remanded for further proceedings.In No. 24-1423, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hifter properly raised a personal jurisdiction defense and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment due to the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to state that the dismissal is without prejudice. View "al-Suyid v. Hifter" on Justia Law

Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law

A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Cuban government seized Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, two privately held Cuban banks, and absorbed their assets into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). Decades later, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue any person trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the assets of Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, brought a Helms-Burton action against Société Générale and BNP Paribas, alleging that the banks trafficked in their confiscated property by providing financial services to BNC.The plaintiffs initially filed their suits in the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York. The district courts dismissed the complaints, holding that most of the allegations were time-barred under 22 U.S.C. § 6084, which they construed as a statute of repose. The courts also found that the remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. However, it affirmed the district courts' rulings that 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling, and that the presidential suspensions of the right to bring an action under the Act did not toll the time bar. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of conduct after 2010 were insufficient to state a plausible claim of trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, dismissing the plaintiffs' actions. View "Moreira v. Société Générale,S.A." on Justia Law

North American Sugar Industries, Inc. ("North American Sugar") filed a lawsuit against five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, alleging that the defendants unlawfully trafficked its property, which was confiscated by the Cuban government. The defendants include three East Asian corporations (Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd., and BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.), and two U.S. corporations (DSV Air & Sea, Inc. and BBC Chartering USA, LLC). North American Sugar claimed that the defendants participated in a conspiracy involving trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation. The magistrate judge found that the alleged trafficking occurred in Cuba, not Florida, and that none of the defendants engaged in any activity in Florida related to the shipments. North American Sugar objected, but the district court upheld the recommendation, concluding that the Helms-Burton Act violations occurred only in Cuba.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its narrow interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. The Act broadly defines "traffics" to include various activities, and the court noted that trafficking can occur outside of Cuba. The appellate court also found that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing, as required under the prima facie standard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider personal jurisdiction in light of the correct interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act and to address whether any defendants committed trafficking activities in Florida. The court also directed the district court to consider the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction if it finds jurisdiction over any defendant. View "North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, P.C. ("LegalForce USA"), a California S corporation operating legal services websites, sued LegalForce, Inc. ("LegalForce Japan"), a Japanese corporation providing legal software services, for trademark infringement. LegalForce USA alleged that LegalForce Japan's U.S. expansion plans, website ownership, and advertising and selling of equity infringed its trademark. The district court dismissed the website claims for lack of jurisdiction and the expansion plan claims as unripe. The claims concerning equity were dismissed for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed all claims except those related to the advertising and selling of equity. The court held that it had jurisdiction over these claims but dismissed them for failure to state a claim, reasoning that advertising and selling equity is not connected to the sale of goods or services and thus cannot constitute trademark infringement. The court also found that LegalForce USA failed to justify an extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that using a trademark in connection with the sale of equity does not constitute using the mark in connection with "goods or services" under the Lanham Act. The court also affirmed that LegalForce Japan's services in Japan could not satisfy the "in connection with" goods or services requirement under the Lanham Act, as the relevant conduct occurred outside U.S. territory. The court concluded that the Lanham Act does not apply extraterritorially in this context. View "LEGALFORCE RAPC WORLDWIDE, PC V. LEGALFORCE, INC." on Justia Law

Sysco Machinery Corp. ("Sysco"), a Taiwanese company, sued two other Taiwanese companies, Cymtek Solutions, Inc. ("Cymtek") and Cymmetrik Enterprise Co. Ltd. ("Cymmetrik"), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Sysco alleged that Cymtek and Cymmetrik infringed its copyrights and misappropriated its trade secrets related to a rotary die-cutting machine developed in Taiwan. The alleged infringing activities occurred in Taiwan, but Sysco claimed that the effects of these activities extended to the United States.Sysco initially pursued legal action in Taiwan's Intellectual Property and Commercial Court (IPCC) and obtained a preliminary injunction against Cymtek and its employees. However, the proceedings in Taiwan are ongoing. Sysco then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which it voluntarily dismissed. Subsequently, Sysco filed the current lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts, asserting claims of trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive acts, and tortious interference.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, concluding that Taiwan was a more appropriate forum for the dispute. Sysco appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Taiwan was an adequate alternative forum, as it could exercise jurisdiction over the parties and provide sufficient remedies for the alleged intellectual property violations. The court also found that the private and public interest factors favored litigation in Taiwan, given that the majority of evidence and witnesses were located there, and the alleged infringing activities primarily occurred in Taiwan. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. View "Sysco Machinery Corp. v. Cymtek Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of American service members and their families affected by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, sought to enforce multi-billion-dollar judgments against Iran. They aimed to obtain $1.68 billion held in an account with Clearstream Banking, a Luxembourg-based financial institution, representing bond investments made in New York on behalf of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Clearstream and Bank Markazi to turn over the account contents. Clearstream and Bank Markazi appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ turnover claim against Bank Markazi. However, it determined that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream. The court also found that Clearstream’s challenge to the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which makes certain assets available to satisfy judgments against Iran, failed. Despite this, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without applying state law to determine the ownership of the assets.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order and judgment. It remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine whether Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and to apply state law to ascertain the parties' interests in the assets before applying 22 U.S.C. § 8772. View "Peterson v. Bank Markazi" on Justia Law

In 2010, four individuals sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, resulting in a default judgment of $318 million against FARC. Unable to collect from FARC, the plaintiffs sought to garnish assets of Samark José López Bello and his companies, alleging they were agents or instrumentalities of FARC. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, mandating a jury trial to determine the agency status of López and his companies.On remand, the district court scheduled a jury trial and allowed discovery. The plaintiffs sought to depose López and requested documents. López and his companies filed motions for protective orders to avoid discovery, which the district court denied, warning of sanctions for non-compliance. López failed to appear for his deposition and did not comply with document requests. Consequently, the district court entered default judgments against López and his companies, citing willful disobedience and the inability to compel compliance due to López's fugitive status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's entry of default judgments, finding no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly interpreted its scheduling order to allow discovery and found that López's failure to comply with discovery orders was willful. The court also determined that less severe sanctions would not ensure compliance, given López's fugitive status. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to an appeal of the protective order denials, as those orders were not final or immediately appealable. View "Stansell v. Lopez Bello" on Justia Law