Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a university in Nebraska instituted a policy requiring all students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by a specified deadline, with the only exemptions allowed for medical reasons or until a vaccine received full FDA approval. Religious exemptions were not permitted. Students who failed to comply were unenrolled and barred from campus, and some had holds placed on their accounts, preventing access to transcripts. One student complied with the mandate but suffered adverse effects and was medically exempted from further doses. Another student withdrew voluntarily before the deadline.After the university enforced the mandate, several students sought injunctive relief in the District Court for Douglas County to prevent their unenrollment, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court denied relief, finding that any contract included the Emergency Use Authorization waiver agreements and that the students breached the contract by not being vaccinated after FDA approval. An initial appeal was dismissed by the Nebraska Supreme Court for lack of a final, appealable order. The students then consolidated their actions and filed an operative complaint alleging breach of implied contract, denial of due process, conversion, negligence, and violations of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (NCPA). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied leave to amend.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and found that the students plausibly alleged claims for breach of an implied contract and conversion, based on the university’s unilateral modification of conditions mid-semester and the withholding of transcripts. The court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence and NCPA claims, finding them preempted by the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, and held that the due process claim was abandoned on appeal. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the breach of contract and conversion claims. View "Ramaekers v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

Epic Games, a developer and operator of the Epic Games Store, sued Apple over its App Store practices, alleging violations of federal and California competition law. The dispute centered on Apple’s rules requiring developers to use Apple’s in-app payment system, which imposed a 30% commission, and its prohibition of developers directing users to other purchasing options outside the App Store. After a bench trial, the district court found Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by preventing informed consumer choice but upheld Apple’s in-app payment system requirement for digital goods. The court issued an injunction barring Apple from restricting developers from including in their apps buttons, links, or other calls to action that direct users to alternative purchasing mechanisms.Following the injunction, Apple implemented a compliance plan involving a 27% commission on linked-out purchases and a series of restrictions on how developers could present external payment options, including limitations on button design, link placement, and user flow. Epic contested Apple’s compliance, arguing these measures still effectively prohibited alternative purchases. After holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply with the injunction, citing Apple’s bad faith and pretextual justifications. The district court imposed broad sanctions, including prohibiting any commission on linked-out purchases, restricting Apple’s ability to limit external links, and referring Apple for criminal investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s contempt findings and most of the resulting sanctions but found portions of the sanctions—particularly the blanket ban on commissions—overbroad and more punitive than coercive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded those parts for further tailoring, clarified the scope of permissible developer link prominence, and declined to vacate the injunction or reassign the case. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s orders. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Two individuals brought their dogs to a veterinary clinic for treatment. Dissatisfied with the care provided, both posted negative reviews on social media, detailing their experiences and criticizing the clinic’s practices. These posts were shared on multiple community Facebook pages and received significant engagement from the local community, including comments from others about the clinic. After the posters refused the clinic’s request to remove the reviews, the clinic filed a lawsuit for defamation per se against both individuals, alleging numerous defamatory statements.In the District Court for El Paso County, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their posts were protected as speech on a public issue. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements concerned a private business dispute and did not address matters of public interest. The court also found that, even if the statute applied, the clinic had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its claims. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the posts provided consumer information relevant to the public but concluded they did not contribute to a broader public discussion, largely because they were motivated by personal animosity and aimed to harm the clinic’s business.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court held that courts must use a two-step test to determine if speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: first, whether an objective observer could reasonably understand the speech, in context, to be made in connection with a public issue or interest; and second, whether the speech contributed to public discussion of that issue. The court further held that the speaker’s motive is irrelevant to this analysis. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter was remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr." on Justia Law

A group of homeowners, all over the age of 65, entered into contracts for energy efficiency improvements to their homes under California's Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. This program allows local governments to offer financing for such improvements, with repayment made through voluntary special assessments added to the homeowners’ property tax bills. Most local governments contracted private companies to administer these PACE loans. The homeowners alleged that these private administrators failed to comply with consumer protection and lending laws applicable to consumer lenders, such as providing required warnings and avoiding prohibited security interests. They filed suit under the Unfair Competition Law, seeking injunctive relief and restitution, including the return of assessment monies paid and prohibitions on future collection of delinquent assessments unless the assessments were removed from their properties.The San Diego County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrers, concluding that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative tax remedies before pursuing their claims in court. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that because PACE assessments are collected as part of property taxes and the relief sought would invalidate those assessments, plaintiffs first needed to pay the assessments and seek administrative relief through the established tax refund procedures.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether plaintiffs were required to follow statutory procedures for challenging taxes. The court held that when plaintiffs’ claims effectively seek to invalidate PACE assessments or prevent their future collection, they must first pay the assessments and pursue administrative tax remedies. However, the court also held that plaintiffs are not required to use tax challenge procedures for claims that do not directly or indirectly challenge a tax, such as those solely addressing the administration of the PACE program. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded to consider whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaints to state only non-tax-related claims. View "Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

A homebuyer entered into an agreement to purchase a property in Titusville, Pennsylvania, and, before completing the purchase, orally contracted with a home inspector to perform an inspection. The inspector delivered a report that did not disclose any structural or foundational issues. Relying on this report, the buyer purchased the property. The following winter, a burst pipe led to the discovery of significant defects, including the absence of a proper foundation and improper ductwork, which had not been disclosed in the inspection report. The buyer filed suit against the inspector more than two years after the report was delivered, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law, breach of contract, and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.The Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County overruled most of the inspector’s preliminary objections and denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding ambiguity in the statute governing the time to bring actions arising from home inspection reports. The trial court reasoned that the statute could be interpreted as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose and declined to grant judgment for the inspector. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the statute in question was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and that all of the buyer’s claims were time-barred because they were filed more than one year after the inspection report was delivered.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the relevant statutory provision, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512, is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. The Court held that the statute is a statute of repose, barring any action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report if not commenced within one year of the report’s delivery, regardless of when the claim accrues. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Gidor v. Mangus" on Justia Law

Carol Rose, a prominent figure in the American Quarter Horse industry, entered into a series of agreements with Lori and Philip Aaron in 2013. The Aarons agreed to purchase a group of Rose’s horses at an auction, lease her Gainesville Ranch with an option to buy, and employ her as a consultant. The relationship quickly soured after the auction, with both sides accusing each other of breaches. Rose locked the Aarons out of the ranch and asserted a stable keeper’s lien for charges exceeding those related to the care of the Aarons’ horses. The Aarons paid the demanded sum and removed their horses. Litigation ensued, including claims by Jay McLaughlin, Rose’s former trainer, for damages related to the value of two fillies.The bankruptcy filings by Rose and her company led to the removal of the ongoing state-court litigation to the United States Bankruptcy Court. After trial, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Aarons on their breach of contract and Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) claims, awarding damages and attorneys’ fees, and in favor of McLaughlin on his claim. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reversed the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Aarons’ claims and McLaughlin’s claim, vacating the damages and fee awards.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal of the damages award for the Aarons’ breach of contract claim, holding that the Aarons failed to prove damages under any recognized Texas law measure. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the TTLA claim, holding that Rose’s threat to retain the Aarons’ horses for more than the lawful amount could constitute coercion under the TTLA, and remanded for further fact finding on intent and causation. The court also reversed and remanded the judgment regarding McLaughlin’s claim, finding his damages testimony legally insufficient. The court left the issue of attorneys’ fees for further proceedings. View "Rose v. Equis Equine" on Justia Law

Ajay Thakore, a resident of La Jolla, California, and owner of Gopher Media LLC, a digital marketing agency, became involved in a dispute with Andrew Melone and American Pizza Manufacturing (APM), a local “take-n-bake” restaurant. The conflict began after the City of San Diego converted parking spaces outside APM to 15-minute zones. Thakore, who frequented nearby businesses and allegedly had a financial stake in a competitor, was accused of parking for extended periods and initiating contentious exchanges. Thakore and Gopher Media sued Melone and APM in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging harassment, discrimination, and unfair competition. Melone and APM counterclaimed, alleging defamation, trade libel, and unfair business practices, including claims that Thakore and Gopher Media orchestrated negative online reviews and made false statements on social media.In response to the countercomplaint, Thakore and Gopher Media filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16), arguing that the alleged conduct constituted protected speech on a public issue. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Thakore and Gopher Media then sought an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under the collateral order doctrine. The court held that such denials do not resolve issues completely separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior decision in Batzel v. Smith, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case. View "GOPHER MEDIA LLC V. MELONE" on Justia Law

The case involved two related companies and three individuals who operated a business targeting immigrants detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and eligible for release on immigration bonds. The companies marketed their services as an affordable way to secure release, but in reality, they charged high fees for services that were often misrepresented or not provided. The agreements were complex, mostly in English, and required significant upfront and recurring payments. Most consumers did not understand the terms and relied on the companies’ oral representations, which were deceptive. The business was not licensed as a bail bond agent or surety, and the defendants’ practices violated federal and state consumer protection laws.After the plaintiffs—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia—filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the defendants repeatedly failed to comply with discovery obligations and court orders. They did not produce required documents, ignored deadlines, and failed to appear at hearings. The district court, after multiple warnings and opportunities to comply, imposed default judgment as a sanction for this misconduct. The court also excluded the defendants’ late-disclosed witnesses and exhibits from the remedies hearing, finding the nondisclosures unjustified and prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that the default judgment was an appropriate sanction for the defendants’ repeated and willful noncompliance. The exclusion of evidence and witnesses was also upheld, as was the issuance of a permanent injunction and the calculation of monetary relief, including restitution and civil penalties totaling approximately $366.5 million. The court found no abuse of discretion or legal error in the district court’s rulings and affirmed the final judgment in all respects. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of New York brought suit in New York state court against several major oil companies and the American Petroleum Institute, alleging violations of New York’s consumer protection laws through deceptive advertising about the environmental impact of fossil fuels. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting multiple grounds for federal jurisdiction. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of a similar case, Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.After the Second Circuit affirmed the remand in the Connecticut case, the district court in New York lifted the stay and allowed the parties to re-brief the remand motion in light of the new precedent. The City renewed its motion to remand and requested attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The oil companies continued to oppose remand, pressing several arguments that had already been rejected by numerous federal courts, including the Second Circuit in the Connecticut case. The district court granted the motion to remand and awarded the City attorneys’ fees and costs, but only for work related to five of the six grounds for removal, and only for work performed after the Connecticut decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed only the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs for the objectively unreasonable grounds for removal pressed after the legal landscape had shifted. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the award was justified under the “unusual circumstances” exception recognized in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. View "The City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law