Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Republic Technologies (NA), LLC and Republic Tobacco, L.P. manufacture and market OCB brand organic hemp rolling papers, while defendant BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP (HBI) markets RAW brand rolling papers. Republic sued HBI in 2016 for a declaration that OCB’s trade dress did not infringe RAW’s trade dress and later added false advertising claims. HBI counterclaimed, alleging that OCB’s trade dress infringed RAW’s trade dress. A jury trial in 2021 resulted in a mixed verdict, and the district court issued a permanent injunction against some of HBI’s advertising practices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found HBI liable under Illinois law for false advertising but not under the federal Lanham Act. The jury also found that OCB’s trade dress for its 99-cent promotional pack infringed RAW’s trade dress, but not the full-priced pack. Republic’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s question about the definition of “consumer” and in denying Republic’s motion for a new trial. The court also upheld the jury’s finding of trade dress infringement, noting that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, rejecting HBI’s arguments that the injunction was vague, overbroad, and improperly applied nationwide. The court concluded that the injunction was appropriately tailored to provide complete relief to Republic. View "Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP" on Justia Law

David O’Connell filed a class action lawsuit against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for fraudulent solicitation of donations. O’Connell alleged that USCCB misled donors about the use of funds collected through the Peter’s Pence Collection, which were purportedly for emergency assistance but were instead used for investments and other purposes. O’Connell claimed that if he had known the true use of the funds, he would not have donated.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied USCCB’s motion to dismiss the case, which was based on the church autonomy doctrine. The District Court found that O’Connell’s claims raised a secular dispute that could be resolved using neutral principles of law, without delving into religious doctrine. The court emphasized that it would not address purely religious questions if they arose during litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed USCCB’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the collateral order doctrine did not apply. The court held that the church autonomy defense could be adequately reviewed on appeal after a final judgment, and that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not conclusive or separate from the merits of the case. The court emphasized that the church autonomy doctrine does not provide immunity from suit but serves as a defense to liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "O'Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff AirDoctor, LLC, sells air purifiers and replacement air filters, while Defendant Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., sells replacement air filters primarily through Amazon.com. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely advertised its air filters as compatible with Plaintiff’s air purifiers and offering equivalent filtration, which diverted sales from Plaintiff and harmed its reputation. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Lanham Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law, seeking various forms of relief, including actual damages to be determined at trial, attorney’s fees, and an injunction.The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Defendant failed to appear or respond. However, the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for actual damages, reasoning that awarding damages would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Complaint did not specify an amount of damages sought. The district court also denied attorney’s fees based on its local rules, which tied fees to the amount of damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Rule 54(c) does not prohibit awarding actual damages in a default judgment when the pleadings sought such damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The court referenced its decision in Henry v. Sneiders, which allowed for damages to be awarded even if the exact amount was not specified in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of damages and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd" on Justia Law

Barrie Myers was seriously injured in an automobile crash shortly after midnight on November 30, 2018. Nasar Khan, who had been drinking at Cadot Restaurant in Dallas, rear-ended Myers’s vehicle. Khan’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.139, well above the legal limit. The record, however, leaves many facts about the evening unclear, including how much alcohol Khan consumed and how long he was at the restaurant and Jones’s home before the crash.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cadot Restaurant, concluding that Myers produced no evidence to establish that it was apparent to Cadot that Khan was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger when served. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed, holding that a fact issue existed based on Khan’s deposition concessions about his appearance and demeanor at Cadot.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court. The court held that the evidence presented by Myers required impermissible inferences upon inferences to establish how Khan may have appeared when served. The court emphasized that the Texas Dram Shop Act requires proof that it was apparent to the provider that the customer was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including Khan’s BAC and expert testimony, was insufficient to establish this fact. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers’s motion for continuance. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Cadot. View "Raoger Corp. v. Myers" on Justia Law

Kenneth Tilley sought financing from Malvern National Bank (MNB) for a real estate development project in 2009 and 2010, totaling $350,000. Tilley claimed MNB engaged in unfair dealings and sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), tortious interference, negligence, and fraud. The case has been appealed multiple times, with the Arkansas Supreme Court previously reversing decisions related to Tilley's right to a jury trial.Initially, the Garland County Circuit Court struck Tilley's jury demand, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. After remand, the circuit court reinstated a bench trial verdict, citing Act 13 of 2018, which was again reversed by the Supreme Court. On the third remand, MNB moved for summary judgment on all claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, citing Tilley's reduction of collateral as a material alteration of the agreement, a rationale not argued by MNB. Tilley appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not violate the mandate by considering summary judgment. However, it was reversible error for the circuit court to grant summary judgment based on an unargued rationale. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on Tilley's ADTPA, tortious interference, and negligence claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. However, it reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Tilley's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims, determining that there were disputed material facts that required a jury trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tilley v. Malvern National Bank" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are independent distributors for Nu Skin Enterprises Inc., and the defendants, which include Nu Skin and its affiliates. The plaintiffs allege that Nu Skin operates an unlawful pyramid scheme, making it difficult for distributors to profit from product sales alone, and instead requiring them to recruit new distributors to earn money. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Spokane County Superior Court, asserting claims under various state and federal laws.In the lower courts, Nu Skin filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue based on a forum-selection clause in the parties' contract, which designated Utah as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. The Spokane County Superior Court denied Nu Skin's motion, ruling that the case did not fall within the contractual definition of a "Dispute" and that Spokane County was a proper venue. Nu Skin sought reconsideration, which was also denied, and then moved for discretionary review.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed whether CR 12(b)(3) is the correct procedural mechanism to enforce a contractual forum-selection clause designating a non-Washington forum. The court held that CR 12(b)(3) is not the appropriate procedure for such enforcement. The court reasoned that the plain language of CR 12(b)(3) authorizes dismissal only when venue is "improper" according to Washington's venue statutes and court rules, which do not account for contractual forum-selection clauses. Therefore, a forum-selection clause cannot render a statutorily authorized venue "improper" under CR 12(b)(3). The court affirmed the denial of Nu Skin's motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Raab v. Nu Skin Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Lisa and Peter Woodward incurred a debt of $2,214.44 for their child's dental care, which was placed with Credit Service International Corporation (CSIC) for collection. CSIC filed a claim in conciliation court, but the Woodwards did not receive notice as the summons was sent to their previous address. CSIC obtained a default judgment and attempted to garnish the Woodwards' wages. The Woodwards hired attorney Kevin Giebel, who filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Minnesota garnishment laws and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). CSIC and Muske removed the case to federal court and offered a judgment of $2,002.00 plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which the Woodwards accepted.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Woodwards' motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $12,075.00 out of the $29,139.00 sought. The court used the lodestar method to determine the reasonable fee, concluding that $350 per hour was appropriate and that only 34.5 of the 72.4 hours claimed were reasonable. The Woodwards requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, stating that the request did not meet the standard for reconsideration and merely reargued previously considered matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no merit in the Woodwards' arguments regarding the denial of their initial motion for attorney’s fees, the reduction of the hourly rate, and the number of hours deemed reasonable. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings and that the fee award was appropriate given the circumstances of the case. View "Woodward v. Credit Service Intl. Corp." on Justia Law

Valerie Thomas received a notice claiming she owed $187, which she disputed. Resurgent Capital Services notified TransUnion about the debt before opening Thomas's letter and reported the dispute 29 days later. Thomas sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, seeking statutory damages for the delay. A jury awarded her $250. The clerk delayed entering the judgment, which was eventually entered on June 11, 2024. Resurgent filed a notice of appeal four days earlier, narrowly avoiding missing the appeal deadline.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Resurgent should have notified TransUnion earlier. Resurgent appealed, arguing that Thomas lacked standing because the delay did not injure her. District Judge Bucklo initially ruled that Thomas was injured as a matter of law, referencing Ewing v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, which treated the absence of a dispute notice as defamation. However, the court noted that injury must be proven and not assumed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Thomas did not provide evidence of injury before or during the trial. She did not attempt to show that her credit score or insurance costs were affected by the delay. Judge Bucklo had precluded Thomas from introducing evidence of actual injury, and Thomas did not challenge this ruling or seek a new trial. The appellate court held that Thomas lacked standing to sue due to the absence of evidence showing injury. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. View "Thomas v LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law