Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Ma Shun Bell, who filed a lawsuit against the law firm Friedman, Framme & Thrush (FFT), formerly known as Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, alleging unfair trade practices and abuse of process. Bell claimed that FFT, representing First Investors Servicing Corporation (FISC), pursued a deficiency debt from her despite knowing it was not lawfully recoverable due to procedural defects in the vehicle repossession process.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Bell's second amended complaint was dismissed. The court ruled that the complaint failed to allege the elements of a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) violation, that FFT was immune from suit under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) and the D.C. Automobile Financing and Repossession Act (AFRA) due to its role as litigation attorneys, and that the complaint did not articulate how FFT’s conduct violated the Debt Collection Law (DCL). Additionally, the court found that Bell’s claims were barred by res judicata based on a Small Claims Court judgment in favor of FISC, with which FFT was found to be in privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that Bell’s DCL cause of action could proceed, but her other causes of action were properly dismissed. The court held that the Superior Court erred in finding privity between FFT and FISC solely based on their attorney-client relationship and a contingency-fee arrangement. The court determined that the DCL claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and that Bell had sufficiently alleged that FFT misrepresented the amount of the debt and charged excessive fees. The court affirmed the dismissal of the UCC, CPPA, and abuse of process claims but reversed the dismissal of the DCL claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Khalilah Suluki alleged that her mother, Khadijah Suluki, committed identity theft by opening several credit card accounts in her name without permission, including an account with Credit One Bank, N.A. Upon discovering the alleged fraud, Suluki disputed the account with Credit One and the three major national credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Credit One investigated the dispute multiple times and concluded that the account was legitimate and belonged to Suluki. Suluki filed suit, claiming that Credit One violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into her dispute.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Credit One. The court concluded that, regardless of the reasonableness of Credit One's investigation, no reasonable investigation required by the statute would have yielded a different result. The court also found that Suluki did not present any triable issues of fact regarding whether Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA to be liable for damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accuracy of the information reported and the reasonableness of Credit One's investigations. However, it concluded that no reasonable investigation would have led Credit One to determine that the account was fraudulent or that the information was unverifiable. The court also determined that Suluki could not recover damages because she did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA" on Justia Law

In 2007, Osman Yunus Guracar took out a private student loan from Bank of America but stopped making payments in 2009. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased the loan and sued Guracar for non-payment in 2022. Guracar filed cross-claims against SLS and others, alleging violations of state and federal debt collection statutes. The cross-defendants moved to strike the cross-claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.The Santa Clara County Superior Court ruled that Guracar's cross-claims arose from protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that Guracar failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claims, holding that the loan was an installment debt and that SLS had timely accelerated the loan in June 2022. The court did not address Guracar's argument that the loan had been accelerated in February 2010.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Guracar had standing to assert his claims under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA without showing concrete harm. On the merits, the court found that Guracar established a probability of prevailing on his cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt, making false and misleading representations, and failing to comply with certain PSLCRA requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, reinstating these cross-claims but affirmed the striking of Guracar’s other cross-claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions" on Justia Law

Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law

Bernadette O’Malley purchased a used 2007 Dodge Caliber from Valpo Motors, Inc. in late 2019. Valpo provided O’Malley with a Buyers Guide stating the car was sold “AS IS” and a Sales Agreement that disclaimed all warranties unless a written warranty or service contract was extended within 90 days. O’Malley also purchased a Service Contract, which was noted in the Buyers Guide. The car broke down a month later, and a repair shop deemed it not worth repairing due to extensive mechanical issues. O’Malley’s son-in-law, Glenn Thomas, took the car to the shop. After Valpo refused to arbitrate, O’Malley sued for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). O’Malley passed away during the proceedings, and Thomas continued the case as the personal representative of her estate.The Porter Superior Court granted summary judgment for Valpo Motors, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Buyers Guide’s disclaimer of all warranties controlled over any contrary provisions in the Sales Agreement. The appellate court rejected Thomas’s argument that the handwritten note on the Buyers Guide negated the warranty disclaimer. Judge Felix dissented, arguing that the Sales Agreement’s specific terms should trump the Buyers Guide’s general terms and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Valpo’s opportunity to cure the breach.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Valpo did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability due to ambiguities in the Buyers Guide. The court found that fact issues remained regarding whether Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects. The court vacated the summary judgment for Valpo, directed the trial court to enter partial summary judgment for Thomas on the warranty-disclaimer issue, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure. If Thomas prevails, the trial court is to assess damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc." on Justia Law

Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Crystal Krueger, who was driving a vehicle owned by Whataburger Restaurants LLC. Ferchichi sued Krueger and Whataburger for negligence. During mediation, Whataburger's counsel revealed the existence of a surveillance video of the plaintiffs, which they refused to share outside of mediation. Ferchichi filed a motion to compel the video and for sanctions. Whataburger responded with a motion to dismiss the sanctions request under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).The trial court denied Whataburger's TCPA motion, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion for sanctions was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Ferchichi failed to establish a prima facie case for the sanctions request. The court remanded the case to the trial court to award Whataburger its costs and attorney’s fees and to consider sanctions against Ferchichi.In a separate case, Haven at Thorpe Lane, a student-housing complex, was sued by students for fraud and deceptive trade practices. Haven filed a motion to compel discovery from two mothers of the plaintiffs, who had created a Facebook group criticizing Haven. The mothers filed a TCPA motion to dismiss Haven's motion to compel. The trial court denied the TCPA motion, but the Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion to compel was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Haven failed to establish a prima facie case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both cases and held that motions to compel and for sanctions are not "legal actions" under the TCPA. Therefore, the TCPA does not apply. The court reversed the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "HAVEN AT THORPE LANE, LLC v. PATE" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

In 2019, Navient Solutions, LLC, a student loan servicer, filed a civil action alleging that a group of lawyers, marketers, and debt-relief businesses conspired to defraud Navient out of millions of dollars in unpaid student debt. Navient claimed that the defendants lured student borrowers into filing sham lawsuits against Navient under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which regulates abusive telemarketing practices. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of Navient. However, the district court later granted the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the TCPA suits were not sham litigation and setting aside the jury's verdicts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially rejected the defendants' argument that their litigation activities were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, which safeguards the First Amendment right to petition the government. After the jury returned verdicts against each defendant, the district court vacated the verdicts, concluding that the TCPA litigation was not sham litigation and that Navient's damages were directly related to the TCPA litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the TCPA actions were not sham litigation and were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. The court found that the defendants' actions were based on a legitimate question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the TCPA. The court also noted that Navient had conceded the merits of the TCPA cases and had only sought damages related to the litigation costs. As a result, the court concluded that the defendants' petitioning activity was protected by the First Amendment, and the district court's judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. View "Navient Solutions, LLC v. Lohman" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Detrina Solomon, a subscriber to a digital video streaming service operated by Flipps Media, Inc. (doing business as FITE), alleged that her rights under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) were violated when FITE disclosed her streaming history to Facebook (now Meta Platforms, Inc.). The disclosed information included the titles and URLs of the videos she watched and her Facebook ID (FID), which is linked to her Facebook profile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Solomon's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that FITE disclosed her personally identifiable information as defined by the VPPA. The district court also denied her leave to amend the complaint, noting that she had multiple opportunities to propose amendments but did not do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court adopted the "ordinary person" standard, which holds that personally identifiable information under the VPPA includes information that would allow an ordinary person to identify a consumer's video-watching habits. The court concluded that the information disclosed by FITE, consisting of video titles and FIDs, did not meet this standard because an ordinary person would not be able to use this information to identify Solomon's video-watching habits without additional effort or technological expertise.The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend, as Solomon's request was made only in a footnote and lacked any proposed amendments to address the deficiencies in her complaint. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Republic Technologies (NA), LLC and Republic Tobacco, L.P. manufacture and market OCB brand organic hemp rolling papers, while defendant BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP (HBI) markets RAW brand rolling papers. Republic sued HBI in 2016 for a declaration that OCB’s trade dress did not infringe RAW’s trade dress and later added false advertising claims. HBI counterclaimed, alleging that OCB’s trade dress infringed RAW’s trade dress. A jury trial in 2021 resulted in a mixed verdict, and the district court issued a permanent injunction against some of HBI’s advertising practices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found HBI liable under Illinois law for false advertising but not under the federal Lanham Act. The jury also found that OCB’s trade dress for its 99-cent promotional pack infringed RAW’s trade dress, but not the full-priced pack. Republic’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s question about the definition of “consumer” and in denying Republic’s motion for a new trial. The court also upheld the jury’s finding of trade dress infringement, noting that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, rejecting HBI’s arguments that the injunction was vague, overbroad, and improperly applied nationwide. The court concluded that the injunction was appropriately tailored to provide complete relief to Republic. View "Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP" on Justia Law