Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

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Casey Cotton was involved in a car collision with Caleb and Adriane Crabtree, resulting in severe injuries to Caleb. The Crabtrees filed a lawsuit against Cotton and his insurer, Allstate, alleging that Allstate refused early settlement offers and failed to inform Cotton of these offers. While the claims against Allstate were dismissed, the claims against Cotton proceeded in the Lamar County Circuit Court. During the personal injury suit, Cotton declared bankruptcy, and his bankruptcy estate included a potential bad faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees, as unsecured creditors, petitioned the bankruptcy court to allow the personal injury suit to proceed to trial.The bankruptcy court directed that the suit against Cotton be liquidated by jury trial to pursue claims against Allstate for any resulting excess judgment. The Crabtrees sought an assignment of Cotton’s bad faith claim as a settlement of their unsecured claims in Cotton’s bankruptcy estate. Unable to afford the $10,000 up-front cost, they engaged Court Properties, LLC, to assist with financing. Court Properties paid the trustee $10,000 to acquire the bad faith claim, then assigned it to the Crabtrees in exchange for $10,000 plus interest, contingent on successful recovery from Allstate. Cotton was discharged from bankruptcy, and a jury verdict awarded the Crabtrees $4,605,000 in the personal injury suit.The Crabtrees filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the assignments champertous and void under Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11. The Crabtrees appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11 prohibits a creditor in bankruptcy from engaging a disinterested third party to purchase a cause of action from a debtor. The court clarified that solicitation of a disinterested third party to prosecute a case in which it has no legitimate interest violates the statute. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Neely, acting as his own general contractor, hired Grosvold to perform excavation work on his property under an oral contract. Grosvold worked from April to October 2021, but their relationship deteriorated, and Neely refused to pay for an invoice amounting to $55,858. Neely sent Grosvold a notice of alleged defects in the work, which Grosvold disputed. Grosvold then filed a complaint for breach of contract and prejudgment interest, while Neely counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and construction defect.The District Court of the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County tried the case before a jury. The court refused to instruct the jury on Neely’s construction defect and negligence claims, reasoning that the evidence did not substantiate the work was done to a residence and that the case was strictly a breach of contract matter. The jury found Neely had breached the contract and awarded Grosvold $60,512.60 in damages. The court denied Grosvold’s request for prejudgment interest, finding the damages were not certain until the jury’s determination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the construction defect claim, holding that the residential construction defect statute did not create an independent cause of action beyond breach of contract or tort. The court also affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on negligence, finding that Neely’s substantial rights were not affected as the breach of contract instructions adequately covered the disputed subject matter. Finally, the court upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding the amount of recovery was not capable of being made certain until the jury’s verdict. View "Grosvold v. Neely" on Justia Law

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Bernadette O’Malley purchased a used 2007 Dodge Caliber from Valpo Motors, Inc. in late 2019. Valpo provided O’Malley with a Buyers Guide stating the car was sold “AS IS” and a Sales Agreement that disclaimed all warranties unless a written warranty or service contract was extended within 90 days. O’Malley also purchased a Service Contract, which was noted in the Buyers Guide. The car broke down a month later, and a repair shop deemed it not worth repairing due to extensive mechanical issues. O’Malley’s son-in-law, Glenn Thomas, took the car to the shop. After Valpo refused to arbitrate, O’Malley sued for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). O’Malley passed away during the proceedings, and Thomas continued the case as the personal representative of her estate.The Porter Superior Court granted summary judgment for Valpo Motors, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Buyers Guide’s disclaimer of all warranties controlled over any contrary provisions in the Sales Agreement. The appellate court rejected Thomas’s argument that the handwritten note on the Buyers Guide negated the warranty disclaimer. Judge Felix dissented, arguing that the Sales Agreement’s specific terms should trump the Buyers Guide’s general terms and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Valpo’s opportunity to cure the breach.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Valpo did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability due to ambiguities in the Buyers Guide. The court found that fact issues remained regarding whether Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects. The court vacated the summary judgment for Valpo, directed the trial court to enter partial summary judgment for Thomas on the warranty-disclaimer issue, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure. If Thomas prevails, the trial court is to assess damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc." on Justia Law

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Kenneth and Doreen Miller entered into a contract with Foundation, Elevation & Repair, LLC (FER) in 2010 for home elevation and foundation work. They also hired Direct Source Home Renovation, LLC (DSHR), owned by the same individual as FER. The Millers' home was allegedly damaged before the renovation was completed, leading them to fire FER. In 2012, FER filed a petition against the Millers for specific performance and declaratory judgment. The Millers responded with exceptions, claiming they were denied a certificate of occupancy due to the damage.After a period of inactivity, the Millers reset their exceptions in 2015, leading to a consent judgment dismissing FER's actions. In 2016, the Millers filed exceptions, an answer, affirmative defenses, and a reconventional demand against FER, including third-party demands against DSHR. After another period of inactivity, the Millers obtained a default judgment against FER and DSHR in 2019. In 2022, the Millers filed a motion to confirm the default judgment, which was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, FER and DSHR filed a motion to dismiss the Millers' action on grounds of abandonment, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Millers' claims against FER but reversed the dismissal against DSHR, finding that DSHR's filing of an answer after the abandonment period constituted a waiver of abandonment. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. The Supreme Court held that DSHR's general denial answer did not constitute a renunciation of abandonment, as it did not clearly demonstrate an intent to proceed with the litigation. The court reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of DSHR, dismissing the Millers' claims as abandoned. View "FOUNDATION ELEVATION & REPAIR, LLC VS. MILLER" on Justia Law

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Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

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In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

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ICON HD, LLC filed a lawsuit against National Sports Opportunity Partners, LLC (NSOP) and Michael Kuntz. Kuntz, the sole owner of NSOP, was previously a founding member of ICON HD. Kuntz had earlier sued ICON HD and its members, leading to a settlement agreement that included a release of claims. ICON HD later alleged that Kuntz, through NSOP, engaged in actions that harmed ICON HD, including failing to pay for contractor services provided by ICON HD.The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment in favor of Kuntz and NSOP, concluding that ICON HD’s claims were barred by the settlement agreement and by res judicata. The court found that the settlement agreement’s release terms covered the claims against Kuntz and NSOP, and that the claims were essentially variations of those resolved in the prior litigation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It determined that the district court erred in applying res judicata because NSOP and Kuntz did not raise it as an affirmative defense in their answer. The Supreme Court also found that the settlement agreement unambiguously released Kuntz from the claims but was ambiguous regarding the release of claims against NSOP. The ambiguity arose from whether NSOP was considered an "unnamed third party" under the settlement agreement’s exception clause.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the claims against Kuntz, as the settlement agreement clearly released him from such claims. However, it reversed the summary judgment dismissing the claims against NSOP, finding that the ambiguity in the settlement agreement regarding NSOP’s status as an "unnamed third party" required further factual determination. View "ICON HD v. National Sports Opportunity Partners" on Justia Law

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The Borough of Englewood Cliffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint against its former attorneys and a builder, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. The Borough's actions followed a previous affordable housing litigation where the Borough did not prevail and subsequently settled with the builder. The Borough's new council, elected after a municipal election, pursued the litigation despite warnings from the defendants that the claims were frivolous.The trial court dismissed the Borough's complaints with prejudice, finding that the Borough acted in bad faith to harass, delay, and cause malicious injury. The court awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs under New Jersey’s Frivolous Litigation Statute (FLS), totaling $216,484.45. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that a public entity is not immune from sanctions under the FLS.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that municipalities and municipal corporations that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Court found that the FLS does not provide immunity to municipalities and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from liability under the FLS. The Court emphasized that the FLS aims to deter frivolous litigation and compensate the victims of such actions. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed as modified, holding the Borough liable for the sanctions imposed. View "Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner" on Justia Law

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Anthology, Inc. entered into a 10-year contract with Tarrant County College District (TCCD) in June 2022 to provide Enterprise Resource Planning products and services for approximately $42 million, plus annual fees. In October 2023, TCCD terminated the contract without cause, as permitted by the contract, but refused to pay the early termination fee and demanded a refund of about $1.7 million already paid. Anthology sued TCCD in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract.TCCD moved to dismiss the case under Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing four grounds: entitlement to immunity from suit under Texas law, state sovereign immunity, lack of diversity jurisdiction, and a statutory bar on recovering damages under Texas law. The district court granted TCCD’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion, dismissing Anthology’s claims without prejudice, based on TCCD’s entitlement to immunity from suit under Texas law, without addressing the other grounds for dismissal. Anthology appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its decision. The appellate court held that state-law immunity cannot limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, which is defined by the Constitution and Congress. Therefore, the district court should not have dismissed the case based on state-law immunity without first addressing the jurisdictional issues of state sovereign immunity and the absence of complete diversity. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Anthology v. Tarrant County College District" on Justia Law