Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose from a vehicle lease agreement, leading Ari Law P.C. to file a Second Amended Complaint in May 2024 against BMW Financial Services NA, LLC and other defendants. Ari Law alleged breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unfair business practices, fraud, and violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The San Mateo County Superior Court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer as to counts 2, 3, and 6 (warranty claims and Rosenthal Act claim) without leave to amend. Despite this, Ari Law included these dismissed counts in a Third Amended Complaint filed in September 2024. BMW FS repeatedly requested Ari Law to withdraw the improper claims, but Ari Law refused. BMW FS then served Ari Law with a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7, initially noticing a hearing for January 17, 2025, and later re-serving and filing the motion with a hearing date of March 18, 2025.The trial court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer to the same counts without leave to amend, and after considering the sanctions motion, imposed monetary sanctions of $29,055 against Ari Law and its counsel. Ari Law challenged the sanctions order, arguing that the notice of motion did not comply with statutory requirements due to differing hearing dates and insufficient time for the safe harbor period. The trial court rejected these procedural objections, finding that Ari Law had adequate notice and opportunity to address the motion, and denied Ari Law’s motion for reconsideration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the discrepancy in hearing dates between the served and filed notices did not invalidate the sanctions order, so long as the substance of the motion remained the same and the safe harbor provisions were strictly satisfied. The court affirmed the sanctions order, denied BMW FS’s request for sanctions on appeal, and awarded BMW FS costs. View "Ari Law v. Autonation.com" on Justia Law

A group of Colombian plaintiffs retained two attorneys under a contingency fee agreement to sue a multinational corporation for allegedly funding a paramilitary group that murdered their relatives. The agreement specified that the attorneys would receive one-third of any monetary award obtained before trial. A conflict soon arose between the attorneys after one joined a law firm, leading to disputes over representation and eventual court intervention. The case was consolidated into multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and over time, one attorney was discharged, with the court instructing the discharged attorney’s firm to file a charging lien to preserve its claim for fees and costs.After a settlement was reached that allocated $12.8 million to the plaintiffs and their counsel, the discharged firm moved to enforce its charging lien against the attorney’s share of the recovery. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended nearly full payment to the firm. The district court adopted this recommendation, ordered the disputed funds to be held in the court registry pending appeal, and required that the funds not be disbursed until appellate review was exhausted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order enforcing the charging lien. The Eleventh Circuit held that such orders do not fall within the collateral-order doctrine because they do not resolve important issues separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The court explained that attorneys’ contractual or equitable rights to payment do not implicate substantial public interests or values of a high order and can be adequately reviewed after final judgment. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "All Does v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP" on Justia Law

A developer formed a company in 2006 and purchased property in the Town of West Yellowstone, Montana, intending to construct a 48-unit condominium project. The developer obtained a building permit and a “Will Serve Letter” from the Town, confirming that water, sewer, and storm drainage services would be provided. Construction began in 2007 but ceased in 2011, after which the building permit expired due to inactivity. The developer did not reapply for a permit, nor did it renew related approvals. In 2019, the Town adopted a resolution limiting new wastewater connections due to capacity concerns. In 2020, the developer attempted to sell the property, contingent on confirmation that service connections would still be honored. The Town responded that hookups would be permitted when capacity allowed but did not guarantee immediate service.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the Town’s argument that the developer’s claims were time-barred under statutory limitations, ruling that the claims accrued only when the Town refused to guarantee connections in 2020. However, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Town on the merits, finding that the Will Serve Letter did not create an enforceable contract or vested right to service after years of inactivity and expired permits, and that the Town did not owe a special duty under the public duty doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the developer’s claims were timely but that, even assuming a contract existed, any right to service under the Will Serve Letter expired after a prolonged period of project inactivity and lapsed permits. The Court further held that the Town owed no special duty to the developer beyond its general obligations to the public, and summary judgment for the Town was appropriate. View "West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

Cowboy Racing was formed in Wyoming with two members: EFTI, which held a 51% interest and was managed by William Edwards, and Dillinger’s, with a 49% interest, managed by Ryan Clement. The company’s operating agreement appointed Edwards and Clement as the initial managers and set out procedures for removing a manager, including both a for-cause provision and a mechanism for removal with the consent of a majority interest. In February 2025, EFTI, holding the majority interest, removed Clement as a manager citing his unauthorized expenditures. Despite his removal, Clement continued to act as though he had authority on behalf of Cowboy Racing.EFTI and Cowboy Racing then filed suit in the District Court of Laramie County, seeking a declaration that Clement could not act on behalf of the company, enforcement of a purchase right under the operating agreement, damages for breach of a letter of intent, and, relevant here, a preliminary injunction to prevent Clement from representing himself as a manager. Clement objected, arguing that the removal process was procedurally and substantively improper and conflicted with the operating agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, applying an abuse of discretion standard. The Court held that while the district court’s order was inartfully phrased as a final determination, it properly found that Cowboy Racing and EFTI were likely to succeed on their claim that Clement was lawfully removed under the operating agreement. The Court concluded the agreement was unambiguous and that EFTI, as the majority member, had the authority to remove Clement with express written consent. The preliminary injunction was affirmed, but the parties retain the right to present further evidence at trial on the merits. View "Dillinger's LLC v. CR-GTD, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over a 2,300-acre land development project in Washington County, Utah. The owners, Keith and Lorin Walker, planned a large residential community but faced foreclosure following the 2008 financial crisis. To save the project, they entered into a contract with Western Mortgage & Realty Company, which agreed to clear the land’s title and transfer ownership to a jointly controlled entity. Western failed to form the promised entity, leading to litigation. Western sued to quiet title, and the Walkers counterclaimed for breach of contract and fiduciary duty, among other claims.The Fifth District Court held a bench trial, finding in favor of the Walkers on their breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. The court imposed a constructive trust, awarded the Walkers monetary damages, and granted attorney fees as consequential damages for the breach of fiduciary duty. The Walkers were instructed to seek attorney fees through a post-trial motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 73. After trial, the parties signed a stipulation waiving appeals on prior rulings but reserving the right to appeal any future rulings regarding attorney fees.In their post-trial motion, the Walkers, for the first time, disclosed a hybrid contingency-hourly fee arrangement with their counsel. The district court accepted this late disclosure, finding that it was either for good cause or harmless, and awarded the Walkers consequential damages based on the contingency fee, increasing their monetary award and interest in the trust.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court’s award of the contingency fee as consequential damages. The court held that attorney fees sought as consequential damages require disclosure under Rule 26, and their foreseeability and amount must be proven at trial. The Walkers’ failure to disclose and prove these elements was neither harmless nor for good cause. The Supreme Court instructed the district court to modify the damages award accordingly. View "Western Mortgage v. Walker" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of severe flooding in Whitley County, Kentucky, the county government sought bids for infrastructure repair projects, specifying that bids should use unit pricing for materials. King-Crete Drilling, Inc. submitted bids and was awarded contracts for two projects. During the bidding and performance phase, King-Crete asserted that a county official directed it to rely on FEMA specifications for material quantities but assured payment for actual quantities required to complete the projects, even if these exceeded the bid amounts. After completing the work, King-Crete invoiced the county for the unit prices multiplied by the actual quantities used. The county, however, paid only the original bid amounts.King-Crete sued the county and the official, claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and seeking to enforce oral modifications to the contract. The Whitley Circuit Court denied the county’s motion to dismiss, allowing the claims to proceed. The county and the official appealed. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the county was immune from suit due to sovereign immunity and dismissed all claims against it. The Court of Appeals also found the official could not be personally liable but remanded for further proceedings to clarify his immunity status.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that, while the Kentucky Model Procurement Code does not waive counties’ sovereign immunity, longstanding common law allows enforcement of express written contracts against counties. The Court reversed in part, holding that King-Crete’s claim to enforce the express written contract may proceed. However, the Court affirmed dismissal of claims based on oral contract modifications and unjust enrichment, as sovereign immunity bars such relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court to interpret the written contract’s terms and determine whether the county met its contractual obligations. View "KING-CRETE DRILLING, INC. V. WHITLEY COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law

Two infrastructure companies formed a joint venture to bid on a Colorado highway express lane project, relying on engineering designs from a subsidiary of one partner. After winning the contract, the joint venture entered a subcontract with the engineering firm that incorporated many of their earlier terms but added a liability cap. During the project, disputes arose over the design work, resulting in multiple redesigns and delays. The engineering firm submitted change orders for additional work, but the joint venture either failed to process them according to contract procedures or “shelved” them as litigation began.The engineering firm sued the joint venture in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The joint venture counterclaimed for breach of both the subcontract and the original teaming agreement, and later added a negligent misrepresentation claim. The district court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation counterclaim under the economic-loss rule and later granted summary judgment to the engineering firm on the teaming agreement counterclaim, holding that the subcontract superseded the earlier agreement and imposed a liability cap. The joint venture sought to add fraud counterclaims more than a year after the final pretrial order, but the district court denied this as untimely and prejudicial. The court also rejected the joint venture’s attempt to concede liability and assume the plaintiff’s role at trial, and denied its Rule 50 motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in denying the joint venture’s various motions, including its attempt to add new counterclaims, to instruct the jury on an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, or to enter judgment against itself. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the engineering firm on all claims and counterclaims. View "AECOM Technical Services v. Flatiron | AECOM" on Justia Law

A married couple enrolled their children at a private school that, until the 2020–2021 academic year, offered a traditional curriculum. Following the events of summer 2020, the school shifted its curriculum to emphasize issues of race and gender identity. The parents became concerned after learning their sixth-grade child was exposed to controversial teachings and age-inappropriate materials. They joined a group of parents to express their concerns to the school’s leadership. After the parents met with school officials, the school abruptly expelled their children and accused the parents of making racist remarks, which the parents deny.The parents filed suit in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, defamation, and other claims. The trial court, Judge Lisa C. Bell presiding, dismissed all claims except for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parents voluntarily dismissed that remaining claim to appeal. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of all other claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine whether the parents’ complaint satisfied the state’s “notice pleading” standard for surviving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the parents adequately alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices based on their fraud allegations, and defamation. The court found that their breach of contract claim was viable because they alleged the school expelled their children under a false pretext, in violation of the contract. The fraud and defamation claims also survived due to sufficient factual allegations. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings on these claims, but affirmed or declined to review the dismissal of other claims. View "Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc" on Justia Law

A couple alleged that their home in Union Springs suffered significant roof damage from a storm in January 2024. They had a homeowners’ insurance policy with an insurer and submitted a repair estimate of $9,112.02 to the company, which responded with a significantly lower settlement offer. The couple sued the insurer in the Bullock Circuit Court, claiming breach of contract and bad faith, and alleged a systematic practice by the insurer of underpaying roof claims. During discovery, the couple requested documents relating to the handling of roof claims. The insurer objected, citing concerns over the breadth of the requests and the confidential nature of certain documents.After both sides submitted competing motions for protective orders, the circuit court entered an order that allowed some confidential materials produced by the insurer to be used not only in the couple’s case but also in other cases handled by their counsel involving similar claims against the insurer. The order also permitted sharing information with governmental agencies under certain conditions. The insurer petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking to vacate the protective order and require a more restrictive, non-sharing version.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that there is no per se prohibition against sharing provisions in protective orders, provided there are adequate safeguards. The court concluded that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in allowing sharing with government entities. However, it required the protective order to be modified to (1) specify the exact cases in which sharing is permitted, (2) require all recipients to agree in writing to be bound by the order and submit to the circuit court’s jurisdiction, and (3) clarify obligations for returning or destroying confidential materials at the conclusion of each case. The petition for mandamus was granted in part and denied in part, and the writ was issued accordingly. View "Ex parte State Farm Fire and Casualty Company" on Justia Law

Underwood Towers Limited Partnership leased land from the city of Hartford to build apartment buildings and financed the project with a mortgage loan. After defaulting, Underwood executed additional notes and a second mortgage in favor of HUD. Following further defaults and transfers, LPP Mortgage Inc. acquired the second mortgage and notes but did not receive the original of one note—only a lost note affidavit. LPP Mortgage then brought a foreclosure action, seeking not only to foreclose the mortgage but also damages against Underwood and its management agent, CDC Management Corporation.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, denied Underwood and CDC’s motion to dismiss, ruling that LPP Mortgage had standing to foreclose as the owner of the debt, even without possession of the lost note, relying on New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp. Judgment of strict foreclosure and damages was entered. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that LPP Mortgage had standing to pursue foreclosure as the debt owner, despite not being able to enforce the note under the UCC. The case was remanded for setting new law days. After remand, Underwood and CDC again moved to dismiss, arguing that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s later decision in Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope changed the law, requiring possession of the note to foreclose.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case after transfer from the Appellate Court. The Court held that res judicata barred Underwood and CDC from relitigating LPP Mortgage’s standing, as the issue had already been fully litigated and decided by the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court further held that Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope did not overrule Bedford Realty Corp., and thus the law had not changed. The trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Underwood Towers Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law