Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

James Marion Del Duca filed a complaint against his ex-wife, Aria Skydancer, alleging Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court for Gallatin County dismissed his claim with prejudice on Skydancer’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Del Duca appealed the dismissal, raising four issues: the court's error in concluding he failed to state a claim, the dismissal with prejudice, the denial of his request to amend his complaint, and the court's failure to explain its ruling.The District Court dismissed Del Duca's complaint without providing a detailed explanation for its decision. The court's order simply stated that the motion to dismiss was granted and the request for attorney fees was denied. Del Duca's motion to amend his complaint was also denied without explanation. Del Duca argued that the court erred by not specifying the grounds for its ruling, as required by Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that the District Court failed to provide sufficient particularity in its order to apprise the parties and the appellate court of the rationale underlying the ruling. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court's failure to explain its decision left the parties and the appellate court to speculate about the reasons for the dismissal and the denial of the motion to amend. The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case with instructions for the District Court to provide an order that specifies the grounds for its rulings, consistent with Rule 52(a)(3). The District Court must clarify whether it converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provide reasons for dismissing Del Duca's claims and denying his motion to amend the complaint. View "Del Duca v. Skydancer" on Justia Law

Ian Elliot, Cindy Elliot, and their mother, Ada Elliot, were partners in StarFire, a limited partnership owning property in Gallatin County. Cindy managed StarFire and sought to remove Ian as a general partner. Ian was appointed Ada’s guardian, and Joyce Wuertz was appointed as Ada’s conservator. Ian sued Cindy for misappropriation of funds and sought to remove Wuertz as conservator, but his motions were denied. Ada’s will divided her estate equally between Ian and Cindy, but due to their strained relationship, a special administrator was appointed instead of Ian. Ian’s subsequent motions to disqualify the special administrator were also denied.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, appointed Andrew Billstein as the special administrator of Ian’s estate. The Objectors (Jenny Jing, Alice Carpenter, and Mike Bolenbaugh) filed an untimely appeal against this appointment, which was declined. The Objectors also opposed the settlement agreements proposed by the Special Administrator, which aimed to resolve ongoing litigation involving Ian’s estate. The District Court approved the settlements, finding them reasonable under the Pallister factors, and denied the Objectors’ motion for relief under M. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decisions. The court held that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreements and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The court found that the settlements were reasonable, considering the strength of the cases, the risk and expense of further litigation, and the views of experienced counsel. The court also upheld the District Court’s denial of the Objectors’ post-judgment relief motions. View "In re Estate of Elliot" on Justia Law

In 1999, Rosemary Colver executed the Colver Land Trust agreement, naming her five children as beneficiaries and appointing Bruce and Karin as co-trustees. Rosemary and her husband, Richard, retained life estates in any real property held by the Land Trust. The Land Trust sold and purchased properties over the years, with the final property being the Sanders County Property, purchased by Rosemary and Richard in 2010. Richard quitclaimed his interest to Rosemary in 2012, and Rosemary's will devised the Sanders County Property in trust for Richard and their daughter, Gretchen, allowing them to reside there until their deaths.After Rosemary's death in 2017, Bruce and Gretchen were appointed co-personal representatives of her estate. The final accounting identified the Sanders County Property as an estate asset. In 2023, Gretchen filed a petition to correct the distribution of the Sanders County Property, claiming a life estate per the will. Bruce and the Land Trust filed a cross-motion, asserting the property belonged to the Land Trust, alleging it was purchased with Land Trust funds.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, sitting in probate, denied Bruce and the Land Trust's motion for summary judgment and granted Gretchen's motion, ruling that the Land Trust did not equitably own the Sanders County Property and that Gretchen had a valid life estate per the will.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Land Trust's claim of equitable ownership, as such claims are equitable in nature and fall outside the probate court's limited jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the probate court's decision regarding the Land Trust's claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. However, it affirmed the probate court's ruling that Gretchen had a valid life estate in the Sanders County Property as per the will. View "In re R.E. Colver" on Justia Law

James Michael Kahl (James) and Jennifer June Sperano (Jennifer) have a minor daughter, M.A.K., born in May 2019. James filed a dissolution and parenting plan action in January 2020, which continued as a parenting plan matter after the parties agreed they were never married. Initially residing in Gardiner, Montana, both parents moved to Red Lodge, Montana, before separating. Jennifer returned to Gardiner and filed her own petition for a parenting plan. The Park County District Court transferred the case to the Carbon County District Court.At a February 2020 hearing, James requested supervised visitation for Jennifer due to her alleged chemical dependency issues, while Jennifer requested primary custody and supervised visitation for James, citing his allegedly abusive behavior. The District Court denied both requests for supervised visitation and ordered alternating weekly custody. In fall 2024, with M.A.K. starting school, both parents requested amended parenting plans. The District Court found both Red Lodge and Gardiner suitable for M.A.K. and ultimately granted Jennifer primary custody during the school year, with James having alternating weekends and extended summer parenting time.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. James raised four issues on appeal: the admissibility of Judge Brenda R. Gilbert's testimony, the District Court's decision not to follow the Guardian Ad Litem's (GAL) recommendation, an alleged factual error regarding Jennifer's employment, and the workability of the parenting plan. The Court found no error in admitting Judge Gilbert's testimony, as she was not the presiding judge and provided relevant testimony. The Court also held that the District Court properly evaluated the GAL's recommendations and found substantial evidence supporting the District Court's findings regarding Jennifer's employment and the parenting plan's workability. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Marriage of: Kahl & Sperano" on Justia Law

Michael Reilly approached William G. Harris III, a developmentally disabled individual, to purchase his home for $30,000, significantly below its appraised value. Harris, unable to understand the value of money, signed the contract. Reilly attempted to finalize the sale but was informed by the Sheltered Workshop, where Harris was a client, of Harris's disability and was denied further contact with him. Harris passed away in December 2021, and Reilly sued Harris's Estate for specific performance of the contract. The Estate counterclaimed, alleging negligence, violations of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and sought punitive damages.The Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, dismissed Reilly's complaint without imposing sanctions and denied the Estate's request for treble damages and attorney fees. The jury awarded the Estate $28,900 in compensatory damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. Reilly moved to dismiss his complaint just before the trial, which the District Court granted, but the Estate objected, seeking sanctions for the late dismissal. The District Court did not rule on the objection. The jury found Reilly exploited Harris and violated the CPA, awarding damages accordingly. The District Court later denied the Estate's request for treble damages and attorney fees, citing the substantial jury award as sufficient.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court abused its discretion by dismissing Reilly's complaint without imposing sanctions, given the late timing and the Estate's incurred costs. However, it affirmed the District Court's denial of treble damages and attorney fees under the CPA, agreeing that the jury's award was substantial. The Supreme Court affirmed the compensatory and punitive damages awarded to the Estate and remanded the case to the District Court to award the Estate its full costs and attorney fees incurred before Reilly's motion to dismiss. View "Harris Estate v. Reilly" on Justia Law

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law

M.H.W. has been involuntarily committed to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center (NCC) since June 16, 2020, due to paranoid schizophrenia and an inability to manage his diabetes. The Tenth Judicial District Court extended his commitment several times, with the most recent extension being on January 6, 2022. On December 14, 2022, a petition was filed to extend his commitment for another year. Notice was served, indicating that if a hearing was requested less than 10 days before the termination of the previous commitment, the commitment would be extended until the hearing. However, the court did not issue an order extending the commitment beyond January 6, 2023.On February 8, 2023, M.H.W.'s counsel requested a contested hearing, which was scheduled for April 6, 2023, and later rescheduled to June 1, 2023. The District Court ordered that M.H.W. remain committed until the hearing. At the hearing, the court found that M.H.W. continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia and could not manage his basic needs, including his diabetes. The court ordered his recommitment to NCC for up to one year.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the expiration of M.H.W.'s commitment did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction, as the commitment was extended by operation of law when no hearing was requested before January 6, 2023. The court also held that the District Court's failure to enter an order extending the commitment did not constitute plain error, as M.H.W. received due process through the contested hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order of recommitment. View "In re M.H.W." on Justia Law

Neely, acting as his own general contractor, hired Grosvold to perform excavation work on his property under an oral contract. Grosvold worked from April to October 2021, but their relationship deteriorated, and Neely refused to pay for an invoice amounting to $55,858. Neely sent Grosvold a notice of alleged defects in the work, which Grosvold disputed. Grosvold then filed a complaint for breach of contract and prejudgment interest, while Neely counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and construction defect.The District Court of the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County tried the case before a jury. The court refused to instruct the jury on Neely’s construction defect and negligence claims, reasoning that the evidence did not substantiate the work was done to a residence and that the case was strictly a breach of contract matter. The jury found Neely had breached the contract and awarded Grosvold $60,512.60 in damages. The court denied Grosvold’s request for prejudgment interest, finding the damages were not certain until the jury’s determination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the construction defect claim, holding that the residential construction defect statute did not create an independent cause of action beyond breach of contract or tort. The court also affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on negligence, finding that Neely’s substantial rights were not affected as the breach of contract instructions adequately covered the disputed subject matter. Finally, the court upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding the amount of recovery was not capable of being made certain until the jury’s verdict. View "Grosvold v. Neely" on Justia Law

Derik L. Seymour was using a cable crossover exercise machine at the Bulldog Athletic Recreation Center at the University of Montana-Western when the cable snapped, allegedly causing him severe injury. Seymour filed a complaint against the State of Montana and the University of Montana-Western, alleging negligence and negligence-premises liability for improper maintenance of the exercise equipment.The First Judicial District Court found that Seymour failed to present admissible evidence that the State breached its standard of care and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. Seymour's counsel withdrew, and he proceeded pro se. The court extended discovery deadlines multiple times due to Seymour's failure to respond to the State’s discovery requests. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Seymour had not secured a liability expert to testify at trial. The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Seymour had not introduced any admissible evidence that the State breached its duty of care.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Seymour failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the State’s standard of care. The court noted that Seymour did not dispute the necessity of an expert in the District Court and only argued on appeal that an expert was not necessary. The court found that the inspection and maintenance of specialized gym equipment involved technical considerations beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors, requiring expert testimony. The court concluded that Seymour did not present any evidence regarding the State’s standard of care, an essential element of his negligence claims, and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "Seymour v. State" on Justia Law

Christopher Shelton, Vicky Costa, and Todd Costa appealed two orders from the First Judicial District Court dismissing their claims against the State of Montana, Susan Ridgeway, and Axilon Law Group. The case arose from the adoption of L.S., Shelton's biological child, by a Utah couple. Melissa Surbrugg, L.S.'s biological mother, arranged the adoption before L.S. was born. After L.S.'s birth, Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs, leading to a report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). Surbrugg relinquished her parental rights, and the adoptive parents took temporary custody of L.S. The Utah court later terminated Shelton's parental rights and finalized the adoption.The District Court dismissed the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, ruling that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs as they represented Surbrugg, not the plaintiffs. The court also granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Utah courts had already determined that Montana complied with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), thus precluding the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, agreeing that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of the State, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It concluded that the Utah courts had already decided the issue of ICPC compliance, and the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in Utah. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, as the alleged misrepresentation related to a future event, not a past or existing fact. View "Shelton v. State" on Justia Law