Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, property owners in Danbury, Connecticut, challenged the tax assessments on their properties, each valued at over one million dollars, by appealing to the Superior Court. They were required by statute to file appraisals of their properties within 120 days of filing their appeals. The plaintiffs requested extensions to this deadline, which the court granted. However, they failed to file the appraisals with the court by the extended deadlines, although they did provide the appraisals to the defendant's counsel.The trial court initially dismissed five of the six tax appeals for failure to meet the filing deadline, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court later granted the plaintiffs' motions to open the judgments of dismissal and for reargument, citing similar cases where the court had not dismissed appeals under similar circumstances. The court denied the defendant's corrected motion to dismiss the sixth appeal, finding no prejudice to the defendant from the late filing.The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' failure to timely file the appraisals. The plaintiffs contended that the appeal was moot because they had filed new tax appeals under a recent statutory amendment allowing for such actions if previous appeals were dismissed under certain conditions.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot, as the underlying appeals were not "dismissed" for purposes of the new statutory provision, given that the judgments of dismissal had been opened. The court further held that the appraisal filing requirement in § 12-117a (a) (2) is not subject matter jurisdictional. The requirement is mandatory but arises after the commencement of a tax appeal, and the time period for filing the appraisal can be extended by the court for good cause. The judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury" on Justia Law

The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Several homeowners sued an irrigation district, claiming that the district's refusal to remove over twenty-year-old charges from the tax rolls was an ultra vires act, violating the Tax Code's twenty-year limitations period. The district argued that the charges were Water Code assessments, not taxes, and thus not subject to the limitations period.The trial court granted the district officials' jurisdictional plea without permitting discovery, dismissing the homeowners' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed in part, concluding that the pleadings did not support an ultra vires claim under the Tax Code because the homeowners had not sought a refund from the tax assessor and the district had clarified that the charges were assessments under the Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the homeowners had sufficiently pleaded facts to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over their ultra vires claim. The court held that the homeowners' pleadings, viewed liberally, alleged that the charges were taxes, had been delinquent for more than twenty years, and that no related litigation was pending at the time of the request to remove the charges. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and did not implicate the district's governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the Tax Code ultra vires claim and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Herrera v. Mata" on Justia Law

George Martens filed a complaint in the Third District Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus against various judges and courts in Hancock County, alleging that they lacked jurisdiction to decide certain tax cases. Martens did not allege that he was a party to any tax case pending before those courts when he filed this action. The judges and courts filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Martens lacked standing and had not stated a cognizable mandamus claim.The Third District Court of Appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Martens lacked standing to bring the complaint and had failed to state a claim for mandamus relief. Martens appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that he did not need to meet the traditional standing requirement based on the public-right doctrine recognized in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward. Alternatively, he claimed taxpayer standing.The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Martens's reliance on Sheward, overruling the public-right doctrine established in that case. The court held that Sheward was contrary to the deeply rooted standing requirement and the Ohio Constitution. The court also found that Martens could not establish taxpayer standing, as he had not shown any special interest in the public funds at issue or cited statutory authority authorizing him to bring a taxpayer suit. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Third District's dismissal of Martens's complaint for lack of standing. View "State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay Municipal Court" on Justia Law

The City of Rittman filed an original action in prohibition against Judge Corey E. Spitler of the Wayne County Common Pleas Court. Rittman sought to prevent Judge Spitler from exercising jurisdiction over a class-action lawsuit in which Rittman was named as a defendant. The lawsuit, filed by Tara Boler and Trista Bise, alleged that Rittman had illegally collected a 0.5 percent income tax increase beyond its authorized period and sought refunds for the overcharged taxes from 2008 to 2022.In the Wayne County Common Pleas Court, Judge Spitler denied Rittman’s motion to dismiss and motion to stay discovery, and he established a case-management schedule. Rittman then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Ohio to stop Judge Spitler from proceeding with the case, arguing that the lawsuit was an impermissible attempt to bypass the statutory process for obtaining tax refunds.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that Judge Spitler had jurisdiction and statutory authority under R.C. 2723.01 to hear the case. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were substantively governed by R.C. 2723.01, which allows common pleas courts to enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes and entertain actions to recover them when collected. The court concluded that although the plaintiffs did not explicitly invoke R.C. 2723, their claims fit within its scope. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of prohibition, allowing Judge Spitler to continue exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case. View "State ex rel. Rittman v. Spitler" on Justia Law

Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (Alcatel) challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's 2014 cap on net-loss carryover (NLC) deductions for corporate net income (CNI) tax. The cap allowed corporations to carry forward net operating losses up to the greater of $4 million or 25% of the company's 2014 net income. Alcatel, with a net income of $27,332,333 and accumulated losses exceeding that amount, could only carry over $6,833,083 due to the cap, resulting in a taxable income of around $20 million and a tax liability of approximately $2 million. Alcatel paid the tax and sought a refund, arguing the cap violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Department of Revenue's Board of Appeals and the Board of Finance and Revenue denied Alcatel's refund request, citing lack of authority to decide constitutional issues. Alcatel then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which initially affirmed the Board's decision, applying the Chevron test and concluding that the Nextel decision should not apply retroactively. However, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in General Motors Corp. v. Commonwealth, which held that Nextel applies retroactively, an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the earlier decision, sustaining Alcatel's exceptions and ordering a refund.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that the General Motors decision was erroneous. The Court held that Nextel should apply only prospectively, not retroactively, as it established a new principle of law. The Court applied the Chevron test, determining that retroactive application would not further the operation of the rule and would cause significant financial harm to the Commonwealth. Consequently, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision, ruling that due process does not require the Commonwealth to refund the taxes paid by Alcatel in 2014. View "Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, Dean and Dave Cook filed a complaint with the Union County Board of Revision in February 2022, seeking an increase in the property valuation of an apartment complex owned by The Residence at Cooks Pointe, L.L.C. The Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of Education filed a counter-complaint in May 2022, supporting the Cooks' claim that the property was undervalued. The Board of Revision held a hearing in August 2022 and decided not to change the property valuation due to insufficient evidence.The Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of Education appealed the Board of Revision's decision to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in September 2022. However, the BTA dismissed the appeal in December 2022, citing a recent amendment to R.C. 5717.01, effective July 21, 2022, which restricted the ability of school boards to appeal property valuation decisions unless they owned or leased the property in question. The school board then appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which reversed the BTA's decision, ruling that the amendment did not apply to cases pending before the Board of Revision when the amendment took effect.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Third District Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the amended R.C. 5717.01, which limits a political subdivision's ability to appeal a county board of revision's property valuation decision, does not apply to cases that were pending before a board of revision when the amendment took effect. The court emphasized that the language of the amended statute is written in the present tense and ties the right of appeal to the moment a complaint is filed with a board of revision. Therefore, the school board's appeal to the BTA should be considered under the former version of R.C. 5717.01. The case was remanded to the BTA for further proceedings. View "Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

A former employee of Credit Suisse, John Doe, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that the bank failed to disclose ongoing criminal conduct to the United States, thereby avoiding additional penalties. This followed Credit Suisse's 2014 guilty plea to conspiracy charges for aiding U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns, which included a $1.3 billion fine. Doe claimed that Credit Suisse continued its illegal activities post-plea, thus defrauding the government.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss the case. The government argued that Doe's allegations did not state a valid claim under the FCA and that continuing the litigation would strain resources and interfere with ongoing obligations under the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the action without holding an in-person hearing, relying instead on written submissions from both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the "hearing" requirement under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA can be satisfied through written submissions and does not necessitate a formal, in-person hearing. The court found that Doe did not present a colorable claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the dismissal. The court emphasized that the government has broad discretion to dismiss qui tam actions and that the district court properly considered the government's valid reasons for dismissal, including resource conservation and the protection of privileged information. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was appropriate and affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who regularly engage in cryptocurrency transactions, challenged amendments to 26 U.S.C. § 6050I, which now require reporting certain cryptocurrency transactions to the federal government. They argued that the law violates their constitutional rights under the Fourth, First, and Fifth Amendments, and exceeds Congress's enumerated powers. The plaintiffs claimed that the law's requirements would force them to disclose private information, incur compliance costs, and potentially expose them to criminal penalties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the case, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. The court ruled that the claims were either not ripe for adjudication or that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Specifically, the court found that the Fourth Amendment claim was not ripe because the law was not yet effective and the Department of Treasury was still developing rules. The First Amendment claim was dismissed for lack of standing, as the court deemed the plaintiffs' injuries too speculative. The court also found the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim unripe due to pending regulatory action, and the enumerated-powers claim unripe for similar reasons. The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim was dismissed as not ripe because the plaintiffs had not yet asserted the privilege.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing the enumerated-powers, Fourth Amendment, and First Amendment claims. The appellate court held that these claims were ripe for review and that the plaintiffs had standing. The court noted that the plaintiffs, as direct objects of the law, would indeed be subject to the reporting requirements and incur compliance costs, thus suffering an injury in fact. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment vagueness and self-incrimination claims as not ripe. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Carman v. Yellen" on Justia Law