Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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James Cooper was injured in a car accident in August 2019 while riding as a passenger in a car owned by Rick Huffman. Both Cooper and Huffman were employees of Pison Management, LLC, and were driving to a jobsite for work. Cooper's injuries exceeded the third-party driver's insurance limits, so he sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under Pison's commercial automobile policy issued by Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company. The policy provided $1 million in liability coverage for two vehicles owned by Pison and a class of non-owned vehicles but only offered UIM coverage for the owned vehicles. Erie denied Cooper's claim for UIM coverage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper, holding that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 required Erie to offer UIM coverage for all vehicles covered by the liability policy, including non-owned vehicles. The court issued a declaratory judgment that Cooper was entitled to $1 million in UIM coverage. Erie appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and certified a question of law to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The West Virginia court concluded that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 did not require Erie to offer UIM coverage for non-owned vehicles. The court determined that Cooper was not an "insured" under the statute because Pison, the named insured, did not own the vehicle in which Cooper was riding and thus could not consent to its use for UIM purposes.Applying the West Virginia court's interpretation, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in favor of Cooper and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Erie. View "Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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A group of current and former pretrial detainees filed a putative class action against Prince George’s County, Maryland, and 11 state court judges, alleging that their detentions and the policies leading to them were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and the Maryland Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the judges and the county had absolute immunity from the plaintiffs’ claims for damages and an injunction, and that a declaratory judgment could not provide meaningful relief. The district court dismissed the judicial defendants based on absolute judicial immunity and dismissed the claims against the county based on quasi-judicial immunity. Additionally, the district court dismissed seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention, reasoning that they would not benefit from any available remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the judicial defendants but concluded that the dismissal should have been for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of an Article III case or controversy. The court held that the judicial defendants were acting in an adjudicative capacity, not as adversaries, and thus there was no justiciable controversy. The court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the county, holding that municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, including the reinstatement of the claims of the seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention. View "Frazier v. Prince Georges County" on Justia Law

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Steve Kovachevich, a homebuyer, was required to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) when he took out a mortgage with a down payment of less than 20%. After a year, he requested his mortgage servicer, LoanCare, to cancel his PMI. LoanCare initially denied the request, stating he had not paid down enough of his mortgage to qualify for cancellation under the Homeowners Protection Act (HPA). However, LoanCare agreed to voluntarily cancel the PMI upon meeting certain conditions, which Kovachevich fulfilled. Subsequently, he sought a refund of the prepaid PMI premiums from the mortgage insurer, National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (NMIC), but was denied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Kovachevich’s claim under the HPA, ruling that he was not entitled to a refund of unearned premiums under § 4902(f) because his PMI was canceled voluntarily and not under the statutory benchmarks of the HPA. The court also dismissed his state-law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion, stating it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kovachevich’s HPA claim, agreeing that § 4902(f) only mandates refunds for PMI canceled under the statutory benchmarks, not for voluntary cancellations. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded them to the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Kovachevich v. National Mortgage Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

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E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law

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The case involves multiple plaintiffs who sued Khalifa Hifter under the federal Torture Victim Protection Act for his actions as the commander of the Libyan National Army. The plaintiffs sought to hold Hifter liable for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings of their family members in Libya. The lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia over a 15-month period.In the district court, Hifter moved to dismiss the first two cases, and the court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. Hifter later moved to dismiss the third case, and the court again granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court eventually consolidated all three cases for discovery and pretrial matters. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all three suits with prejudice, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over Hifter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Hifter’s cross appeals in Nos. 24-1425, 24-1427, and 24-1429, as they merely sought affirmance of the district court’s judgments on alternative grounds. In Nos. 24-1422 and 24-1426, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, finding that Hifter waived his personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely assert it in his pre-answer motions. The cases were remanded for further proceedings.In No. 24-1423, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hifter properly raised a personal jurisdiction defense and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment due to the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to state that the dismissal is without prejudice. View "al-Suyid v. Hifter" on Justia Law

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T.M. has a medical condition that causes psychosis when she ingests gluten. After an episode in 2023, she was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center. Despite her and her father's request for voluntary admission, an administrative hearing led to her involuntary commitment. A clinical review panel approved forcibly injecting T.M. with antipsychotic medication, a decision affirmed by a Maryland administrative law judge. T.M. and the medical center later reached an oral agreement for her release, which was formalized in a consent order by a state court. The consent order required T.M. to follow certain conditions, including taking prescribed medications and dismissing other lawsuits.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed T.M.'s claims, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over T.M.'s claims and dismissed the parents' claims for failure to state a claim. T.M.'s claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the parents' claims were dismissed without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of T.M.'s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that T.M. was a state court loser seeking to overturn a state court judgment, which is barred by the doctrine. The court vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to dismiss T.M.'s claims without prejudice. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the parents' claims for failure to state a claim, noting that the complaint did not allege a violation of their First Amendment rights. View "T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation" on Justia Law

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Hanan Elatr Khashoggi brought a lawsuit following the assassination of her husband, Jamal Khashoggi, alleging that her cell phone was unlawfully surveilled using spyware developed by NSO Group Technologies. She claimed that this surveillance, conducted by agents of Saudi Arabia and the UAE using NSO's Pegasus spyware, led to her husband's death. NSO, an Israeli company, moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted NSO's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Khashoggi had not sufficiently alleged that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia. The court noted that Khashoggi's claims did not establish a significant connection between NSO's actions and the state of Virginia, as the alleged surveillance was directed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not NSO itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that NSO had not purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Virginia. The court found that Khashoggi's allegations did not demonstrate that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia, as the surveillance was carried out by third parties. Consequently, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Khashoggi v. NSO Group Technologies Limited" on Justia Law

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Eugene Kritter, an experienced helicopter pilot, owned and operated Kritter Cropdusting. While crop dusting over a farm in North Carolina, his helicopter collided with a low-hanging steel wire, resulting in his death. Kritter Cropdusting and Kritter’s estate filed a negligence lawsuit against the farm owners and operators, as well as Nutrien, the pesticide company that hired Kritter Cropdusting for the job.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that the farm owners and operators owed no duty of care to Kritter to remove or warn about the wire, as the risk was not reasonably foreseeable to them. The court also found that neither Nutrien nor its employee, Elmore, owed Kritter a duty of care. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Kritter was contributorily negligent and found that the wire was not an open and obvious condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact remained regarding whether the defendants owed a duty of care to Kritter. The court noted that under North Carolina law, issues of negligence are generally for the jury to decide, especially when facts are disputed or multiple reasonable inferences can be drawn. The court also found that the district court erred in concluding that the risk posed by the wire was not foreseeable and that Kritter’s death was incident to his work. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kritter v. Mooring" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Anthony D’Armiento and Susan Scharpf filed a class action lawsuit against several major shipbuilders and naval-engineering consultancies, alleging a "no-poach" conspiracy to suppress wages by agreeing not to recruit each other’s employees. The plaintiffs, who had not worked for any defendant since 2013, claimed that this conspiracy was concealed through a "non-ink-to-paper" agreement, which they only discovered in April 2023 through an investigation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling that it was barred by the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations. The court found that the alleged "non-ink-to-paper" agreement did not constitute an affirmative act of fraudulent concealment that would toll the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that an agreement deliberately kept unwritten to avoid detection could qualify as an affirmative act of concealment. The court emphasized that fraudulent concealment can include acts of omission, such as avoiding the creation of written evidence. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants engaged in affirmative acts of concealment by maintaining a secret, unwritten no-poach agreement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations met the relaxed Rule 9(b) standard for pleading fraudulent concealment with particularity. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged due diligence, as they were not on inquiry notice of the conspiracy until the investigation in 2023. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corporation" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Navient Solutions, LLC, a student loan servicer, filed a civil action alleging that a group of lawyers, marketers, and debt-relief businesses conspired to defraud Navient out of millions of dollars in unpaid student debt. Navient claimed that the defendants lured student borrowers into filing sham lawsuits against Navient under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which regulates abusive telemarketing practices. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of Navient. However, the district court later granted the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the TCPA suits were not sham litigation and setting aside the jury's verdicts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially rejected the defendants' argument that their litigation activities were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, which safeguards the First Amendment right to petition the government. After the jury returned verdicts against each defendant, the district court vacated the verdicts, concluding that the TCPA litigation was not sham litigation and that Navient's damages were directly related to the TCPA litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the TCPA actions were not sham litigation and were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. The court found that the defendants' actions were based on a legitimate question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the TCPA. The court also noted that Navient had conceded the merits of the TCPA cases and had only sought damages related to the litigation costs. As a result, the court concluded that the defendants' petitioning activity was protected by the First Amendment, and the district court's judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. View "Navient Solutions, LLC v. Lohman" on Justia Law