Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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The United States Environmental Protection Agency issued a rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act that banned several uses of chrysotile asbestos following its determination that exposure could cause serious health issues, including various cancers and respiratory diseases. Multiple groups filed petitions challenging the rule: industry associations argued that the ban was overbroad and failed to follow statutory procedures, while labor unions and public health advocates claimed the rule did not go far enough and inadequately protected workers and the public from asbestos exposure. The petitions were consolidated for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The challenges originated from filings in several circuit courts but were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Some petitioners, such as industry groups, sought to vacate parts of the rule affecting their sectors, while others, including unions and public health organizations, argued that the EPA should have imposed broader bans or stronger interim protections. Olin Corporation initially joined the industry petitioners but later withdrew its petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether any petitioner had standing to challenge the rule. The court found that none had demonstrated standing in accordance with Article III requirements, as they failed to provide specific facts or evidence at the appropriate time showing actual or imminent injury traceable to the EPA's action and likely redressable by court intervention. The court held that arguments for standing were either forfeited or unsupported by the record, and that post-argument supplementation was not permitted. Accordingly, the court dismissed all petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "TexasChemistry Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

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A married couple, the plaintiffs, alleged that their life savings were lost due to investment advisory services provided by a national bank and an investment management company. The husband, after retiring, managed his investments, particularly in master limited partnerships (MLPs). He had a long-standing banking relationship with the defendant bank and, in 2015, signed an advisory agreement appointing the bank as investment manager for an MLP-focused portfolio managed by the defendant investment company. Despite the bank’s internal policy limiting such investments to 5% of a client’s liquid net worth, the husband invested a much larger amount, after signing a letter acknowledging the risks. The plaintiffs’ MLP investments subsequently suffered significant losses, especially during the early 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, resulting in the loss of most of their liquid assets.After divesting from MLPs in 2020, the plaintiffs sued both defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2021, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and violations of certain state statutes, as well as seeking declaratory and rescission relief. The district court referred pretrial matters to a magistrate judge. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add a new party and claims, but the magistrate judge denied this, citing undue delay and prejudice; the district court affirmed. The district court also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of causation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the plaintiffs forfeited the causation argument required for their claims, failed to develop arguments regarding their declaratory and rescission claims, and that the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. The court dismissed as moot the pending substitution and motions to strike. View "Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Robert Alan Roginsky was previously convicted in 2014 for violating the conditions of lifetime supervision imposed after he pleaded no contest to a charge of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. However, the Nevada Supreme Court later determined that his actions did not violate the statutory conditions, found him actually innocent of the supervision violation, and ordered the district court to vacate that conviction. Subsequently, Roginsky filed a lawsuit seeking compensation for wrongful conviction under Nevada’s statutory scheme, NRS 41.900, while he was in custody awaiting trial on an unrelated murder charge.The Eighth Judicial District Court considered the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Roginsky was not eligible for compensation because he was “currently incarcerated” at the time he filed his claim. The district court agreed, finding that his confinement in county jail awaiting trial on another offense rendered him ineligible under NRS 41.900, and granted summary judgment for the State.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. The court analyzed the statutory language and concluded that the term “incarcerated” in NRS 41.900 refers to confinement in general, not just imprisonment in a prison facility. The court found that the legislative use of different terms—“incarcerated” and “imprisoned”—in different parts of the statute suggested distinct meanings, and the plain meaning of “incarceration” supported this interpretation. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that Roginsky was not eligible to bring a claim for wrongful conviction compensation while he was in custody for another offense, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "IN RE: CONVICTION OF ROGINSKY" on Justia Law

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Paul Calvert owned several rental properties in Conway, Arkansas. Over several years, the City cited these properties for various code violations, including the presence of trash, dilapidated structures, and health hazards. When Calvert did not resolve the violations, the City performed cleanups, billed him for the costs, and, after hearings, placed liens on three properties—512 Third Avenue, 1135 Ash Street, and 1900/1902 Dave Ward Drive. Calvert did not always attend the hearings, and some invoices were paid by tenants or through sale proceeds when the properties were sold.Calvert filed suit in the Faulkner County Circuit Court, challenging the liens and raising additional claims, including alleged violations of due process, unlawful search and seizure, excessive fines, and seeking a declaratory judgment. The circuit court found that Calvert’s appeals of the liens for the Third Avenue and Ash Street properties were untimely and dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The lien on the Dave Ward property was found to be moot because it was paid when Calvert sold the property and there was no evidence the lien affected the sale price. On Calvert’s other claims, the court granted summary judgment to the City, finding adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, that the search was conducted under a valid warrant, and that the City acted within its authority.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the lien appeals, agreeing that the first two were untimely and the third was moot. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Calvert’s constitutional and statutory claims, holding that he did not present sufficiently developed legal arguments or evidence, and that the City acted under the appropriate statutory authority. View "CALVERT v. THE CITY OF CONWAY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

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The appellant was the director of the Arkansas Towing and Recovery Board and was sued in his individual capacity for tortious interference with contract. The plaintiff, a towing company, had a longstanding contract with a local Wal-Mart to remove abandoned or illegally parked vehicles. The complaint alleged that the director, who had close ties to a competing towing company and its owners, used his position and influence to encourage Wal-Mart managers to terminate their contract with the plaintiff and sign with the competing company. The plaintiff also claimed that the director made misleading and coercive statements to Wal-Mart staff and conducted a sting operation targeting the plaintiff’s tow operator, resulting in harm to its business and reputation.The case was initially reviewed by the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The competing towing company and its owners moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, while the director filed a separate motion to dismiss, asserting both sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied all motions to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed. The director appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity, pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil Rule 2(a)(10).The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the director’s motion to dismiss. Applying the statutory immunity standard, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that the director’s actions were malicious or constituted a conscious violation of the law without just cause. As a result, the director was entitled to statutory immunity. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the complaint against the director. The court also clarified that sovereign immunity did not apply because the director was sued in his individual capacity. View "BURNETT V. G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC" on Justia Law

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A former elementary school student brought a lawsuit against a school district, alleging that she was sexually abused by her teacher during her time as a student. The complaint included claims of negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, asserting that the district was aware of prior allegations against the teacher, had settled an earlier lawsuit involving similar misconduct, and failed to take adequate action to protect students. The plaintiff claimed the abuse occurred both on and off school property, including during rides home with the teacher.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding the district immune from liability under Education Code section 44808 because, based on the plaintiff’s deposition, the abuse occurred off school property and after school hours. The trial court also excluded certain evidence offered by the plaintiff, such as police reports and documents intended to show the district’s notice of the teacher’s dangerousness, on grounds of hearsay and lack of authentication, and found that the plaintiff’s efforts to cure these evidentiary defects were untimely.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the summary judgment. The appellate court held that Education Code section 44808 does not provide immunity to a school district when it has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, regardless of whether the resulting injury occurred on or off campus. The court concluded that the district’s motion only addressed the location and timing of the abuse, not whether the district exercised reasonable care or whether any failure of care caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Because the district did not meet its initial burden for summary judgment, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "S.N. v. Fresno Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent a taxpayer a notice of deficiency, informing him that he owed over $14,000 in underpaid taxes. The notice explained that he had either 90 days (or, if outside the United States, 150 days) to file a petition with the United States Tax Court to contest the deficiency. The taxpayer, who was traveling at the time, believed the 150-day deadline applied but missed even that deadline, filing his petition 163 days after the notice was mailed.Upon motion by the IRS Commissioner, the United States Tax Court dismissed the petition as untimely. The court held that, regardless of which filing period applied, the petition was late and that § 6213(a) of the Internal Revenue Code set a jurisdictional deadline that deprived the court of authority to consider the case. The Tax Court also concluded it had no power to grant equitable tolling—meaning it could not extend the filing deadline for fairness reasons—even if extraordinary circumstances had prevented timely filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s jurisdictional determination and the question of equitable tolling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the 90-day filing deadline in § 6213(a) is not jurisdictional but is instead a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. The court further held that, because the deadline is nonjurisdictional, there is a presumption that equitable tolling applies. Finding no language in the statute to rebut this presumption, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court does have the authority to consider equitable tolling in appropriate cases. The court therefore vacated the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Laurenzano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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A woman experiencing persistent medical symptoms visited a state-run hospital complaining of chest pain, weakness, nausea, headaches, and jaw pain. After psychiatric evaluation, a psychiatrist determined she posed a substantial suicide risk and arranged for her involuntary transfer to a private psychiatric hospital. Two staff psychiatrists at the private hospital also assessed her suicide risk and ordered her continued commitment. The woman later disputed the accuracy of the medical notes regarding her statements and the thoroughness of the evaluations, asserting that the doctors performed only brief assessments and did not sufficiently investigate mitigating factors such as her religious beliefs and supportive family.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, declining jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The court excluded the plaintiff’s affidavit and supplemental expert report, finding the affidavit to be a “sham” that contradicted her deposition testimony. It held that no reasonable jury could find the evaluations unreasonable or that the private hospital doctors acted under color of state law for purposes of federal liability. The court also ruled that a Section 1983 claim could not be predicated solely on violations of state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in applying the sham affidavit doctrine to exclude the plaintiff’s affidavit and expert report, concluding that disputes of fact preclude summary judgment for the psychiatrist at the state hospital regarding the Fourth Amendment claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the private hospital doctors, finding insufficient evidence that they acted under color of state law. The court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against the state hospital psychiatrist and reinstated the state-law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Rene v. Mustafa" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a resident of Missoula, Montana, alleged wrongful discharge from employment by a geological consulting company that had originally been organized under Montana law but later domesticated in Wyoming and terminated its Montana registration. The plaintiff worked for the company both in Montana and Wyoming, including specific projects in Montana, and his employment documents reflected Montana tax withholding. In June 2024, the company terminated his employment, citing a failed drug test conducted at a drilling rig in Wyoming. The plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge complaint under Montana law, seeking lost wages and other relief.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reviewed the complaint and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court found that the company’s Montana contacts—such as previous organization under Montana law, Montana employment, and tax withholding—did not establish general personal jurisdiction, as the company was not “at home” in Montana at the time of the discharge. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument for specific jurisdiction under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)(F), concluding that the company was neither organized under Montana law nor had its principal place of business in Montana when the discharge occurred. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the District Court’s ruling that personal jurisdiction was lacking, based solely on the grounds developed by the plaintiff on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction should not have been with prejudice, as such a ruling is not a determination on the merits, and remanded for entry of a dismissal without prejudice. The Court also denied the defendant’s request for appellate sanctions. View "Witmer v. Mojo Geological Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

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A woman was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her daughter. Her daughter and granddaughter died in the crash, while she and another granddaughter survived with significant injuries. The daughter had taken medication that could cause drowsiness, and the accident occurred after she fell asleep at the wheel, despite requests from passengers to let someone else drive. The injured woman filed suit against her daughter, the daughter’s estate, the daughter’s husband, and other unnamed parties, alleging negligent driving caused her injuries.After the defendants failed to respond, the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Payette County, entered default on liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. However, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice, reasoning that without a probate proceeding or appointment of a personal representative, claims could not proceed against the estate or the deceased daughter. It also found the husband was not a proper party, as no negligence was alleged against him. The court denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider or set aside the judgment, concluding she did not act with excusable neglect and failed to timely name the proper party.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion and violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights by dismissing the case with prejudice without providing meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the dismissal’s severity. The Supreme Court also found the district court failed to articulate any legal or factual basis for dismissing with prejudice. The judgment was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to seek leave to amend her complaint to name the personal representative and determining if the amended complaint relates back to the original filing. View "Birch v. Ross" on Justia Law