Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Clayton Creason worked as an engineer for Elanco US from November 2017 to November 2021. During his employment, Elanco offered a standard paid vacation benefit and an optional “vacation buy” program that allowed employees to purchase an extra week of paid leave by accepting a reduction in weekly salary. Creason participated in this program, reducing his pay by approximately $84 per week for the additional vacation week. After resigning, he filed suit under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, claiming Elanco owed him the amount of the salary reduction, arguing the program required a written assignment of wages with notice of the right to rescind, as specified by Indiana law.The suit was initially filed in Indiana state court, with Creason seeking class certification for similarly situated employees. Elanco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court denied Creason’s belated motion to remand, finding his delay in seeking remand unreasonable after substantial progress in federal court. The court then dismissed some claims on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to Elanco on the remaining issues, concluding the vacation buy program did not constitute an assignment of wages and that Elanco’s policies concerning unused pandemic-related vacation hours did not violate Indiana law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the remand request due to Creason’s unreasonable delay. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the vacation buy program was not an assignment of wages under Indiana law and that Elanco was not obligated to pay out unused COVID-related vacation hours. The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Creason v Elanco US Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a New Zealand citizen who currently resides in Scotland, alleged that the defendant, a United Kingdom citizen and lawful permanent resident of Wisconsin, repeatedly sexually assaulted her while she was employed as a live-in nanny for the defendant’s family in New Zealand. The plaintiff claimed she was economically distressed and intermittently unhoused at the time, and accepted the job for secure employment and housing. She brought federal claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and Wisconsin common law claims, seeking damages for the alleged assaults and related harms.After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the defendant moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: forum non conveniens, arguing that New Zealand was a more appropriate forum, and failure to state a federal claim, contending the civil-remedy provision of the Act does not apply extraterritorially. The district court granted the motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens, finding that New Zealand was an available, adequate, and more convenient forum with a stronger connection to the dispute. The district court did not address the extraterritoriality issue. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under forum non conveniens. The appellate court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s findings that New Zealand was both an available and adequate forum, and it properly balanced public and private interest factors. The Seventh Circuit held that New Zealand’s connection to the dispute was stronger than that of the United States and that international comity concerns supported dismissal. The judgment was affirmed and the action dismissed without prejudice. View "Pavlovich v. Gaiman" on Justia Law

A county attorney sued the county auditor for defamation after the auditor made statements about the attorney’s professional conduct in emails and social media posts. After a five-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the auditor, finding in his favor. The plaintiff then filed a motion to correct error, raising several arguments for a new trial, including that the jury was incorrectly instructed and that the court improperly excluded certain evidence. The trial court did not rule on the motion within thirty days, so under Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A), the motion was deemed denied. However, the trial court subsequently belatedly granted the motion and ordered a new trial based on the jury instruction issue, then vacillated between rescinding and reinstating its order.Following these developments, the auditor appealed, arguing that the trial court’s belated order was void because the motion had already been deemed denied, and that the motion lacked merit. The attorney, still within his time to appeal the deemed denial, cross-appealed, raising not only the issues in his motion to correct error but also two additional evidentiary arguments. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated the belated order, reinstated the jury verdict, and held that the attorney’s cross-appeal was limited to the issues raised in his motion to correct error.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when a nonmovant appeals after a belated grant of a motion to correct error, and the movant’s deadline to appeal the deemed denial has not yet expired, the movant may cross-appeal any issues preserved in the trial court—not just those in the motion to correct error. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the additional cross-appeal issues, and otherwise affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "Stabosz v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The dispute involved neighboring commercial properties in Fort Worth, Texas. After a store was constructed on one property, the adjacent property began to experience flooding during rainfall, which led to silt and trash accumulation and eventually damaged the building and parking lot. The owner of the flooded property documented the issue over several years and sought remedies from the city, but received no resolution. Engineering reports concluded that the store’s drainage system caused increased groundwater and stormwater runoff onto the neighbor’s land.The owner of the flooded property sued the store owner and related parties for nuisance, trespass, negligent and intentional diversion of water, and violations of the Texas Water Code, seeking damages and permanent injunctive relief. Two groups of defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The District Court for Tarrant County granted both motions for summary judgment in separate orders, one of which explicitly stated it was final and disposed of all parties and claims. The trial court subsequently issued a clarifying order allowing for a permissive interlocutory appeal but did not clarify whether the summary judgment orders’ finality was undone.The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas determined that the trial court’s summary judgment was final and accepted appellate jurisdiction. It held that while the two-year statute of limitations barred claims for damages, it did not bar injunctive relief to abate a nuisance. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that appellate jurisdiction was proper because the summary judgment order was expressly final and was not undone by the subsequent clarifying order. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that injunctive relief cannot be granted without an underlying cause of action, and that the two-year statute of limitations applies to all claims for damages and injunctions in this case. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the trial court’s judgment was reinstated. View "FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF TEXAS, LLC v. JLMH INVESTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, an individual referred to as Mark was detained following property damage allegations and later underwent an inpatient psychiatric evaluation to assess his competency for trial. As his mental health concerns continued, Outagamie County initiated involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law. After his emergency detention, two examiners were appointed to assess Mark and submit written reports. One examiner’s report was not made accessible to Mark’s counsel until less than 48 hours before the final hearing, because the filing was delayed due to a holiday.The Outagamie County Circuit Court determined that, despite the delayed access to the report by Mark’s counsel, the court retained competency to proceed. Neither party intended to rely on the late report, and Mark’s counsel declined to seek a postponement. The court found the statutory violation did not affect Mark’s substantial rights and entered orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment. Mark appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the failure to provide timely access to the examiner’s report deprived the circuit court of competency.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement for counsel to have access to the examiners’ reports at least 48 hours before the final hearing is not central to Chapter 51’s statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment, and thus, noncompliance does not strip the circuit court of competency. The court further held that any error in failing to meet the 48-hour requirement was subject to harmless error review. Because the delay in access did not affect Mark’s substantial rights or the outcome, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s orders. View "Outagamie County v. M.J.B." on Justia Law

After suffering personal injuries in a motor-vehicle accident, a plaintiff obtained a default judgment in 2005 against the defendant for $1,500,000. More than a decade later, the plaintiff revived the judgment and secured a writ of garnishment against the defendant’s wages through her employer, a property management company. Wage garnishment payments were made for nearly eight years. In 2024, the employer sold most of its assets to another company, and the defendant’s employment with the original employer ended.Following this, the employer (now renamed) moved to be released from its garnishment obligations, arguing that, since the defendant was no longer employed, it held no further wages subject to garnishment. The motion was signed by the employer’s attorney but did not include a separate affidavit as typically required by statute. The Madison Circuit Court granted the motion the next day, releasing the employer from the garnishment. On that same day, the plaintiff requested the court to set aside the release, citing the lack of affidavit and seeking the right to orally examine the employer under state law. The plaintiff also moved to substitute the successor employer as garnishee. The trial court did not rule on these motions within the required period, so they were deemed denied by operation of law.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court held that the employer’s amended answer, though lacking a formal affidavit, substantially complied with statutory requirements due to the attorney’s certification. However, the trial court erred by not granting the plaintiff’s timely request to orally examine the employer under the applicable statute. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and instructed it to permit the oral examination as required by law. View "Moore v. Capesius" on Justia Law

The case concerned a request from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for Nebraska’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. Before the Secretary of State released the list, a membership organization and a registered voter filed suit, seeking to block or limit the disclosure, alleging that such release would violate Nebraska statutes restricting the dissemination and use of voter information. They argued that the DOJ was not entitled to all the requested data under federal law and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.In the District Court for Lancaster County, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to join the DOJ as an indispensable party. The court agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing, finding that they had not alleged a concrete injury and that concerns over possible future public disclosure or misuse were speculative. The court also found that Common Cause had not adequately pleaded associational standing. However, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the DOJ (or the U.S. Attorney General) was an indispensable party. The case was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and the plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary injunction and summary judgment were denied.On appeal, while the matter was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Secretary released the voter list to the DOJ. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because the list had already been disclosed, eliminating any live controversy or possibility of meaningful relief. The court declined to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The main holding is that, due to the completed disclosure, the action no longer presented a justiciable issue. View "Common Cause v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a delivery driver for a furniture distribution company, transporting goods from California warehouses to customers. The furniture was sourced both within and outside California, including from Mexico, and arrived at the distribution centers before being delivered to customers. The plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with a delivery-service provider that included an arbitration clause, and subsequently filed two lawsuits against the furniture company and the delivery company: a class action alleging wage and hour violations, and a separate action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for civil penalties.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed the defendants’ omnibus motion to compel arbitration of all claims and to dismiss the plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims. The trial court found that, although the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, the plaintiff qualified as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and was thus exempt from FAA coverage. As a result, state law governed the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The court ordered certain claims (reimbursement of expenses, wage statement claims, and unfair competition) to arbitration, but allowed wage claims to proceed in court under Labor Code section 229. It denied the motion to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing California Supreme Court precedent, and stayed both actions pending arbitration of individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that the plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt from the FAA because he played a direct and active role in the interstate movement of goods, even though his deliveries were intrastate and retail in nature. The court affirmed that the plaintiff has standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in court, following Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. The order by the trial court was affirmed. View "Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC" on Justia Law

Four individuals who regularly engage in panhandling in Daytona Beach, Florida, challenged the city’s 2019 ordinance that imposed wide-ranging restrictions on panhandling. They argued that the law, which defined panhandling as in-person requests for immediate donations, and which banned or restricted this conduct in various locations and circumstances, violated their First Amendment rights. Each plaintiff relied on panhandling for basic needs and had faced threats, arrests, or other enforcement actions as a result of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that the ordinance’s challenged provisions were content-based, failed strict scrutiny, and thus violated the First Amendment. It issued a declaratory judgment, a universal injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and awarded damages as agreed by the parties. The City of Daytona Beach appealed these decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on speech by targeting only in-person requests for immediate donations, distinguishing them from other types of solicitation. The court found that several provisions could not withstand strict scrutiny, as the city had less speech-restrictive means to achieve its public health and safety goals. However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only some, not all, of the ordinance’s provisions and that the district court’s remedy was overbroad. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the provisions where at least one plaintiff had standing, vacated it in other respects, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The damages award was affirmed because at least one provision was found unconstitutional. View "Scott v. City of Daytona Beach" on Justia Law

An elected official in a Tennessee city, after selling her home and residing outside city limits for an extended period, faced a legal challenge to her eligibility to serve based on the city’s residency requirement. The challenge was initiated after a citizen petition, supported by over two hundred signatures, prompted the district attorney to file a quo warranto petition seeking her removal from office. Although she later purchased an unimproved lot in the city and began construction of a new home, questions remained about her intent to return and her actual residency during the contested period.The Tennessee state court found her claims of living on the undeveloped property unconvincing but ultimately determined that her efforts to build a residence demonstrated just enough intent to return, allowing her to retain her office. Following this outcome, the official sued two citizens, the city, the mayor, and the city administrator in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy for their roles in initiating the removal proceedings, along with a state law malicious prosecution claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, holding that she failed to show a conspiracy or retaliation connected to her protected speech, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, when a claim of First Amendment retaliation is based on the initiation of a civil action such as a quo warranto petition, the plaintiff must show a lack of probable cause for that action. The court concluded that probable cause existed to support the quo warranto petition, as there were reasonable grounds to doubt the official’s residency. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery deadlines. View "Amacher v. City of Tullahoma" on Justia Law