Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Professor James Wetherbe, known for his anti-tenure views, claimed he faced retaliation from Lance Nail, the then-dean of the business school at Texas Tech University (TTU), for his public criticisms of tenure. Wetherbe alleged that Nail's retaliatory actions included removing him from teaching assignments, falsely accusing him of misconduct, and revoking his emeritus status, among other adverse actions. Wetherbe sued Nail under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating his First Amendment rights and sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the current dean, Margaret Williams.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the defendants' second amended Rule 12(c) motion, holding that Wetherbe sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation and that Nail’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the contours of First Amendment law regarding retaliation were not clearly established at the time the events occurred. Specifically, the court found that it was not clearly established that Wetherbe’s speech regarding tenure was on a matter of public concern. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, granting Nail qualified immunity from Wetherbe’s First Amendment retaliation claims. The court did not address Wetherbe’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Williams, as the district court had not ruled on those claims. View "Wetherbe v. Texas Tech University" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated neglect proceedings against a mother for leaving her young children unsupervised. The mother consented to a neglect finding, and subsequent permanency hearings were held regarding the placement of two of her children in DSS custody. In 2020, the Family Court trial discharged the children to the mother's custody, but later returned them to DSS after allegations of the mother's non-compliance and further neglect surfaced. In March 2022, the Family Court continued the children's placement with DSS and ordered the mother to participate in various programs and evaluations. The mother appealed this order.During the appeal, another permanency hearing was held, resulting in an October 2022 order that also continued the children's placement with DSS and reiterated the requirements for the mother. The mother appealed this order as well. While these appeals were pending, new permanency hearings and orders were issued, superseding the previous ones. The Appellate Division dismissed the mother's appeals as moot, given that the orders had expired and been replaced.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the appeals were moot because the orders in question had been superseded by subsequent orders, and thus no longer affected the mother's rights. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in declining to invoke the mootness exception, as the issues raised were not sufficiently substantial or novel. Additionally, the Court declined to adopt a blanket mootness exception for all permanency hearing orders, emphasizing that such a rule would be impractical and could undermine the purpose of timely and effective judicial review in child welfare cases. View "Matter of Joshua J." on Justia Law

Ezrasons, Inc., a New York corporation and beneficial owner of Barclays PLC shares, initiated a derivative action on behalf of Barclays against several current and former Barclays directors and officers, as well as Barclays Capital Inc. (BCI). The complaint alleged breaches of fiduciary duties under English law, causing significant harm to Barclays. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that under English law, only registered members of Barclays could maintain such an action, and Ezrasons was not a registered member.The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the internal affairs doctrine required the application of English law, which precluded Ezrasons from having standing. The court rejected the argument that New York's Business Corporation Law (BCL) sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2) overrode the internal affairs doctrine. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the internal affairs doctrine applied and that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the internal affairs doctrine, which mandates that the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes related to corporate internal affairs, was not overridden by BCL sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2). The court found no clear legislative intent to displace the doctrine and concluded that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law to maintain the derivative action. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Ezrasons, Inc. v Rudd" on Justia Law

Ross Shaun Adair hired Stutsman Construction to repair his flood-damaged home. Adair claimed the repairs were substandard and refused to pay the final installment. Stutsman obtained a default judgment against Adair in Louisiana state court. Adair then filed for bankruptcy, and Stutsman sought to have its judgment declared nondischargeable. Adair argued that Stutsman’s regulatory violations barred this relief under the unclean hands doctrine. The bankruptcy court ruled that the Louisiana judgment precluded Adair’s unclean hands defense.The bankruptcy court held that Adair willfully and maliciously injured Stutsman by not paying the final installment and denied dischargeability of the judgment. The district court affirmed both the preclusion of Adair’s unclean hands defense and the merits of Stutsman’s complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the bankruptcy court erred in finding Adair’s unclean hands defense precluded, as the default judgment did not indicate the issue was actually litigated. Additionally, the court noted that Adair’s unclean hands defense was not available in the Louisiana litigation, which only allowed a narrower legal defense under the Louisiana Civil Code. The appellate court vacated the bankruptcy court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of Adair’s unclean hands defense. View "Adair v. Stutsman Construction" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution, Kimani E. Ware, sought a writ of mandamus to compel Richland County Sheriff Steve Sheldon to provide public records he requested, including a booking report, use-of-force reports, and policies on inmate grievances and use of force. Ware also sought statutory damages and court costs.Ware sent his public-records request in October 2022, and the sheriff's office responded in November 2022. However, there was conflicting evidence regarding the completeness of the sheriff's response. Ware claimed that the sheriff did not provide the inmate-grievance policy and use-of-force policy, and that the sheriff provided incident reports instead of the requested use-of-force reports. Ware filed his mandamus complaint in December 2023, and the sheriff moved to dismiss, which was denied by the court. Both parties submitted evidence, but only Ware filed a timely merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found discrepancies in the evidence provided by Ware, suggesting that Ware may have altered the response letter from the sheriff's office. The court determined that Ware did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the sheriff failed to provide the requested records. Consequently, the court denied Ware's claim for a writ of mandamus and his requests for statutory damages and court costs. The court also denied motions from both parties for leave to file additional evidence. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Two children in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) appealed the dismissal of guardianship petitions filed by their great-aunt and great-uncle, who reside in Pennsylvania. The Juvenile Court dismissed the petitions, citing the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), as Pennsylvania had denied the placement due to the great-uncle's felony convictions from the 1990s. The children argued that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state relatives seeking guardianship, while DCF contended that the appeal should be dismissed because the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, did not appeal the dismissal.The Juvenile Court granted DCF's motion to dismiss the guardianship petitions, concluding that allowing the guardianship would violate the ICPC. The court noted that Pennsylvania's denial was based on the great-uncle's ineligibility to work or volunteer with children due to his felony convictions. The children filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed timely notices of appeal, but the great-aunt and great-uncle did not.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the absence of the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, compelled the dismissal of the appeal. The court emphasized that it could not proceed without the relatives, whose rights would be affected by the decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Guardianship of Wilson" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Boyang Song and Travis McCune, own a unit at The 903 condominium complex in Providence, Rhode Island. They filed a lawsuit against Evan Lemoine and Stephen Rodio, the president and secretary of The 903 Condominium Owner’s Association, respectively. The dispute arose when the defendants failed to include the plaintiffs' specific agenda items in a special-meeting petition regarding gas metering and billing issues at the complex. The plaintiffs sought to address the malfunctioning gas timers and the board's decision to switch to a ratio utility billing system, which they argued conflicted with the complex’s governing documents and the Rhode Island Condominium Act.The Superior Court consolidated the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. After a three-day nonjury trial, the Superior Court found in favor of the defendants. The trial justice determined that the notice of the special meeting sent by the board was insufficient but concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed meeting notice was improper because it did not set forth valid transactable business within the association’s authority. The court found for the defendants on count I of the verified complaint and later entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint, while dismissing the defendants' counterclaims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the part of the Superior Court's judgment finding in favor of the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied their obligation to obtain the requisite number of signatures for the special meeting and that their proposed notice complied with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial justice overstepped by evaluating the merits of the plaintiffs' motions individually and granting relief not sought by the parties. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Song v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

Eugene Kritter, an experienced helicopter pilot, owned and operated Kritter Cropdusting. While crop dusting over a farm in North Carolina, his helicopter collided with a low-hanging steel wire, resulting in his death. Kritter Cropdusting and Kritter’s estate filed a negligence lawsuit against the farm owners and operators, as well as Nutrien, the pesticide company that hired Kritter Cropdusting for the job.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that the farm owners and operators owed no duty of care to Kritter to remove or warn about the wire, as the risk was not reasonably foreseeable to them. The court also found that neither Nutrien nor its employee, Elmore, owed Kritter a duty of care. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Kritter was contributorily negligent and found that the wire was not an open and obvious condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact remained regarding whether the defendants owed a duty of care to Kritter. The court noted that under North Carolina law, issues of negligence are generally for the jury to decide, especially when facts are disputed or multiple reasonable inferences can be drawn. The court also found that the district court erred in concluding that the risk posed by the wire was not foreseeable and that Kritter’s death was incident to his work. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kritter v. Mooring" on Justia Law

In August 2021, the Cook County Health and Hospitals System implemented a policy requiring all personnel to be fully vaccinated against infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Exemptions were allowed for disability, medical conditions, or sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, who are healthcare employees or contractors, requested religious exemptions, which were granted. However, the accommodation provided was a transfer to unpaid status pending termination, with a limited time to find a non-existent remote position. Plaintiffs argued this was religious discrimination violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois previously denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions against the vaccine mandates, including Cook County’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the mandate. On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint but were denied permission to add a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act until after the court ruled on the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the second amended complaint, considering it a facial challenge, which had already been ruled upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs waived their as-applied challenge by not raising it in the district court or their opening brief on appeal. The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded they no longer sought injunctive relief and did not pursue a facial challenge. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claim. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint to include the Illinois RFRA claim. The court criticized the plaintiffs' counsel for poor advocacy and procedural errors. View "Lukaszczyk v Cook County" on Justia Law

In April 2021, David Browne visited Billy Jack’s Saloon and Grill in Dewey-Humboldt, Arizona. After leaving the bar, Browne, with a blood alcohol content nearly four times the legal limit, caused a multi-vehicle collision on State Route 69. Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta, Janette Dodge, and their two minor children, Elijah and Amelia, were injured in the crash. The plaintiffs alleged that the Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (the Department) was negligent in failing to prevent Billy Jack’s from overserving its patrons.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the State of Arizona, the Town of Dewey-Humboldt, and Yavapai County. The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the claims against all defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs’ notice of claim to the County and Town was insufficient and that the Department did not have a legal duty to protect the plaintiffs from the harm caused by Browne’s actions. The court dismissed the minor plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice and the adult plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the Department owed a statute-based duty of care to the plaintiffs. However, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Department did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court found that the statutes cited by the plaintiffs did not impose a mandatory duty on the Department to prevent the overserving of patrons. The Supreme Court vacated parts of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the adult plaintiffs’ claims against the State with prejudice. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider the Town’s cross-appeal. View "SANCHEZ-RAVUELTA v YAVAPAI" on Justia Law