Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Goff v. Goff
Fawna and Terry Goff were married in 2015 and had one child, M.G. In late 2021, Terry left for work in Texas and did not return, pursuing a new relationship. Fawna allowed M.G. to visit Terry in Texas, but he refused to return the child. Fawna filed for divorce, and the circuit court granted her a divorce on grounds of adultery, awarded her primary custody of M.G., set child support, divided property, and awarded partial attorney fees to Fawna. Terry appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Terry did not respond to the divorce complaint in time, leading Fawna to seek a default judgment. At the hearing, Terry requested to proceed with the divorce trial, which the court allowed. The court granted Fawna a divorce, primary custody of M.G., and ordered Terry to pay child support and arrearages. Terry was also ordered to pay half the mortgage on the marital home and awarded his camper. Terry filed for divorce in Texas, but the South Dakota court retained jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Terry waived his claim against the trial on the merits by not objecting at the hearing. However, the court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in calculating arrearages without considering the months Terry cared for M.G. and other support provided. The court also found insufficient findings regarding the best interests of M.G. for visitation limitations and the award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculating arrearages and further findings on visitation and attorney fees. View "Goff v. Goff" on Justia Law
Richard v. Governor
The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law
Czechoslovak Group A.S. v. SARN SD3 LLC
In this case, SARN SD3 LLC ("SD3") brought a breach of contract action against Czechoslovak Group A.S. ("CSG") regarding an option contract for shares in RETIA A.S. ("RETIA"). The contract stipulated that if CSG ceased to own a majority of RETIA before SD3's call option expired, CSG would pay SD3 a "Penalty Amount" based on an "Independent Valuation" of RETIA. CSG sold RETIA, triggering the Penalty Amount, but disputes arose over access to valuation information, leading SD3 to file suit.The Superior Court of Delaware granted SD3's entitlement to the Penalty Amount and calculated the Independent Valuation as the average of two valuations from Big Four accounting firms, despite CSG's objections. The court later determined that SD3's valuation was independently determined and in good faith. SD3 then filed a Rule 37 Motion for sanctions, alleging CSG withheld important valuation documents, but the court denied the motion, suggesting SD3 seek relief under Rule 60(b) for newly discovered evidence. SD3's subsequent Rule 60 Motion was also denied, as the court found the documents were not newly discovered and no exceptional circumstances warranted relief.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that the contract's provisions were clear and unambiguous, not requiring judicial inquiry into the valuation methodologies. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's handling of the Rule 37 and Rule 60 motions, as SD3 had the documents in question well before the summary judgment ruling and failed to demonstrate due diligence. Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's decision to convert the judgment to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of the valuation date, rejecting SD3's arguments for a different conversion date. View "Czechoslovak Group A.S. v. SARN SD3 LLC" on Justia Law
Hartnett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
The case involves Susan Hartnett, a public employee who worked for the Commonwealth from 1978 to 1990 and then rejoined public service in 2002, working for the city of Boston. Upon her return, her salary more than doubled compared to her 1990 salary. Hartnett continued working until 2006 and deferred her retirement until 2016. Initially, her pension was calculated without applying the anti-spiking provision of the public employee pension statute, but after an audit, the Boston Retirement System (BRS) applied the provision, reducing her pension.Hartnett challenged the application of the anti-spiking provision. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) affirmed BRS's decision. Hartnett then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which ruled in her favor, concluding that the anti-spiking provision did not apply because the years 1990 and 2002 were not "two consecutive years" under the statute. The agencies appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the phrase "two consecutive years" in the anti-spiking provision refers to two back-to-back years without interruption. The court found that the plain meaning of "consecutive" means following one after another without interruption, and this interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme. The court rejected the agencies' argument that "two consecutive years" should mean two creditable years of service without another intervening year of service. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of Hartnett, ruling that the years 1990 and 2002 are not "two consecutive years" under the anti-spiking provision. View "Hartnett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law
Fernandez v. RentGrow, Inc.
Marco Fernandez applied to rent an apartment, and RentGrow, Inc. provided a tenant screening report to the property owner. The report inaccurately indicated that Fernandez had a "possible match" with a name on the OFAC list, which includes individuals involved in serious crimes. However, the property manager did not understand or consider this information when deciding on Fernandez's application. Fernandez sued RentGrow, alleging that the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by not ensuring the accuracy of the OFAC information.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of individuals who had similar misleading OFAC information in their reports. The court rejected RentGrow's argument that Fernandez and the class lacked standing because they did not demonstrate a concrete injury. The district court held that the dissemination of the misleading report itself was sufficient to establish a concrete injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The appellate court held that reputational harm can be a concrete injury, but only if the misleading information was read and understood by a third party. In this case, there was no evidence that anyone at the property management company read or understood the OFAC information in Fernandez's report. Therefore, Fernandez failed to demonstrate a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fernandez v. RentGrow, Inc." on Justia Law
Malek v. Feigenbaum
The case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Joel J. Malek, who filed a complaint alleging that Defendants-Appellees, including Leonard Feigenbaum and AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., engaged in a deceptive marketing scheme to trick him and others into replacing their existing life insurance policies with more expensive and less valuable ones. Malek claimed violations of New York law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Malek’s complaint and denied him leave to amend. The court found that Malek’s New York claims were time-barred and that he failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise. Malek served a motion for reconsideration on the Defendants but did not file it with the court until after the deadline. The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely because he did not file his motion for reconsideration within the required timeframe, thus failing to toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. The Second Circuit reiterated its holding in Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) requires timely filing, not just service, of a post-judgment motion to toll the appeal deadline. The court also concluded that under Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling.The Second Circuit found that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court also determined that Malek’s notice of appeal could not be construed to include the order denying reconsideration. View "Malek v. Feigenbaum" on Justia Law
Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United
A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. View "Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United" on Justia Law
McCurry v. Singh
Daniel McCurry and Carie Powell sued Dr. Inder Singh for malpractice, alleging he violated a duty of care by refusing to treat their mother, Carol McCurry, who died while awaiting transfer to another hospital. Carol was brought to Methodist Hospital with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with an aortic dissection and a possible heart attack. Dr. Michael Brandon, the treating emergency physician, consulted Dr. Singh, an on-call interventional cardiologist at Mercy General Hospital. Dr. Singh initially agreed that Carol needed acute catheterization but later decided she was not a candidate for the procedure. Consequently, Dr. Singh did not accept her transfer, and Carol died before she could be transferred to another facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh, ruling that he did not owe a duty of care to Carol because no physician-patient relationship existed between them. The court found that Dr. Singh did not affirmatively treat or directly advise Carol, and thus, no legal duty was established.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a physician's duty of care arises only when a physician-patient relationship is established, which did not occur in this case. Dr. Singh's consultation with Dr. Brandon and his decision not to treat Carol did not create such a relationship. The court also declined to apply the reasoning from an Arizona case cited by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that under California law, the duty of care is contingent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh was affirmed. View "McCurry v. Singh" on Justia Law
House v Orr
This case involves a property dispute in Lincoln County, Montana. Tiffany House sought to sell a property initially conveyed to her former husband, Conrad Coggeshall, by an LLC owned by David E. Orr. After their divorce, House was granted permission by the Superior Court of Arizona to transfer the property into her name. However, Coggeshall, while incarcerated, executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the property to Orr, who recorded it in Lincoln County. House then filed a quiet title action, alleging the transfer was fraudulent.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the case. House served Orr with discovery requests, including admissions that Orr failed to respond to. Consequently, House filed a motion for summary judgment, which Orr did not contest. The District Court granted House’s motion, quieting title in her name and ordering Orr to execute a quitclaim deed. Orr filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay execution, which the District Court denied. Orr’s first appeal was dismissed, and he filed a second notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. Orr argued that the requests for admission were improperly served, that he did deny them, and that the summary judgment violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court noted that these arguments were not raised in the lower court and thus were not preserved for appeal. The court emphasized the importance of procedural rules and fair notice of legal issues. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of House. View "House v Orr" on Justia Law
In re O.L.K.
O.L.K. was admitted to Montana State Hospital in January 2022 following a disturbance at a mental health treatment center. The petition for involuntary commitment was based on an evaluation by Michale McLean, LCSW, which included observations and reports from medical staff and law enforcement. O.L.K. had been brought to the hospital twice in one day for aggressive behavior, including threatening his therapist and threatening to burn down the treatment center. During his second hospital visit, he made several threatening statements, including threats to kill someone.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, appointed Shannon McNabb, a Licensed Clinical Professional Counselor, to evaluate O.L.K. McNabb testified that O.L.K. exhibited disorganized and delusional behavior and diagnosed him with Bipolar I disorder. She relied on various records, including the St. Patrick’s Report, and testified about O.L.K.’s threats and delusional statements. The District Court overruled hearsay objections raised by O.L.K.’s attorney, admitting the St. Patrick’s Report under the medical records exception. The court found that O.L.K. presented an imminent risk to others and committed him to Montana State Hospital for up to 90 days.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that while the District Court erred in admitting the St. Patrick’s Report as a hearsay exception, there was substantial admissible evidence from McNabb’s testimony to support the finding of an overt act. The court concluded that O.L.K.’s statements to McNabb, which included threats to kill someone, were sufficient to demonstrate an imminent threat of injury to others. The decision to commit O.L.K. was therefore upheld. View "In re O.L.K." on Justia Law