Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff Yesenia Pacheco sought contraception from Neighborcare Health, a federally funded community health center, “to prevent the birth of an unwanted child.” The method Pacheco and her care providers selected was Depo-Provera, “a highly effective” injectable contraceptive medication that “must be administered on a timely basis every eleven to thirteen weeks.” Pacheco received regular Depo-Provera injections from December 2009 until July 2011. On September 30, 2011 for her next scheduled appointment, a medical assistant “mistakenly injected [Pacheco] with a flu vaccine instead.” The medical assistant “failed to confirm why Ms. Pacheco was there, to document consent to the flu vaccine or a change in the orders, or to advise Ms. Pacheco of the side effects of a flu shot and/or the consequences of skipping a Depo-Provera injection.” Neighborcare did not inform Pacheco of its mistake until December 2011, when she sought an appointment for her next Depo-Provera injection. At that time, Neighborcare asked Pacheco to come to the clinic for a pregnancy test, which was positive. Plaintiff S.L.P. was born to Pacheco and plaintiff Luis Lemus, diagnosed with perisylvian polymicrogyria (PMG), a congenital defect resulting in permanent disabilities. In March 2017, Pacheco, Lemus, and S.L.P. filed an amended complaint against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) at the federal district court for the Western District of Washington, seeking damages relating to Pacheco’s pregnancy and S.L.P.’s PMG. The federal district court certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court, asking whether a patient who received negligent reproductive health care could recover all damages proximately caused by the provider’s negligence, regardless of the patient’s reason for seeking care. To this, the Supreme Court answered yes: if any Washington health care provider breaches their duty “to follow the accepted standard of care,” then damages proximately caused by the provider’s negligence may be recovered upon the necessary factual findings. Where negligent contraceptive care results in the birth of a child, and that child has a congenital defect, the provider may be liable for damages relating to the child’s condition. Such liability does not require proof that the child was at a known, heightened risk for developing congenital defects or that the patient sought contraception for the specific purpose of preventing the birth of a child with congenital defects. View "Pacheco v. United States" on Justia Law

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The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. The federal court asked the Supreme Court to clarify the standards for equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law. The underlying federal case involved a long-running dispute between a certified class of more than 25,000 Washington teachers (Teachers) and the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS). The federal district court determined that while the Teachers established a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the applicable statute of limitations on that claim lapsed several years before the Teachers filed this suit. The Teachers asked the federal district court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to allow the suit to proceed despite the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question by reiterating the four conditions it previously identified as necessary to justify equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in the civil context. Washington law allows equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in a civil suit when: (1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence; (2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception has interfered with the plaintiff’s diligent efforts; (3) tolling is consistent with (a) the purpose of the underlying statute and (b) the purpose of the statute of limitations; and (4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations. View "Fowler v. Guerin" on Justia Law

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Angela Hansen appealed orders denying her motion for an order to show cause and her demand for a change of judge. Hansen was subject to a standing order prohibiting her from filing new motions without permission of court. Hansen and Shannon Dieterle married in 2009 and have one child. The parties divorced in 2012. Following the parties’ divorce, Hansen filed several motions primarily related to the district court’s decisions on residential responsibility and parenting time. The court entered a standing order in April 2016 prohibiting Hansen from “filing any claim, motion, or document in Sheridan County, or in any other county, related to the issues of primary residential responsibility and/or parenting time regarding [the child], without first obtaining permission from the district court of the county in which she is attempting to file.” The court entered the order due to the frivolous and duplicative nature of Hansen’s motions. The North Dakota Supreme Court treated the district court’s orders as ones denying Hansen permission to file new motions. The Court found orders denying permission to file were not appealable; therefore, that part of the appeal was dismissed. Hansen also appealed the award of sanctions for violation of the standing order, and rejecting her demand for change of judge. On those issues, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dieterle v. Dieterle n/k/a Hansen, et al." on Justia Law

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The juvenile court bypassed family reunification services for appellant S.Z. (Mother) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(5) and (c)(3). Mother contended the court’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded Mother’s argument lacked merit, but published its opinion in this case to clarify the relationship between subdivisions (b)(5) and (c)(3) of section 361.5 and the resulting burden on an appellant challenging the bypass of reunification services under those provisions. Because Mother did not make a showing under subsection (c)(3), and could not do so on this record, the Court affirmed. View "In re Raul V." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Lynn Gerlach and Lola Seals appealed the judgment entered in their action against defendant K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Beaumont, LLC under the Right to Repair Act (the Act), concerning alleged construction defects. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed and published its opinion to clarify: (1) a roof is a manufactured product within the meaning of California Civil Code section 896(g)(3)(A) only if the roof is completely manufactured offsite; and (2) to prove a roof defect claim under subdivision (a)(4) or (g)(11) of section 896, a plaintiff must prove that water intrusion has actually occurred or roofing material has actually fallen from the roof. View "Gerlach v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Beaumont, LLC" on Justia Law

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Innovel hired Diakon to take furniture from warehouses to customers’ homes. Plaintiffs, two of Diakon's drivers, were citizens of Illinois who drove out of Innovel’s Illinois warehouses and made deliveries to customers in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. They signed “Service Agreements” that classify the drivers as independent contractors yet include detailed expectations for the drivers, covering uniforms, business cards, truck decals, and how to perform deliveries and installations. The Agreements select Virginia law to govern the parties’ relations and authorize Diakon to deduct fees and penalties from the drivers’ pay for truck rental fees, insurance, workers’ compensation coverage, damaged merchandise, and customers’ refused deliveries.Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Diakon misclassified them as independent contractors when they were employees under Illinois law. Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status, which is more likely to classify workers as employees than is Virginia law, which would treat the plaintiffs as contractors. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act allows deductions from pay only if the employee consents in writing at the time of the deduction.The district judge certified a class but ruled in favor of Diakon. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their work in Illinois, not from their contracts. The Illinois Act governs payment for work in Illinois regardless of what state’s law governs other aspects of the parties' relations. View "Timothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

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Technology Credit Union (TCU) sought a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) (Code Civ. Proc., 527.81) restraining Rafat and protecting TCU’s employee, M.L., claiming that Rafat had made a credible threat of violence against M.L. M.L.’s declaration, described a single encounter between her and Rafat at TCU, during which Rafat “became visibly angry and became aggressive towards” her, made a video recording of her “without her consent,” “made several rude and inappropriate statements questioning [her] mental competency,” repeatedly refused her request to stop recording, and “forced a pen and paper back towards [her] and demanded that [she] write down his number.” M.L. believed that Rafat “will come back and seek [her] out” because Rafat “frequently visits” TCU. Rafat admitted that he made a video recording of the interaction, which he posted on his YouTube channel, but denied M.L.’s other claims and denied that he made a credible threat of violence.The court of appeal reversed the entry of a WVRO. The evidence is insufficient to show that Rafat made a credible threat of violence. Rafat’s conduct was rude, impatient, aggressive, and derogatory; he had a history of using aggressive language, including making offensive remarks. However, the only threats he made were litigation and complaints to a federal agency. His actions toward M.L. consisted of berating her, complaining to her supervisor, and posting an accurate video of their interaction on YouTube. View "Technology Credit Union v. Rafat" on Justia Law

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Delaware and Hoboken, New Jersey each sued the oil companies in state court for state-law torts. By “produc[ing], marketing, and s[e]l[ling] fossil fuels,” they claimed, the oil companies worsened climate change. They sought damages for the environmental harm they had suffered and injunctions to stop future harm. The oil companies removed the cases to federal district courts. The suits’ broad focus on “global climate change,” the companies reasoned, “demand[ed] resolution by a federal court under federal law.”. They argued the tort claims arose under federal law, either because they were inherently federal, not state claims, or they raised substantive federal issues; the suits related to producing oil on the Outer Continental Shelf; and the oil companies were acting under federal officers.The Third Circuit affirmed the remands of the cases to state courts, noting that four other circuits have refused to allow the oil companies to remove similar state tort suits to federal court. These lawsuits neither are inherently federal nor raise substantial federal issues that belong in federal court. Oil production on the Outer Continental Shelf is too many steps removed from the burning of fuels that causes climate change. Delaware and Hoboken are not suing over actions that the companies were directed to take by federal officers. View "City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Petitioner Mayra Estrada-Cardona entered the United States on a tourist visa which she subsequently overstayed. She resided in the United States with her two United States citizen children: A.E. and L.E. A.E. suffers from mental and physical disabilities, some of which are likely to be lifelong. While in the United States, Petitioner played a key role in ensuring A.E. received physical therapy and special education support—both vital to A.E.’s wellbeing and continued progress. In 2009, Petitioner was arrested for driving without a license. She pled guilty and paid the associated fines, but because of the traffic violation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Petitioner and began removal proceedings. At the hearing, Petitioner appeared unrepresented and conceded the charge contained in the notice to appear—rendering her removable. At the time, Petitioner was in the country for at most seven years, making her statutorily ineligible for any discretionary relief from removal. The immigration judge therefore ordered Petitioner to voluntarily depart the United States. Every year—from 2013 to 2017—Petitioner requested a stay of removal, and every year ICE approved her request. ICE denied her most recent request on December 28, 2017. ICE did not take any immediate action to remove Petitioner from the United States, only requiring her to attend regular check-ins at the local ICE office. ICE finally detained Petitioner and initiated removal on September 30, 2020. Petitioner asked the BIA to reopen removal proceedings pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Petitioner's notice to appear failed to specify the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Because the notice to appear did not stop the clock, Petitioner insisted that she had the requisite presence to be eligible for cancellation of removal because she had been in the country for 16 years. BIA held Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because the immigration judge issued the order to voluntarily depart, which qualified as a final order of removal, when Petitioner had accrued, at most, eight years of physical presence. The Tenth Circuit rejected the BIA's final-order argument, holding that a final order of removal did not stop the accrual of continuous physical presence. View "Estrada-Cardona v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Consolidated appeals arose from two actions based on real estate development disputes. Plaintiffs sued their former legal counsel, two real estate developers, and executives employed by the developers, alleging that defendants’ tortious conduct deprived them of the opportunity to construct an affordable housing complex on a property in Monroe Township, New Jersey; a second development was planned for Egg Harbor. Plaintiffs had formed NJ 322, LLC with a developer to build a market-rate rental and commercial development on the property. Plaintiffs contended that defendants arranged to have the property rezoned so that only affordable housing could be built on it, at which time the developer withdrew and Plaintiff had no alternative but to sell the property. Plaintiffs’ damages expert prepared a report that included his opinion on “the profits that would likely have been earned by [p]laintiffs in the event that their development goals and objectives in connection with the development of the Project had not been frustrated” by defendants’ alleged conduct. The expert presented lost profits damages models for the development: the profit plaintiffs would have achieved if the development had proceeded as originally planned, and the profit had plaintiffs been the ones to construct the affordable housing project that was actually built. Based on the new business rule, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to bar testimony by plaintiffs’ expert in both cases. The Appellate Division affirmed in both cases. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a per se ban on claims by new businesses for lost profits damages, and it declined to follow Weiss v. Revenue Building & Loan Association, 116 N.J.L. 208 (E. & A. 1936) to the extent that it barred any claim by a new business for such damages. "Claims for lost profits damages are governed by the standard of reasonable certainty and require a fact-sensitive analysis. Because it is substantially more difficult for a new business to establish lost profits damages with reasonable certainty, a trial court should carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim that a defendant’s tortious conduct or breach of contract prevented it from profiting from an enterprise in which it has no experience and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty." The Court remanded these cases so that the trial court could decide defendants’ motions in accordance with the proper standard. View "Schwartz v. Menas, Esq." on Justia Law