Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Efrain Oliveras-Villafañe, Mirta Rosario-Montalvo, and their conjugal partnership (collectively, "Appellants") filed a lawsuit against Baxter Healthcare SA and related entities ("Appellees"), alleging unlawful discrimination. Oliveras worked for Baxter from 1990 until 2019, holding various positions, including Engineering Director. In 2018, he was transferred to a lower position, which he claimed was part of a discriminatory effort to remove senior Puerto Rican personnel. In 2019, his position was eliminated, and he chose termination over accepting two part-time roles. He filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in May 2019.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. The court found that the Appellants failed to comply with Local Rule 56(c) and disregarded non-compliant facts. It dismissed the Title VII claims, ruling that the EEOC charge did not encompass the February 2018 transfer and was untimely. The court also found that the Appellants did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination regarding the March 2019 termination. The remaining claims were dismissed based on the Appellants' concessions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court noted that the Appellants failed to challenge the district court's finding that the EEOC charge did not encompass the February 2018 transfer, leaving an independent ground for affirmance. The court emphasized that arguments must be clearly articulated and supported, and the Appellants' failure to address the exhaustion issue was fatal to their appeal. Thus, the district court's decision was upheld. View "Oliveras-Villafane v. Baxter Healthcare SA" on Justia Law

A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

After a welfare check was requested by his fiancée, Joseph Maser was involved in a standoff with police at his suburban Iowa home. Maser had threatened suicide, fired a gun inside his house, and was reportedly intoxicated with access to firearms. Officers attempted to negotiate with Maser for nearly an hour, during which Maser became increasingly agitated and made threats. Maser exited his garage holding a rifle, ignored commands to drop the weapon, and raised the rifle outward from his body. Officer Joshua Van Brocklin, perceiving a threat, shot Maser twice in the chest. Maser survived and subsequently brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Van Brocklin used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.Initially, Maser filed suit in state court against Officer Van Brocklin, the City of Coralville, and other officers, asserting both state and federal claims. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in Burnett v. Smith, which foreclosed excessive force claims under the Iowa Constitution, the district court granted summary judgment on those claims. The district court also granted summary judgment for Officer Van Brocklin on the federal excessive force claim, finding no constitutional violation and awarding qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Van Brocklin’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Maser’s actions—raising a rifle outward after repeated noncompliance and threats—created an imminent threat of serious harm. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Maser’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Maser v. City of Coralville, IA" on Justia Law

A landowner recorded a plat dividing its property into seventy-three tracts, each between one and two acres. A restriction in the recorded deeds stated that no more than two residences could be built on any five-acre tract. Neighbors sued to enforce this restriction, arguing it limited development to no more than two residences per five acres.The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the neighbors, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development to two residences per five-acre tract. The court dismissed the landowner's defenses and counterclaims, except for changed conditions, and issued a temporary injunction. The jury found no changed conditions, and the court permanently enjoined the landowner from building more than two residences per five-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development and rejecting the landowner's defenses.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the restriction did not prevent the landowner from building one residence on each sub-five-acre tract. The court concluded that the restriction limited density, not tract size, and did not expressly address tracts smaller than five acres. The court reversed the judgment awarding the neighbors declaratory and injunctive relief and remanded for a new trial on the landowner's changed-conditions counterclaim, finding the jury was improperly instructed to consider only post-purchase changes. The court also held that nonparty adjoining landowners and the State were not necessary parties to the suit. View "EIS DEVELOPMENT II, LLC v. BUENA VISTA AREA ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Rhonda Lucas, filed a personal injury lawsuit against Peter Warhol and Progressive Direct Insurance Company following a car accident. Lucas struggled to serve Warhol, who had no fixed address and may have been homeless. Despite various efforts, including hiring a private investigator and attempting service through the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT), Warhol remained unserved eleven months after the lawsuit was filed. The district court eventually allowed Lucas to serve Warhol by serving an attorney hired by Warhol’s liability insurance carrier.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Warhol’s motion to dismiss for lack of timely service, finding good cause to extend the time for service due to the difficulty in locating Warhol. The court also permitted alternative service on the attorney. Warhol appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court granted interlocutory review. While the appeal was pending, Lucas personally served Warhol.The Iowa Supreme Court addressed three issues: whether the district court should have dismissed the case for untimely service, whether the district court erred in permitting service on the attorney, and the effect of the personal service during the interlocutory review. The court held that the district court was correct in finding good cause to extend the time for service due to Lucas’s diligent efforts and Warhol’s homelessness. However, the court found that serving the attorney did not satisfy due process requirements, as there was no evidence of contact between Warhol and the attorney. The court concluded that the personal service on Warhol during the interlocutory review should be treated as timely.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the case, reversed the order permitting service on the attorney, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lucas v. Warhol" on Justia Law

Walter F. Scott III filed an appeal against the Alabama Department of Revenue, challenging the Jefferson County Board of Equalization's valuation of 176 parcels of real property for property-tax purposes. Scott identified himself as "Agent for Owners" in his notice of appeal. The Department, Jefferson County, and the Board moved to dismiss Scott's appeal, arguing that he had incorrectly filed the tax appeal and had not paid the necessary filing fees.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Scott was improperly attempting to aggregate 176 separate and distinct parcels of property into one lawsuit for the purpose of appealing tax assessments on each parcel. The court concluded that each parcel required a separately filed lawsuit accompanied by the appropriate filing fees. Scott then appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the tax appeal. The court held that the relevant statutes, §§ 40-3-24 and 40-3-25, Ala. Code 1975, do not require a taxpayer to appeal each assessment separately. The court found that the language of the statutes allows for multiple contested assessments to be included in a single appeal to the circuit court. The court also noted that consolidating challenges to multiple parcels into one appeal is consistent with the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address whether multiple owners could use a single appeal to contest the assessments of multiple parcels, as this issue had not been sufficiently explored at this point in the action. View "Scott v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Tara Gentele and Christopher Gentele were involved in divorce proceedings and attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation. Christopher claimed that a settlement agreement was reached during mediation, but Tara denied this. Christopher then asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court found that a settlement agreement had been reached and entered a dissolution decree based on its terms. The decree required Christopher to make equalization payments to Tara and to divide certain credit card rewards points between them. Christopher made the first payment and transferred the rewards points, which Tara accepted. Tara then filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement.The district court for Lancaster County found that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement during mediation and entered a dissolution decree based on that agreement. Tara accepted the benefits provided by the decree but subsequently filed an appeal challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreement.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that Tara's appeal was precluded by the acceptance of benefits rule. This rule generally prevents an appellant from accepting the benefits of a judgment and then appealing the parts of the judgment that are unfavorable. The court found that Tara's acceptance of the equalization payment and rewards points was inconsistent with her appeal. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the acceptance of benefits rule applied and barred Tara from challenging the decree. View "Gentele v. Gentele" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton rear-ended Caleb Crabtree, causing significant injuries. Cotton, insured by Allstate, faced potential liability exceeding his policy limit. Allstate allegedly refused to settle with Crabtree and failed to inform Cotton of the settlement negotiations or his potential liability, giving Cotton a potential bad-faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees sued Cotton, who declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the personal-injury action to proceed, resulting in a $4 million judgment for the Crabtrees, making them judgment creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. Cotton’s bad-faith claim was classified as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the Crabtrees to purchase Cotton’s bad-faith claim for $10,000, which they financed through Court Properties, Inc.The Crabtrees sued Allstate, asserting Cotton’s bad-faith claim. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the assignments of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties and then to the Crabtrees were champertous and void under Mississippi law. Consequently, the court found that the Crabtrees lacked Article III standing as they had not suffered any injury from Allstate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding the validity of the assignments under Mississippi’s champerty statute. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute prohibits a disinterested third party engaged by a bankruptcy creditor from purchasing a cause of action from a debtor’s estate. Based on this ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties was void, and thus, the Crabtrees did not possess Cotton’s bad-faith claim. Therefore, the Crabtrees lacked standing to sue Allstate, and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property" on Justia Law