Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Florida pharmacy received a two-page fax from subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson, which described a patient support program called Janssen CarePath that offered resources and savings options to help patients afford Xarelto, a prescription anticoagulant. The fax outlined how the program could assist patients regardless of their insurance status and included information about Xarelto’s uses and side effects, with instructions to explore savings options on a website. The pharmacy alleged that this fax was an unsolicited advertisement in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially dismissed the pharmacy’s complaint on two grounds: that the fax was not an advertisement under the TCPA and that the pharmacy did not plausibly allege the defendants had sent the fax. The pharmacy amended its complaint, and the defendants again moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the second motion solely on the basis that the fax did not qualify as an advertisement within the meaning of the TCPA, declining to address other arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case, applying plenary review to the District Court's grant of the motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that a reasonable factfinder could determine the fax promoted Xarelto with profit as an aim, making it plausible that it was an unsolicited advertisement under the TCPA. The court also found that the pharmacy adequately alleged the defendants sent the fax and put both defendants on notice. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal, allowing the pharmacy's claim to proceed. View "S.A.S.B. CORP v. Johnson & Johnson Health Care Systems Inc" on Justia Law

A railroad company operates lines throughout Indiana, holding various property interests in its corridors, such as easements and fee simple ownership. A telecommunications utility installed fiber optic cables above and below some of these railroad tracks without the railroad’s permission, safety review, or payment of licensing fees required by the railroad. The railroad claimed that under Indiana law, its easements gave it exclusive rights to the airspace and subsurface, including the right to exclude third parties and charge for installations.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the railroad asserted claims including trespass, theft, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed all claims related to Illinois sites for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the Indiana properties where the railroad held only easements, the district court ruled that the railroad lacked standing to assert trespass and rent claims, finding that its easements did not necessarily include the right to exclude others from the air or subsurface where there was no interference with railroad operations. The court also held that claims based on older installations were time-barred, determining these did not constitute continuing trespasses under Indiana law.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the railroad argued its easements included exclusion and licensing rights, and that the installations were continuing trespasses. The Seventh Circuit held that, under Indiana law, railroad easements do not necessarily include the right to exclude third parties from the air or ground below the tracks, nor the right to charge licensing fees for such installations unless the railroad’s operations are disturbed. The court also affirmed that these installations are not continuing trespasses and that claims outside the applicable statute of limitations are barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v Zayo Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who worked for Greene County sued the Greene County Commission, alleging negligence, outrage, trespass, and nuisance due to injuries from rodent infestations and faulty building systems in the county courthouse. The Greene County Commission was a member of a self-insurance fund operated by the Association of County Commissions of Alabama Liability Self-Insurance Fund, Inc. The association provided a defense to the county commission in the tort action under a reservation of rights. In June 2024, the association initiated a declaratory-judgment action against the county commission and the county workers, seeking a determination that certain claims were excluded from coverage under the insurance agreement and asserting it had no duty to defend the county commission in the tort action.The Greene Circuit Court heard motions to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, with the county workers arguing it was not ripe until the tort action was resolved and the county commission contending the association was obligated to defend. On December 1, 2025, the circuit court stayed the declaratory-judgment action pending the outcome of the tort action, reasoning that resolving coverage issues could supersede issues already pending in the tort action.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the association’s petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the circuit court’s stay. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by staying the declaratory-judgment action as it related to the association’s request for a determination of its duty to defend. The court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to proceed with the declaratory-judgment action on the duty-to-defend issue, but not on indemnification issues. The disposition was to vacate the stay as to the duty to defend. View "Ex parte Association of County Commissions of Alabama Liability Self-Insurance Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose over real property in Harrison County, Mississippi, after the land was sold to the state for unpaid taxes in August 2017 and subsequently conveyed to Jermille Johnson via forfeited tax land patents in 2021. Elizabeth Cleveland, who had lived on the property since the 1980s, filed a complaint in the Harrison County Chancery Court seeking to quiet title through adverse possession and to void the tax sale due to lack of proper notice. Cleveland asserted that she had acquired ownership by adverse possession over more than twenty years.The Harrison County Chancery Court found that Cleveland had standing to challenge the tax sale and land patents, and determined the sale was void because the required notice had not been given. The chancellor cancelled the land patents and returned the property to the county. Johnson appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s judgment, holding that Cleveland lacked standing to challenge the tax sale and that Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21 barred such claims once land was struck off to the state. The appellate court remanded the case for consideration of Johnson’s counterclaim to quiet title.On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only the issue of Cleveland’s standing. The Court held that Cleveland has standing to challenge the tax sale because her adverse possession claim, if true, would have vested title in her by operation of law. Additionally, the unique facts of the case demonstrated an adverse impact sufficient to confer standing, as Cleveland faced losing her home. The Court rejected Johnson’s statutory argument, holding that other statutes permit challenges to tax sales. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court. View "Johnson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The case concerns Robert Boyd, who had a history of sexual offenses involving minors. After serving prison time for downloading child sexual abuse material, post-incarceration civil commitment proceedings were initiated against him under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Boyd was designated a “sexually dangerous person” and committed to the custody of the Attorney General. Eight years later, Boyd was conditionally discharged after the district court concluded he no longer posed a threat if released under a strict treatment regimen. Conditions included supervision, participation in treatment, restrictions on internet usage, and prohibitions on possessing pornography.About a year after his conditional discharge, the Government sought to revoke Boyd’s release, alleging he violated his treatment regimen by possessing an SD card with images deemed pornographic and engaging in risk-related behaviors, such as interactions with underage individuals and unauthorized internet use. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found Boyd in violation, determined he remained sexually dangerous, and revoked his conditional discharge, returning him to federal custody.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that revocation of conditional discharge under the Adam Walsh Act requires the Government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual failed to comply with their prescribed regimen, suffers from a serious mental disorder, and would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct if released. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings, concluding there was sufficient evidence Boyd violated his regimen and posed a risk if allowed to remain in the community. The judgment revoking Boyd’s conditional discharge was affirmed. View "US v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The plaintiff leased a new vehicle from the defendant, but soon experienced persistent defects that could not be repaired despite multiple attempts. After the defendant failed to promptly replace the vehicle or provide restitution under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff filed suit for breach of warranty, seeking damages and attorney fees. During litigation, the defendant made a statutory settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, presenting two alternative sets of terms: a lump-sum payment or a reimbursement option requiring proof of damages, both accompanied by provisions for attorney fees and costs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages totaling $76,155.27, less than the lump-sum alternative in the defendant’s 998 offer. The trial court found the offer valid, imposed section 998’s cost-shifting penalty, limited plaintiff’s postoffer costs and attorney fees, and awarded defendant its postoffer costs. The plaintiff appealed, contesting the validity of the alternative-choice offer. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s awards, finding the lump-sum alternative sufficiently certain but deemed alternative-choice offers categorically invalid for cost-shifting purposes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether an offer under section 998 that presents two independent, alternative sets of terms for acceptance is categorically invalid due to uncertainty. The Court held that such an alternative-choice offer can be valid if it clearly presents the alternatives and at least one alternative is sufficiently certain to permit accurate valuation at the time the offer is made. If the judgment or award does not exceed the highest valued, valid alternative, cost-shifting under section 998 is permitted. The Court affirmed the trial court’s award, but rejected the Court of Appeal’s categorical prohibition of alternative-choice offers under section 998. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant in Minneapolis, Seven Acquisition LLC, operated its business in a building owned by 700 Hennepin Holdings LLC and subject to a mortgage held by a bank. After the landlord failed to repair a leaking roof, Seven withheld rent, leading to an eviction action. Seven prevailed in arbitration against the landlord and was awarded damages. The landlord then defaulted on the mortgage, prompting the bank to initiate foreclosure proceedings and request the appointment of Gregg Williams as receiver. Despite claims of independence, Seven alleged Williams had significant prior business with the bank’s agent. As receiver, Williams controlled the property, but Seven alleged he refused necessary repairs and acted to evict them for the bank’s benefit.In response, Seven sought to have Williams removed as receiver, arguing he was not independent and failed in his duties, but the Hennepin County District Court denied this motion as untimely and unsupported by good cause. Seven then filed a separate lawsuit against Williams, asserting negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the negligence claim based on quasi-judicial immunity, but allowed the fiduciary duty claim to proceed, finding factual questions regarding Williams’s independence and actions.Williams appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that quasi-judicial immunity protected Williams from suit for all actions taken within the scope of his receivership, regardless of motive or alleged conspiracy with the bank. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed this decision. The court held that quasi-judicial immunity shields a court-appointed receiver from lawsuits for actions taken within the scope of the appointment, even if the receiver is alleged to have acted at the direction of a party or with improper motive. The complaint’s allegations were found insufficient to defeat this immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Seven Acquisition LLC vs. Williams" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all cast members of a reality television show, became embroiled in a public scandal when one, Rachel Leviss, had a secret sexual affair with another cast member, Tom Sandoval, who was in a relationship with fellow cast member Ariana Madix. The affair came to light when Sandoval’s phone fell into Madix’s possession during a public event. Upon accessing his phone—using a passcode known to her from their longstanding relationship—Madix discovered and recorded sexually explicit videos of Leviss that Sandoval had secretly made. Madix then sent these videos to Leviss and informed the show’s production team, after which the affair became widely publicized.Leviss filed a civil suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against Sandoval and Madix, asserting causes of action for violation of privacy and “revenge porn,” among others. She alleged that Madix had obtained and disseminated the explicit videos without consent, causing Leviss emotional and reputational harm. Madix responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16), arguing that her conduct was protected as activity in connection with a public issue involving public figures. The Superior Court denied Madix’s motion, finding that the conduct did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, and that the gravamen of Leviss’s claims was private conduct, not public commentary.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, holding that Madix failed to meet her burden to show that Leviss’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that the unauthorized acquisition and dissemination of private sexual videos did not qualify as conduct in connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest as required by the statute. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law

Several homeowners lost their properties through foreclosure after failing to pay property taxes to Oakland County, Michigan. Although the properties’ values exceeded the tax debts, the County retained all surplus equity rather than refunding the difference to the owners. The affected individuals, represented by attorney Scott Smith and later the McAlpine PC firm, brought suit alleging that this retention violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Both cases were initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed. In the Hall case, the Pacific Legal Foundation represented the plaintiffs pro bono. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the County’s actions constituted a violation of the Takings Clause. The district court subsequently denied motions for class certification and the parties settled for $500,000. Plaintiffs then sought attorney fees totaling over $4.2 million, including hours spent on failed class certification and appeals largely handled by other counsel. The district court reduced the fee request by 40% and applied a 1.1 multiplier, awarding $1,361,476.51.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the fee award for abuse of discretion and determined that the district court erred in several respects. The appellate court held that hours spent on failed class certification, litigation against other defendants, and certain other tasks were not properly billable and should have been categorically excluded. The court also found that the hours claimed for appellate work and by Mark McAlpine were grossly excessive, and that the district court failed to address the reasonableness of the hourly rates. The Sixth Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded, instructing the district court to recalculate fees with specific exclusions, a blended $325 hourly rate, and a 1.1 multiplier. No fees were awarded for the present appeal. View "Sinclair v. Meisner" on Justia Law