Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case centers on a longstanding family partnership, formed originally in 1988 and later converted to a limited partnership. Rick served as the managing partner, with other family members as partners. Following the death of a parent in 2011, annual financial meetings ceased, and several partners alleged they did not receive adequate financial records or updates for years. Concerns arose over Rick’s management, including incomplete and disorganized financial disclosures, and withdrawals from accounts over which Rick had power of attorney. These issues, along with disputed partnership interests and controversial financial transactions, led to Rick’s removal as managing partner and triggered litigation over his alleged breach of fiduciary duties.The District Court for Douglas County was presented with an amended complaint alleging Rick’s breach of fiduciary duties to the partnership. Rick moved to dismiss, arguing that a related county court proceeding involving a family trust precluded jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. Rick filed responses and counterclaims, but failed to properly plead affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations. Extensive discovery and a bench trial followed, with evidence showing Rick’s negative capital account and numerous questionable withdrawals and transfers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, including jurisdictional questions, evidentiary issues, and the award of attorney fees. The Court held that it had jurisdiction, affirmed the district court's findings that Rick no longer had an ownership interest in the partnership due to his negative capital account, and upheld the damages awarded for his breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the prevailing parties and rejected Rick’s arguments regarding lack of specificity in pleadings, statute of limitations, and the district court’s jurisdiction. The district court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "Berkshire v. Berkshire" on Justia Law

A Mississippi-based furniture company and its principal operated an online “drop shipping” business, selling to customers nationwide. They fulfilled over a thousand orders for Michigan residents, accepting payments and arranging deliveries to Michigan addresses, but beginning in 2020, they kept payments for furniture they never delivered. After numerous complaints, the Michigan Attorney General sued them for violations of Michigan’s consumer protection laws and statutory conversion involving ten Michigan consumers. The defendants did not appear in the Michigan court, asserting that their website’s terms limited legal disputes to Mississippi and that Michigan lacked personal jurisdiction. Default judgments were entered against both defendants, awarding damages, civil fines, and attorneys’ fees.Following the Michigan judgment, the Attorney General enrolled it in the Lowndes County Circuit Court in Mississippi under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The defendants objected, arguing that the Michigan court lacked jurisdiction due to their choice-of-law provision and that the forum-selection clause in their terms of service precluded jurisdiction. The circuit court held that the forum-selection clause was irrelevant to the statutory action and that Michigan law governed its validity, overruling the objections and directing enrollment of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal de novo. It held that the Michigan court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they knowingly and repeatedly contracted with Michigan residents, took their money, and arranged deliveries into Michigan, thus purposefully availing themselves of Michigan’s market. The choice-of-law provision in the website’s terms did not negate purposeful availment. The court found that Michigan’s long-arm statutes and due process requirements were satisfied. It also held that the size of the judgment was irrelevant to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s order enrolling the Michigan judgment. View "AF, LLC v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Kennedy filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the White County Circuit Court, seeking dismissal of misdemeanor charges pending against him in the Judsonia District Court. He argued that the charges should be dismissed on the grounds of a speedy-trial violation. After filing his petition, Kennedy attempted to serve process on the district court by mailing the summons and complaint. The district court clerk acknowledged receipt of the documents, but Kennedy did not address them to a specific person, nor did he use certified mail with a return receipt requested.The White County Circuit Court reviewed Kennedy’s petition and determined that service of process had not been properly perfected within the 120-day period required by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Specifically, the circuit court found that Kennedy did not comply with Rule 4’s requirements: he failed to serve by certified mail addressed to a specific person, did not provide a notarized affidavit of proof of service, and did not include a copy of the summons in the record. As a result, the circuit court dismissed Kennedy’s petition without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. Applying a clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court’s factual findings, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy’s failure to comply with Rule 4’s service requirements rendered the process defective. The Supreme Court held that because the dismissal was without prejudice and Kennedy could refile his claims, the order was not final or appealable. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. View "KENNEDY v. WHITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT JUDSONIA" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief.BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Investors in an e-commerce company alleged they were defrauded by the founder and former CEO, claiming that their decisions to purchase preferred shares in early 2021 were based on false representations about the company’s profitability and financial health. The founder repeatedly refused to provide audited financial statements before closing, and pressured the investors to move quickly, warning that their allocation would be lost to other parties if they delayed for due diligence. The investors relied on unaudited financial statements and entered into two stock purchase agreements in February and March 2021. After the transactions, the company failed to provide audited financial statements by the contractual deadline, and the founder sold significant personal stock. In June 2022, the investors finally received audited statements revealing substantial losses and inconsistencies with previous unaudited reports.The investors initially filed suit in New Jersey in August 2024. After enforcement of the Delaware forum-selection clause, they dismissed the New Jersey action and refiled in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in April 2025, asserting claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and a New Jersey statutory claim. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the claims accrued no later than March 2021 and were barred by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations. The court found no basis for tolling under fraudulent concealment or inherently unknowable injury doctrines, reasoning the investors were on inquiry notice when they executed the agreements without the requested information.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the statute of limitations question de novo. The Court held that, regardless of tolling doctrines, inquiry notice was triggered in April 2021 when the company breached its obligation to provide audited financials. Because the investors filed more than three years later, their claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. View "Cornice Ventures I LLC v. Silberstein" on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories.Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect.After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe.The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition.Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law