Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A married couple executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) in 2012, which allocated their marital debts, including a Parent PLUS student loan, to the husband. He agreed to be solely responsible for the debt and indemnify his former wife. While he resolved other debts, he did not pay the Parent PLUS loan until the wife sought contempt in 2022. The parties then stipulated that the husband would make monthly loan payments and apply proceeds from a business sale toward the loan. The wife remained the borrower, but the husband assumed responsibility for payments. After further nonpayment, the wife again sought contempt in 2024.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held the husband in contempt for failing to pay monthly amounts due in August and September 2024, denied his request for expanded account access, entered an immediately collectible judgment for the entire unpaid loan balance in favor of the wife, and awarded her attorney fees. The court determined that the husband had willfully failed to comply with his payment obligation and found that his unauthorized changes to the account justified restricted access.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of unrestricted account access and the contempt determination based on August and September 2024 nonpayments. It also affirmed the award of $3,237.50 in attorney fees to the wife. However, the Supreme Court vacated the full-balance judgment for the loan, holding that the parties’ agreements did not authorize immediate acceleration of the entire debt based on missed monthly payments. The Court remanded for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the agreements and applicable law, and for reasonable appellate attorney fees, while denying appellate sanctions. The underlying allocation of debt and adjudicated obligations from June 2024 remain undisturbed. View "In re Marriage of Kearns" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, acting as executor of a probate estate, brought suit against a law firm and its principal, alleging negligent misrepresentations related to their representation in a probate matter. After initially naming multiple defendants and amending her complaint several times, only the law firm and its principal remained as defendants in this appeal. During the proceedings, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint that included unsanctioned pro se coplaintiffs and was found by the court to be unnecessarily lengthy and filled with irrelevant allegations. The court struck this complaint and offered the plaintiff options: to dismiss with prejudice, to file a more detailed motion explaining the absence of legal prejudice to the defendants if dismissed without prejudice, or to file a compliant Third Amended Complaint. Instead, the plaintiff filed a notice seeking voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but failed to provide the required explanation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that, since the defendants had already answered, the dismissal had to proceed under Rule 41(a)(2), which requires a court order and can be with prejudice if warranted. The court found that the plaintiff failed to address its directive and, given her history of frivolous filings and sanctions in other cases, dismissed the action with prejudice. Additionally, the court designated the plaintiff as a vexatious litigator and imposed prefiling restrictions, requiring attorney certification or prior court review for any new cases.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s actions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly dismissed the action with prejudice, complied with due process in imposing vexatious litigator restrictions, correctly declined to recuse, and found no merit in the claim of failure to report elder abuse. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Wasserman v. Beggs" on Justia Law

A city was investigated by the Civil Rights Department (CRD) after a job applicant complained that his conditional job offer for a custodian position was rescinded due to his criminal history. The applicant had explained his prior convictions, and the city stated it considered this information but ultimately decided that a recent conviction for fighting in public was sufficiently relevant to deny him employment. The city asserted it followed all procedural requirements under California’s Fair Chance Act, which restricts when and how employers may consider criminal records in hiring.The CRD began a broader investigation into whether the city’s hiring practices complied with the Fair Chance Act for all applicants. During this investigation, the city refused to provide certain documents related to its individualized assessments of applicants’ criminal histories, claiming these documents were protected by attorney-client and work product privileges, as city attorneys were involved in preparing them. The CRD petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel production, arguing that by defending its hiring decisions as compliant with the law, the city had waived any privilege.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the CRD’s motion, finding the city had waived privilege by putting the adequacy of its compliance at issue. The city appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s order. The appellate court held that by asserting its individualized assessments were legally adequate as a defense, the city put those documents directly at issue and therefore waived any claim to privilege regarding them. The court emphasized that an employer cannot shield the content of such assessments from scrutiny by involving counsel in their preparation when claiming compliance with the Fair Chance Act. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. City of Torrance" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought to appear as Republican candidates for the Catoosa County Commission in the May 2024 primary election. The local county Republican Party (CCRP), believing that existing state law and party rules did not sufficiently protect against non-Republicans qualifying, adopted a new rule requiring candidates to interview with the CCRP executive committee and obtain a “qualifying affidavit.” When four candidates failed to secure this affidavit and were denied qualification, they brought suit against the CCRP and certain individual members, arguing the rule was unauthorized and prevented their lawful qualification.Reviewing the case, the Superior Court of Catoosa County granted the candidates a temporary restraining order, then a permanent injunction prohibiting the CCRP from enforcing the affidavit rule. After the CCRP persisted in refusing to qualify the candidates, the court found the CCRP and several members in contempt, awarded attorney fees to the candidates, and extended the injunction. The court also awarded attorney fees against certain CCRP members who were not named parties in the litigation. Appeals followed: the CCRP and named members challenged the injunction, contempt finding, and attorney fees; nonparty CCRP members appealed the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the injunction, holding that county-level party organizations are not authorized by Georgia law to create independent candidate qualification rules beyond those established by the state party and statute. The permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was upheld, as was the contempt finding and attorney fee award against most named appellants. However, the contempt finding against two individuals was reversed for lack of evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal by nonparty CCRP members for failure to follow the required discretionary appellate procedure for attorney fee awards. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

A married couple acquired a residential property in Maine, building their home on a subdivided lot. In 2005, the husband alone obtained a mortgage on the property to pay off an earlier joint mortgage, but the wife did not sign the new note. After their divorce, the husband quitclaimed his interest in the property to the wife, then filed for bankruptcy. The mortgage lender and its successors initiated multiple foreclosure actions over the years. In a 2012 foreclosure judgment, only the husband was held liable, as the wife had been dismissed from the suit. The wife later obtained a declaratory judgment in state court: although not personally liable on the debt, her property interest was found to be subject to the mortgage. No payments were made on the mortgage after 2010, and the loan fully matured before the current foreclosure attempt.The lender, U.S. Bank, sent both spouses a statutorily required notice under Maine law before foreclosing, but the notice incorrectly labeled the principal as "Payments" and failed to strictly comply with statutory requirements. When U.S. Bank sued for foreclosure in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, the wife argued that the notice was deficient. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment for her based on the notice's noncompliance. The court also found that the wife was entitled to notice as a "mortgagor," even though she had not signed the note, and rejected arguments that the earlier foreclosure judgment against the husband precluded her from raising defenses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The First Circuit held that Maine’s statutory notice requirement applies even after a loan has matured, to a spouse whose property interest is subject to the mortgage but who did not sign the note, and after a prior foreclosure judgment against the signing spouse. The court also held that a noncompliant notice mandates judgment for the mortgagor under the law applicable to this case. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Bowden" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review.By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

GateOne Gillette, LLC entered into a 20-year lease with the Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board to serve as the fixed base operator at the Campbell County airport, providing services such as flight instruction and aircraft maintenance. The Board was responsible for maintaining certain airport facilities and for shared maintenance of the fuel farm. In March 2025, the Board issued a notice terminating GateOne’s lease, asserting breach of contract, and subsequently took over GateOne’s operations and solicited its employees.GateOne filed a lawsuit against the Board in the District Court of Campbell County, seeking declaratory relief, damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The Board moved to dismiss the suit under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that it was immune from suit under both the terms of the lease and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The district court denied the Board’s motion, finding that the lease was ambiguous regarding the preservation of governmental immunity and could reasonably be read in more than one way. The Board appealed that denial.The Supreme Court of Wyoming first determined that the order denying the motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity was immediately appealable because immunity under the WGCA constitutes immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. On review, the Supreme Court held that the lease was ambiguous as to whether it preserved the Board’s immunity from contract claims, noting conflicting provisions and the need to consider extrinsic evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings to resolve the ambiguity using extrinsic evidence, as necessary. View "Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board v. GateOne Gillette, LLC" on Justia Law

A marine-equipment dealership purchased insurance policies through its agent, who obtained those policies from a wholesale insurance broker. The dealership alleged it paid its insurance agent a sum significantly greater than the premiums that were ultimately forwarded to the broker and that, after canceling the policies, the agent failed to return the excess amount. The broker refunded a portion of the unearned premiums to the agent, but the dealership maintained that it was also owed the larger sum it paid in excess, as those funds had not been properly applied or returned.The dealership filed suit in the Baldwin Circuit Court against the insurance agent, alleging negligence, wantonness, recklessness, and/or fraud for mishandling and wrongfully retaining premium payments. The insurance agent, in response, moved to interplead the smaller, refunded amount from the broker into court in exchange for its dismissal from the case. The circuit court granted the agent’s motions to interplead those funds, awarded attorney’s fees to the agent from that amount, and dismissed the agent from the action. The dealership’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and subsequently, the dealership and the wholesale broker petitioned for relief.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petition for a writ of mandamus. It held that interpleader was not proper in this situation because the funds at issue were not exposed to double or multiple liability, and the claims against the agent included independent allegations of liability beyond the interpleaded sum. The court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the agent from the lawsuit based solely on the interpleader. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition and issued the writ, directing the circuit court to vacate its order. View "In re: Gulf Shores Power Sports, Inc. v. McCarron Insurance Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court against the Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce, alleging that their applications for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic were unreasonably delayed. They also claimed that the Department’s notices regarding the unemployment process were too difficult to understand, violating the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. Their complaint sought various forms of injunctive relief, primarily to require prompt processing of applications and to mandate that notices be written at a level comprehensible to people with an eighth-grade education.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had not exhausted the required state administrative remedies under Alabama law. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that federal law under Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida precluded the exhaustion requirement for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed this decision, but only on the narrow ground that, when a state’s exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from § 1983 claims of administrative delay, such claims cannot be denied for failure to exhaust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama directed the circuit court to determine if the case was moot, given that the Secretary asserted all plaintiffs had either been paid or received final denials. The circuit court found the case moot. Reviewing this determination, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the plaintiffs had not shown any remaining justiciable controversy, as their delay claims were moot and their arguments for relief on the notice claims were inadequately supported. The court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Johnson v. Reed" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of teachers, professors, students, parents, and advocacy organizations challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted Mississippi law, House Bill 1193, which restricts the use of state education funds for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in public schools and colleges. The law prohibits the mandatory implementation of DEI programs, penalizing students for disagreeing with DEI concepts, promoting DEI through official course materials, and engaging in DEI activities in official capacities, while carving out exceptions for scholarly research, creative works, and student group activities.After the plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge on First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction blocking the law’s enforcement. The district court’s proceedings, however, were marred by multiple errors: the TRO included fabricated facts, non-existent parties, and a citation to a fictitious case, some of which stemmed from the judge’s or his clerk’s reliance on artificial intelligence in drafting. When these issues came to light, the judge revised the TRO without adequate explanation and incorporated the flawed order by reference into the preliminary injunction. The district court’s legal analysis was also found deficient, failing to properly apply binding Supreme Court precedent and misinterpreting the requirements for facial constitutional challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found grave procedural and substantive errors in the district court’s handling, including the use of fabricated evidence, failure to follow controlling legal standards, and an overbroad injunction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the errors justified reassignment of the case to a different district judge on remand. The court provided detailed instructions for the new judge, emphasizing the need to follow the Supreme Court’s framework for facial First Amendment challenges and to properly analyze the law’s scope and constitutionality. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand the case for further proceedings before a new judge. View "Jackson Federation of Teachers v. Fitch" on Justia Law