Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Following significant property damage due to a rainstorm in January 2023, several local government entities in Merced County, including the City of Merced and a school district, filed suit against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). They alleged that the CDFW’s restrictions on cleaning and maintaining waterways contributed to flooding that caused the damage. Subsequent to this initial complaint, other parties—including homeowners, businesses, and insurers—filed related actions against CDFW, the City, and the County. These cases were ultimately consolidated in Merced County Superior Court.After consolidation, CDFW became the sole nonresident defendant in the case. In late 2025, CDFW sought to transfer the venue out of Merced County, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 and 397, which generally allow for venue changes to guard against local prejudice in actions involving local government plaintiffs and nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Superior Court of Merced County ruled that venue was proper in Merced County under Government Code section 955.3, which specifically governs actions brought by local agencies against the State of California. The court also found CDFW’s motion untimely.CDFW then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that Government Code section 955.3 expressly provides that such actions may be tried in the county where the local government plaintiff is situated, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The court concluded that section 955.3 supersedes section 394 and that the Attorney General’s ability to seek a venue change under section 397 is limited to a pre-answer motion, which was not made here. The stay previously issued was lifted, and costs were awarded to the real parties in interest. View "Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involved a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The main issue was whether the action was "brought to trial" within the statutory period required by California law, which mandates dismissal if a civil case is not brought to trial within five years (plus a COVID-19 emergency extension). As the deadline approached, several panels of prospective jurors were assembled and sworn in by the trial court, and the court conducted hardship excusals. However, the parties did not begin their voir dire examination of the sworn juror panels before the deadline expired.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the action with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360, concluding the matter was not "brought to trial" by the deadline. The trial court reasoned that jury selection had not sufficiently commenced because the parties had not yet started their voir dire examination of the juror panels. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, consistent with Stueve v. Nemer, a civil action is "brought to trial" when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in the courtroom for voir dire and is sworn in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a). The court determined that the action was timely "brought to trial" on the date the panels were sworn, regardless of whether the parties' examination of the jurors had begun. The court reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding it was error to dismiss the case since the statutory requirements were met when the jury panels were assembled and sworn before the deadline. The plaintiff was awarded costs on appeal. View "Wilson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A police officer in Somerville, Massachusetts was terminated from his position following alleged misconduct connected to his use of an informant, which ultimately resulted in the informant attacking a third party. The officer did not initially disclose all relevant information during the investigation of the attack. After further internal investigation and public accusations, including statements made by city officials to the press, the officer was officially terminated. He challenged his termination by both pursuing arbitration under the police union’s collective bargaining agreement and by filing a civil suit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law regarding interference with advantageous relations. While the lawsuit was pending, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay. Following this, the mayor placed the officer on paid administrative leave, which affected his ability to earn overtime and additional compensation.The case was first filed in Middlesex Superior Court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district judge allowed the officer to seek damages at trial not only for the termination but also for being placed on paid leave after reinstatement, even though the officer never amended his complaint to include this post-arbitration event as a basis for liability. The district court permitted the jury to award damages for both the termination and the paid-leave decision, over the defendants’ repeated objections.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on the paid-leave decision. The appellate court held that, absent an amended complaint or the defendants’ consent, new factual bases for liability such as the paid-leave decision could not be considered at trial. The First Circuit reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DiFronzo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted.The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, asserting that these firms contributed to the opioid crisis in Kentucky by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase opioid supply. Kentucky alleged the PBMs negotiated with drug companies to give opioids preferred placement on formularies in exchange for rebates and fees, thus violating state consumer protection laws and creating a public nuisance. The PBMs served both federal and commercial clients, including federal workers under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, TRICARE members, and Veterans Health Administration beneficiaries.Following removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by the PBMs under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), Kentucky sought to remand the case to state court, arguing its complaint disclaimed liability for conduct undertaken at the direction of federal officers. The district court granted Kentucky’s motion to remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Relying on its prior decision in Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC, and similar decisions from other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined the PBMs acted under federal officers when administering federal health benefits and that Kentucky’s claims related to conduct performed under federal supervision. The court found the PBMs had raised colorable federal defenses, including immunity and preemption under federal statutes governing federal health plans, TRICARE, ERISA, and Medicare Part D. The court concluded that Kentucky’s complaint targeted indivisible conduct relating to federal duties, so the PBMs met the requirements for removal under § 1442. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Two American entrepreneurs established three international corporations to invest in the casino and gaming industry in Laos. Two of these corporations became involved in disputes with the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), resulting in multiple arbitration proceedings in Singapore. The tribunals issued monetary awards in favor of Lao PDR against the two companies. Lao PDR tried to collect the awards through various means, including contacting corporate officers, filing suits abroad, and pursuing enforcement actions in U.S. courts. After an unsuccessful attempt in Idaho, Lao PDR filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to enforce the arbitral awards, asserting that the entrepreneurs and their third corporation, Bridge Capital, were alter egos of the award-debtor corporations and should also be liable.The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted a joint motion by Baldwin and Bridge Capital to dismiss the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to enforce the awards against parties not named as debtors in the arbitral awards. The court reasoned that Lao PDR would need to bring a separate action to pursue enforcement against alleged alter egos. The court stayed a similar motion by Scott pending the present appeal.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 because the awards arose from a commercial, international relationship and were foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The appellate court determined that the district court was required to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s alter ego theory in a single enforcement proceeding, rather than requiring a separate action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN" on Justia Law

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan.The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law

Island Creek Associates, LLC was awarded a multiple award contract (MAC) known as SeaPort-NxG by the United States Navy, alongside two other companies, Don Selvy Enterprises, Inc. (DSE) and Precise Systems Inc., each receiving contracts on identical terms. In 2022, DSE and Precise formed a joint venture, Secise, under the Small Business Administration’s Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP). In 2024, the Navy issued a modification to the SeaPort-NxG MAC, allowing MPP joint ventures, as well as their mentor and protégé members, to each hold a separate MAC, creating an exception to the previous “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule. Following this modification and the issuance of a task order to Secise, Island Creek filed a five-count complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, raising challenges to the contract modification, its implementation, and an alleged organizational conflict of interest involving a Navy contracting official and a Precise employee.After Island Creek’s complaint, the Navy took corrective action by rescinding the challenged portions of the contract modification, thereby reverting to the original rules. The Navy then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the corrective action mooted four counts and that the remaining count was barred by statutory restrictions. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint, holding that Island Creek lacked statutory standing as an “interested party” under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), but did not rule on mootness or the application of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on alternative grounds. The appellate court held that Counts I–III and V were moot due to the Navy’s corrective action, which eradicated the effects of the challenged modification. It further held that Count IV was barred under the FASA’s task order protest provision, 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f), and Island Creek lacked statutory standing to challenge Precise’s award. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Todd Mueller was shopping at a Walmart in Duluth, Georgia, when store employee Brandon Burston suspected him of shoplifting and surveilled him. After Mueller checked out, Burston and another associate approached him, resulting in a disputed encounter that led Mueller to exit through a rear entrance. Police pursued and arrested Mueller for obstruction of justice, and Burston later applied for a shoplifting warrant. Mueller also filed assault claims with police, but an additional warrant was issued against him for filing a false report. Ultimately, Mueller faced charges for obstruction, shoplifting, and filing a false police report. The district attorney declined to prosecute the false-report charge, negotiated a plea for obstruction resulting in probation, and dropped the shoplifting charge, with the parties disputing whether the latter was connected to the plea deal.Mueller initially sued Walmart and Burston in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, as well as various state-law claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. Mueller abandoned the federal claims, which the district court dismissed. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but declined jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims, dismissing them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that district courts have broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some, but not all, state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional decisions but reversed the summary judgment on Mueller’s malicious-prosecution claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find in Mueller’s favor regarding favorable termination of the shoplifting charge. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mueller v. Walmart Corporation" on Justia Law

A school principal and special education teacher sought a protective order against the mother of an autistic student after an incident at a local gas station. The mother, who worked at the station, threw change at the principal and made a comment interpreted as a threat. The event was captured on security cameras. The principal petitioned for a temporary order of protection, alleging assault and fear of bodily injury.The Richland County Justice Court held two hearings. At the evidentiary hearing, it reviewed testimony and video footage, determining the change had been thrown purposefully as a message, and that the accompanying statement was threatening. While the court concluded the act was not an assault in a criminal sense, it found that the totality of the actions and words caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury. The Justice Court granted a permanent order of protection for one year, barring the mother from approaching the principal and certain locations, and prohibiting any contact. The mother appealed to the Seventh Judicial District Court, arguing that no crime had been committed and the protective order was unwarranted. The District Court affirmed the Justice Court’s decision, finding that the mother had caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury and had not preserved an objection to the scope of the order for appeal.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana determined the case was not moot due to the public interest exception. It clarified that the standard of proof for making an order of protection permanent is a preponderance of the evidence, not a separate “good cause” standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s findings, holding that sufficient evidence supported the protective order and that the appellant had not preserved a challenge to its scope. View "Nelson v. Frisk" on Justia Law