Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company.An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges. View "Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations of breach of contract and related claims involving a credit card account that the defendant allegedly opened with a national bank. The bank claimed that the defendant opened the account, used it for purchases and cash advances, and then defaulted by failing to make the required payments, leaving a substantial unpaid balance. The defendant denied the material allegations in her answer to the complaint.After the initial pleadings, the bank moved for summary judgment in the Kent County Superior Court, asserting that there were no material facts in dispute and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Importantly, the bank’s motion was not initially accompanied by any supporting affidavits or exhibits. The defendant filed an affidavit in opposition, pointing out the lack of any supporting affidavit from the bank. On the day of the hearing, the bank submitted an affidavit by emailing it to the hearing justice’s clerk, rather than filing and serving it in accordance with procedural rules. Despite the defendant’s objections to this late submission and improper service, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, relying on the belated affidavit. Final judgment was entered, and the defendant appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Supreme Court found that the bank’s failure to timely file and serve the affidavit, as required by Rule 6(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudiced the defendant’s ability to respond. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice erred in relying on the untimely affidavit and in not postponing the hearing. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "American Express National Bank v. Perretta" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by law enforcement while driving a rental car in Kansas. During the stop, officers discovered a locked suitcase in his vehicle, which he claimed belonged to someone else. After forcibly opening the suitcase, officers found a large sum of cash and a notebook referencing marijuana. The money was seized, and the man was taken to highway patrol headquarters, where he denied ownership of the suitcase and cash, but ultimately signed a property disclaimer at the officers’ request. He was later released.The State, acting through the Kansas Highway Patrol, initiated a forfeiture proceeding in the Saline District Court to retain the seized cash. The man filed a claim asserting an interest in the funds and moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search, including his statements and the disclaimer. The State sought to strike his claim, arguing that his verbal and written disclaimers deprived him of standing. The district court addressed the State’s motion first, found the disclaimer voluntary, and concluded the man lacked standing to contest the forfeiture or to pursue his suppression motion. As a result, the district court dismissed him as a claimant. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding the district court should have considered the suppression motion before ruling on standing.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that it is an error of law, and thus an abuse of discretion, for a district court to rely on contested evidence without first ruling on its admissibility when a timely objection has been made. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case, directing the lower court to first address the evidentiary objections before making any further rulings. View "State ex rel. Kansas Highway Patrol v. Fuleki " on Justia Law

An Oklahoma company, formed to acquire mineral rights in Appalachia, alleged that two Texas parties failed to convey certain West Virginia mineral interests as contractually agreed. The Oklahoma company, which included non-Texas owners and participants, had funded the purchase of these rights, but a number of mineral deeds were recorded in the name of the Texas seller rather than the buyer. As a result, royalties from those mineral rights were paid to the seller. The Oklahoma plaintiff sought to compel the Texas defendants to reform the deeds, perform their contractual obligations, declare the plaintiff’s entitlement to the royalties, and enjoin the defendants from transferring the disputed interests.The 141st District Court in Tarrant County, Texas, denied the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and ultimately granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, awarding specific performance, deed reformation, declaratory relief, an injunction, and monetary relief. The court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and the contract, even though the mineral rights were located in West Virginia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed, holding that Texas courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit’s gravamen was the adjudication of title to foreign (West Virginia) real property.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the matter and disagreed with the appellate court’s application of the so-called “gist” rule. The Supreme Court held that Texas courts with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue in personam judgments concerning contractual obligations to convey out-of-state real property, as long as the judgment binds only the parties and does not purport to establish or alter title to the property by the court’s own force. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of remaining issues. View "BRAXTON MINERALS III, LLC v. BAUER" on Justia Law

A young man died after his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned and operated by a nationwide commercial motor carrier. The victim’s parents and his estate brought a wrongful-death and survival action against the trucking company, its driver, and a customer whose goods were being transported at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the customer was negligent for hiring the trucking company, claiming it should have known the carrier employed reckless drivers due to a history of safety violations. However, the pleadings did not allege that the customer owned, operated, or controlled the truck, employed the driver, influenced how the shipment was conducted, or that the shipment itself involved any unusual risk or hazard.The trucking company and driver were sued for negligence and gross negligence. The plaintiffs later amended their petition to name the customer (a national retailer) as a defendant on the same theories. The customer moved to dismiss the claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing it owed no duty of care to the public as a mere shipper of goods transported by an independent, federally regulated carrier. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on petition for writ of mandamus. It held that Texas law does not impose a duty of care on a passive shipper in these circumstances. The court concluded that because the customer neither created nor controlled the risk, and the allegations did not show any exception to the general rule against liability for acts of independent contractors, the claims against the customer had no basis in law. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its denial and dismiss the claims against the customer. View "IN RE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC." on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, which created a private civil enforcement mechanism for certain abortion restrictions, the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity’s deputy director made a sworn statement indicating the Fund had paid for abortions potentially in violation of that law. In response, Sadie Weldon filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County seeking to depose the deputy director and obtain documents related to possible violations of the statute. While Weldon's petition was pending, the Lilith Fund initiated a lawsuit against Weldon, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief to prevent Weldon from pursuing related legal actions.The trial court denied Weldon’s Rule 202 petition, and Weldon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Lilith Fund’s suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which aims to quickly dispose of lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech, association, or petition. The trial court did not rule on Weldon’s TCPA motion, resulting in its denial by operation of law. Weldon appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed the denial, holding that the TCPA did not apply because the Fund’s suit was not “based on or in response to” Weldon’s Rule 202 petition.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply. The Court found that the Fund’s legal action was indeed “based on or in response to” Weldon’s exercise of her right to petition, as her Rule 202 petition was a protected activity under the statute and the Fund’s lawsuit sought relief directly connected to that petition. As a result, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings under the remaining steps of the TCPA analysis. View "WELDON v. THE LILITH FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY" on Justia Law

A private trust owning land near a community park at Triboji Beach, adjacent to West Okoboji Lake, sought to quiet title to an unpaved road (Lakeview Drive) bordering its property. The land, including the road, had originally been dedicated to public use in 1929 by the Tribune Company. Despite the public’s longstanding use of the road for access to the beach and park, the trust initiated a quiet-title action against “Unknown Claimants,” providing notice solely by publication in a local newspaper. No parties appeared to contest the petition, resulting in a default judgment for the trust.Following the judgment, a group of neighboring landowners who regularly used the road discovered the action and filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County to vacate the default judgment. They argued that they, as well as the State of Iowa, should have received personal service because they were known or readily ascertainable interested parties. The district court initially agreed, finding that failure to personally serve the landowners and the State constituted fraud. However, after reconsideration, the district court reversed itself, holding that neither the landowners nor the State had a specific property interest requiring personal service and dismissed the petition to vacate, reinstating the default judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trust’s failure to provide personal service to the neighboring landowners, who were known or readily ascertainable and had a potential adverse interest, constituted a procedural irregularity requiring the default judgment to be vacated. The Court also determined the trust was required to personally serve the State due to its potential jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 461A.11(2). The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Streeter v. The Dunn Trust Dated May 20, 2005" on Justia Law

A house in Hoover, Alabama was owned by William and Roberta as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. After William’s death in 2012, Roberta remained at the property, later joined by her son, Parker, who eventually married Hall. Roberta died in 2019, and Parker claimed he became the property owner as her sole heir. The mortgage, originally executed with Countrywide Home Loans and later assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), went into default, leading to foreclosure in 2021. BONY purchased the property at foreclosure, but Parker and Hall did not vacate. BONY filed an ejectment action in 2022, initially naming William and Roberta (both deceased) as defendants, later substituting Parker, Hall, and the estate of Roberta.The Shelby Circuit Court granted summary judgment for BONY and Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), ordering Parker and Hall to make payments into court, granting BONY immediate possession, declaring Parker and Hall forfeited any right of redemption for failing to vacate, and granting judgment against their counterclaims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and first addressed whether the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that, because the original complaint only named deceased persons as defendants, the action was void from its inception and did not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the circuit court had no authority to entertain amendments, substitute the estate, or address any further motions or pleadings. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court’s order and remanded with instructions for the trial court to vacate its order and dismiss the action, without prejudice. This disposition was based solely on the jurisdictional defect, pretermitting other arguments. View "Parker v. The Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Two brothers became parties to a dispute over the inheritance of their father’s estate after the father died intestate. One brother, Christopher, asserted that his sibling, Daniel, was not the biological child of their father, Ernest, and therefore not entitled to inherit. Christopher petitioned for letters of administration in the probate court, claiming to be Ernest's sole heir. The probate court granted him letters of administration. Christopher then sought to remove the estate administration to the circuit court, filing a petition that was not verified under oath as required by Alabama law. The circuit court entered an order removing the administration and later, based on DNA evidence, an affidavit from the mother, and Daniel’s marriage certificate, declared that Daniel was not Ernest’s biological child or heir.After the circuit court’s order, Daniel filed a postjudgment motion arguing that the removal of the estate administration was invalid because Christopher’s initial removal petition was not sworn, as required by Ala. Code § 12-11-41. Around the same time as the hearing on this motion, Christopher submitted an amended, sworn petition for removal, and the circuit court then entered a new order granting removal. However, this action occurred after the circuit court had already issued its prior order resolving the inheritance dispute.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the estate administration was not properly invoked until a sworn petition was filed, as mandated by statute. Thus, the July 2025 order declaring Daniel not an heir was void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at the time it was entered. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the July 2025 order. View "Thomas v. Thomas" on Justia Law