Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

by
In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, a dispute arose over the distribution of a deceased person's estate, particularly a 1978 Ford pickup truck. The decedent was Ronald Glen Kemmer, who died intestate and was survived by his four adult children: Travis Kemmer, Becky Mastley, Collette Cole, and Ronda Gilge, referred to as the Heirs. Travis Kemmer served as the Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate. The Heirs could not agree on the disposition of the truck, and a conflict arose over whether a binding agreement had been reached and whether Travis Kemmer, as PR, had breached his fiduciary duties by not drafting a written agreement on the truck's distribution.The Court found that the PR was not obligated to draft a formal written agreement. The plain language of Montana's Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) requires a written contract executed by all successors to alter the amounts to which they are entitled under the laws of intestacy, and this requirement was not fulfilled in this case. The Court also held that the PR had no duty to piece together emails and texts to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds among successors or to take responsibility for putting any such agreement in writing.As such, the Court reversed the District Court's order that had concluded that the PR had a duty to draft a written agreement and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Kemmer" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

by
In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff, Rudolph Betancourt, a disabled individual, filed a lawsuit against Indian Hills Plaza LLC, the owner of a shopping plaza, citing violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff experienced difficulties accessing the shopping plaza due to his disability. The parties agreed that the defendant had violated the ADA in 17 aspects, and Indian Hills Plaza LLC undertook remediation measures. The district court awarded Betancourt $12,000 in attorney's fees and costs. However, Betancourt appealed this decision, believing he was entitled to more.The main issue on appeal was the challenge to the district court's award of attorney’s fees and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The court explained that the district court properly calculated the lodestar amount (reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the reasonable number of hours worked), which serves as a baseline for attorney's fees. It reduced the hourly rate considering the quality of the performance of Betancourt’s attorney and reduced the number of hours billed by 20% due to excessive billing. The court further reduced the attorney’s fees award based on deficiencies in the actions by Betancourt’s counsel during the litigation. The district court also deemed the requested expert costs as unreasonable and reduced them.Therefore, the holding of the case is that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $12,000 in attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff, and that the court properly calculated the lodestar amount and adjusted it based on relevant considerations. The court also held that the plaintiff's attorney's premature fee motions, not the defendant's opposition to those motions, caused the excessive fees. View "Betancourt v. Indian Hills Plaza LLC" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the plaintiff, Maria Del Rosario Hernandez, filed a lawsuit against MicroBilt Corporation alleging the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act after the lender denied her loan application based on inaccurate information provided by a MicroBilt product. MicroBilt moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions that Hernandez agreed to while applying for the loan, which included an arbitration provision. However, Hernandez had already submitted her claims to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) for arbitration.The AAA notified MicroBilt that its agreement with Hernandez was a consumer agreement, which meant the AAA's Consumer Arbitration Rules applied. Applying these rules, the AAA notified MicroBilt that its arbitration provision included a material or substantial deviation from the Consumer Rules and/or Protocol. Specifically, the provision’s limitation on damages conflicted with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, which requires that an arbitrator should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in equity. After MicroBilt did not waive the damages limitation, the AAA declined to administer the arbitration under Rule 1(d).MicroBilt asked Hernandez to submit her claims to a different arbitrator, but she refused, requesting a hearing before the District Court. She argued that she must now pursue her claims in court because the AAA dismissed the case under Rule 1(d). The District Court reinstated Hernandez’s complaint and granted MicroBilt leave to move to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. However, the District Court denied MicroBilt’s motion to compel, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Hernandez had fully complied with MicroBilt’s arbitration provision, which allowed her to pursue her claims in court. The court held that it lacked the authority to compel arbitration. The court rejected MicroBilt's arguments that the AAA administrator improperly resolved an arbitrability issue that should have been resolved by an arbitrator, that the provision’s Exclusive Resolution clause conflicted with Hernandez’s return to court, and that the AAA’s application of the Consumer Due Process Protocol was unreasonable. The court concluded that it lacked the authority to review the AAA’s decision or to sever the damages limitation from the arbitration provision. View "Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp" on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's approval of a class action settlement between Tinder and Lisa Kim, a user of the dating app, ruling that Kim was not an adequate class representative. This class action lawsuit against Tinder was over its former age-based pricing model. Kim had agreed to arbitration, unlike over 7,000 potential members of the class, creating a fundamental conflict of interest that violated Rule 23(a)(4). The court found that Kim had a strong interest in settling her claim as she had no chance of going to trial, unlike the other members. The court also noted that Kim failed to vigorously litigate the case on behalf of the class, with her approach to opposing Tinder’s motion to compel arbitration not suggesting vigor. The court remanded the case for consideration of Kim's individual action against Tinder. View "KIM V. TINDER, INC." on Justia Law

by
In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the question of when an order finding contempt becomes a final, appealable order. The case arose from a dispute between Robert A. Sweetapple and Asset Enhancement, Inc., in which Sweetapple was found in contempt by a bankruptcy court for violating an automatic stay. The bankruptcy court awarded Asset Enhancement attorney's fees and costs for filing and prosecuting its motion for contempt, but did not specify the amount. The amount was later determined in a subsequent order. Sweetapple appealed the contempt order to the district court, but the district court dismissed his appeal as untimely, reasoning that the contempt order was a final, appealable order when it was issued, not when the amount of the attorney's fees was later determined. Sweetapple then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit held that the contempt order did not become a final, appealable order until the bankruptcy court issued the later order setting the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. The court reasoned that this rule avoided the risk of disrupting ongoing proceedings and was consistent with its precedent. Accordingly, since Sweetapple filed his appeal within fourteen days of the bankruptcy court's issuance of the later order, his appeal of the contempt order was timely and the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of Sweetapple's appeal and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Sweetapple v. Asset Enhancement, Inc." on Justia Law

by
In a collision between two vessels on the Mississippi River, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana law, not general maritime law, governs the burden of proof for the pilot's error.On January 3, 2019, the M/V STRANDJA, piloted by Captain Robert Johnson, drifted from its anchorage into the middle of the river, colliding with the M/V KIEFFER E. BAILEY, owned by Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland LLC. The collision caused damage to both vessels. Marquette brought claims against STRANDJA's owner, Balkan Navigation Ltd, and manager, Navigation Maritime Bulgare JSC (collectively referred to as "Balkan"), alleging their negligence caused the collision.A jury found that Marquette was not negligent and that Balkan and Captain Johnson were each 50% at fault. The jury awarded Marquette $114,000 in damages and awarded Balkan $0 in damages. Both Balkan and Captain Johnson appealed the judgment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment that Marquette was not negligent, and therefore not liable for the accident. However, the court found that the district court erred in instructing the jury to apply general maritime law, which only requires a finding of ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, to the claim against Captain Johnson. Instead, the court held that Louisiana law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, should have been applied.As a result, the court vacated the judgment against Balkan and Captain Johnson and remanded the case for a new trial, applying the correct standard of proof under Louisiana law. The court also ordered Marquette to amend its complaint within 14 days to allege admiralty jurisdiction as the jurisdictional basis for its claim against Balkan. View "Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C. v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the Gibson Foundation, a charitable arm of Gibson Brands, sued Rob Norris and The Piano Mill Group, alleging that they breached a contract and bailment when they refused to return a piano that had been used by entertainer Liberace, upon Gibson Foundation's request. The piano was initially transferred from Gibson Brands to Norris and Piano Mill. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the breach-of-bailment claim was not time-barred, reversing the lower court's decision. The court explained that a reasonable juror could find that Gibson Brands, the original owner of the piano, and Norris and Piano Mill had a mutual agreement where Gibson Brands would avoid storage costs by leaving the piano with Norris and Piano Mill, who would benefit from using the piano for promotional opportunities. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations for certain contract claims applied, rather than the three-year limit for tort claims. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Gibson Foundation, or its predecessor in title, Gibson Brands, owned the piano in question, which is necessary to establish a valid contract or bailment. The court also affirmed the lower court's denial of summary judgment to Gibson Foundation on the breach of contract claim, noting that a reasonable juror could find that Gibson Brands had given the piano to Norris and Piano Mill as a gift. View "Gibson Foundation, Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law

by
In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, the court evaluated the legality of three members of the City of Mission Viejo City Council holding office after their elected terms had expired. The three council members, Ed Sachs, Wendy Bucknum, and Greg Raths, were elected in November 2018 for two-year terms that expired in December 2020. These two-year terms, rather than the traditional four-year terms, were part of a stipulated judgment to remedy violations of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA). The judgment intended to implement a system of cumulative voting for the city council, with all five seats up for election in November 2020. However, cumulative voting could not be implemented in time for the 2020 election, and the three councilmembers did not stand for reelection but continued to hold office after their terms expired.Michael Schlesinger, the plaintiff, brought a quo warranto lawsuit, with the permission of the California Attorney General, to have the three councilmembers removed from office. The councilmembers argued that they were entitled to hold office until the next cumulative voting election in 2022. However, the court ruled that the councilmembers were elected for two-year terms, and the stipulated judgment did not extend their terms contingent on the implementation of cumulative voting. As a result, the court affirmed the quo warranto judgment that Sachs, Bucknum, and Raths were holding office unlawfully after their terms expired in December 2020. View "P. ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs" on Justia Law