The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a library district, holding that Senate Bill 175 (SB 175) does not preempt a library district from banning the possession of firearms on its premises. In 2015, the Legislature enacted SB 175, which declares that the regulation of firearms in the State is within the exclusive domain of the Legislature and that any other law, regulation, or rule to the contrary is null and void. The library district in this case had a policy prohibiting patrons from bringing firearms onto the district’s premises. Plaintiff filed a declaratory relief action seeking a ruling that SB 175 preempted the district from enforcing its policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the library district. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because SB 175’s plain language expressly pertains only to counties, cities, or towns with respect to firearm regulation, library districts are not within the field of governmental entities that the Legislature expressly stated SB 175 would preempt. View "Flores v. Las Vegas-Clark County Library District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing Appellant’s counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), holding that the Court was unable to address the sole issue raised by Appellant on appeal. On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider her counterclaim because DHS was entitled to sovereign immunity and that her case should be dismissed without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to preserve her sovereign-immunity argument, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the counterclaim. View "Wilson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether full faith and credit required Washington courts to enforce an Illinois class action judgment by dismissing subsequent local cases based on the same facts. An Illinois medical provider brought a nationwide consumer protection class action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in Illinois. The suit was settled and approved by an Illinois trial court. Chan Healthcare group, a Washington provider, received reasonable notice of the suit, but neither opted out of the class nor objected to the settlement. Chan sought to collaterally challenge the Illinois judgment in Washington courts, arguing the interests of Washington class members were not adequately represented in Illinois. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Chan failed to show its due process rights were violated, thus full faith and credit required Washington courts to enforce the Illinois judgment. View "Chan Healthcare Grp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Appellants’ motion to intervene in a partnership dissolution action, holding that Appellants failed to meet the tripartite test necessary for intervention as a matter of right under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-24(a)(2). Appellants entered into a farm lease/cash rent agreement with Berbos Farms General Partnership. Appellants sued Berbos Farms to recover unpaid cash rent under the lease for the years 2015. During discovery, Appellants learned that Joe and Lisa Berbos, partners in Berbos Farms, had filed a separate action to dissolve Berbos Farms. Seeking to preserve their right to payment of the 2015 cash rent in the event Berbos Farms was dissolved, Appellants move to intervene in the partnership dissolution action. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants failed to show that the claim for unpaid cash rent might be impaired by the disposition of the partnership dissolution lawsuit, the circuit court correctly denied the motion to intervene under section 15-6-24(a)(2). View "Berbos v. Berbos" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review were the insurance proceeds owed to petitioners Rosalin Rogers and Mark Thompson because of a failed property investment orchestrated by their broker-dealer, United Securities Alliance. Ten years into litigation, the issue of the amount of debt at issue has remained at issue, and unresolvable by the courts. United's insurer, Catlin Insurance, was ordered to pay petitioners under a professional liability policy; an appellate court upheld a district court's determination of attorney fees and costs that Catlin could deduct from the liability limit under the policy. The Supreme Court first addressed whether the "Thompson IV" division erred when it upheld the district court’s decision to consider new evidence on remand from Thompson v. United Securities Alliance, Inc. (Thompson III), No. 13CA2037, (Colo. App. Oct. 16, 2014). And Secondly, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Thompson IV division erred when it held that there was no legal basis for awarding prejudgment interest in a garnishment proceeding. As to the first issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals; as to the second, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thompson v. Catlin" on Justia Law

McCormick County voters elected Clarke Anderson Stearns as their Sheriff in the November 8, 2016, general election. After the election, Appellants brought this action alleging "Stearns does not possess the necessary qualifications to be Sheriff of McCormick County." Based on that claim, Appellants "specifically request[ed]" the circuit court issue an order "enjoining the Defendant Stearns from serving as Sheriff of McCormick County." Before the circuit court action was filed, however, the losing candidate in the general election, J.R. Jones, filed a Title 7 election protest with the McCormick County Board of Canvassers. Jones filed the challenge on November 16, 2016. The county board held a hearing on November 21. By a vote of 3-to-3, the county board took no action on Jones's protest. Jones did not appeal the county board's decision. Jones then filed this action in circuit court on December 7, 2016, joined as plaintiff by the South Carolina Democratic Party and the McCormick County Democratic Party. This appeal presented two issues for the South Carolina Supreme Court's resolution: (1) whether a challenge to an elected official's legal qualifications to serve in the office to which he has just been elected must be brought pursuant to the administrative provisions of Title 7 of the South Carolina Code, or whether such a challenge may be brought in circuit court; and (2) whether the "certified law enforcement officer" requirement to serve as sheriff, found in subsection 23-11- 110(A)(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018), required the certification to come from South Carolina authorities, as opposed to authorities in another state. The Supreme Court determined the plaintiffs in this case were permitted to bring the action in circuit court, but the necessary certification to serve as sheriff need not come from South Carolina authorities. The Court affirmed the result of the circuit court's decision, which did not remove the elected McCormick County Sheriff from office. View "Jones v. South Carolina Republican Party" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2009, plaintiffs sued defendants, including Associated Insulation, for injuries arising out of plaintiffs’ alleged asbestos exposure. Plaintiffs served Associated with the complaints. Associated, which apparently ceased operating in 1974, did not respond. The court entered default judgments, ranging from $350,000 to $1,960,458. Plaintiffs served notice of the judgments on Associated, but not on Fireman’s Fund. After entry of the judgments, Fireman’s located insurance policies appearing to provide coverage for Associated, retained counsel, and moved to set aside the defaults. Fireman’s argued “extrinsic mistake” because service of the complaint on Associated did not provide notice to Fireman’s and that it “never had the opportunity to participate in [the] lawsuit.” Plaintiffs noted that in two cases, they sent a “demand seeking coverage” to Fireman’s which was “acknowledged and denied” in 2012. Fireman’s had responded that it had searched all available records without locating any reference or policies of insurance issued to Associated. Plaintiffs did not respond with evidence of coverage. The court set aside the defaults. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Fireman’s has a meritorious case and articulated a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense. Fireman’s established diligence in “seeking to set aside the default” judgments once they were discovered. View "Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Water Court denying Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC’s (LBWR) motion to reopen proceedings and its request to substitute as an objector, holding that the Water Court did not err when it denied LBWR’s motion to reopen cases 40M-171 and 40M-238 and when it denied LBWR’s request for substitution in those cases. At issue was two water rights from Big Warm Springs Creek and Little Warm Springs Creek - one claim for stock water and the other claim for irrigation. The Water Court in this case determined that LBWR was not entitled to substitute itself as an objector to Claimants’ water rights in Cases 40M-171 and 40 M-238 and denied LBWR’s request for substitution and its motion to reopen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court did not err. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Victory Insurance Company’s (Victory) motion to change venue, holding that the specific venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 33-2-1118 controlled over the general venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-124. Appellant Matthew Rosendale filed a complaint against Victory, a Montana workers’ compensation insurance company with its principal office located in Custer County, Victory’s president, and a living trust formed under the laws of South Dakota and a Victory shareholder, seeking statutory fines and to enjoin Victory pursuant to alleged violations of Montana’s Holding Company Act. Appellant filed the complaint in the First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County. Victory filed a motion to change venue to Custer County. The district court granted the motion on the basis that section 33-2-1118 controlled and that venue was proper in Custer County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that venue was proper in Custer County for all defendants. View "Rosendale v. Victory Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The North Dakota State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors ("Board") appealed district court judgments affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding to the Board its disciplinary decisions against Michael Berg, Apex Engineering Group, Inc., Scott Olson, Dain Miller, Thomas Welle, and Timothy Paustian. Respondents Berg, Olson, Miller, Welle and Paustian were former employees of Ulteig Engineers, Inc. Olson was terminated from Ulteig in 2009. In 2010, Berg, Miller, Welle, and Paustian resigned from Ulteig and, along with Olson, started a competing business, Apex. Following the Respondents' departure, Ulteig sued Apex and filed an ethics complaint with the Board, alleging Berg, Olson, Miller, Welle and Paustian violated the Professional Engineers' Code of Ethics by disclosing Ulteig's confidential information and failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest by not informing Ulteig of their decision to form Apex. Ulteig also alleged the Respondents knowingly participated in a plan to seek employment for Apex on projects that Ulteig had been contracted to perform before the Respondents' departure from Ulteig. The Board found that each of the Respondents had violated one or more of the provisions of the code of ethics. Respondents appealed the Board's disciplinary decisions to the district court. The court affirmed the Board's decision that Welle, Berg, and Miller failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest. The court reversed the determination that Miller, Welle, and Paustian had improperly disclosed confidential information. The court also reversed the decision that Berg, Olson, and Welle knowingly participated in a plan to seek employment for Apex on projects Ulteig had been contracted to perform before their departure from Ulteig. The court remanded to the Board for reconsideration the discipline imposed on Berg, Olson, Miller, Welle, and Paustian in light of the court's reversal of the disciplinary decisions. The court also awarded attorney fees to Berg, Welle, Apex, Olson, Miller, and Paustian. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Board argued the district court wrongfully reversed the Board's disciplinary decisions because the decisions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded a preponderance of the evidence supported the Board's factual findings regarding the improper solicitation by Welle, Olson, Berg, and Apex. Those findings supported a conclusion that Welle, Olson, Berg, and Apex knowingly sought or accepted employment for professional services for an assignment for which Ulteig was previously employed or contracted to perform in violation of N.D. Admin. Code 28-03.1-01-12(6). The Supreme Court therefore reversed those parts of the district court's judgments relating to the violation of N.D. Admin. Code 28-03.1-01-12(6) by Welle, Olson, Berg, and Apex. View "Berg, et al. v. North Dakota State Board of Registration" on Justia Law