Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This appeal challenges the legality of lease-leaseback agreements used by school districts for construction and modernization projects. The trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's remaining conflict of interest claims because the challenged projects had all been completed, which it held rendered the reverse validation action moot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that allowing plaintiff's claims to proceed long after the projects have been finished would undermine the strong policy of promptly resolving the validity of public agency actions. In this case, the lease-leaseback agreements were subject to validation, and plaintiff's conflict of interest claims necessarily challenge the validity of the agreements, regardless of label or remedy. Because the projects were completed, plaintiff's claims are moot. View "McGee v. Torrance Unified School District" on Justia Law

The mother of an autistic child filed a petition for a protective order against the child’s father, alleging that the father kicked the child during an altercation that took place at the Extreme Fun Center in Wasilla, Alaska. At the hearing on the long-term protective order, the court admitted the mother’s recording of statements the son made to her approximately 30-35 minutes after the incident. The son stated that the father kicked him in the buttocks; the only disinterested witness with personal knowledge of the incident testified that the father did not kick his son. Relying on the recording and testimony from the child’s mother and therapist, the superior court found that the father committed assault; relying on the mother’s testimony, the court found that the father committed criminal trespass and granted the mother’s petition. The court also required the father to undergo a psychological evaluation and pay the mother’s attorney’s fees. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court vacated and remanded the superior court’s assault finding, and reversed the court’s trespass finding. The Court determined the superior court made its findings by a "bare preponderance" of the evidence. It was an abuse of discretion for the superior court to admit the recording without making threshold findings as to the child's competency and the recording’s trustworthiness. The protective order was vacated, as was the order for the father to undergo a psychological evaluation. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephan P. v. Cecilia A." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a group of fourteen diversity cases that were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs in all fourteen cases were cancer treatment providers who purchased multi-dose vials of Herceptin, a breast cancer drug, from defendant Genentech, Inc. (Genentech). Plaintiffs alleged that Genentech violated state law by failing to ensure that each vial of Herceptin contained the labeled amount of the active ingredient, and by misstating the drug concentration and volume on the product labeling. After the cases were consolidated, Genentech moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted by federal law. The district court agreed with Genentech and granted its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were preempted, and consequently, reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: MDL 2700 Genentech" on Justia Law

After movant filed a putative class action against SquareTrade, plaintiff filed a similar suit. Movant moved to intervene in plaintiff's suit, plaintiff and SquareTrade then reached a proposed class settlement, and the district court in plaintiff's case denied the motion to intervene. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that, although movant is situated so that disposing of plaintiff's action may impair his interests, movant is adequately represented by plaintiff, who seeks the same relief for the same claims as movant. Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff settlement constituted a reverse auction. Therefore, the motion to intervene was properly denied. Finally, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion for stay under the first-to-file rule based on lack of pendent jurisdiction. View "Swinton v. Starke" on Justia Law

Subcontractor Construction Drilling, Inc. (CDI) appealed a trial court’s judgment on the merits in its breach-of-contract claim against Engineers Construction, Inc. (ECI). CDI contended the trial court erred in: (1) holding that the terms of the parties’ subcontract required CDI to request a change order before it billed ECI for “drilling in obstructions” in excess of CDI’s bid price; (2) denying CDI’s motions to reopen the evidence and for a new trial; and (3) awarding ECI $234,320 in attorneys’ fees under the Prompt Payment Act. ECI cross-appealed, arguing the trial court improperly allowed CDI’s owner to offer opinion testimony absent a finding of reliability under Vermont Rule of Evidence 702 and maintaining that his testimony could not have met this standard in any event. Therefore, should the Vermont Supreme Court reverse the trial court’s denial of CDI’s breach-of-contract claim, ECI asserted the matter had to be remanded for a new trial without such testimony. The Court affirmed the trial court, and therefore did not reach the issue raised in ECI’s cross-appeal. View "Construction Drilling, Inc. v. Engineers Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Joel Kennamer appealed a circuit court's dismissal of his complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against the City of Guntersville, the City's mayor Leigh Dollar, each member of the Guntersville City Council, and Lakeside Investments, LLC ("Lakeside"). Kennamer's complaint sought to prevent the City from leasing certain City property to Lakeside. Kennamer asserted that the City had erected a pavilion on "Parcel One" for public use and that residents used Parcel One for public fishing, fishing tournaments, truck and tractor shows, and public festivals and events. As for Parcel Two, Kennamer alleged that in 2000, the City petitioned to condemn property belonging to CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), "for the purpose of constructing [a] public boat dock and a public recreational park." In 2019, the City approved an ordinance declaring the development property "is no longer needed for public or municipal purposes." The development agreement, as updated, again affirmed that the development property would be used "for a mixed-use lakefront development containing restaurants, entertainment, retail, office space, high density multi-family residential, and other appropriate commercial uses, including parking." Thereafter, Kennamer sued the City defendants arguing the City lacked the authority to lease to a third-party developer City property that had been dedicated for use as, and/or was being used as, a public park. Finding that the City had the statutory authority to lease the property to the third-party developer, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal. View "Kennamer v. City of Guntersville et al." on Justia Law

TD Bank, National Association and TD Bank US Holding Company (collectively, "TD Bank") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss claims filed against them by Bolaji Kukoyi and Dynamic Civil Solutions, Inc., on the basis of a lack of personal jurisdiction. In January 2017, Kukoyi retained Jessyca McKnight, a real-estate agent and broker employed with A Prime Location, Inc., d/b/a A Prime Real Estate Location ("Prime"), to assist him in purchasing a house. Kukoyi made an offer on a house, the offer was accepted, and the closing was scheduled to take place at attorney David Condon's office in Birmingham. Before the closing date, McKnight and Prime received an e-mail purportedly from Condon's paralegal instructing Kukoyi to wire funds for the closing costs one week before the closing date to an account at a TD Bank location in Florida. According to Kukoyi, he questioned the instructions but was assured by McKnight and Prime that wiring the funds was necessary for the closing to go forward. Kukoyi initiated a wire transfer in the amount of $125,652.74 from an account he owned jointly with Dynamic Civil Solutions with ServisFirst Bank ("ServisFirst") to the account at TD Bank as instructed in the e-mail McKnight and Prime had forwarded to Kukoyi. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, the account to which Kukoyi wired the funds had been opened by a company known as Ozoria Global, Inc. ServisFirst discovered that the wire transfer was fraudulent and had not been completely processed. Kukoyi requested that ServisFirst put a stop-payment on the wire transfer, and ServisFirst advised TD Bank that the transfer had been fraudulent and requested that TD Bank reverse the transfer. In late 2017, plaintiffs sued, asserting various causes of action against TD Bank and other defendants in relation to the wire transfer. By March 2019, TD Bank filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Alabama Supreme Court determined TD Bank demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to mandamus relief, and granted the writ. The trial court was directed to grant TD Bank's motion to dismiss. View "Ex parte TD Bank US Holding Company" on Justia Law

David Turner appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. In August 2017, Turner was on duty as a paramedic and was riding in the passenger seat of an ambulance while responding to an emergency call. While traversing an intersection, the ambulance collided with a vehicle being driven by Michael Norris. Turner suffered multiple injuries, including a broken leg. In November 2017, Turner sued Norris, asserting claims of negligence and "recklessness." Norris answered the complaint, denying that he had been negligent or reckless. Because the Alabama Supreme Court Held that State Farm was discharged from its obligation to pay Turner UIM benefits based on State Farm's payment of a "Lambert" advance and Turner's repudiation of his policy with State Farm, the Court pretermitted consideration of Turner's alternative argument regarding State Farm's failure to disclose the substance of its investigation of Turner's claim for UIM benefits, and expressed no opinion concerning that issue. The Court also expressed no opinion regarding any potential liability State Farm may or may not have to Turner in tort because Turner did not assert such a claim in this action. View "Turner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the validity of District of Columbia regulations that impose minimum education requirements for certain childcare providers. The district court held that the case was non-justiciable on grounds of standing, ripeness, and mootness. The DC Circuit held that the case is justiciable and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of the complaint. The court held that Plaintiff Sorcher's due process and equal protection claims are ripe for review, because she has demonstrated cognizable hardship where, in the absence of a decision in her favor, she will have to begin expending time and money in order to obtain the necessary credentials. The court also held that Plaintiff Sanchez's claims are not moot where there is no dispute that the regulations' education requirements continue to apply to her and her experience waiver is not permanent. Therefore, Sanchez retains a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation and her case is also ripe. Likewise, Plaintiff Homan's claims are similar to Sorcher and Sanchez. View "Sanchez v. Office of the State Superintendent of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that Defendant's assignments of error either were without merit or were not adequately preserved for appellate review. On appeal, Defendant argued that two of the district court's jury instructions were incorrect, that the affidavit relied upon by law enforcement to obtain a warrant to collect a sample of Defendant's DNA was insufficient to support probable cause, and that the identification of Defendant by one of the State's witnesses was unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant either waived his right to assert the allege errors on appeal or that his arguments on appeal were without merit. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law