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The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court vacated the district court's holding that production of a privilege log pursuant to an employment discrimination investigation was sufficient to establish that the attorney-client privilege protected BDO's withheld documents. The court held that by adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation, the district court erred when inverting the burden of proof, requiring that the EEOC prove that BDO improperly asserted the attorney-client privilege as to its withheld documents, and concluding that all communications between a corporation's employees and its counsel were per se privileged. The court remanded for a determination applying the correct attorney-client privilege principles and legal standards. In regard to the protective order, because the magistrate judge's incorrect application of the legal standard may have affected both her analysis of the allegedly disclosed communications and the breadth of the protections she imposed in her order, the court remanded so that BDO's request for protection may be considered under the proper legal standard for determining privilege. View "EEOC v. BDO USA, LLP" on Justia Law

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Edwards owns a taxicab in Milwaukee and gets referrals from Yellow Cab. Edwards leased the cab to Giri, who subleased some of the time to Chapman so that the cab could be in service much of the day. Chapman received fares and tips, paid rent to Giri, and kept the difference; he did not pay or receive anything from Yellow Cab. Chapman argued, in his suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act that he was a Yellow Cab “employee” and that, after he complained about not receiving the minimum wage, Mohamed, Yellow Cab's President, told Giri that Chapman was “fired” (would not be dispatched to passengers calling Yellow Cab). Giri then terminated the sublease. Chapman argued that Mohamed’s action violated the Act’s anti-retaliation clause, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). His suit was dismissed with prejudice. The judge stated that Chapman had not addressed all of the relevant factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While federal court plaintiffs need not plead all legal elements plus facts corresponding to each, Chapman’s claim was implausible because it did not allege any direct dealings between himself and Yellow Cab. When the court requested more, Chapman did not respond with a plausible claim. He failed to provide additional details, insisting that, because Yellow Cab affected his driving through the chain of leases, it must be his employer. View "Chapman v. Yellow Cab Cooperative" on Justia Law

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)(1)(B) for failing to show excusable neglect. Appellant filed her motion one business day late as a result of her attorney’s preoccupation with his second job as a church’s music director. The district court concluded that counsel’s explanation for the delay amounted to mere inadvertence and did not constitute excusable neglect. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant’s counsel’s inadvertence did not constitute excusable neglect and that Appellant was bound by counsel's carelessness. View "Sheedy v. Bankowski" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by Appellant challenging the circuit court’s order dismissing her case with prejudice based on the statute of limitations. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because Appellant’s various complaints, including Appellant’s fourth amended complaint, were time-barred. In her complaints, Appellant named different defendants, and none of the amended complaints stated that they were incorporating Appellant’s earlier complaints. The Supreme Court held that Appellant’s appeal was not final because not all defendants were dismissed, and therefore, there were still claims pending against some Defendants. View "Henson v. Cradduck" on Justia Law

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In 2007, a Palatine police officer issued Collins a parking ticket, placing the bright yellow ticket under his car’s wiper blades. The ticket listed his name, address, driver’s license number, date of birth, sex, height, and weight. Collins claims that the display of his personal information violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721. In 2016, he sued the village on behalf of himself and a proposed class. The DPPA’s statute of limitations is four years but a purported class action filed in 2010 (Senne’s case) tolled the statute for everyone in the proposed class. In 2010, before Senne filed a class certification motion, the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district judge again entered summary judgment and “terminated” a motion for class certification as moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In November 2015, the Supreme Court denied certiorari; on the same day, Senne’s attorney, Murphy, filed a successor class action on behalf of himself and a proposed class as a placeholder. Murphy later filed this suit naming Collins as the class representative. The district court held that Collins’s claim was time-barred and denied the motion for class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal with prejudice strips a case of its class-action character. Tolling stops immediately when a class-action suit is dismissed—with or without prejudice—before the class is certified. View "Collins v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal granted plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its limited discovery order, and enter a new order granting the motion and ordering Marshalls to produce a list of the names and contact information of its nonexempt California employees employed since March 22, 2012. The case was before the court on remand from the California Supreme Court. The previous opinion was vacated and the trial court was directed to vacate its limited discovery order and enter a new order granting discovery. View "Williams v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court did not reach the merits in this matter where Father appealed the district court order awarding Mother attorney fees and costs for the underlying juvenile court proceedings for lack of jurisdiction and awarded Mother reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. The juvenile court denied Father’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and granted Mother custody of the parties’ minor children. The court also ordered Father to pay all fees and costs incurred by Mother. When jurisdiction over the case had been transferred to the district court, the court granted Mother’s motion for attorney fees. Father filed a motion to alter or amend under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 challenging the award. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked the authority to rule on the merits of the Rule 59 motion because it was not timely filed, and therefore, the earlier order of the district court was the final judgment on the underlying matter of attorney fees and costs; (2) the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of this case; and (3) Mother is awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Appellants Ralphs Grocery Company and related subsidiaries (Ralphs) appealed an order striking their complaint against respondents Victory Consultants, Inc. (Victory) and Jerry Mailhot under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law). Appellants contended the superior court erred in determining their complaint, which alleged a cause of action for trespass, arose out of activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law, and by concluding they failed to demonstrate a probability of succeeding on the merits of that cause of action. After review of the complaint, the Court of Appeal agreed with Appellants: respondents have not shown Appellants' cause of action for trespass arises out of protected activity. The acts constituting trespass were not protected activity. Although Respondents argued that Appellants were suing them based upon petitioning activity, which would typically be protected, such activity was occurring on private property. “Respondents have provided no persuasive argument that their activity occurring on such private property is protected. Additionally, even if we were to reach the second question under an anti-SLAPP analysis, we would conclude Appellants carried their minimal burden of showing a probability of succeeding on the merits.” The Court, therefore, reversed the order. View "Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Mary Anna Whitehall worked as a social worker for the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS or the County). She sought legal advice pertaining to any liability she might have for submitting misleading information and doctored photographs to the juvenile court at the direction of her superiors. Her counsel prepared a filing; subsequently plaintiff was immediately placed on administrative leave for disclosing confidential information to an unauthorized person. Upon being informed she would be terminated for the breach, plaintiff resigned her position and filed a whistle blower action against the County. The County filed a special motion to strike the complaint as an Anti-SLAPP action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which was denied by the trial court. The County appealed. On appeal, the County argued the trial court erred in determining plaintiff had established the second prong of the criteria to overcome a special motion to strike an Anti-SLAPP lawsuit by finding a likelihood she would prevail because the County’s actions were not privileged or covered by governmental immunity. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, members of Global Fitness gyms, believed that Global misrepresented the terms of its gym memberships and sued as a class. The parties settled: Global agreed to pay $1.3 million to the class members, class counsel’s fees as ordered by the court, and the claims administrator’s fees and costs. The court approved the agreement over the objections of some class members and ordered its implementation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In the meantime, Global had sold all of its gyms and funneled $10.4 million of the proceeds to its managers through “tax distributions.” The payments Global owed to the class were in escrow under the terms of the settlement agreement, which made no similar provision for class counsel and the claims administrator. Days before its payment obligation under the agreement came due, Global notified the court it could not meet its remaining obligations. The court held Global Fitness and its managers in civil contempt. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Global had no legal obligation to conserve funds to pay class counsel and the claims administrator while the appeals were pending. Its obligation to pay became definite and specific only once the appeals were exhausted. The court erred in considering any of Global’s conduct from before that date and by holding the managers jointly and severally liable. View "Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law