Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES V. WOOD
Taylor Wood and her family received medical services from physicians employed by Intermountain Emergency Physicians, PLLC (IEP), resulting in alleged medical debt. IEP assigned this debt to Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS) for collection. After Wood’s attorneys disputed the validity of the debt and alleged violations of Idaho statutes, the Woods and IEP executed a settlement agreement that discharged the debt, mutually released claims, and required IEP to pay the Woods $6,000. Despite this, MRS subsequently filed a collection action against Wood. Wood responded with counterclaims and a third-party complaint against IEP, attaching the settlement agreement. MRS voluntarily dismissed its complaint upon learning of the settlement, and Wood eventually dismissed her remaining claims after achieving her objectives.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, entered judgment dismissing all claims. Both sides moved to be declared the prevailing party and sought costs and attorney fees. The district court determined Wood was the prevailing party and awarded her attorney fees and costs, finding MRS’s complaint frivolous due to inadequate investigation. MRS and IEP filed motions for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Later procedural developments required entry of a Fourth Amended Judgment to resolve third-party claims involving Wood’s husband, Tyson, after ambiguity about his participation necessitated further clarification.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the district court’s prevailing party determination, fee award, and the timeliness of the appeal. The Supreme Court held the appeal was timely due to the Fourth Amended Judgment resolving all claims. The Court affirmed the district court’s findings that Wood was the prevailing party and that MRS’s suit was frivolous, supporting the fee award under Idaho Code section 12-121. However, it reversed the award’s amount and remanded for the district court to consider whether fees incurred after MRS moved to dismiss were reasonable. Neither party was awarded fees or costs on appeal. View "MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES V. WOOD" on Justia Law
Promier Products Inc v. Gearoz
A company based in Illinois that sells flashlights online through Amazon became concerned that other sellers on the platform were misrepresenting the brightness of their competing products. To investigate, the company hired a Pittsburgh law firm, which purchased flashlights from 153 Chinese sellers on Amazon, having them shipped to the law firm’s office in Pennsylvania. The purchased products allegedly failed to meet their advertised brightness. The company then filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against these sellers, asserting claims under Pennsylvania common law and the Lanham Act for false advertising. The company sought damages, an accounting of profits, and broad injunctive relief, including orders to freeze the defendants’ assets and restrict their access to online marketplaces.Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania questioned whether it had personal jurisdiction and proper venue, but was persuaded temporarily by the plaintiff’s arguments. The court issued a temporary restraining order. As defendants began to respond, some challenged personal jurisdiction, while others did not. Upon further review and adversarial briefing, the District Court concluded that purchases made by the plaintiff’s lawyers could not be used to establish personal jurisdiction and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court also raised concerns about improper joinder of defendants and permitted amendment of the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, for false advertising claims, jurisdiction requires a showing that a deceived consumer in Pennsylvania—not simply the plaintiff’s lawyer—purchased the falsely advertised item. The court found the plaintiff had not made a sufficient showing of personal jurisdiction for a preliminary injunction, but vacated and remanded for the District Court to determine whether any defendants had waived the personal jurisdiction defense and to further develop the jurisdictional record, including permitting discovery. View "Promier Products Inc v. Gearoz" on Justia Law
SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
A San Diego resident, who was a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, had his concealed-carry weapon (CCW) license revoked in December 2023 by the San Diego County Sheriff. The Sheriff cited the “good moral character” requirement in California law, stating that his association with the Boozefighters—a group characterized by the Sheriff as a “criminal street gang”—justified the revocation. The individual, who had no criminal record, was not given an opportunity to challenge this decision before his license was revoked, though he could seek reconsideration. Shortly after, California replaced the “good moral character” requirement with a new standard focused on dangerousness.The plaintiff sued both the County of San Diego and the Sheriff in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free association and his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the claims, holding that the Sheriff was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the state,” that the County was not liable because the revocation was a state policy, and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a First Amendment claim. The district court also found the Second Amendment claim moot after the license expired and the law changed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the San Diego County Sheriff is not an “arm of the state” and thus is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that revocation of a CCW license under the “good moral character” requirement was a county policy, making the County potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that the Second Amendment claim was not moot because effective relief, such as destruction of revocation records, remained possible. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a First Amendment violation by alleging his license was revoked solely due to his lawful association with the club, absent evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY v. ESPINOZA
A traffic accident occurred on December 3, 2021, when Sonia Espinoza’s vehicle was rear-ended by a car driven by Madyson Leita, a Texas Tech University employee who was acting within the scope of her employment. Texas Tech qualifies as a governmental unit under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Espinoza filed suit on November 17, 2023, naming only Leita in her official capacity as the defendant, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims expired.After being served, Leita filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(f), which allows for dismissal unless the plaintiff amends the pleadings to name the governmental unit as defendant and dismiss the employee within thirty days. Espinoza failed to do so within the statutory window; she amended her petition to name Texas Tech as a defendant fifty-three days later, after limitations had expired, and did not formally dismiss Leita until even later. Texas Tech responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted, dismissing the case.The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas reversed the trial court, reasoning that § 101.106(f) simply ensured the proper party was named and did not require dismissal for untimely amendments. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that § 101.106(f) requires dismissal if the plaintiff does not amend within thirty days, and that a subsequent suit naming the governmental employer is then subject to limitations and other procedural bars. Because Espinoza amended her petition after limitations had expired, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY v. ESPINOZA" on Justia Law
The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC
A construction company submitted a bid to build a military project for a state commission, but its bid was rejected because it included only one original bid form instead of the preferred two, despite otherwise complying with requirements. The company claimed to be the lowest responsible bidder and alleged the commission failed to consider its bid due to a minor irregularity. After exhausting administrative remedies, the company sued the commission, seeking to enjoin further work and recover bid-preparation costs, arguing the rejection was improper.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, finding the complaint stated a claim. On remand, the company sought a preliminary injunction to stop further payments on the project, citing ongoing disbursement of funds. The commission moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution, which it argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction against the commission and its officers, but stayed the injunction pending appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the commission is an arm of the state entitled to absolute sovereign immunity, meaning the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction against it. The court emphasized that such immunity is not waived and applies regardless of the nature of the plaintiff or the relief sought, including claims relating to competitive bidding laws or taxpayer status. The court concluded that the preliminary injunction was void and dismissed the appeal, instructing the trial court to vacate the injunction and dismiss the commission from the case. The court took no position on whether claims could proceed against the commission's officer in his official capacity. View "The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC" on Justia Law
In re: Jeremy Pruitt v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
The case centers on Jeremy Pruitt, a former head football coach at the University of Tennessee, who was investigated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for rule violations involving improper benefits to players and recruits. After the university fired Pruitt for cause and self-reported violations to the NCAA, the association conducted an investigation, during which Pruitt moved to Alabama. The NCAA’s Committee on Infractions held a hearing out of state, found Pruitt had committed severe violations, and issued a six-year show-cause order restricting his employment at NCAA institutions nationwide. Pruitt appealed to the NCAA’s Infractions Appeals Committee, which upheld the penalties.Subsequently, Pruitt brought a lawsuit in the DeKalb Circuit Court in Alabama against the NCAA, asserting various tort claims related to the investigation and enforcement actions. The NCAA moved to dismiss, arguing the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction. The trial court agreed there was no general jurisdiction but found specific personal jurisdiction existed because the NCAA’s activities, including enforcement of its orders affecting Alabama institutions and residents like Pruitt, amounted to “doing business” in Alabama. It denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, and later granted Pruitt’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the show-cause order, though that injunction was later dissolved.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on the NCAA’s petition for a writ of mandamus. It held that the NCAA’s enforcement actions, while affecting Pruitt in Alabama, were not suit-related conduct purposefully directed at Alabama, but rather arose from events and processes in other states. The court concluded that the NCAA’s general regulatory activities over its member institutions in Alabama were insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, it granted the NCAA’s petition and directed the trial court to dismiss Pruitt’s action for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Jeremy Pruitt v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Alabama
In re: Burns v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
Several individuals who used a widely known social media platform brought claims against the company that operates the platform, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Their allegations centered on the company’s practice of allowing third-party developers to access users’ private data, allegedly contrary to the platform’s representations regarding privacy controls. The plaintiffs, all residents of Alabama, asserted multiple tort claims, including fraud and breach of privacy, and contended that their personal data was affected while using the application within Alabama.Previously, a nationwide class action with similar factual allegations was litigated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in this case opted out of that class action before filing their own suit in the St. Clair Circuit Court in Alabama. After the company moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the circuit court denied the motion, finding specific personal jurisdiction existed over the company. The plaintiffs supported their opposition with affidavits detailing their use of the platform in Alabama and referenced the company’s data center operations in the state.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss through a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over the company. The Court explained that the company’s business activities in Alabama, including the existence of Alabama-based users and a data center, did not establish that the company was “at home” in Alabama for general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, the Court found the plaintiffs failed to allege conduct by the company purposefully directed at Alabama as a forum, rather than at users generally. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition and ordered dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Burns v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of Alabama
Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi
A city attorney entered into a retainer agreement with a municipal board, serving as an independent contractor at the board’s pleasure, with the agreement permitting termination at will, with or without cause. Several months into the engagement, disputes arose regarding the attorney’s invoices and billing practices. The board discussed these concerns at various meetings and, at a special-called meeting, voted to terminate the attorney’s retainer agreement. The agenda for this meeting listed “Attorney Bills?” but did not explicitly mention termination of the attorney’s contract. The attorney did not attend the meeting and received notice of his termination the following day.After his termination, the attorney appealed to the Sunflower County Circuit Court under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75, arguing that the meeting was not lawfully noticed for the business transacted, specifically the termination of his contract, and that he was denied due process. The City responded that the attorney was an at-will contractor with no property interest requiring due process and that the board acted within its legal authority. The circuit court found that the attorney had standing and had timely appealed but held that the board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal, and that as an at-will contractor, the attorney was owed no hearing or due process protections.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that while the board could terminate the attorney at will and owed no hearing, the termination action taken at the special-called meeting was void because the written call for the meeting did not distinctly specify the subject of terminating the city attorney, as required by statute and city ordinance. The court accepted the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error, reversed the circuit court’s order, set aside the termination, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court denied the attorney’s requests for additional relief. View "Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi" on Justia Law
TexasChemistry Council v. EPA
The United States Environmental Protection Agency issued a rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act that banned several uses of chrysotile asbestos following its determination that exposure could cause serious health issues, including various cancers and respiratory diseases. Multiple groups filed petitions challenging the rule: industry associations argued that the ban was overbroad and failed to follow statutory procedures, while labor unions and public health advocates claimed the rule did not go far enough and inadequately protected workers and the public from asbestos exposure. The petitions were consolidated for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The challenges originated from filings in several circuit courts but were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Some petitioners, such as industry groups, sought to vacate parts of the rule affecting their sectors, while others, including unions and public health organizations, argued that the EPA should have imposed broader bans or stronger interim protections. Olin Corporation initially joined the industry petitioners but later withdrew its petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether any petitioner had standing to challenge the rule. The court found that none had demonstrated standing in accordance with Article III requirements, as they failed to provide specific facts or evidence at the appropriate time showing actual or imminent injury traceable to the EPA's action and likely redressable by court intervention. The court held that arguments for standing were either forfeited or unsupported by the record, and that post-argument supplementation was not permitted. Accordingly, the court dismissed all petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "TexasChemistry Council v. EPA" on Justia Law
Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
A married couple, the plaintiffs, alleged that their life savings were lost due to investment advisory services provided by a national bank and an investment management company. The husband, after retiring, managed his investments, particularly in master limited partnerships (MLPs). He had a long-standing banking relationship with the defendant bank and, in 2015, signed an advisory agreement appointing the bank as investment manager for an MLP-focused portfolio managed by the defendant investment company. Despite the bank’s internal policy limiting such investments to 5% of a client’s liquid net worth, the husband invested a much larger amount, after signing a letter acknowledging the risks. The plaintiffs’ MLP investments subsequently suffered significant losses, especially during the early 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, resulting in the loss of most of their liquid assets.After divesting from MLPs in 2020, the plaintiffs sued both defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2021, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and violations of certain state statutes, as well as seeking declaratory and rescission relief. The district court referred pretrial matters to a magistrate judge. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add a new party and claims, but the magistrate judge denied this, citing undue delay and prejudice; the district court affirmed. The district court also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of causation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the plaintiffs forfeited the causation argument required for their claims, failed to develop arguments regarding their declaratory and rescission claims, and that the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. The court dismissed as moot the pending substitution and motions to strike. View "Doelger v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law