Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

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Regina M. Thornton was employed by Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. as Associate Director - Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Thornton requested a religious exemption, which Ipsen denied. After she did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment. Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Title VII, Massachusetts law (Chapter 151B), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (MDR). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The Magistrate Judge granted Ipsen's motion, dismissing Thornton's complaint. Thornton appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Thornton's complaint, finding that she failed to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination under Title VII or Chapter 151B. The court concluded that Thornton did not adequately state her religious beliefs or how they related to vaccines. The court also found that Thornton's federal constitutional claims failed because Ipsen was not a state actor, and her MDR claims failed because the MDR does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Thornton's religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, finding that she had plausibly alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccination requirement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of her federal constitutional claims, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actors like Ipsen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her MDR claims, noting that Thornton had waived any argument that her claim should be reimagined under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. View "Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

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J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

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On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law

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Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who are deemed a danger to themselves or others. Cole was charged with several crimes and found incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, he was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Just before the expiration of his commitment, the People filed a petition to extend it, and Cole was held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Cole's request for release pending trial, relying on section 6506, which allows for interim placement at a suitable facility. Cole's petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. Cole then petitioned for review, and the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its order and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection arguments. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders or found not guilty by reason of insanity justified the different procedures. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based. Consequently, the court dismissed Cole's petition as moot, as he had already been released from custody for unrelated reasons. View "Cole v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system via eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the water system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructures Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action to acquire the system. A day later, Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After extensive proceedings, including a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to Liberty. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the required elements for eminent domain was not satisfied. The court also ruled that Liberty need not submit the administrative record (AR) underlying TAV’s RONs. The trial court held a bench trial and issued a Statement of Decision (SOD) finding that Liberty met its burden, rejecting TAV’s evidence and relying on Liberty’s post-RON evidence. TAV’s objections to the SOD were overruled, and the court entered judgment for Liberty and awarded attorney’s fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof and failed to give appropriate deference to TAV’s decision and findings. The trial court also improperly based its decision on post-RON facts and events. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the trial court to determine whether to allow TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct burdens of proof and standard of review. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

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A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP, Framework Ventures, L.P., and 1kx LP, invested in Curve, a decentralized cryptocurrency trading platform developed by Mikhail Egorov. They allege that Egorov fraudulently induced them to invest by making false promises about their stake in Curve and then canceled their investment, leading to claims of fraud, conversion, and statutory violations. Egorov, who developed Curve while living in Washington and later moved to Switzerland, formed Swiss Stake GmbH to manage Curve. The investment agreements included Swiss law and forum selection clauses.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted Egorov’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Egorov did not purposefully avail himself of California’s benefits. The court noted that the plaintiffs initiated contact and negotiations, and the agreements specified Swiss jurisdiction. The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that discovery would likely produce evidence establishing jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Egorov’s contacts with California were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs had solicited the investment and Egorov had not directed any activities toward California. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ unilateral actions could not establish jurisdiction and that the agreements’ Swiss law and forum selection clauses further supported the lack of jurisdiction. The court also upheld the denial of jurisdictional discovery, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. View "ParaFi Digital Opportunities v. Egorov" on Justia Law

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In the 1950s, the Tucson Unified School District (the District) operated a dual school system for Black and non-Black students. In 1974, class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of African American and Latino students, leading to a 1978 settlement agreement and desegregation decree. Over the years, the District undertook numerous efforts to remedy past discrimination. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's preliminary finding of unitary status, remanding the case for further supervision. A Unitary Status Plan (USP) was created in 2013 to guide the District towards unitary status.The District Court for the District of Arizona found partial unitary status in 2018, retaining jurisdiction over unresolved issues. By 2021, the court found the District had achieved unitary status in most areas, except for two subsections of the USP. In 2022, after further revisions and compliance, the district court declared the District had achieved full unitary status and ended federal supervision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District had achieved unitary status, meaning it had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable. The court found no error in the district court's conclusions regarding student assignments, transportation, staff diversity, quality of education, student discipline, family and community engagement, and transparency and accountability. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that perfect implementation of the USP was not necessary for unitary status and that the District had demonstrated a lasting commitment to the USP and the Constitution. View "MENDOZA V. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

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Anastasia Wullschleger sued Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. in state court, alleging deceptive marketing practices. Her original complaint included both federal and state law claims. Royal Canin removed the case to federal court based on the federal claims, which allowed the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Wullschleger then amended her complaint to remove all federal claims and requested the case be remanded to state court.The District Court denied Wullschleger’s request to remand the case. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the amended complaint, which no longer contained any federal claims, eliminated the basis for federal-question jurisdiction. Consequently, the federal court also lost its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The case must then be remanded to state court. The Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision, emphasizing that the jurisdictional analysis must be based on the amended complaint, which in this case contained only state-law claims. View "Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger" on Justia Law

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EMD Sales, Inc. distributes food products in the Washington, D.C. area and employs sales representatives who manage inventory and take orders at grocery stores. Several sales representatives sued EMD, alleging that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime. EMD argued that the sales representatives were outside salesmen and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held a bench trial and found EMD liable for overtime pay because EMD did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that its sales representatives were outside salesmen. The court ordered EMD to pay overtime wages and liquidated damages. EMD appealed, arguing that the District Court should have used the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, adhering to Circuit precedent that required employers to prove FLSA exemptions by clear and convincing evidence.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA. The Court reasoned that the FLSA does not specify a standard of proof for exemptions, and in the absence of such specification, the default preponderance standard should apply. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera" on Justia Law