Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Apria Healthcare provides home healthcare products and services, employing delivery drivers through third-party agencies and licensed vocational nurses directly. Travis Smith and Uriel Arauz, both former employees, commenced a class action against Apria in Sutter County Superior Court alleging wage and hour violations on behalf of similarly situated employees. Proposed interveners Angela Tisdale and Terrance Pratt are former delivery drivers and named plaintiffs in a separate, related federal action against Apria for similar wage and hour claims, covering delivery drivers hired after the class certification date in another Los Angeles County action.The Sutter County Superior Court preliminarily approved a settlement in the Smith action, which conditionally certified a class and found the settlement fair. Tisdale and Pratt, concerned about a collusive “reverse auction” settlement that might undermine the rights of putative class members in their federal action, filed an ex parte application to intervene in the Smith action after the court’s preliminary approval and class notice. Their application was supported by evidence of their early awareness and concern over the settlement process, but was filed several months after those concerns were first raised.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the intervention application. The appellate court held that Tisdale and Pratt’s application was untimely, noting that they knew or should have known of risks to their interests well before filing, and their delay prejudiced the settlement process and the original parties. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying intervention, concluding that the untimeliness of the application defeated both mandatory and permissive intervention. Respondents were awarded costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Apria Healthcare" on Justia Law

J.O. has been under a conservatorship since 2016, with the San Joaquin County Public Conservator serving as his conservator and represented by County Counsel. In December 2023, Judge Guy Castillo began presiding over most mental health cases in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Starting in May 2024, County Counsel adopted a practice of filing “blanket” motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify Judge Guy Castillo from all cases involving the Public Conservator. On July 10, 2024, County Counsel filed both a petition to extend J.O.’s conservatorship and a section 170.6 motion; the motion was initially denied as premature. J.O. subsequently sought to have the Public Conservator removed and his sister appointed. County Counsel filed another section 170.6 motion, which was granted, removing Judge Guy Castillo from J.O.’s case. J.O. objected, arguing the blanket challenges were improper and aimed at forcing Judge Guy Castillo’s reassignment following her admonishment of County Counsel’s attorney; Judge Guy Castillo was later reassigned.The San Joaquin County Superior Court overruled J.O.’s objection, relying on Solberg v. Superior Court, which permitted blanket section 170.6 challenges. The California Court of Appeal denied writ relief. The Supreme Court of California granted review, overruling Solberg in part, and held that blanket abuses of section 170.6 could unconstitutionally interfere with core judicial functions and are subject to as-applied separation-of-powers challenges. The Supreme Court established a burden-shifting procedure to evaluate whether such challenges are made in bad faith and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, determined the case was not moot and issued a writ directing the Superior Court to vacate its order granting County Counsel’s section 170.6 motion. The court ordered a hearing consistent with the Supreme Court’s procedure to determine whether County Counsel’s motion was made in bad faith. View "J.O. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After the foreclosure sale of a residential property in Charles Town, West Virginia, the purchasers sought to evict the previous owners, who had defaulted on their mortgage. The former owners responded by filing counterclaims and third-party claims against the mortgage servicing company and others, alleging breach of contract, tortious conduct, and violations of West Virginia’s consumer protection laws. The litigation centered on whether the mortgage servicer had properly handled a payment intended to cure the default: the former owners claimed they mailed a cashier’s check that was delivered before the sale, but were repeatedly told by customer service representatives that the check had not been received. The dispute focused on what actually happened to the payment and what representations were made by the servicer’s employees.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County initially denied the mortgage servicer’s request for a protective order and granted the former owners’ motion to compel depositions of two customer service employees located outside the United States. The circuit court determined these individuals were “managing agents” because they made decisions regarding the disputed payment and its investigation, thus subject to deposition upon notice alone. PHH Mortgage Corporation argued that international procedures, such as those in the Hague Convention, were required and that the depositions would be unduly burdensome and duplicative.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that, under West Virginia’s procedural rules, a corporate party’s managing agents located outside the United States may be deposed upon notice alone, without resort to international procedures. It clarified the factors courts should consider in determining “managing agent” status. Finding no clear legal error or abuse of discretion by the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals denied the requested writ of prohibition and upheld the circuit court’s discovery order. View "State ex rel. PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Hammer" on Justia Law

A county attorney in Montana advised local officials not to provide confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for civil purposes without a court order, citing Montana law. The Montana Attorney General disagreed, asserting that ICE is a “criminal justice agency” entitled to access such information and ordered the county attorney to change her policy. When the county attorney requested a formal opinion, the Attorney General refused, then formally asserted supervisory control, requiring the county attorney to issue a memo permitting full disclosure of CCJI to ICE. The county attorney complied under protest and filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment on the matter.The Attorney General claimed the dispute was nonjusticiable, arguing it was a political question, that the county attorney lacked standing, and that any opinion would be advisory. The Supreme Court of Montana found these arguments unpersuasive. The Court determined that the county attorney had standing because she is an independently elected official with statutory duties, including advising county officials, and the Attorney General’s supervisory authority does not extend to this advisory function. The Court also concluded that the dispute did not present a political question or an advisory opinion and thus was justiciable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the county attorney’s petition is properly before the Court and that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by attempting to direct the county attorney’s legal advice to county officials. The Court declared the Attorney General’s order unenforceable. The Court did not decide whether ICE is a “criminal justice agency” under Montana law but ordered further briefing on that issue and whether such agencies are automatically entitled to CCJI solely by virtue of their status. View "Cromwell v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization planned to run several political advertisements critical of socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America ahead of the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. New York’s independent expenditure disclosure law, which requires entities spending money on political elections to register and disclose information about their expenditures, was interpreted by state regulators to cover these advertisements, as the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA was running for mayor. The organization feared enforcement of the law against its ads and sought judicial relief.After filing its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the organization moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the State from enforcing the disclosure law against its advertisements before the upcoming election. The district court denied this emergency motion. The organization then appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit while the underlying challenge to the law was stayed in the district court at the organization’s request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the motion for preliminary injunction sought relief only for an injury related to the 2025 mayoral election, which had already occurred, making it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief. The court further held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply because the underlying action remained pending in the district court, and thus could still be litigated and reviewed in the future. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of a live controversy, with instructions that any future appeals concerning preliminary injunctions in this matter would be heard by the same panel. View "Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

After a new audio and visual system was installed in a county courthouse, including microphones for security and meeting purposes, certain county board members discovered that audio feeds were accessible during closed meetings and private sessions. This led to concerns about privacy and prompted the board to hire a special attorney and deputy to investigate potential breaches of courthouse security and possible violations of law. A district court determined that a conflict of interest prevented the special attorney from conducting a related criminal investigation and instead appointed the Nebraska Attorney General’s office as a special prosecutor. The court ordered that investigative materials be sealed. After the special prosecutor declined to file charges, the special prosecutor’s appointment was terminated, and additional records summarizing the investigation were also sealed.Subsequently, the board’s own civil investigation led to discipline or discharge of several employees, including a former county attorney whose name had been reported for possible professional misconduct. This former county attorney later moved in the original miscellaneous court file to unseal the records related to the special prosecutor’s investigation, arguing that the documents could be relevant to ongoing litigation and reputational interests. The special prosecutor did not oppose unsealing, but the board, represented by the special attorney, objected, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and insufficient grounds for unsealing. The District Court for Knox County found it had jurisdiction, determined good cause existed, and ordered the records unsealed.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order. The court held that the order to unseal records in a special proceeding was not a final, appealable order because the board failed to demonstrate that any substantial right was affected by unsealing. Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re Special Knox Cty. Atty. Begley" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought suit against a municipal defendant, raising several claims related to alleged procedural violations during a city council meeting, including purported breaches of Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act. The plaintiff sought to void actions taken at that meeting. The defendant responded by moving to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. After a hearing, the District Court for Custer County dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims but allowed five to proceed. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew two causes of action, and the court held a trial on the remaining three. The court determined it lacked jurisdiction over certain claims and found the plaintiff had not met the burden of proof, ultimately denying all requested relief.Following the district court’s entry of a judgment in April 2026, the plaintiff appealed. The Nebraska Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because, in its view, the district court had not rendered a judgment in compliance with Nebraska statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals relied on the absence of a “single written document” as prescribed by statute and cited the Nebraska Supreme Court’s prior decisions interpreting those requirements.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal for plain error. It held that the district court had rendered judgment by signing a single written document that denied all relief and stated judgment was entered against the plaintiff and for the defendant as to each cause of action. The Supreme Court clarified that a judgment exists without explicit dismissal language, provided all relief is addressed in one signed document. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Koch v. City of Sargent" on Justia Law

Derek and Keisha Hall hired Jose Silva to construct their new home and financed the project through Priority One Bank, where Harvey Lott served as the loan officer. The Halls later discovered construction defects and alleged that Silva, Lott, and the bank engaged in a secret arrangement for personal profit, including unauthorized loan disbursements and a failure to conduct proper inspections. The Halls also claimed Silva lacked a contractor’s license and that the relationship between Silva and Lott involved improper payments. Both Lott and the bank denied these allegations, asserting that bank inspections were for their own benefit and that loan advances sometimes occurred before work was completed, in line with their agreement.The Halls brought several claims against the bank, Lott, and Silva in the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court, including breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy. In response, the bank and Lott sought summary judgment, but the circuit court denied their motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained. Subsequently, the Halls moved to strike a provision in the loan agreement, arguing it was unconscionable and deprived them of legal remedies. The circuit court granted this motion, holding the provision was void, invalid, and unconscionable.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the Halls’ “Motion to Strike Contract Provision” was not an appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge the enforceability of a contract provision, as motions to strike under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) are limited to pleadings, not contract clauses. The court reversed the circuit court’s order striking the provision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that any challenge to the provision’s enforceability must follow the proper procedures for dispositive motions. View "Priority One Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

The case centers on a dispute between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor concerning the period within which a judgment must be renewed to remain enforceable. The creditor, who had previously won a judgment against her former attorney for improperly retaining legal fees, obtained an initial judgment in 2006. This judgment was renewed in 2011 and again in 2016. In 2016, the district court also amended the judgment to correct an error in the amount, pursuant to a clerical correction rule. In 2025, the creditor sought to renew the judgment again, but the debtor objected, arguing that the time to renew had expired and the judgment was now unenforceable.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed the creditor’s motion and denied it, finding that the applicable renewal period was five years, as provided by the law in effect when the original judgment was entered in 2006. The court reasoned that subsequent renewals or the amendment of the judgment did not change the operative date of issuance for the purpose of determining the renewal period. The court also found that the 2016 amendment to the statute extending the renewal period to ten years applied only to original judgments issued on or after July 1, 2015, and not to earlier judgments, even if they were renewed or amended after that date.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the ten-year renewal period enacted in 2016 applies exclusively to original judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015. Judgments issued before that date remain subject to the prior five-year renewal period, regardless of subsequent renewals or clerical amendments. Because the creditor’s judgment expired in 2021, her 2025 motion to renew was untimely and properly denied. View "Cheung v. Pena" on Justia Law

Four individuals alleged that they were sexually abused as children by James Nesmith, a pediatric doctor and church counselor, between 1995 and 2007. They claimed the abuse occurred during medical visits, at home, and at a church camp. Their lawsuit sought damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and infliction of extreme emotional distress under Arkansas tort law and a statute granting crime victims a cause of action. However, the plaintiffs did not file their claims within the standard limitations periods applicable to such actions. Instead, they relied on the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, which revived and extended the statute of limitations for child sex abuse claims within a specific timeframe. The parties conceded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed within the revived window provided by the Act.James Nesmith moved for summary judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, arguing that under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s existing vested-rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive claims that were already time-barred, rendering the Act invalid and the claims untimely. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, citing binding precedent that prohibited legislative revival of expired claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The court overruled its prior vested-rights precedent, finding no constitutional basis for categorically prohibiting the legislature from reviving time-barred claims through legislation. It upheld the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, concluding that the General Assembly has the authority to set or extend statutes of limitations, including for previously barred claims. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. View "H.C. v. NESMITH" on Justia Law