Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A parish resident attended a council meeting intending to comment on an agenda item involving the retention of special legal counsel related to ethics laws. Shortly before this meeting, she had filed an ethics complaint against the Parish President, alleging a conflict of interest regarding a zoning decision. When she began to speak, she was interrupted by the Parish President and Council Chairman, who told her that discussing her ethics complaint was off-topic and cited a Louisiana statute prohibiting public discussion of private ethics investigations. This statute had been declared unconstitutional years prior, but the officials nonetheless enforced it, leading the resident to end her remarks prematurely. She later sued the parish, the Parish President, and the Council Chairman under federal civil rights law and state law, claiming her First Amendment rights had been violated.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over a jury trial where the jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. During trial, defense counsel repeatedly violated court instructions, asked improper legal questions, referred to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, and made inappropriate comments. The plaintiff objected to these actions, and the court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. Despite these issues, the district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, relying in part on a juror’s public interview and noting that curative instructions had been given and no motion for mistrial had been made.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by relying on evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), specifically the juror’s public comments. The appellate court further held that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s misconduct so thoroughly permeated the trial proceedings that even curative instructions could not remedy the prejudice. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Banner v. Wright" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from a series of business dealings among several corporate parties involved in the repurposing of ammonium nitrate water from a landfill in Mobile County, Alabama. The plaintiffs, two corporate entities, accused certain defendants of disrupting long-standing contracts and business relationships by sharing confidential information in violation of a 2013 contract. The alleged conduct resulted in the plaintiffs being cut out of relationships they had developed over many years. The 2013 contract at issue contained a forum-selection clause requiring that disputes be brought exclusively in courts located in New York, New York.After the plaintiffs initiated suit in the Monroe Circuit Court, the defendants sought dismissal for improper venue, citing the forum-selection clause and arguing in the alternative that, even if venue were proper in Alabama, it was not proper in Monroe County. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs’ tort claims failed to state a claim. While these motions were pending, disputes arose over the scope and timing of discovery. The trial court issued a series of discovery-related orders, culminating in a January 6, 2026, order requiring the defendants to provide broad discovery, including depositions and responses to interrogatories, before the motion to dismiss would be heard.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that venue is a threshold issue that should be addressed as soon as practicable and that the trial court exceeded its discretion by requiring the defendants to participate in extensive merits-based discovery before ruling on the venue motion. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its January discovery order and to rule expeditiously on the motion to dismiss. Pending that ruling, any discovery must be limited to issues relevant to venue. View "In re: Southern Logistics, Inc. v. UOP, LLC" on Justia Law

An inmate at Easterling Correctional Facility filed a lawsuit against his former wife and two employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections. He alleged that his ex-wife falsely told one of the employees, an agent, that he had hired someone to kill her. He further claimed that the agent failed to exercise due diligence and then falsely imprisoned him in a segregation unit without due process. The inmate also alleged that a correctional officer defamed, libeled, and slandered him, and denied him access to the courts by refusing to notarize a petition he attempted to file. He asserted similar claims of defamation against his former wife.The employees sought to transfer venue from the Barbour Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court, arguing that the complaint was essentially a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Barbour Circuit Court granted the transfer. The employees then moved for summary judgment in the Montgomery Circuit Court. Five days after the motion was filed, the Montgomery Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate filed for an extension of time to respond and later sought to alter or vacate the judgment, explaining that he had not received the motion until after the court had already ruled. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied these motions.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It determined that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred by granting summary judgment before the inmate received the motion and without providing him a meaningful opportunity to respond, as required by Rule 56 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the lower court’s failure to provide notice or an opportunity to respond prejudiced the inmate and violated procedural safeguards. View "McConico v. Haynes" on Justia Law

A landlord and a tenant, a ballet studio, entered into two lease agreements for suites in a shopping center. The leases contained provisions for indemnification, default, and attorney fees. After the ballet studio vacated the premises, alleging that the landlord failed to address mold issues that caused personal injuries to two individuals associated with the studio and damage to the studio’s property, the studio and the individuals filed a multi-count complaint against the landlord. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and sought defense and indemnity from the ballet studio for the claims made by the individuals.The Montgomery Circuit Court addressed a partial summary judgment motion filed by the landlord, which concerned only the claims between the landlord and the ballet studio, not the individuals’ personal injury claims. The ballet studio and the individuals filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was submitted one business day late. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to strike the late response and, later, denied the plaintiffs’ attempt to resubmit the same response. The court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Subsequently, the court certified this partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, but also included language purporting to dismiss the entire case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s orders striking the untimely response and denying its resubmission, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court also affirmed the certification of the partial summary judgment as final but reversed the dismissal of the entire case, noting that claims by the individuals against the landlord and the determination of damages owed to the landlord remained unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou" on Justia Law

A woman, Emily, had been under a conservatorship granted to her mother in 2012 due to mental incapacity and remained under that conservatorship, which was never formally terminated. Emily became a mother of four children. In early 2023, after concerns about the care and living situation of her youngest child, Zane, the Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) intervened. Zane was removed from Emily's custody and placed in foster care following an emergency order. Emily was given a reunification service plan, but failed to comply with its requirements, including obtaining stable housing and addressing drug use. Over the next two years, Emily struggled with housing, employment, and substance abuse, while Zane remained in foster care and developed a bond with his foster family.The Prentiss County Youth Court adjudicated Zane as a neglected child in April 2023, though Emily’s conservator, Lisa, was not served with process or present at the adjudication. Both Emily and Lisa participated in later proceedings. No appeal was taken from the adjudication or disposition orders. In August 2024, a permanency review led to a plan for Zane's adoption. Subsequently, the Prentiss County Chancery Court heard a petition to terminate parental rights. Carter, the father, voluntarily surrendered his rights. At the termination hearing, Emily argued that the underlying adjudication was void due to lack of service on her conservator, but the chancellor found this objection had been waived due to ongoing participation in the proceedings without timely objection or appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the youth court had personal jurisdiction over Emily and whether the chancellor erred in terminating her parental rights. The court held that any deficiency in service was waived by the parties’ participation and failure to timely object. The court also found that substantial evidence supported termination of Emily’s parental rights under statutory grounds, including desertion and substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship. The judgment of the chancery court was affirmed. View "E.K.W. v. Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

Several residents of Skagit County sought to recall the county prosecuting attorney and three county commissioners. Their charges did not allege any misconduct related to the officials’ own oaths of office, but instead focused on alleged defects in the filing of oaths by other public servants, such as judges, a court commissioner, and deputy prosecuting attorneys. The recall petitions advanced five theories, including claims that the elected officials had a duty to address purported failures by others to timely file oaths, that paying salaries to these officials constituted a loss of public funds, and that election law violations were improperly handled. The evidence showed that the officials whose oaths were questioned had, in fact, taken oaths, and there was no statutory requirement for some of the filings alleged.The recall charges were initially reviewed in the Skagit County Superior Court by visiting judges. Each judge found the charges legally and factually insufficient, determining that the allegations lacked a basis in law or fact, and dismissed the recall petitions. The court found the recall efforts were intentionally frivolous and coordinated to harass the elected officials, imposing joint and several sanctions totaling $5,348.22 against six of the seven residents who filed charges. One appellant was not sanctioned due to his conduct at the hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the consolidated appeals de novo. The court held that all charges were legally and factually insufficient, as no law imposed a duty on the elected officials to ensure other public servants’ oaths were properly filed, nor was there evidence of intentional misconduct or loss of public funds. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal and sanctions, finding substantial evidence of coordinated harassment. Additionally, the Supreme Court awarded attorney fees to the elected officials for the appeal. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

A church contracted with a corporation, operated by its president, to refurbish and install a pipe organ. The corporation delivered an unfinished, nonfunctional organ. The church then sued both the corporation and its president, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and sought to hold the president personally liable by piercing the corporate veil. Both defendants were properly served but did not respond to the complaint.Subsequently, the church moved for a default judgment. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted the motion, adopting the church’s proposed findings and order verbatim. The court concluded that the corporate veil could be pierced, found fraudulent conduct, and awarded damages totaling $324,640 against both defendants. After judgment was entered, the defendants retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), presenting evidence that the president had suffered cognitive decline that excused the failure to respond. The district court denied the motion, finding the evidence of incapacity insufficient and, in its written order, applied additional legal requirements not supported by the cases it cited, including showing diligence, lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, and good faith.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by imposing a heightened legal standard not supported by precedent and by adopting the church’s proposed order verbatim without adequate independent analysis, especially given that many of the order’s case citations were inaccurate or nonexistent. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "St. Paul's Newman Center v. P.J. Swartz, Inc." on Justia Law

A party entered into a contract for investment-management services with a trust company and later brought suit asserting multiple claims related to the agreement. The plaintiff initially filed the action in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in 2016, but voluntarily dismissed it in 2017. Within a year, the plaintiff refiled the action, which was again dismissed without prejudice in 2022. Shortly after, and within one year of the second dismissal, the plaintiff commenced a third action asserting similar claims.The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in the trial court, contending that the plaintiff could not invoke Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), more than once, as the statute of limitations had expired for some claims before the second refiling. The trial court agreed, holding that the saving statute did not apply to the third action and that the claims were time-barred. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claims but reversed as to the fraud, breach-of-contract, and promissory-estoppel claims, concluding that the latter had not previously relied on the saving statute because their statute-of-limitations periods had not expired at the time of the second filing.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and clarified that R.C. 2305.19(A) does not limit the number of times an action may be recommenced if the statute’s requirements are met, regardless of whether the statute of limitations for a claim expired before a prior use of the saving statute. The court held that the saving statute applied to the entire action and that all claims could proceed. The judgment of the Eighth District was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens.Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

An individual who was convicted in Arizona for several sexual offenses moved to Georgia after completing his sentence and registration period in New Mexico. Upon arrival in Georgia, he was advised by law enforcement that he would need to register as a sex offender under Georgia law. After several years, he sought removal from the registry, arguing that he had fulfilled his obligations elsewhere, that the crimes for which he was convicted did not require registration in Georgia, and that continued enforcement of the registry against him violated his constitutional rights.The Superior Court of DeKalb County initially dismissed his petition for declaratory relief, finding it time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. The Supreme Court of Georgia later reversed, holding that his claims for prospective relief had not accrued and thus were not time-barred, and remanded the case. On remand, after further amendments and substitution of parties, the trial court dismissed the petition again, this time as moot, citing recent revisions to Georgia’s Registry Act which provided a statutory mechanism for requesting removal from registration requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but on the alternative ground that any decision would be an impermissible advisory opinion since only prospective relief was sought.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that seeking prospective relief in a declaratory judgment action is not grounds for dismissal as an impermissible advisory opinion. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Court of Appeals to address whether the trial court’s dismissal on mootness grounds was proper and, if not, to instruct the trial court to adjudicate the merits of the declaratory judgment claim. View "GARDEI v. TAYLOR" on Justia Law