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Landlord sued in 2005, contending that Joliet had interfered with the way in which it set rents apartments under the mark-to-market program for rates at subsidized apartments and violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601–31. While an appeal was pending, Joliet filed an eminent-domain suit, proposing to add the land to a public park. The Seventh Circuit held that a recipient of federal financing is not immune from the power of eminent domain. The condemnation trial ran for 18 calendar months; compensation was set at $15 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the FHA claim. The district judge dismissed Landlord's original suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Landlord’s argument that the judge should have put the condemnation action on hold, reserving its FHA suit for a jury trial. The Seventh Circuit had directed it to resolve the condemnation suit first because Joliet professed concern about crime and deterioration at the property. Landlord was free to reserve the FHA claim for this suit, where it would have been entitled to a jury trial. Its FHA claim was resolved in a bench trial only because Landlord insisted on presenting it earlier. Landlord wanted the FHA to be treated as a defense to condemnation, and the district court acquiesced. That choice is responsible for the fact that a judge rather than a jury resolved the FHA claim. View "New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

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Huff worked for Securitas, which hires employees to work as security guards, and contracts with clients to provide guards for a particular location. Securitas typically provides long-term placements. After Huff resigned, he sued Securitas, alleging a representative cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code, 2698) and citing Labor Code sections 201 [requiring immediate payment of wages upon termination of employment]; 201.3(b) [requiring temporary services employers to pay wages weekly]; 202 [requiring payment of wages within 72 hours of resignation]; and 204 [failure to pay all wages due for work performed in a pay period]. The trial court held that Huff was not a temporary services employee under section 201.3(b)(1), and, therefore, could not show he was affected by a violation and had no standing to pursue penalties under PAGA on behalf of others. The court of appeal affirmed the subsequent grant of a new trial. Under PAGA an “aggrieved employee” can pursue penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of others; the statute defines an aggrieved employee as having suffered “one or more of the alleged violations” of the Labor Code for which penalties are sought. Since Huff’s complaint alleged that another violation of the Labor Code (separate from the weekly pay requirement) affected him personally, the failure to establish a violation of the weekly pay requirement did not preclude his entire PAGA claim. View "Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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This cross-appeal primarily concerned the amount of compensation owed to Petitioner-respondent Edward Sullivan as personal representative (PR) of Marion Kay's estate. Sullivan filed a petition to settle the estate and sought probate court approval for his commissions as PR together with fees and costs. In response, Respondents-petitioners Martha Brown and Mary Moses, cousins of the deceased and two of multiple beneficiaries under the will, challenged his compensation as excessive, and the probate court agreed, reducing Sullivan's commissions, disallowing certain fees and costs, and awarding attorney's fees to Brown and Moses. The circuit court affirmed, and both sides appealed. In a 2-1 opinion, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the probate court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision to uphold the award of $51,300 in commissions for Sullivan's services as personal representative and the determination that Brown and Moses were responsible for their own attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that Sullivan is not entitled to recover necessary expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred at the settlement hearing under section S.C. Code 62-3-720, and remanded this case back to the probate court for that determination. View "Kay v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

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At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this appeal was a question of whether Appellant Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) was subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) due to its receipt and expenditure of certain funds designated for promoting tourism ("accommodation tax funds"). The Chamber's receipt and expenditure of these funds was pursuant to, and governed by, the Accommodations Tax (A-Tax) statute and Proviso 39.2 of the Appropriation Act for Budget Year 2012–2013. Respondent DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC (Domains) filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration and corresponding injunctive relief on the basis that the Chamber's receipt of these funds renders the Chamber a "public body" pursuant to FOIA, thus subjecting the Chamber to all of FOIA's requirements. The Chamber countered that FOIA did not apply, for the receipt, expenditure, and reporting requirements concerning these funds were governed by the more specific A-Tax statute and Proviso 39.2. The trial court held that the Chamber was a public body and, thus, was subject to FOIA's provisions. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding as a matter of discerning legislative intent, that the General Assembly did not intend the Chamber to be considered a public body for purposes of FOIA as a result of its receipt and expenditure of these specific funds. View "DomainsNewMedia.com v. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

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Overland, Inc., filed this lawsuit against Lara Nance, Bank of America, SunTrust Banks, and other defendants seeking damages arising out of Nance's embezzlement of $1,282,000 from the Land Rover dealership Overland operated in the city of Greenville. Nance pled guilty in federal court to wire fraud for stealing the money and was sentenced to 46 months in prison. Overland's theory of liability against Bank of America and SunTrust was that allowing Nance to deposit forged checks into fraudulent accounts she created breached duties the banks owed to Overland. The banks made motions for summary judgment on the ground they owed no duty to Overland, who was not a customer of either bank. The circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment, stating, "Overland [was] unable to demonstrate that [the banks] owed it any duty . . . ." The circuit court denied Overland's Rule 59(e) motion. Overland filed a notice of appeal, which the court of appeals dismissed in an unpublished opinion. Though the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized that a trial court does not have the power to alter or amend a final order if more than ten days passes and no Rule 59(e) motion has been served, nor does a trial court have any power to grant the moving party an extension of time in which to file a Rule 59(e) motion. The failure to serve a Rule 59(e) motion within ten days of receipt of notice of entry of the order converts the order into a final judgment, and the aggrieved party's only recourse is to file a notice of intent to appeal. View "Overland v. Nance" on Justia Law

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Lujan had a Chase credit card account, governed by an agreement with a provision stating “federal law and the law of Delaware” govern the agreement and a provision for attorney’s fees. When Lujan’s account had an unpaid balance in 2007, Chase assigned its claim to interim assignees. In 2011, PCC filed suit, alleging a debt of $8,831.90. PCC Vice President Shields verified the complaint. Lujan cross-complained against PCC, Shields, and interim assignees seeking damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S. C. 1692, and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices. The court granted Lujan summary judgment as to PCC, applying Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations. On the cross-complaint, the court granted the other defendants summary judgment, finding that none met the statutory definition of a debt collector. The judgment is silent om statutory damages, leaving Lujan with only “attorney fees and costs" as provided by statute. The court awarded Lujan $140,550.51 in fees against PCC but denied the other defendants fees because the cross-complaint was not an action “on a contract” under Civil Code 1717. The appeals court affirmed Lujan’s summary judgment against PCC, Lujan’s award of attorney’s fees, and the interim assignees’ summary judgment and denial of fees. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Shields and PCC’s attorney. View "Professional Collection Consultants v. Lujan" on Justia Law

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Prolite Building Supply bought Ply Gem windows, which it resold to Wisconsin builders. Some homeowners were not satisfied with the windows, which admitted air even when closed. Contractors stopped buying from Prolite, which stopped paying Ply Gem. Prolite and homeowners sued. Ply Gem removed the action to federal court and counter-claimed against Prolite for unpaid bills. Additional parties intervened. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Prolite. The court vacated the judgment on the homeowners’ claims for remand to state court. The service agreement between Prolite and Ply Gem requires Prolite to repair the Ply Gem windows in exchange for a discount and needed parts. There was no breach of that agreement. The homeowners’ claims can be resolved under supplemental jurisdiction only if they “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The language of the window warranties received by the homeowners and the service agreement did not overlap. Prolite complained that Ply Gem did not do enough to ensure that its customers (the builders) remained willing to purchase Ply Gem windows. The homeowners just wanted to stop drafts and moisture. The nature of the work done differed. View "ProLite Building Supply, LLC v. Ply Gem Windows" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment against the Republic of Cuba seeking to enforce a Maine Superior Court’s default judgment of $21 million for the “extrajudicial killing” of Plaintiff’s father, a purported covert United States agent. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion and dismissed her suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602-1611, which generally bars suits against foreign sovereigns. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because of Plaintiff’s failure to show that the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity applied. Specifically, the district court disagreed with the Maine Superior Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s father was “extrajudicially killed” by Cuba for purposes of the FSIA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that Cuba committed an extrajudicial killing, and therefore, Plaintiff could not establish that the terrorism exception to the FSIA applied. View "Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

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After defendant Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (Coastal Pacific) terminated plaintiff Terri Raines from her employment there, she sued Coastal Pacific for age and disability discrimination and other related claims. In addition, she sought recovery, both individually and in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide and maintain accurate wage statements as required by statute. Raines appealed after the trial court reversed its original ruling denying Coastal Pacific’s motion for summary adjudication and instead granted the motion as trial was about to begin. Raines contended triable issues of fact remained: (1) on her individual claim for statutory penalties; (2) whether she sustained an injury; and (3) whether Coastal Pacific’s failure to provide accurate wage statements was knowing and intentional. Raines also argued the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on her PAGA claim by improperly finding injury was required, and that the trial court erred in reversing its original order denying summary adjudication. The Court of Appeal found merit in only Raines' PAGA claim: a representative PAGA claim for civil penalties for a violation of Labor Code section 226(a) did not require proof of injury or a knowing and intentional violation. "This is true even though these two elements are required to be proven when bringing an individual claim for damages or statutory penalties under section 226(e). Because the trial court erroneously required proof of injury on the PAGA claim, the grant of summary adjudication was improper and we therefore reverse the judgment as to that claim." View "Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors" on Justia Law

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Appellants, Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC (Algonquin) and Public Service Company of New Hampshire d/b/a Eversource Energy (Eversource), appealed a New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) order dismissing Eversource’s petition for approval of a proposed contract for natural gas capacity, as well as a program to set parameters for the release of capacity and the sale of liquefied natural gas made available to electric generators, and/or an associated tariff. Appellees, NextEra Energy Resources, LLC (NextEra), Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), and the Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA), appeared in opposition to this appeal. In denying Eversource’s petition, the PUC first ruled “that the overriding purpose of the Restructuring Statute is to introduce competition to the generation of electricity” with the “long-term results [to] be lower prices and a more productive economy.” The PUC then further ruled that “[t]o achieve that purpose, RSA 374-F:3, III directs the restructuring of the industry, separating generation activities from transmission and distribution activities, and unbundling the rates associated with each of the separate services.” Given these rulings, the PUC concluded that “the basic premise of Eversource’s proposal — having an EDC purchase long-term gas capacity to be used by electric generators — runs afoul of the Restructuring Statute’s functional separation requirement.” The NEw Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed. Pursuant to its plain language, and reading the statute as a whole, the Court discerned the primary intent of the legislature in enacting RSA chapter 374- F was to reduce electricity costs to consumers. The Court disagreed with the PUC’s ruling that the legislature’s “overriding purpose” was “to introduce competition to the generation of electricity.” Rather, as the statute provides, the legislature intended to “harness[ ] the power of competitive markets,” as a means to reduce costs to consumers, not as an end in itself. Likewise, the Court disagreed with the PUC’s ruling that RSA 374-F:3, III directed the “functional separation” of generation services from transmission and distribution services and elevates that single policy principle over the others identified in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court held the PUC erred in dismissing Eversource’s petition as a matter of law. In light of its decision, the Court did not address the appellant’s remaining arguments. View "Appeal of Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law