Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A restaurant group based in Orange County provided catering services to a client and his family during the Masters golf tournament in Georgia. The parties discussed a menu for seven days but did not sign a written contract or discuss the cost beforehand. The restaurant group ended up providing meals and services for five days, serving around 25 guests per meal. After the event, the group sent an invoice for nearly $75,000, which the client disputed and refused to pay, leading to an increase in the invoice amount. The client maintained that he had been overcharged and would have made other arrangements had he known the cost.The Superior Court of Orange County heard the breach of contract case. During discovery, the client denied a request for admission that he had contracted with the restaurant group for seven days of service. At trial, the jury found in favor of the restaurant group but awarded a lesser amount than invoiced. After the verdict, the restaurant group sought cost-of-proof attorney’s fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for the client’s denial of the request for admission, as well as court reporter costs. The trial court awarded only a small portion of the requested attorney’s fees, explaining that the restaurant group had not properly identified which fees related specifically to proving contract formation. The court also struck the entire amount claimed for court reporter costs, finding the group had not provided sufficient proof that the costs were recoverable.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed both the fee and costs orders. The court held that the restaurant group was entitled to some cost-of-proof fees because the client denied a request for admission that was later proved true, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only a limited amount due to the group’s failure to segregate relevant fees. The court also upheld the denial of court reporter costs for lack of supporting documentation. View "Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad" on Justia Law

A group of immigration attorneys, a law firm, and a legal services organization challenged practices by the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies involved in immigration enforcement and adjudication. They alleged that the agencies routinely require noncitizens and their counsel to obtain key records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rather than providing them directly during immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs claimed this so-called “Nondisclosure Policy” causes delays, omissions, and additional burdens that impede their ability to represent clients effectively and limit their capacity to take on more cases.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case in multiple stages. Initially, the court dismissed claims related to removal proceedings and due process violations, but allowed the APA claim regarding asylum proceedings to proceed. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add allegations about ICE’s practices following Dent v. Holder, the court again dismissed the removal-related claims, finding no disclosure obligation in those proceedings. The surviving claim then proceeded to summary judgment, where the district court found insufficient evidence of a formal agency-wide policy and ruled that the government’s use of FOIA did not violate relevant regulations or the APA, granting summary judgment for the government.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a uniform, agency-wide Nondisclosure Policy, and concluded their alleged injuries were too speculative and were not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, holding that voluntary expenditures and increased burdens do not, by themselves, amount to an injury in fact. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the government on the basis of lack of standing. View "Greater Boston Legal Services v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A company based in Texas purchased a group of telecommunications patents and soon after sued another company for patent infringement in several European courts, including the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German district court. The defendant in those foreign proceedings argued that its products did not infringe the patents and, in the alternative, that the patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. To support its FRAND defense, the defendant sought access to an unredacted patent purchase agreement, which it believed contained information relevant to the appropriate licensing terms.After the UPC denied the defendant’s request for production of the unredacted agreement—finding the request unsubstantiated and the information likely irrelevant at that stage—the defendant applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. A federal magistrate judge granted the discovery request, and the district court affirmed, applying a deferential standard of review and requiring the plaintiff to provide “authoritative proof” that the European courts would not be receptive to the discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in both its standard of review and its allocation of the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district courts must review magistrate judge recommendations on § 1782 applications de novo, as such applications are dispositive. The Court further held that respondents are not required to provide authoritative proof of foreign court non-receptivity and that the lower court misapplied the discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The appellate court found that the balance of factors weighed against permitting discovery at this time and reversed the district court’s order granting discovery. View "Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication" on Justia Law

An Arkansas resident applied to work as a warehouse driver for a chemical company. He received a conditional job offer, which was withdrawn after a third-party testing company reported a positive result for marijuana metabolites. The applicant explained to both the employer and the testing company that he had not used marijuana but had consumed a CBD product for anxiety related to a medical condition. He alleged that, despite notifying the employer of his disability and the possible source of a false positive, the employer did not investigate further or engage in any process to accommodate his disability, nor did the employer respond to his request to return to duty.After the withdrawal of the job offer, the applicant filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 266 days later. The EEOC dismissed his charge as untimely and issued a right-to-sue letter. The applicant then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), race discrimination under Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and a negligence claim against the testing company.The district court dismissed all claims against the testing company, noting the plaintiff conceded the federal statutes did not apply and finding no facts alleged to support racial animus. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law negligence claim. As to the employer, the court granted judgment on the pleadings, finding the EEOC charge was untimely and the complaint lacked facts showing race discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Arkansas 180-day filing deadline applied because the applicant was notified of the job offer withdrawal in Arkansas, making his EEOC charge untimely. The court also found the complaint failed to plausibly allege race discrimination and upheld the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Stephens v. Harcros Chemicals" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

The appellants entered into a contract with the appellee for the construction of a house in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and paid a $10,000 deposit. After terminating the contract in October 2015, the appellants expected the return of their deposit, but the appellee retained it. On April 10, 2017, the appellants filed a complaint in magisterial district court (MDJ court) seeking the return of the deposit. The MDJ court entered judgment in their favor, awarding the deposit amount plus costs.The appellee then timely appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which required the appellants to file a new complaint within twenty days. The appellants failed to do so, and the case became dormant until July 2020, when, in response to a notice of intent to terminate, the appellants filed a common pleas court complaint including a conversion claim. The appellee asserted that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations. At trial, the jury found in favor of the appellants on conversion and determined the claim accrued on October 15, 2015. However, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the appellee, holding the complaint was not timely filed within the two-year statute of limitations. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations only during the pendency of the MDJ case and that the statute begins to run again after the expiration of the twenty-day period to file a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court’s holding. It held that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations for any cause of action based on the factual averments in that complaint, including during any appeal, and that the subsequent filing of a common pleas court complaint is a continuation of the original action, not the commencement of a new one. The appellants’ claim was thus not time barred. View "Whittington v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2019, a county initiated a project involving the drilling of new foundations for guy wires attached to a communications tower. The county hired a general contractor, which then subcontracted drilling work to another company. An employee of the subcontractor, while working near the site, carried a steel cable into contact with an overhead high voltage power line owned by an electric cooperative, resulting in his electrocution and subsequent death. The power line was not part of the communications tower and the contractors were not working on it.The estate of the deceased employee sued the electric cooperative, the general contractor, and the subcontractor in the Circuit Court of Accomack County, alleging negligence under Virginia’s Overhead High Voltage Line Safety Act (OHVLSA) for failing to implement safety measures near the power line. The circuit court dismissed the subcontractor based on the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Act. The general contractor settled with the estate, and the electric cooperative also settled before a verdict was reached. Subsequently, the electric cooperative’s insurer, as subrogee, filed a federal suit seeking indemnification from the contractors under the OHVLSA. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the claim, holding that the work performed fell within an exemption in the OHVLSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified two questions of Virginia law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the exemption in Virginia Code § 59.1-413 applies to the contractors’ work on the communications tower, thereby excluding them from the OHVLSA’s requirements. As a result, the court found the second certified question—concerning indemnification requirements—to be moot. View "A&N Electric Cooperative v. Dietzel Enterprises" on Justia Law

Hall Trucking, Inc., a company that moves oil rigs, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after an employee was fatally struck by a truck during a rig-moving operation. OSHA alleged that Hall Trucking violated the general duty clause under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards. The citation suggested that implementing an internal traffic control plan (ITCP)—including measures such as minimizing interactions between employees and trucks, requiring high-visibility gear, and employee training—was a feasible method to reduce the risk.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission reviewed the case. The ALJ excluded testimony from Hall Trucking’s expert, finding he lacked specialized knowledge in traffic control and that his opinions amounted to legal conclusions. The ALJ admitted the Secretary’s expert, who had specific experience with ITCPs, and found his testimony reliable. The ALJ concluded that Hall Trucking’s existing safety procedures were inadequate and that an ITCP was a feasible and effective abatement method. Hall Trucking’s arguments regarding the adequacy of its measures, the specificity of abatement steps, and the industry standards were rejected. Additionally, Hall Trucking’s argument that a specific OSHA regulation supplanted the general duty clause was deemed waived because it was not properly raised before the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Hall Trucking’s petition for review. The court held that the ALJ’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the legal conclusions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also found the ALJ’s rulings on expert witness admissibility and reliability were proper. The Eighth Circuit denied Hall Trucking’s petition for review, affirming the Commission’s decision. View "Hall Trucking Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

A person sought a civil stalking protection order against another individual in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. After the court denied an initial request for ex parte relief, a magistrate conducted a full hearing and granted the protection order. The trial court then adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered a civil stalking protection order against the respondent.Following the entry of judgment, the respondent did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision as permitted and required by the applicable procedural rule, Civ.R. 65.1(G). Instead, he filed a notice of appeal with the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Tenth District dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgment because the respondent had not filed timely objections under Civ.R. 65.1(G). The appellate court subsequently certified that its decision conflicted with those of other Ohio appellate districts on whether the objection requirement was jurisdictional, prompting review by the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a party’s failure to file objections under Civ.R. 65.1(G) does not deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal from a final civil-protection-order judgment. However, such failure means that the party forfeits appellate review of alleged errors that could have been raised by objection. Furthermore, Civ.R. 65.1 does not provide for plain-error review as a substitute for failing to file objections. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed, with modification, the appellate court’s disposition, clarifying that jurisdiction existed but the respondent had not preserved his right to challenge the trial court’s alleged errors on appeal. View "A.A. v. S.P." on Justia Law

A married couple executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) in 2012, which allocated their marital debts, including a Parent PLUS student loan, to the husband. He agreed to be solely responsible for the debt and indemnify his former wife. While he resolved other debts, he did not pay the Parent PLUS loan until the wife sought contempt in 2022. The parties then stipulated that the husband would make monthly loan payments and apply proceeds from a business sale toward the loan. The wife remained the borrower, but the husband assumed responsibility for payments. After further nonpayment, the wife again sought contempt in 2024.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held the husband in contempt for failing to pay monthly amounts due in August and September 2024, denied his request for expanded account access, entered an immediately collectible judgment for the entire unpaid loan balance in favor of the wife, and awarded her attorney fees. The court determined that the husband had willfully failed to comply with his payment obligation and found that his unauthorized changes to the account justified restricted access.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of unrestricted account access and the contempt determination based on August and September 2024 nonpayments. It also affirmed the award of $3,237.50 in attorney fees to the wife. However, the Supreme Court vacated the full-balance judgment for the loan, holding that the parties’ agreements did not authorize immediate acceleration of the entire debt based on missed monthly payments. The Court remanded for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the agreements and applicable law, and for reasonable appellate attorney fees, while denying appellate sanctions. The underlying allocation of debt and adjudicated obligations from June 2024 remain undisturbed. View "In re Marriage of Kearns" on Justia Law