Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Cheung v. Pena
The case centers on a dispute between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor concerning the period within which a judgment must be renewed to remain enforceable. The creditor, who had previously won a judgment against her former attorney for improperly retaining legal fees, obtained an initial judgment in 2006. This judgment was renewed in 2011 and again in 2016. In 2016, the district court also amended the judgment to correct an error in the amount, pursuant to a clerical correction rule. In 2025, the creditor sought to renew the judgment again, but the debtor objected, arguing that the time to renew had expired and the judgment was now unenforceable.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed the creditor’s motion and denied it, finding that the applicable renewal period was five years, as provided by the law in effect when the original judgment was entered in 2006. The court reasoned that subsequent renewals or the amendment of the judgment did not change the operative date of issuance for the purpose of determining the renewal period. The court also found that the 2016 amendment to the statute extending the renewal period to ten years applied only to original judgments issued on or after July 1, 2015, and not to earlier judgments, even if they were renewed or amended after that date.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the ten-year renewal period enacted in 2016 applies exclusively to original judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015. Judgments issued before that date remain subject to the prior five-year renewal period, regardless of subsequent renewals or clerical amendments. Because the creditor’s judgment expired in 2021, her 2025 motion to renew was untimely and properly denied. View "Cheung v. Pena" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
H.C. v. NESMITH
Four individuals alleged that they were sexually abused as children by James Nesmith, a pediatric doctor and church counselor, between 1995 and 2007. They claimed the abuse occurred during medical visits, at home, and at a church camp. Their lawsuit sought damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and infliction of extreme emotional distress under Arkansas tort law and a statute granting crime victims a cause of action. However, the plaintiffs did not file their claims within the standard limitations periods applicable to such actions. Instead, they relied on the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, which revived and extended the statute of limitations for child sex abuse claims within a specific timeframe. The parties conceded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed within the revived window provided by the Act.James Nesmith moved for summary judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, arguing that under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s existing vested-rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive claims that were already time-barred, rendering the Act invalid and the claims untimely. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, citing binding precedent that prohibited legislative revival of expired claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The court overruled its prior vested-rights precedent, finding no constitutional basis for categorically prohibiting the legislature from reviving time-barred claims through legislation. It upheld the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, concluding that the General Assembly has the authority to set or extend statutes of limitations, including for previously barred claims. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. View "H.C. v. NESMITH" on Justia Law
FRANKLIN v. WILLIAMS
The dispute involved actions by city officials in Helena-West Helena, Arkansas, concerning two ordinances passed in December 2022 by outgoing city council members. These ordinances, among other things, increased the mayor’s salary from $48,000 to $70,000. The outgoing mayor attempted to veto these ordinances, but the newly elected mayor, Christopher Franklin, sought to rescind the veto. Greg Williams, a local resident, challenged the validity of the ordinances, arguing they had been properly vetoed and were therefore void.The Phillips County Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order against implementation of the ordinances and, after a hearing, issued a declaratory judgment holding the two ordinances null and void. The court did not issue a permanent injunction. The City appealed, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the Circuit Court’s declaratory judgment. Subsequently, Williams filed for contempt against Franklin, alleging he had violated the court’s order by accepting the increased salary. The Circuit Court found Franklin in civil contempt for willfully disobeying the declaratory judgment and ordered him to repay part of his salary or face jail.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the contempt order. The court held that a declaratory judgment, which only settles the rights and obligations of the parties without compelling or prohibiting specific actions, cannot be enforced by contempt; only injunctive orders may be enforced in this manner. Since the Circuit Court’s order was a declaratory judgment, and not an injunction, the contempt finding was improper. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the Circuit Court’s contempt order and dismissed the contempt proceedings. View "FRANKLIN v. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law
FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
The case concerns Christopher Franklin, who was serving as the mayor of Helena-West Helena, Arkansas. The State filed a lawsuit against Franklin in June 2025, alleging that he had abused his office and committed various illegal acts. The State sought civil penalties, damages, attorneys’ fees, and Franklin’s removal from office. Unusually, instead of the circuit court clerk issuing and signing the summons as required, the circuit court judge did so after the State handed him the complaint in open court. The next day, the documents were filed with the clerk, and the court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order removing Franklin from his mayoral duties.Franklin responded by filing several motions, including one to dismiss the case on the ground that the summons was defective because it had not been signed by the clerk or a deputy clerk. Despite Franklin’s objections, the Phillips County Circuit Court imposed penalties, awarded attorneys’ fees, and removed him from office. Franklin then filed a motion under Rule 60(a) to vacate the orders, which was deemed denied by operation of law. He appealed the case.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the summons was valid and whether Franklin had waived his objection. The court held that the summons was constitutionally defective because only the clerk or a deputy clerk may sign a summons, not a judge. Since the State did not serve Franklin with a valid summons within the required 120 days, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. The court also determined that Franklin did not waive his objection. As a result, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s orders, vacated all actions taken, and dismissed the case without prejudice. View "FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Arkansas Supreme Court, Civil Procedure
Whaleco Inc. v. Gluck
A company operating an online shopping platform entered into settlement agreements with two other companies that had previously brought legal claims against it. An intellectual property lawyer, representing these companies, negotiated and personally signed two provisions in each agreement. The lawyer represented that neither he nor his firm had clients intending to sue the shopping platform, but reserved the right to represent future clients. Shortly after the agreements were effective, the lawyer allegedly advertised for new clients to sue the shopping platform and threatened new litigation on behalf of additional clients.Following these events, the shopping platform filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging claims such as intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, including the lawyer and his clients, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, with some also moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, dismissing the complaint on the merits, and awarded attorney fees to some defendants. The court explicitly chose not to address the personal jurisdiction challenges raised by certain defendants.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a federal court may not reach the merits of a case without first determining that it has personal jurisdiction over the parties. Because the district court dismissed the case on the merits without resolving the personal jurisdiction issues, the First Circuit vacated the orders and judgment below and remanded the case. The district court was instructed to first resolve the motions challenging personal jurisdiction before considering the merits or other remedies. Each party was ordered to bear its own appellate costs. View "Whaleco Inc. v. Gluck" on Justia Law
Kaszuba v. Norris
An employee of an electric car company was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a motorcyclist while driving a company-owned service truck. The employee had been authorized by his manager to take the truck home the previous evening for his convenience, rather than returning it to the service center after dropping off a company trailer. The following morning, while driving the truck back to work, the employee stopped for gas per an informal company policy recommending that vehicles be returned with at least a quarter tank of fuel. During this stop, the collision occurred, resulting in severe injuries to the motorcyclist.Following the accident, the injured party was found incompetent, and his guardian substituted as plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the employee and his employer, claiming the employer was vicariously liable under respondeat superior because the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. The Marion Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff and the employee, finding as a matter of law that the employer was liable since the employee was on a special errand for his employer. The trial proceeded in two phases: the jury allocated seventy percent fault to the employee and thirty percent to the motorcyclist, and awarded damages, which were then reduced according to comparative fault.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability and the liability phase, but reversed for a new trial on damages due to improper ex parte communications between the judge and jury. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate decision. The Indiana Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue and on damages, but the jury’s allocation of fault remains intact. View "Kaszuba v. Norris" on Justia Law
Riffenburg v. Rice
In this matter, Logan Riffenburg and Vanessa Roper, formerly married, jointly acquired property in Arkansas. After their divorce, each retained a half-interest in the property. Roper subsequently remarried and, with her new husband, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sought court approval to sell Roper’s interest in the property to Blue Sun Capital LLC. Riffenburg objected to the sale, but his objection was overruled by the bankruptcy court, which authorized the sale. The court focused on the trustee’s good faith and the fairness of the process but did not address whether Blue Sun Capital was a good-faith purchaser.Following the bankruptcy court’s approval, Riffenburg appealed to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit (BAP) and requested a stay pending appeal, which was denied. The sale was completed. The trustee then moved to dismiss the appeal as statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), arguing that the completed sale to a good-faith purchaser could not be unwound in the absence of a stay. The BAP, with one judge dissenting, agreed and dismissed the appeal, finding that Riffenburg had not raised the issue of the purchaser’s good faith in the bankruptcy court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the BAP’s dismissal. The court held that under its precedent, in order to avoid mootness under § 363(m), an objector must challenge the good faith of the purchaser before the bankruptcy court. Because Riffenburg did not do so, the issue was not preserved for appeal, and the appeal was dismissed as statutorily moot. The Eighth Circuit explicitly stated that this precedent remained binding, even after the Supreme Court’s decision in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC. View "Riffenburg v. Rice" on Justia Law
Ortiz-Resto v. Rivera-Schatz
Three former employees of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico alleged they were terminated from their positions—Protocol Officer and Liaison Technician—because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The suit was brought against Senate officials in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged unconstitutional patronage dismissals.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially heard the case, which involved numerous plaintiffs and claims, including due process, equal protection, and Puerto Rico law claims. Many claims were dismissed at earlier procedural stages. The claims relevant to this appeal survived summary judgment and concerned only the First Amendment-based damages actions brought by the three former employees. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was based on qualified immunity, finding there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the plaintiffs’ job duties and whether defendants had considered the nature of those duties before termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal, which focused on the denial of qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The appellate court held that the District Court erred in considering whether the officials had subjectively inquired into the plaintiffs’ job duties, as qualified immunity is an objective standard. However, the First Circuit found no error in the District Court’s other reasoning, ruling that unresolved factual disputes about the nature of the plaintiffs’ job responsibilities precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. The court also determined that claims against the officials in their personal capacities were not discharged by the Commonwealth’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA. Thus, the District Court’s denial of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Ortiz-Resto v. Rivera-Schatz" on Justia Law
SCHRAMMEL & WARD v. COLYER HEREFORDS AND ANGUS, INC.
Two Oklahoma cattle ranchers entered into an agreement with an Idaho-based cattle breeder concerning the ownership and profits from a Hereford bull named Guardian. The arrangement involved the Plaintiffs bidding on Guardian at an Oklahoma auction, acquiring a partial ownership interest, and receiving a share of profits from the sale of Guardian’s semen. The agreement also contemplated that Guardian would spend part of each year in Oklahoma. After the auction, Guardian remained in the Defendant’s custody out of state. Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant’s negligent care led to Guardian’s death and sought compensation and an accounting of profits.The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissed the Plaintiffs’ action for lack of both general and specific personal jurisdiction, finding that the Defendant’s contacts with Oklahoma were insufficient. After the judgment, a dispute arose over the timeliness of the Plaintiffs’ appeal, because proof of service of the judgment was not immediately filed. The Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing the appellate deadline had passed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the Plaintiffs’ appeal was timely, as the thirty-day period to appeal began when proof of service was filed, not when the judgment was originally served. The Supreme Court further found that, although Oklahoma lacked general jurisdiction over the Defendant, specific personal jurisdiction existed because the Defendant purposefully directed activities toward Oklahoma by facilitating the auction transaction and ongoing custodial arrangement. Plaintiffs’ claims “arose out of or related to” these contacts. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, reversed the district court’s order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SCHRAMMEL & WARD v. COLYER HEREFORDS AND ANGUS, INC." on Justia Law
Estate of Isham v. Richardson
The case involves the fatal shooting of Elijah Isham by Moraine, Ohio police officers following a car crash. After the incident, Elijah’s father, Ralph Isham, was appointed administrator of his son’s estate and, acting in that role, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police chief and several officers. Isham filed the complaint pro se, just before the statute of limitations expired. The complaint alleged violations of Elijah’s Fourth Amendment rights during the police encounter that led to his death.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sua sponte raised the issue of whether Isham could represent the estate without counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The court determined Isham was not permitted to proceed pro se because he had not sufficiently proven he was the sole beneficiary and that the estate had no creditors. The court ordered him to retain counsel or show cause why he should be allowed to proceed alone. After initial attempts to satisfy the court’s requirements were deemed inadequate, Isham retained counsel, but the district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, holding that the initial pro se filing rendered the lawsuit a legal nullity. The court dismissed the case without prejudice and denied reconsideration, even after new evidence was submitted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether a complaint filed in violation of § 1654 is a “nullity” or whether the defect is curable by retaining counsel. The Sixth Circuit held that, while § 1654 bars non-lawyers from representing estates in most cases, federal law does not mandate treating such complaints as nullities. Instead, district courts have discretion to allow correction by retaining counsel. Because Isham retained counsel within the court’s timeline, dismissal was not required. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Isham v. Richardson" on Justia Law