Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens.Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

An individual who was convicted in Arizona for several sexual offenses moved to Georgia after completing his sentence and registration period in New Mexico. Upon arrival in Georgia, he was advised by law enforcement that he would need to register as a sex offender under Georgia law. After several years, he sought removal from the registry, arguing that he had fulfilled his obligations elsewhere, that the crimes for which he was convicted did not require registration in Georgia, and that continued enforcement of the registry against him violated his constitutional rights.The Superior Court of DeKalb County initially dismissed his petition for declaratory relief, finding it time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. The Supreme Court of Georgia later reversed, holding that his claims for prospective relief had not accrued and thus were not time-barred, and remanded the case. On remand, after further amendments and substitution of parties, the trial court dismissed the petition again, this time as moot, citing recent revisions to Georgia’s Registry Act which provided a statutory mechanism for requesting removal from registration requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but on the alternative ground that any decision would be an impermissible advisory opinion since only prospective relief was sought.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that seeking prospective relief in a declaratory judgment action is not grounds for dismissal as an impermissible advisory opinion. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Court of Appeals to address whether the trial court’s dismissal on mootness grounds was proper and, if not, to instruct the trial court to adjudicate the merits of the declaratory judgment claim. View "GARDEI v. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

After her husband was kidnapped and likely murdered in Honduras, and her brother-in-law—who had opposed a local gang—was murdered, a woman and her young daughter fled to the United States. The woman believed the 18th Street Gang was responsible for both crimes and feared retaliation against her family. After arriving in the U.S., she applied for asylum, citing her relationship to her husband’s immediate family as the basis for her claim. She submitted supporting evidence including a death certificate, police report, and affidavits. Later, after receiving direct death threats from individuals identified as gang members, she sought to reopen her asylum proceedings based on this new evidence.The Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but determined the evidence did not sufficiently establish persecution on account of her membership in a protected group—her husband’s family—due to a lack of proof regarding the gang’s involvement in the murders. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed and affirmed this decision. After the death threats, the woman filed a motion to reopen, providing new evidence; however, the BIA denied the motion, concluding the threats did not demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and her family membership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the new evidence and the context surrounding the threats. The court found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, as the threats and violence were sufficiently connected to the woman’s family membership. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination.The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case centers on a longstanding family partnership, formed originally in 1988 and later converted to a limited partnership. Rick served as the managing partner, with other family members as partners. Following the death of a parent in 2011, annual financial meetings ceased, and several partners alleged they did not receive adequate financial records or updates for years. Concerns arose over Rick’s management, including incomplete and disorganized financial disclosures, and withdrawals from accounts over which Rick had power of attorney. These issues, along with disputed partnership interests and controversial financial transactions, led to Rick’s removal as managing partner and triggered litigation over his alleged breach of fiduciary duties.The District Court for Douglas County was presented with an amended complaint alleging Rick’s breach of fiduciary duties to the partnership. Rick moved to dismiss, arguing that a related county court proceeding involving a family trust precluded jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. Rick filed responses and counterclaims, but failed to properly plead affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations. Extensive discovery and a bench trial followed, with evidence showing Rick’s negative capital account and numerous questionable withdrawals and transfers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, including jurisdictional questions, evidentiary issues, and the award of attorney fees. The Court held that it had jurisdiction, affirmed the district court's findings that Rick no longer had an ownership interest in the partnership due to his negative capital account, and upheld the damages awarded for his breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the prevailing parties and rejected Rick’s arguments regarding lack of specificity in pleadings, statute of limitations, and the district court’s jurisdiction. The district court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "Berkshire v. Berkshire" on Justia Law

A Mississippi-based furniture company and its principal operated an online “drop shipping” business, selling to customers nationwide. They fulfilled over a thousand orders for Michigan residents, accepting payments and arranging deliveries to Michigan addresses, but beginning in 2020, they kept payments for furniture they never delivered. After numerous complaints, the Michigan Attorney General sued them for violations of Michigan’s consumer protection laws and statutory conversion involving ten Michigan consumers. The defendants did not appear in the Michigan court, asserting that their website’s terms limited legal disputes to Mississippi and that Michigan lacked personal jurisdiction. Default judgments were entered against both defendants, awarding damages, civil fines, and attorneys’ fees.Following the Michigan judgment, the Attorney General enrolled it in the Lowndes County Circuit Court in Mississippi under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The defendants objected, arguing that the Michigan court lacked jurisdiction due to their choice-of-law provision and that the forum-selection clause in their terms of service precluded jurisdiction. The circuit court held that the forum-selection clause was irrelevant to the statutory action and that Michigan law governed its validity, overruling the objections and directing enrollment of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal de novo. It held that the Michigan court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they knowingly and repeatedly contracted with Michigan residents, took their money, and arranged deliveries into Michigan, thus purposefully availing themselves of Michigan’s market. The choice-of-law provision in the website’s terms did not negate purposeful availment. The court found that Michigan’s long-arm statutes and due process requirements were satisfied. It also held that the size of the judgment was irrelevant to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s order enrolling the Michigan judgment. View "AF, LLC v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Kennedy filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the White County Circuit Court, seeking dismissal of misdemeanor charges pending against him in the Judsonia District Court. He argued that the charges should be dismissed on the grounds of a speedy-trial violation. After filing his petition, Kennedy attempted to serve process on the district court by mailing the summons and complaint. The district court clerk acknowledged receipt of the documents, but Kennedy did not address them to a specific person, nor did he use certified mail with a return receipt requested.The White County Circuit Court reviewed Kennedy’s petition and determined that service of process had not been properly perfected within the 120-day period required by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Specifically, the circuit court found that Kennedy did not comply with Rule 4’s requirements: he failed to serve by certified mail addressed to a specific person, did not provide a notarized affidavit of proof of service, and did not include a copy of the summons in the record. As a result, the circuit court dismissed Kennedy’s petition without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. Applying a clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court’s factual findings, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy’s failure to comply with Rule 4’s service requirements rendered the process defective. The Supreme Court held that because the dismissal was without prejudice and Kennedy could refile his claims, the order was not final or appealable. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. View "KENNEDY v. WHITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT JUDSONIA" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law