Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jennifer Virden, a small business owner in Austin, Texas, ran for city council in 2020 and for mayor in 2022. The City of Austin has a regulation that prohibits candidates from fundraising outside a one-year period before the general election. Virden announced her candidacy for the 2022 election in March 2021, which was seven months before she could start fundraising under the ordinance. She filed a lawsuit challenging the one-year fundraising window as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Virden's request for a preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm. Virden's interlocutory appeal was dismissed as moot after the fundraising window opened. The district court later granted summary judgment in part, ruling that the one-year fundraising window was unconstitutional and awarding nominal damages to Virden and her donor, William Clark. The court found that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot since the 2022 election had ended and there were no concrete plans for future campaigns. The court also refused to consider evidence regarding Virden's desire to contribute to another candidate in the 2024 election, deeming the submission untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the one-year fundraising window was unconstitutional, agreeing that it violated the First Amendment. The court also upheld the award of nominal damages to Virden and Clark. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the late evidence regarding the 2024 election. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the suit was timely, Virden had standing, and the city's arguments were without merit. The court affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety. View "Virden v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Following public outcry over "Pride Month" displays in St. Tammany Parish's public libraries, the Parish Council passed a resolution that vacated the terms of the Library Board of Control members, staggered those terms in accordance with Louisiana law, and appointed new Board members. Three ousted Board members—Anthony Parr, Rebecca Taylor, and William McHugh, III—sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting viewpoint-discrimination, free-speech, retaliation, and substantive-due-process claims against the Council and Councilman David Cougle. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the resolution from taking effect.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that the legislative privilege was inapplicable because the resolution was not "legislative" in nature. Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal challenging this ruling. Before addressing the legislative privilege issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged speech-related injuries were not particularized, as they were tied to their positions as Board members and affected all members equally. Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiffs' alleged reputational injuries were neither fairly traceable to the defendants' conduct nor redressable by a favorable decision. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Parr v. Cougle" on Justia Law

The City of Martinsville, Virginia, sued Express Scripts and OptumRx in state court, alleging public nuisance and harm related to the opioid epidemic. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, but the district court remanded it back to state court. In 2024, the defendants again removed the case to federal court under the federal-officer-removal statute. The district court granted Martinsville's motion to remand the case to state court.The defendants appealed the remand order before it was mailed to the state court and requested a stay of the remand order pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski. The district court denied the stay, interpreting Coinbase narrowly to apply only to orders compelling arbitration. The defendants then sought a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit granted the stay, holding that the district court was automatically stayed from mailing the remand order once the defendants filed their notice of appeal. The court applied the "Griggs principle," which divests the district court of control over aspects of the case involved in the appeal. The court found that the district court's interpretation of Coinbase was too narrow and that the automatic stay applied to the remand order. The court concluded that the district court lacked the authority to mail the remand order while the appeal was pending. View "City of Martinsville v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Haley Olson was arrested in Idaho for marijuana possession and consented to a search of her phone by Idaho police, who created a copy of its contents. Glenn Palmer, then-Sheriff of Grant County, Oregon, learned of the arrest and, curious about Olson's relationship with Grant County Deputy Tyler Smith, asked County Attorney Jim Carpenter to request the phone extraction from the Idaho prosecutor. Carpenter obtained and reviewed the extraction, allegedly deleting it afterward. However, Olson later heard gossip about the contents of her phone, including nude photos, seemingly originating from the sheriff’s office. Olson sued Palmer, Carpenter, and Grant County, alleging Fourth Amendment violations.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Palmer, finding no supervisory liability, and for Carpenter, granting him qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Olson appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that Palmer was not liable due to lack of supervisory authority over Carpenter. The court also held that Carpenter was entitled to qualified immunity because Olson’s right to be free from Carpenter’s search was not clearly established at the time. However, the court concluded that Carpenter’s search did violate Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was conducted without a warrant, consent, or suspicion of criminal activity. The court emphasized the importance of developing constitutional precedent in this area, despite affirming the grant of qualified immunity to Carpenter. View "OLSON V. COUNTY OF GRANT" on Justia Law

Frankie Greer filed a lawsuit against the County of San Diego under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he suffered serious injuries while incarcerated in the San Diego Central Jail. During discovery, Greer requested documents from the County’s Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) meetings related to in-custody deaths. The CIRB’s purpose is to consult with legal counsel on incidents that may lead to litigation, assess civil exposure, and recommend remedial actions. The district court ruled that the CIRB documents were not protected by attorney-client privilege, as the CIRB served multiple purposes beyond obtaining legal advice. After Greer settled his claims, several media organizations intervened to unseal the CIRB documents.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the County’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the production of the CIRB documents, which were then produced under an attorneys’-eyes-only protective order. The district court also granted the media organizations' motion to intervene and unseal the documents, leading to the County’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the appeal was not moot, as effective relief could still be provided by ordering the return or destruction of the CIRB documents. The court determined that the attorney-client privilege applied to the CIRB documents, as the primary purpose of the CIRB meetings was to obtain legal advice regarding potential litigation and to avoid future liability. The court found that the district court had made significant legal errors in its determination and that the County had not waived the privilege. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to require the return and/or destruction of the privileged documents. View "GREER V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

Trudell Medical International Inc. (Trudell) owns U.S. Patent No. 9,808,588, which relates to devices for performing oscillatory positive expiratory pressure (OPEP) therapy. Trudell sued D R Burton Healthcare, LLC (D R Burton) for patent infringement. D R Burton sells OPEP devices, including the vPEP®, vPEP® HC, iPEP®, PocketPEP®, and PocketPEP® Advantage products. Trudell alleged that these products infringed certain claims of the ’588 patent.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina allowed D R Burton to present infringement testimony by Dr. John Collins at trial. After a three-day trial, the jury found that the asserted claims of the ’588 patent were valid but not infringed. Trudell filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on infringement or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Collins to testify on noninfringement because his testimony was untimely and did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Additionally, the court found Dr. Collins' testimony unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s finding of noninfringement and remanded for a new trial, excluding Dr. Collins’ noninfringement testimony. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Trudell’s motion for JMOL of infringement, as the jury could have reasonably found noninfringement based on the evidence presented.The Federal Circuit ordered that the case be reassigned to a different district court judge on remand to preserve the appearance of justice and fairness, given the trial judge’s statements indicating a predisposition to quickly resolve the case. View "TRUDELL MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL INC. v. D R BURTON HEALTHCARE, LLC " on Justia Law

Trina Cunningham, an employee of the Baltimore Department of Public Works, was responsible for monitoring water flow at the Patapsco Wastewater Treatment Plant. On June 3, 2019, while inspecting the plant's Grit Facility, Cunningham fell through a metal, grated catwalk that collapsed under her feet, causing her to drown in the wastewater chamber below. Her estate and family members filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the City of Baltimore, various city officials, and several crane servicing companies, alleging negligence and other claims related to her death.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted motions to dismiss filed by most of the defendants, including Freeland Hoist & Crane, Inc., but did not address the claims against Crane 1 Services, Inc., and Overhead Crane Service, Inc., who had not filed motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the entire complaint, despite the unresolved claims against these two defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order was not a final decision because it did not resolve all claims against all parties. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to address the claims against Crane 1 Services and Overhead Crane Services, and thus, the order was not appealable. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate the remaining claims. View "Estate of Cunningham v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Caesar Elmi rejected a settlement offer from defendant Related Management Company, L.P. (Related) under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The case was resolved for less than the amount offered by Related, leading to a limitation on Elmi’s award of prejudgment costs and attorney fees to those incurred before the offer. Elmi later filed a motion seeking additional fees and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment, which the trial court denied, stating that Elmi was not entitled to any fees or costs after the date of the settlement offer.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Elmi’s motion for additional fees and costs, reasoning that section 998 precluded any fees or costs incurred after the settlement offer. Elmi appealed this decision, arguing that section 998 only applies to prejudgment costs and fees, not postjudgment costs incurred in enforcing the judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Elmi, holding that postjudgment costs and fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not governed by section 998. The court noted that postjudgment costs and fees are distinct from prejudgment costs and fees and are governed by different laws, specifically section 685.040, which allows for the recovery of reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment, including attorney’s fees.The court reversed the trial court’s order denying Elmi’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the motion on its merits. Elmi was also entitled to recover his costs on appeal. View "Elmi v. Related Management Co., L.P." on Justia Law