Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, property owners in Danbury, Connecticut, challenged the tax assessments on their properties, each valued at over one million dollars, by appealing to the Superior Court. They were required by statute to file appraisals of their properties within 120 days of filing their appeals. The plaintiffs requested extensions to this deadline, which the court granted. However, they failed to file the appraisals with the court by the extended deadlines, although they did provide the appraisals to the defendant's counsel.The trial court initially dismissed five of the six tax appeals for failure to meet the filing deadline, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court later granted the plaintiffs' motions to open the judgments of dismissal and for reargument, citing similar cases where the court had not dismissed appeals under similar circumstances. The court denied the defendant's corrected motion to dismiss the sixth appeal, finding no prejudice to the defendant from the late filing.The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' failure to timely file the appraisals. The plaintiffs contended that the appeal was moot because they had filed new tax appeals under a recent statutory amendment allowing for such actions if previous appeals were dismissed under certain conditions.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot, as the underlying appeals were not "dismissed" for purposes of the new statutory provision, given that the judgments of dismissal had been opened. The court further held that the appraisal filing requirement in § 12-117a (a) (2) is not subject matter jurisdictional. The requirement is mandatory but arises after the commencement of a tax appeal, and the time period for filing the appraisal can be extended by the court for good cause. The judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff, K, and the defendant, R, with the intervenor, B, also involved due to a related New Jersey litigation. The key marital asset was the couple's home in Greenwich, Connecticut, valued at approximately $11 million, and several investment accounts. The defendant had previously pledged these assets as security in a New Jersey court case, which resulted in a $24.7 million judgment against him and his father. The New Jersey court ordered the forfeiture of the Greenwich property and imposed a constructive trust on the investment accounts due to the defendant's misconduct, including transferring $3 million to Slovakia.The Connecticut trial court found that the defendant had dissipated marital assets by pledging and forfeiting the Greenwich property and investment accounts. The court included these assets in the marital estate and ordered their sale, with proceeds to be divided among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the intervenor. The court also found the defendant's annual earning capacity to be $400,000 and ordered him to pay $749 per week in child support, based on his earning capacity rather than actual income. Additionally, the court allowed the plaintiff to relocate with the children to the Czech Republic and granted her motion for contempt against the defendant for failing to support the family during the pendency of the dissolution action.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to afford full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders, which had removed the Greenwich property and investment accounts from the marital estate. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court improperly calculated child support by not first determining the presumptive amount based on the defendant's actual income. The court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt was reversed due to a lack of clear and unambiguous orders requiring the defendant to provide the support he allegedly withheld. The case was remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues, including the division of the marital assets, giving full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders. View "K. S. v. R. S." on Justia Law

Three registered electors from Bridgeport filed a writ of error challenging a trial judge's decision to deny their applications for arrest warrants for two individuals who allegedly violated election laws during the 2023 Democratic primary for the mayoral office. The plaintiffs claimed that the trial judge misinterpreted the relevant statute, General Statutes § 9-368, which they argued mandated the issuance of arrest warrants upon their complaint. The state of Connecticut, the defendant in error, argued that the writ should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the denial of their applications.The Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, with Judge Thomas J. Welch presiding, denied the applications for arrest warrants. The judge concluded that § 9-368 was inconsistent with the federal and state constitutions and the rules of practice, as it allowed for the issuance of arrest warrants based on a standard less than probable cause and without coordination with the Division of Criminal Justice. The judge did not reach the substantive merits of the applications and suggested that the matter could be referred to a prosecuting authority.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs in error were not required to establish statutory aggrievement to bring a writ of error. However, the court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not classically aggrieved. The court determined that the plaintiffs lacked a specific, personal, and legal interest in the arrest and prosecution of those who allegedly violated election laws, as they were private citizens without a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the trial judge's denial of their arrest warrant applications. View "In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident. The original action was dismissed due to insufficient service of process, as the defendant had moved from the address where service was attempted. The plaintiff then filed a new action under the accidental failure of suit statute, § 52-592.The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the original action was not commenced within the time limited by law because the defendant did not receive the summons and complaint within the statutory period. The Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant did not have actual or effective notice of the original action within the required time frame.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that for an action to be "commenced" under § 52-592, the defendant must receive the summons and complaint within the time permitted by law, even if the service was improper. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant or her agent received the summons and complaint within the statutory period. Therefore, the original action was not commenced within the meaning of § 52-592, and the plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute to file a new action. View "Laiuppa v. Moritz" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, had a loan secured by a mortgage on her property. The defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., acquired the loan and later counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the setting of new law days. On remand, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion to reset the law days, arguing that the judgment of strict foreclosure did not account for the substantial increase in property values that had occurred during the appeal. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to revisit the merits of the strict foreclosure judgment, as it was bound by the Appellate Court’s rescript order requiring the setting of new law days. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal with the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from entertaining the plaintiff’s request to modify the judgment of strict foreclosure and order a foreclosure by sale. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked authority to entertain the plaintiff’s request. The court further held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was required to file a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to present evidence that the value of the subject property had substantially increased since the date of the original judgment before the trial court could exercise that authority. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law