Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute within the Unification Church, also known as the Unification Movement, following a schism and succession conflict. The plaintiffs, including the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International, filed a complaint in 2011 against defendants, including Unification Church International (UCI) and its president, Hyun Jin (Preston) Moon. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in actions contrary to the church's mission, including amending UCI's articles of incorporation and transferring assets to entities like the Kingdom Investments Foundation (KIF) and the Global Peace Foundation (GPF).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants' actions were inconsistent with UCI's original purposes. However, the court's decision was reversed on appeal in Moon III, where it was held that resolving the plaintiffs' claims would require deciding disputed religious questions, making them nonjusticiable under the First Amendment's religious abstention doctrine. The case was remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked special interest standing to pursue their self-dealing claims against Preston Moon after Moon III, as the claims no longer involved extraordinary measures threatening UCI's existence. The court also determined that the contract claims were nonjusticiable under the religious abstention doctrine, as resolving them would require interpreting religious terms and doctrines. The court declined to apply the potential fraud or collusion exception to the religious abstention doctrine, finding no evidence of bad faith for secular purposes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's orders, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable and that they lacked special interest standing. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. The litigation, which spanned over a decade, was thereby brought to a close. View "Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon" on Justia Law

Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law

The case involves three separate lawsuits filed by individuals, organizations, and states to prevent the enforcement of President Trump's Executive Order No. 14160. This order specifies conditions under which a person born in the United States is not considered a citizen. The plaintiffs argue that the order violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. District Courts in each case issued universal injunctions, preventing the order's enforcement against anyone, not just the plaintiffs. The Government sought to limit these injunctions to the plaintiffs, arguing that the courts lacked the authority to issue such broad relief.The District Courts concluded that the Executive Order was likely unlawful and issued universal preliminary injunctions. The Courts of Appeals denied the Government's requests to stay these injunctions. The Government then filed emergency applications with the Supreme Court, seeking partial stays to limit the injunctions to the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority granted to federal courts by Congress. The Court granted the Government's applications for partial stays, limiting the injunctions to the extent necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. The Court emphasized that federal courts' equitable authority is confined to traditional remedies available at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and universal injunctions do not have a historical precedent. The Court directed the lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions would be appropriate. View "Trump v. CASA, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individuals and community organizations, challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Infrastructure Trespass Statute, arguing that amendments to the statute rendered it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, violating the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. The statute criminalizes unauthorized entry into critical infrastructure, including pipelines, and imposes significant penalties for violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including the Louisiana Attorney General, the District Attorney of the 16th Judicial District, and the Sheriff of St. Martin Parish. The district court dismissed claims against the Attorney General on sovereign immunity grounds and found that the Advocacy and Landowner Plaintiffs lacked standing. The court also dismissed the Arrested Plaintiffs' as-applied claims as moot due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for their alleged violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims against the Attorney General, agreeing that the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity did not apply. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Advocacy and Landowner Plaintiffs for lack of standing, finding that their alleged injuries were not traceable to or redressable by the remaining defendants. The court agreed that the Arrested Plaintiffs had standing for their facial challenges but affirmed the dismissal of their as-applied claims as moot.On the merits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Infrastructure Trespass Statute was neither impermissibly vague nor violative of the First Amendment. The court found that the statute provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and did not authorize arbitrary enforcement. The court also determined that the statute was not overbroad, as it served a substantial governmental interest in protecting critical infrastructure and did not substantially burden protected speech. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "White Hat v. Murrill" on Justia Law

A public benefit corporation, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA), challenged local rules of federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. These rules require attorneys seeking general admission to be members in good standing of the bar of the state where the district court is located. LFRA argued that these rules prevent its members, who are barred in states outside the Ninth Circuit and do not wish to join another state bar, from seeking general admission to these federal district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed LFRA’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that LFRA had standing to bring claims on behalf of its members, except for the Sixth Amendment claim, which lacked standing. The court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that the Admission Rules did not violate constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds as alleged by LFRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that the Admission Rules are constitutional and do not violate separation of powers, federalism principles, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Rules Enabling Act, or procedural due process. The court also found that Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private right of action. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without leave to amend, as the complaint could not be saved by amendment. The court also upheld the denial of LFRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as procedurally premature. View "Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States" on Justia Law

Seven District of Columbia citizen-voters filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Local Resident Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2022, which allows noncitizens to vote in municipal elections. The plaintiffs argued that this law dilutes their votes, discriminates against U.S. citizens, and violates the constitutional right to citizen self-government. The District of Columbia Board of Elections, responsible for implementing the law, was named as the defendant.The case was initially brought in D.C. Superior Court, but the Board removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Board then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. The district court agreed with the Board, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any individual disadvantage and thus lacked standing. The court dismissed the complaint, characterizing the plaintiffs' grievances as generalized and insufficient to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they alleged a concrete and particularized injury: the dilution of their votes due to the expansion of the electorate to include noncitizens. The court distinguished this case from others where plaintiffs failed to show individualized harm. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were specific to their voting power in D.C. local elections and not merely a generalized grievance. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Board's cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Hall v. District of Columbia Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In this case, inmate Kyle Richards alleged that Thomas Perttu, a prison employee, sexually harassed him and other inmates. Richards also claimed that Perttu destroyed his grievance documents and retaliated against him for attempting to file them. Richards sued Perttu under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment right to file grievances. Perttu moved for summary judgment, arguing that Richards had failed to exhaust available grievance procedures as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The Magistrate Judge found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Richards was excused from exhausting his claims due to Perttu's interference and held an evidentiary hearing. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Richards's witnesses lacked credibility and recommended dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The District Court adopted this recommendation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial when the resolution of the exhaustion issue under the PLRA would also resolve a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of the plaintiff's substantive case.The Supreme Court of the United States held that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Court reasoned that the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that factual disputes regarding legal claims go to the jury. The PLRA is silent on whether judges or juries should resolve exhaustion disputes, and this silence indicates that the usual practice should be followed. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. View "Perttu v. Richards" on Justia Law