Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A firearms dealer in Madison County filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Attorney General, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Firearms Industry Responsibility Act. The plaintiff argued that the statute was preempted by federal law, void for vagueness, violated the Second Amendment, and violated the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule. Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the venue provision, which limited venue to Sangamon and Cook Counties for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to a state statute, was unconstitutional as it violated federal due process rights.The circuit court of Madison County denied the Attorney General's motion to transfer the case to Sangamon County and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the venue issue. The court found that transferring the case to Sangamon County would be inconvenient for the plaintiff and would deprive it of its ability to effectively challenge the statute. The court concluded that the venue provision was unconstitutional as applied to individuals residing or injured outside of Cook or Sangamon Counties.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the venue provision did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights. The court emphasized that the inconvenience of traveling to Sangamon County did not rise to the level of a due process violation, especially considering the availability of remote court proceedings. The court also noted that the legislature has the authority to determine venue and that the state's interest in consolidating actions in certain counties was reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The appellants, Robin and Louie Joseph Aquilino, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in April 2020 and retained the law firm Spector Gadon Rosen & Vinci P.C. (Spector Gadon) as their counsel. They agreed to pay a flat fee of $3,500 and a $335 filing fee, which Spector Gadon disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court. However, due to the complexity of the case, Spector Gadon billed the Aquilinos for additional post-petition services, resulting in a fee agreement of $113,000, which was not disclosed to the Bankruptcy Court as required by 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b).The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey found that Spector Gadon violated the disclosure requirements and sanctioned the firm by ordering the disgorgement of collected fees and cancellation of the remaining fee agreement. Spector Gadon appealed, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reversed the Bankruptcy Court's decision, concluding that Spector Gadon was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Bankruptcy Court had "core" jurisdiction over the fee disclosure issue under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The Third Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment did not entitle Spector Gadon to a jury trial in the § 329(a) proceeding because the sanctions imposed were equitable in nature, designed to restore the status quo, and did not involve legal claims. The Third Circuit also found that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions, as it considered all relevant factors, including the Debtors' misconduct.The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court's sanctions order. View "In re Aquilino" on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Bruce Henry, who pled guilty to possessing child pornography in 2013, challenged Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4), which prohibits adult sex offenders convicted of a sex offense involving a child from residing or conducting overnight visits with a minor, including their own child. Henry, who has completed his prison term, married, and fathered a son, argued that the statute violated his First Amendment right of intimate association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Henry’s motion for a preliminary injunction but later partially granted his motion for summary judgment, finding the statute facially unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further Alabama’s compelling interest in protecting children and issued an injunction against its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the statute violated Henry’s fundamental right to live with his child. The court held that the statute was overinclusive, underinclusive, and not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. However, the court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in facially enjoining the statute, as Henry had not shown that it was unconstitutional in all its applications. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County" on Justia Law

C.L., a twelve-year-old student, was invited by her teacher, Jenna Riep, to an after-school art club meeting, which turned out to be a Gender and Sexualities Alliance (GSA) meeting. During the meeting, a guest speaker, Kimberly Chambers, discussed gender identity and suggested that students uncomfortable with their bodies might be transgender. Chambers also warned students that it might not be safe to tell their parents about the meeting and provided her personal contact information for further communication. C.L. announced herself as transgender at the meeting and later informed her parents, who subsequently disenrolled her from the school. H.J., another student, had similar experiences and also faced emotional distress, leading her parents to disenroll her from the school.The parents of C.L. and H.J. sued the Poudre School District and its Board of Education, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment parental substantive-due-process rights. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The parents then moved to amend their complaint, focusing solely on a claim against the school district for monetary damages. The district court denied the motion to amend, concluding that the parents had failed to plausibly allege municipal liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parents did not plausibly allege that the school district's official policy was the moving force behind their alleged injuries. The court found that the parents failed to establish a direct causal link between the district's policies and the constitutional injury they claimed. View "Lee v. Poudre School District R-1" on Justia Law

8fig, Incorporated, a technology company, entered into agreements with several e-commerce merchants (Defendant-Appellants) to purchase projected revenue in exchange for an up-front payment. 8fig alleged that the Defendant-Appellants failed to remit the agreed payments and instead transferred the funds to a religious movement, World Olivet Assembly, closed their bank accounts, and went out of business. 8fig filed a lawsuit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964, 1962, and various state and common law claims. The parties filed a Joint Agreed Motion to Administratively Close and Seal Proceedings, which the district court granted, and the case settled quickly.Newsweek Digital, LLC moved to intervene and unseal the judicial record, arguing that the seal hindered its reporting. The district court granted Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal, allowing any party to propose redactions. Certain defendants filed proposed redactions, which the district court granted, and denied a motion to extend filing deadlines. The district court proceeding has been unsealed for over a year, except for documents with redacted versions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Newsweek had standing to intervene, as alleged violations of the public right to access judicial records and gather news are cognizable injuries-in-fact. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in unsealing the records, emphasizing the public’s common law right of access to judicial records and the presumption in favor of transparency. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal the proceeding. View "8Fig v. Stepup Funny" on Justia Law

AT&T sought review of a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) forfeiture order, which fined the company $57 million for mishandling customer data in violation of section 222 of the Telecommunications Act. The FCC found that AT&T failed to protect customer proprietary network information (CPNI) and issued the fine after an internal adjudication process. AT&T argued that the FCC's in-house adjudication violated the Constitution by denying it an Article III decisionmaker and a jury trial.The FCC's Enforcement Bureau investigated AT&T following reports of misuse of customer location data by service providers. The Bureau issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL), proposing the penalty. AT&T responded in writing, contesting the penalty and raising constitutional challenges. The FCC rejected AT&T's arguments and affirmed the penalty, leading AT&T to pay the fine and seek review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit, guided by the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, agreed with AT&T that the FCC's enforcement procedures violated the Seventh Amendment and Article III. The court found that the FCC's imposition of civil penalties was akin to a common law action for money damages, which traditionally requires a jury trial. The court also determined that the public rights exception did not apply, as the action was closely related to common law negligence and did not fall within the historical categories of non-Article III adjudications.The court concluded that the FCC's process, which allowed for a section 504 trial only after the agency had already adjudicated the matter, did not satisfy the constitutional requirements. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted AT&T's petition and vacated the FCC's forfeiture order. View "AT&T v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Mississippi statute, House Bill 1126, aims to protect minors from harmful online material by requiring digital service providers (DSPs) to verify users' ages, obtain parental consent for minors, limit data collection, and implement strategies to mitigate harmful content exposure. NetChoice, L.L.C., a trade association for internet-focused companies, challenged the statute's constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the preliminary injunction, finding that NetChoice was likely to succeed on its claims that the statute was unconstitutional. The court determined that NetChoice had associational standing to bring the suit on behalf of its members and that the statute imposed significant regulatory burdens that could cause financial harm. The Attorney General of Mississippi appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings and failed to perform the necessary facial analysis as mandated by the Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not conduct the required two-step analysis outlined in Moody. This analysis involves defining the law's scope and determining which applications violate the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit noted that the district court did not fully assess the range of activities and actors regulated by the statute or the specific regulatory burdens imposed on different DSPs. Consequently, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further factual analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Moody and Fifth Circuit precedent. View "NetChoice v. Fitch" on Justia Law

Carlos and Ana Carachure filed a lawsuit against the City of Azusa, claiming the City violated article XIII D of the California Constitution by charging sewer and trash franchise fees that exceeded the cost of providing those services and using the fees to fund general city services. The City argued that the Carachures failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not follow the statutory procedures for a refund, which require paying the fees under protest and filing a claim for a refund. The trial court agreed with the City and entered judgment in its favor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the Carachures were required to file a claim for a refund with the City before seeking judicial relief, as they claimed the fees were illegally collected or assessed. The court denied the Carachures' petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment for the City. The Carachures filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, arguing the trial court relied on inapplicable property tax cases and the current version of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Carachures' constitutional challenge to the City's collection and use of franchise fees seeks relief outside the scope of the statutory claims procedure for refunds. The court concluded that the Carachures did not have to file a claim for a refund before bringing this action, as their challenge was not an action for a refund governed by section 5472 and Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The judgment was reversed, allowing the Carachures to proceed with their constitutional claims. View "Carachure v. City of Azusa" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Missouri General Assembly enacted sections 67.287 and 479.359.2, which imposed certain standards and revenue caps on municipalities, specifically targeting St. Louis County. The City of Normandy and other municipalities challenged these statutes, claiming they violated the Missouri Constitution's prohibition against local or special laws. In 2016, the Circuit Court of Cole County declared these sections unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed this decision in City of Normandy v. Greitens.Following a shift in legal analysis in City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC, the state sought relief from the 2016 injunction, arguing that the statutes would have survived under the new rational basis review. The circuit court initially granted this relief, but the Missouri Supreme Court vacated that judgment in City of Normandy v. Parson, remanding the case for further proceedings. On remand, the circuit court overruled the state's motion for partial relief from the judgment.The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the change in legal analysis from City of Aurora did not automatically warrant relief from the permanent injunction under Rule 74.06(b)(5). The court emphasized the importance of finality in judgments and found that the state did not demonstrate sufficient inequity to justify lifting the injunction. The court also noted that the state had not sought relief from the declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional, which remained in effect. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the state's motion for relief. View "City of Normandy v. Kehoe" on Justia Law