Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, which created a private civil enforcement mechanism for certain abortion restrictions, the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity’s deputy director made a sworn statement indicating the Fund had paid for abortions potentially in violation of that law. In response, Sadie Weldon filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County seeking to depose the deputy director and obtain documents related to possible violations of the statute. While Weldon's petition was pending, the Lilith Fund initiated a lawsuit against Weldon, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief to prevent Weldon from pursuing related legal actions.The trial court denied Weldon’s Rule 202 petition, and Weldon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Lilith Fund’s suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which aims to quickly dispose of lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech, association, or petition. The trial court did not rule on Weldon’s TCPA motion, resulting in its denial by operation of law. Weldon appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed the denial, holding that the TCPA did not apply because the Fund’s suit was not “based on or in response to” Weldon’s Rule 202 petition.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply. The Court found that the Fund’s legal action was indeed “based on or in response to” Weldon’s exercise of her right to petition, as her Rule 202 petition was a protected activity under the statute and the Fund’s lawsuit sought relief directly connected to that petition. As a result, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings under the remaining steps of the TCPA analysis. View "WELDON v. THE LILITH FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs challenged the Oklahoma State Board of Education’s adoption of the 2025 Social Studies Standards, arguing the standards were improperly enacted and violated statutory and constitutional rights, including compelled viewpoint-specific speech in public education. After the Board approved the standards, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent their implementation, claiming both procedural errors in their adoption and substantive harms to students, parents, and teachers.The District Court for Oklahoma County heard the case and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed and that their claims about the Oklahoma Administrative Code were incorrect. The District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs appealed, raising issues about administrative procedures, standing, and the denial of an opportunity to amend their petition.While the appeal was pending, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Randall v. Fields, 2025 OK 91, held that the 2025 Social Studies Standards could not be enforced due to violations of the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act, rendering the standards void. In light of this, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma determined that the plaintiffs’ claims for relief were now moot because the challenged standards no longer existed. The Court found that neither the “broad public interest” nor “capable of repetition yet evading review” exceptions to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, reversed the District Court’s judgment, and directed the lower court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ petition without prejudice due to mootness. View "FORD v. THE OKLAHOMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

A catastrophic storm in March 2016 caused unprecedented rainfall in the Sabine River basin, leading the operators of the Toledo Bend Dam—jointly managed by the Sabine River Authority of Texas and the Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana—to open nine spillway gates. This action released significant amounts of water into the Sabine River over several weeks. Downriver landowners experienced extensive flooding and property damage. More than 700 landowners brought suit, alleging that the dam operators’ actions constituted a compensable taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment.The case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the defendants raised several defenses, including sovereign immunity, which was litigated and ultimately denied. Discovery disputes arose over the admissibility and timeliness of the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits and reports, which were found to rely heavily on an untested graduate thesis. The magistrate judge struck the challenged affidavits as untimely, and the plaintiffs did not object. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dam’s operation caused the flooding, nor that a taking had occurred. The court also found the necessity doctrine might shield the defendants but did not decide the case on that ground.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the untimely expert affidavits. Affirming summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation—specifically, that the dam’s operation, rather than the unprecedented storm itself, caused additional flooding beyond what would have occurred without the dam. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Bonin v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures.Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

A Mexican national who entered the United States unlawfully in 1992 married a U.S. citizen, and together they had three children who are U.S. citizens. In seeking to obtain lawful permanent residency, the noncitizen husband traveled to Mexico for a required consular interview. After the interview, the consular officer denied his visa application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“3A2”) and concluding there was reason to believe he was a member of a known criminal organization. The denial notice referenced a review of interview statements, law enforcement information, the immigration record, and all documents submitted. The applicant had no criminal record and disputed gang affiliation, contending that his tattoos were the basis for suspicion.The couple filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting that the visa denial was based solely on the noncitizen’s tattoos, violated their First Amendment rights, and that 3A2 was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the case, finding the noncitizen could not overcome the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, and that the U.S. citizen spouse had not plausibly alleged the absence of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial. The court also rejected the vagueness challenge to 3A2.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the noncitizen could not rely on his own First Amendment rights to challenge the visa denial, but the U.S. citizen spouse’s First Amendment right to receive information was implicated, triggering the narrow Mandel exception to consular nonreviewability. Nevertheless, applying the limited review allowed, the court found the government provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denial, the applicants did not show bad faith, and the relevant statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SANCHEZ GONZALEZ V. DEPARTMENT OF STATE" on Justia Law

In June 2023, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of unserialized firearms, frames, receivers, and firearm parts kits, as well as the manufacture of firearm frames or receivers by most people. Several individuals and two associations representing Colorado gun owners sued, alleging that the statute infringes their Second Amendment rights. The individual plaintiffs had previously purchased or owned firearm parts kits and intended to continue similar activities but for the new law. The associations represent gun owners in Colorado and were acting on behalf of similarly situated members.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It determined that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the possession prohibition, but found that the claims relating to future acquisition were not ripe due to an overlapping federal regulation, and that claims challenging the manufacturing prohibition lacked standing because the plaintiffs’ conduct was not covered by that provision. The court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the possession prohibition was a presumptively constitutional condition on the commercial sale of firearms that did not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both the possession and acquisition prohibitions, but not the manufacturing prohibition. The court found that the district court erred in treating the possession prohibition as a condition on commercial sales, since the law regulated possession regardless of how the item was acquired. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the possession prohibition, holding that this provision regulates possession, not just commercial sales. The court remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to address the merits of the acquisition prohibition claim in the first instance. View "National Association for Gun Rights v. Polis" on Justia Law

Duane Gonder, an inmate serving a lengthy prison sentence following guilty pleas to multiple charges in 2010, filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas Attorney General. He challenged the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-119(a), which criminalizes furnishing prohibited articles in correctional facilities. Gonder contended that the statute, as interpreted in Laster v. State, 76 Ark. App. 324, 64 S.W.3d 800 (2002), was unconstitutional as applied to him and other inmates who never leave the prison facility, arguing that it violated due process and equal protection. He asserted that he and similarly situated inmates faced a threat of prosecution for actions that, under his reading of the statute, should not apply to them.The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Third Division, dismissed Gonder’s petition without prejudice. The circuit court found that Gonder lacked standing and failed to present a justiciable controversy, and imposed a strike under applicable Arkansas law. The court reasoned that Gonder’s claims were speculative and hypothetical, rather than based on a present injury or sufficient facts to establish an actual controversy. Gonder appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The court held that Gonder had not alleged sufficient facts demonstrating standing, as he did not show a present injury or a concrete threat of prosecution under the challenged statute. The court further agreed that no justiciable controversy existed, as Gonder’s claims were speculative and not ripe for judicial determination. As a result, the dismissal without prejudice became a dismissal with prejudice, and Gonder’s motion for a decision based on his brief alone was rendered moot. The imposition of a strike was also affirmed. View "GONDER v. GRIFFIN" on Justia Law

An Afghan infant was orphaned and injured during a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation and received emergency care at a U.S. military hospital. A U.S. Marine Corps Judge Advocate, Major Joshua Mast, and his wife, Stephanie Mast, initiated custody proceedings and ultimately obtained a Virginia adoption order for the child. Separately, the U.S. Embassy gave custody to a man claiming to be the child's uncle, and the infant was subsequently cared for by John and Jane Doe, who later evacuated from Afghanistan to the United States with the child during Operation Allies Refuge. After arriving in the U.S., the Masts took custody of the child. The Does then challenged the adoption in Virginia state court, but the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected their challenge.Following the state proceedings, the Does filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking, among other things, a protective order to prevent the defendants from disclosing their identities. The district court granted the protective order, concluding that disclosing the Does’ identities would pose a substantial risk to their safety and that of their family in Afghanistan. The order prohibited the defendants and their representatives from revealing any information that could directly or indirectly identify the Does or their family members unless a non-disclosure agreement was executed. After the Does engaged with the media while maintaining anonymity, the Masts moved to vacate or modify the protective order, arguing it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The district court denied the motion and held Joshua Mast in contempt for violating the order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fourth Circuit held that the protective order, while a content-based prior restraint, fit within a narrow exception because it was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security—specifically, the protection of individuals perceived as U.S. collaborators. The court found the order survived strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Doe v. Mast" on Justia Law

Two individuals purchased Florida prepaid college tuition savings plans for their daughters in 2004 and 2006. The plans promised to cover tuition at Florida public colleges or transfer an equivalent amount to non-Florida colleges if the beneficiary chose to attend elsewhere. In 2007, the Florida Legislature authorized a new “tuition differential” fee, exempting holders of existing plans from paying that fee at Florida colleges. The Florida Prepaid College Board amended the plan contracts to specify that this new fee was not covered for out-of-state schools. Over a decade later, when both daughters chose to attend out-of-state colleges, the Board declined to transfer an amount equivalent to the tuition differential fee.The purchasers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against members of the Board, alleging that the Board’s refusal violated the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Board from applying the statutory exemption and contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning the relief sought was prospective. However, the district court disagreed, ruling that the relief requested was essentially a demand for a refund, thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because the relief sought would require specific performance of a contract with the state, which is not permitted under Ex parte Young and related Supreme Court precedent. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, as the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old was involved in a physical altercation with a thirteen-year-old after getting off a school bus, during which he struck the younger student and kicked him once. Tragically, the victim died from his injuries. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted in the Superior Court of Cherokee County for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and his federal habeas petition was denied, with the denial affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.Years later, the defendant filed a motion to correct a void sentence, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because a life sentence was grossly disproportionate to an unintentional killing committed by a juvenile during a fistfight. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the sentence was within the statutory range and thus not void, and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim. The court also suggested the case did not meet the rare threshold for an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge but ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that a proportionality challenge under the Eighth Amendment is a cognizable void sentence claim that may be raised at any time, not just within the statutory time frame for sentence modification. The Court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the dismissal order, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. View "MILLER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law