Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In June 2023, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of unserialized firearms, frames, receivers, and firearm parts kits, as well as the manufacture of firearm frames or receivers by most people. Several individuals and two associations representing Colorado gun owners sued, alleging that the statute infringes their Second Amendment rights. The individual plaintiffs had previously purchased or owned firearm parts kits and intended to continue similar activities but for the new law. The associations represent gun owners in Colorado and were acting on behalf of similarly situated members.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It determined that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the possession prohibition, but found that the claims relating to future acquisition were not ripe due to an overlapping federal regulation, and that claims challenging the manufacturing prohibition lacked standing because the plaintiffs’ conduct was not covered by that provision. The court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the possession prohibition was a presumptively constitutional condition on the commercial sale of firearms that did not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both the possession and acquisition prohibitions, but not the manufacturing prohibition. The court found that the district court erred in treating the possession prohibition as a condition on commercial sales, since the law regulated possession regardless of how the item was acquired. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the possession prohibition, holding that this provision regulates possession, not just commercial sales. The court remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to address the merits of the acquisition prohibition claim in the first instance. View "National Association for Gun Rights v. Polis" on Justia Law

Duane Gonder, an inmate serving a lengthy prison sentence following guilty pleas to multiple charges in 2010, filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas Attorney General. He challenged the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-54-119(a), which criminalizes furnishing prohibited articles in correctional facilities. Gonder contended that the statute, as interpreted in Laster v. State, 76 Ark. App. 324, 64 S.W.3d 800 (2002), was unconstitutional as applied to him and other inmates who never leave the prison facility, arguing that it violated due process and equal protection. He asserted that he and similarly situated inmates faced a threat of prosecution for actions that, under his reading of the statute, should not apply to them.The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Third Division, dismissed Gonder’s petition without prejudice. The circuit court found that Gonder lacked standing and failed to present a justiciable controversy, and imposed a strike under applicable Arkansas law. The court reasoned that Gonder’s claims were speculative and hypothetical, rather than based on a present injury or sufficient facts to establish an actual controversy. Gonder appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. The court held that Gonder had not alleged sufficient facts demonstrating standing, as he did not show a present injury or a concrete threat of prosecution under the challenged statute. The court further agreed that no justiciable controversy existed, as Gonder’s claims were speculative and not ripe for judicial determination. As a result, the dismissal without prejudice became a dismissal with prejudice, and Gonder’s motion for a decision based on his brief alone was rendered moot. The imposition of a strike was also affirmed. View "GONDER v. GRIFFIN" on Justia Law

An Afghan infant was orphaned and injured during a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation and received emergency care at a U.S. military hospital. A U.S. Marine Corps Judge Advocate, Major Joshua Mast, and his wife, Stephanie Mast, initiated custody proceedings and ultimately obtained a Virginia adoption order for the child. Separately, the U.S. Embassy gave custody to a man claiming to be the child's uncle, and the infant was subsequently cared for by John and Jane Doe, who later evacuated from Afghanistan to the United States with the child during Operation Allies Refuge. After arriving in the U.S., the Masts took custody of the child. The Does then challenged the adoption in Virginia state court, but the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected their challenge.Following the state proceedings, the Does filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking, among other things, a protective order to prevent the defendants from disclosing their identities. The district court granted the protective order, concluding that disclosing the Does’ identities would pose a substantial risk to their safety and that of their family in Afghanistan. The order prohibited the defendants and their representatives from revealing any information that could directly or indirectly identify the Does or their family members unless a non-disclosure agreement was executed. After the Does engaged with the media while maintaining anonymity, the Masts moved to vacate or modify the protective order, arguing it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The district court denied the motion and held Joshua Mast in contempt for violating the order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fourth Circuit held that the protective order, while a content-based prior restraint, fit within a narrow exception because it was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security—specifically, the protection of individuals perceived as U.S. collaborators. The court found the order survived strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Doe v. Mast" on Justia Law

Two individuals purchased Florida prepaid college tuition savings plans for their daughters in 2004 and 2006. The plans promised to cover tuition at Florida public colleges or transfer an equivalent amount to non-Florida colleges if the beneficiary chose to attend elsewhere. In 2007, the Florida Legislature authorized a new “tuition differential” fee, exempting holders of existing plans from paying that fee at Florida colleges. The Florida Prepaid College Board amended the plan contracts to specify that this new fee was not covered for out-of-state schools. Over a decade later, when both daughters chose to attend out-of-state colleges, the Board declined to transfer an amount equivalent to the tuition differential fee.The purchasers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against members of the Board, alleging that the Board’s refusal violated the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Board from applying the statutory exemption and contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning the relief sought was prospective. However, the district court disagreed, ruling that the relief requested was essentially a demand for a refund, thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because the relief sought would require specific performance of a contract with the state, which is not permitted under Ex parte Young and related Supreme Court precedent. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, as the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old was involved in a physical altercation with a thirteen-year-old after getting off a school bus, during which he struck the younger student and kicked him once. Tragically, the victim died from his injuries. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted in the Superior Court of Cherokee County for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and his federal habeas petition was denied, with the denial affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.Years later, the defendant filed a motion to correct a void sentence, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because a life sentence was grossly disproportionate to an unintentional killing committed by a juvenile during a fistfight. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the sentence was within the statutory range and thus not void, and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim. The court also suggested the case did not meet the rare threshold for an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge but ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that a proportionality challenge under the Eighth Amendment is a cognizable void sentence claim that may be raised at any time, not just within the statutory time frame for sentence modification. The Court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the dismissal order, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. View "MILLER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

After being found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, C.F. was admitted to a state hospital, where he was treated with antipsychotic medication under a court order. When the Department of State Hospitals sought to renew the order authorizing involuntary medication, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. C.F.’s counsel did not request a court reporter, though one could have been provided at no cost by simply submitting a form. Consequently, no verbatim record of the hearing was made, and C.F. did not attend, with his counsel waiving his appearance.The Superior Court of Napa County heard from the Department’s expert witness and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that C.F. lacked capacity to refuse treatment, granting the renewal for up to one year. C.F. appealed, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not secure a record of the hearing. When C.F. later applied for a settled statement to reconstruct the hearing for appellate review, the trial court denied the request, finding he had waived his right to a record by not requesting a reporter.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, found that C.F.’s counsel’s failure to request a reporter constituted deficient performance, with no tactical explanation and resulting prejudice. The absence of a hearing record rendered meaningful appellate review impossible, amounting to a denial of due process and effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for a new hearing, noting that if the Department seeks to renew the order after its expiration, the new hearing may be combined with any future renewal petition. View "People v. C.F." on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law

An inmate at an Arkansas state prison injured his right pinky finger while playing basketball, resulting in a dislocation. He was treated initially by infirmary staff with a splint and pain medication, and an x-ray was ordered. The x-ray showed no fracture but confirmed the dislocation. After a week, a doctor and a nurse attempted to realign the finger but were unsuccessful, so they provided additional pain management and referred him to an orthopedic surgeon. The finger was reset by a specialist over a month after the original injury. The inmate followed the prison grievance process, complaining about pain, the delay in seeing a provider, and subsequent delays in receiving further care.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed the inmate’s claims. The court dismissed the claims related to delay in care for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the inmate did not specifically name the doctor and nurse responsible for the alleged delay in his grievances. The district court granted summary judgment to the doctor and nurse on the remaining claim regarding their care on May 19, finding no deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the inmate did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies against the doctor and nurse for claims of delayed care, since he failed to name them as required by prison policy. Further, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the care provided on May 19 did not constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the medical staff acted with deliberate indifference, and thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal and grant of summary judgment. View "Nuuh Na'im v. Beck" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A group of students, their parents or guardians, and local school boards from several low-wealth and urban school districts in North Carolina brought suit against the State and the State Board of Education in 1994. They claimed that the State’s method of funding education deprived students in their districts of their constitutional right to the opportunity for a sound basic education, focusing on perceived inadequacies in the implementation and funding of the Basic Education Program (BEP) as it then existed. The plaintiffs did not allege that the statewide education system was unconstitutional on its face, but rather that it was unconstitutional as applied to their specific districts due to disparities in resource allocation.After various procedural developments, including intervention by additional parties and the dismissal of some claims, the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which previously clarified that the right at issue belonged only to students, not school boards. The Supreme Court held in Leandro v. State that the constitution guarantees every child the opportunity for a sound basic education, and remanded the case for as-applied determinations regarding whether that right was denied in the named districts. In Hoke County Board of Education v. State, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court finding that at-risk students in Hoke County had been deprived of their right, but otherwise found the statewide education system generally constitutional as then structured. The Supreme Court remanded for further as-applied proceedings in the other named districts, but no further trials occurred.Over time, the case’s subject matter shifted, and the trial court, with the parties’ acquiescence, began addressing a statewide, facial challenge to the current education system, including ordering the implementation of a statewide remedial plan without a new or amended complaint raising such a claim. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, reviewing an order entered on 17 April 2023, held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a facial challenge to the statewide education system, since no party had properly invoked jurisdiction over such a claim by amending the pleadings or following the statutory procedure. The Court vacated the trial court’s order and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that any orders entered after 24 July 2017, when the litigation’s nature changed, were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State" on Justia Law