Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law

Cynthia Maldonado and Martha Amaro, who lived on both sides of the Oklahoma-Kansas border and in Mexico, appealed a trial court's order that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over a juvenile deprived proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The trial court found that Maldonado's child, L.A., had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the commencement of the proceeding, making Oklahoma the child's home state. The court also adjudicated the children deprived as to Maldonado.The Texas County District Court of Oklahoma ordered that N.A. and L.A. be taken into emergency custody by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS) after Maldonado and N.A. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Maldonado filed a motion arguing that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, claiming that Mexico and Kansas were the children's home states. The State argued that Oklahoma had jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Children's Code. The trial court found that L.A. had lived in Oklahoma for six months before the proceeding and adjudicated the children deprived.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's findings. The court held that the Oklahoma district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile deprived proceeding and that the UCCJEA applied to such proceedings. The court found that the trial court's determination that L.A. had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the proceeding was not clearly erroneous. The court also affirmed the trial court's order adjudicating the children deprived as to Maldonado, finding competent evidence to support the order. The appeal was not considered moot due to ongoing collateral consequences. View "IN RE: N.A.; STATE OF OKLAHOMA vs MALDONADO" on Justia Law

In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves three consolidated appeals concerning the constitutionality of the Child Victims Act of 2023, which retroactively eliminated the statute of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. The plaintiffs, who are alleged survivors of childhood sexual abuse, filed lawsuits against various institutions, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the Board of Education of Harford County, and The Key School, Inc. The defendants argued that the 2023 Act unconstitutionally abrogated their vested rights by reviving claims that were previously time-barred.In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the court denied the Archbishop’s motion to dismiss, determining that the relevant statute was a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and thus did not create vested rights. The Circuit Court for Harford County reached a similar conclusion regarding the Board of Education of Harford County. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the court certified the question of the 2023 Act’s constitutionality to the Supreme Court of Maryland without ruling on The Key School’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2017 statute, which the 2023 Act amended, was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations is a procedural device that does not create vested rights, whereas a statute of repose creates substantive rights that cannot be retroactively abrogated. The court concluded that the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights and was constitutional as applied to the defendants. The court applied heightened rational basis review and found that the 2023 Act bore a real and substantial relation to addressing the problem of delayed reporting of child sexual abuse and the need for justice for survivors. The judgments of the lower courts were affirmed, and the certified question was answered in the negative. View "Archbishop of Washington v. Doe" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

The case involves a father (H.B.) appealing a juvenile court's disposition order that declared his two sons dependents of the court, placed them in the custody of their mother, and provided family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The father contested the findings, arguing that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings.The juvenile court sustained the petition's allegations, assumed jurisdiction over the children, and ordered their placement with the mother. The court found that the father posed a substantial danger to the children due to his substance abuse and poor parenting decisions, including providing drugs to his son. The court applied section 362, subdivision (c), rather than section 361, subdivision (c), concluding that the children were not removed from a custodial parent since they remained with their mother.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c), as the children were effectively removed from the father's custody. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding of substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's care. However, it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. The appellate court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing, instructing the juvenile court to make its decision based on the facts existing at the time of the new hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no one was willing to be his legal guardian. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was not present at the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was found to be an error as Juan had a right to be present under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared Juan a dependent of the court in January 2020, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. In August 2021, the court terminated these services. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights, finding Juan not adoptable and no potential legal guardians available. The court ordered Juan to remain in foster care with permanent placement services. In March 2024, the court denied a continuance request for Juan to attend the permanency planning review hearing, found his placement appropriate, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court held that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have allowed him to request additional services to improve his academic performance and employment prospects. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024 hearing and remanded the case for a new status review hearing in accordance with section 349. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

The case involves a grandmother (Grandmother) who was adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent to her grandchildren, B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against the children's parents in 2018, and the children were placed with Grandmother. In 2021, several referrals were made to Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding Grandmother's care, leading to the children's removal from her home in December 2021 due to safety concerns and Grandmother's failure to inform DHS of her marriage. The DHS filed a Sixth Amended Petition in April 2022, alleging various forms of abuse and neglect by Grandmother.The Circuit Court of Barbour County held several hearings, concluding with a final adjudicatory hearing in March 2023. The court found that Grandmother had abused and neglected the children, citing evidence of her excessive drinking, drug use, lack of supervision, inappropriate discipline, and instability. The court also noted Grandmother's failure to take responsibility for her actions. The court directed the Multidisciplinary Treatment Team (MDT) to discuss an improvement period for visitation purposes only, as it could not envision a scenario where the children would be returned to Grandmother's custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's rulings. The court found that Grandmother was not entitled to relief based on procedural delays, as she did not seek extraordinary relief through a petition for writ of mandamus. The court also upheld the circuit court's adjudication of Grandmother as abusing and neglectful, finding no clear error in the circuit court's findings. Additionally, the court found that consideration of Grandmother's status as a psychological parent was premature at the adjudicatory phase and that the current visitation arrangement served the best interests of the children. Finally, the court determined that any discussion of dispositional decisions was premature, given the procedural posture of the case. View "In re B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S." on Justia Law

A child, Baby Boy B (BBB), was removed from his mother, JB, shortly after birth and placed in shelter care with his maternal grandmother. The King County Superior Court held shelter care hearings in April, May, and June, finding no contested issues and maintaining prior orders. The court then decided not to hold additional hearings unless there was a motion alleging a change in circumstances, based on King County Superior Court Local Juvenile Court Rule (LJuCR) 2.5.The trial court found that JB's requests for 30-day shelter care hearings were unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources, as her visits were unsupervised. The court stated it would hear motions under LJuCR 2.5 if new issues arose. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, interpreting the statute to not require monthly review hearings for continued shelter care and finding that LJuCR 2.5 was not contrary to RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i) requires trial courts to hold shelter care review hearings every 30 days while the dependency decision is pending, unless there is a valid waiver or agreed continuance. The court emphasized that ongoing judicial oversight is necessary to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of the child, and to hold parties accountable. The court found that King County LJuCR 2.5 was inconsistent with the statute. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Dependency of Baby Boy B." on Justia Law