Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Kevin Johnson, an inmate in Indiana, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he received inadequate dental and mental health care while incarcerated. The case was complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and Johnson's frequent transfers between prisons in Indiana, Ohio, and Virginia, which disrupted his mail service. Johnson claimed he never received the defendants' summary judgment motions due to these mail issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially denied the defendants' summary judgment motions without prejudice, recognizing potential mail delivery problems. The court allowed the defendants to refile their motions and instructed them to notify the court if Johnson did not receive the filings. Despite these measures, Johnson did not respond to the refiled motions within the given 28-day period. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case. Johnson later filed a motion to vacate the judgment, asserting he never received the refiled motions, but the district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged the procedural complexities but focused on whether Johnson had constructive notice of the summary judgment motions. The court concluded that Johnson had constructive notice because he received the district court's order resetting the briefing schedule and instructing him on how to proceed. The court found no substantive or procedural error in the district court's decision and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Johnson v Purdue" on Justia Law

The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

A borrower misrepresented his authority to act on behalf of two corporations he intended to acquire, providing false documents to a lender. Despite having documents contradicting the borrower's claims, the lender proceeded with a $7 million loan, including a confession-of-judgment affidavit naming the corporations as additional borrowers. When the borrower defaulted, the lender sought a confessed judgment against all borrowers, including the corporations, whose true officers were unaware of the transaction until served with notice of the judgment.The Superior Court of Delaware conducted a hearing and entered judgment in favor of the lender, finding that the borrower had apparent authority to bind the corporations. The court focused on the borrower's conduct and representations, concluding that they created the impression of authority sufficient to warrant the entry of a confessed judgment against the corporations.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court's formulation of the test for apparent authority was flawed. The Supreme Court emphasized that apparent authority must be based on the principal's manifestations, not solely on the agent's conduct. The evidence did not support a finding that the corporations acted in a way that created a reasonable belief in the lender that the borrower was authorized to bind them. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the Superior Court's judgment, concluding that the borrower lacked apparent authority and that the corporations did not effectively waive their due process rights. View "Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc. v. Halevi Enterprises LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, G.P.P., Inc. (GIS) sued Guardian Protection Products, Inc. (Guardian) and RPM Wood Finishes Group, Inc. (RPM) for breach of contract and other claims related to nine warehousing distributor agreements (WDAs). GIS alleged that Guardian wrongfully terminated three WDAs and threatened to terminate the remaining six. GIS sought damages and other relief, while Guardian countersued for declaratory relief and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California conducted two trials. In the first trial, the jury rejected all claims and counterclaims. GIS appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment on certain claims, leading to a second trial. In the second trial, the jury awarded GIS $6 million in damages. GIS then sought attorney’s fees from Guardian, while Guardian and RPM sought fees from GIS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's award of over $4 million in attorney’s fees to GIS. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court correctly deemed GIS the prevailing party against Guardian, as GIS successfully defended against Guardian’s counterclaims and won significant damages. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis of RPM’s entitlement to fees. The district court had deemed certain claims voluntarily dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that GIS did not provide adequate notice of its intent to abandon those claims. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision regarding the abandoned claims and remanded for further determination of fees due to RPM.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s methodology and equitable considerations in deeming GIS the prevailing party against Guardian but reversed and remanded the decision regarding RPM’s entitlement to fees. View "GPP, INC. V. GUARDIAN PROTECTION PRODUCTS, INC." on Justia Law

Jason Terrell, M.D., provided consulting services and served on the board of directors of Kiromic Biopharma, Inc. between December 2014 and May 2021. During this period, Kiromic awarded Terrell stock options through three separate agreements. The first agreement granted Terrell an option to purchase 500,000 shares at $0.50 per share for consulting services. The second agreement, made when Terrell joined the board, granted him an option to purchase 500,004 shares at $0.17 per share. The third agreement, which included a waiver clause, granted him an option to purchase 500,004 shares at $0.19 per share. After Terrell resigned from the board in September 2019, Kiromic refused to honor the options from the first two agreements, claiming that Terrell waived his rights to those options in the third agreement.The Court of Chancery dismissed Terrell’s complaint seeking specific performance of the first two option grants, finding that the waiver clause in the third agreement unambiguously extinguished Terrell’s rights to the previous option awards. The court held that the language in the waiver clause, which stated that Terrell had no other rights to any other options or securities of the company, was clear and that the carveout for "securities issued" did not include unexercised options.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and found that the waiver language was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. The court noted that the term "securities" could reasonably include options and that the parties' use of the word "issued" did not exclusively refer to shares. Therefore, the court concluded that the waiver clause was ambiguous and that the case should not have been dismissed at the pleadings stage. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Terrell v. Kiromic Biopharma, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Maine healthcare workers who were terminated from their employment for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate based on their religious beliefs. The mandate, initially promulgated by emergency rule on August 12, 2021, was no longer enforced as of July 12, 2023, and was repealed effective September 5, 2023. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, asserting that the mandate's lack of religious exemptions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the First Circuit. The Supreme Court also denied their application for emergency injunctive relief.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which was granted. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, reinstating the First Amendment Free Exercise and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against state health officials. Following the repeal of the mandate, the defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims as moot, and the district court granted the motion, also denying the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's determinations. The court held that the challenge was moot because the COVID-19 vaccine mandate had been repealed and was no longer in effect. The court also found that no exceptions to mootness, such as voluntary cessation or capable of repetition yet evading review, applied. The court further affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint, concluding that justice did not require permitting further amendments to broaden the scope of their claims. View "Lowe v. Gagne-Holmes" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, a Chapter 11 Trustee for BK Racing, LLC, initiated an adversary proceeding against multiple defendants, including Ronald and Brenda Devine, various family trusts, and corporate entities. The defendants were accused of obstructing the bankruptcy process by failing to comply with discovery obligations, including not producing required financial documents and records, despite multiple court orders.The bankruptcy court found that the defendants willfully disregarded their discovery obligations and engaged in a pattern of obstruction and delay. As a result, the court entered a default judgment against the defendants as a discovery sanction, awarding the plaintiff $31,094,099.89. The district court affirmed this decision, noting the defendants' repeated noncompliance and the necessity of deterrence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding no abuse of discretion in the entry of default judgment. The court applied the Wilson factors, determining that the defendants acted in bad faith, caused significant prejudice to the plaintiff, necessitated deterrence, and that lesser sanctions would be ineffective. The court also affirmed the decision to pierce the corporate veil, holding the defendants jointly and severally liable, based on evidence that the corporate entities were mere instrumentalities of the Devines, lacking proper corporate formalities and used to siphon funds.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the default judgment and the amount awarded were appropriate given the defendants' egregious conduct. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Smith v. Devine" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law