Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, filed a complaint against Victoria Camacho, alleging sexual harassment, assault, and exploitation while incarcerated. The claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations starting in April 2020. Doe initially filed a similar complaint in June 2022, but Camacho was not properly served within the required 60 days. Despite multiple extensions and attempts, service was not completed until January 2023, after the deadline had passed. The court dismissed the claims against Camacho in the original case due to insufficient service.In the current case, Doe refiled the complaint in July 2023, arguing that the Vermont savings statute or equitable tolling should apply to extend the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure to serve Camacho was not due to unavoidable accident or neglect by the process server. The court also rejected the equitable tolling argument, noting that the State's actions did not mislead Doe regarding service.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court held that the savings statute did not apply because the failure to serve Camacho was due to Doe's lack of diligence, not an unavoidable accident or neglect by the process server. The Court also found that Doe did not preserve her equitable tolling argument for appeal, as it was not adequately presented in the lower court. Consequently, the dismissal of Doe's claims as time-barred was upheld. View "Doe v. Camacho" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The case involves two sisters, Stacey Martin and Christine Lyon, who inherited their family residence as tenants in common after their father's death in 2019. Their mother lived on the property until her death in 2022, after which the sisters agreed to prepare the property for sale. They decided to restore the property, with Christine performing most of the labor. However, their relationship deteriorated, leading Stacey to file a complaint seeking partition of the property.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, held a one-day bench trial and issued written findings. The court calculated the contributions each sister made towards the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and agreed-upon maintenance and improvements. It credited Christine for her labor but excluded her discretionary improvements due to lack of evidence of increased property value. The court concluded that Christine's share of the equity was $187,450 and ordered her to take assignment of the property by paying Stacey $92,550. If Christine chose not to take assignment, the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided.Christine appealed the denial of her request for prejudgment interest, arguing it should be awarded as of right under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or as a matter of discretion. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is not available for partition awards, as partition is an equitable remedy, not an action for damages. The court concluded that the credits for Christine's contributions were part of the equitable distribution of the property and did not qualify as damages, thus not triggering prejudgment interest. View "Martin v. Lyon" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses, Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler, who have a minor daughter together. After their divorce, Dasler engaged in extensive litigation against Knapp, including multiple appeals, motions, and lawsuits in various courts. Knapp sought an order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing that his filings were intended to harass and burden her.The Windsor Unit, Family Division of the Superior Court issued a final divorce order in August 2018, awarding Knapp primary custody of their daughter. Dasler appealed this order, but it was affirmed. He continued to file various motions and appeals, including attempts to modify custody and hold Knapp in contempt, all of which were denied. Dasler also initiated lawsuits in New Hampshire and federal courts, which were dismissed. In March 2023, Knapp moved for sanctions against Dasler, claiming his filings were abusive, but the court denied the motion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division’s order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation. The court found that Dasler’s repetitive filings were made to harass and intimidate Knapp, meeting the criteria for abusive litigation under 15 V.S.A. § 1181. The court concluded that Dasler’s actions, including attempts to relitigate final orders and filing numerous motions for reconsideration, were abusive. The order restricted Dasler from filing motions or engaging in litigation against Knapp unless represented by a licensed attorney or with prefiling approval from the court. The court also dismissed Dasler’s pending motions as abusive and denied his claims that the court erred in its factual findings and procedural rulings. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law

The Board of Allied Mental Health Practitioners denied an application for a license to practice clinical mental-health counseling in Vermont, citing the applicant's failure to meet educational prerequisites. The applicant, who graduated from a non-accredited program, argued that her coursework met the requirements through a combination of two courses. She also claimed that the Board had previously accepted similar coursework from another candidate, J.L., and sought to present evidence to support this claim.The Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) upheld the Board's decision. The applicant appealed, arguing that the Board and OPR improperly limited her ability to demonstrate that she was treated differently from similarly situated candidates. She also contended that the Board failed to justify its allegedly inconsistent application of licensing regulations. The appellate officer denied her motion to present additional evidence, concluding that the Board's evidentiary ruling was a matter of record and that the applicant was not seeking to introduce evidence of procedural irregularities but rather the excluded evidence itself.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the Board and OPR. The Court held that comparator evidence might be relevant in some circumstances but found that the applicant failed to make a threshold showing that the Board had accepted credits from two courses in J.L.'s case. The Court also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding further evidence about J.L.'s coursework as cumulative and of dubious relevance. The appellate officer's denial of the motion to present additional evidence was also upheld, as the applicant did not demonstrate good cause for the motion. The Court affirmed the lower decisions, finding no basis to disturb them. View "In re McNamer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own a 325-acre property in Tunbridge, Vermont, crossed by two legal trails. The Town of Tunbridge converted these trails from Class 4 roads in 1987. In 2021, the Town's selectboard revised the town plan to potentially expand trail use, including bicycling. Plaintiffs opposed this and claimed exclusive authority over trail maintenance on their property. In 2022, the selectboard adopted a policy allowing private individuals to apply for permission to maintain the trails, prompting plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the Town lacked such authority.The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as unripe, stating there was no justiciable controversy since no one had applied to maintain the trails. The court reiterated its stance from a prior action, emphasizing that discussions and policy adoptions did not constitute a concrete threat to plaintiffs' interests. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the new policy and procedure for trail maintenance created a sufficiently concrete controversy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated a sufficiently concrete threat of physical invasion and interference with their property rights. The Court held that the Town's formal assertion of authority to maintain and repair the trails, coupled with the procedure for private individuals to apply for permission, constituted an actual case or controversy. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action to proceed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

The case involves Aerie Point Holdings, LLC (Aerie Point) and Vorsteveld Farm, LLC (Vorsteveld). Aerie Point owns a property in Panton, Vermont, which is located downhill from Vorsteveld's dairy farm. In 2017, Vorsteveld began installing tile drains in its fields to improve soil quality. The excess water drained from these tiles was discharged into public ditches, then through culverts, and finally towards Lake Champlain over Aerie Point’s property. This led to increased water flow, sediment, and contaminants on Aerie Point's land, causing shoreline erosion and algae blooms in Lake Champlain. In April 2020, Aerie Point filed a lawsuit against Vorsteveld for trespass and nuisance.The civil division found in favor of Aerie Point in March 2022, concluding that Vorsteveld's actions constituted trespass and nuisance. The court issued an injunction in August 2022, preventing Vorsteveld from allowing water from its drain tile system to flow into the public ditches and culverts on Arnold Bay Road. Vorsteveld did not appeal this judgment.In August 2023, Vorsteveld moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), arguing that postjudgment changes in fact and law justified relief from the injunction. Vorsteveld claimed that an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation regarding filled wetlands on the farm prevented it from complying with the injunction, and that the federal investigation/enforcement action preempted the state injunction. Vorsteveld also argued that changes to Vermont’s Right-to-Farm law justified relief from the injunction. The court denied the motion and the request for an evidentiary hearing.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Vorsteveld's arguments were attempts to relitigate issues that had been resolved by the judgment. The court also found that Vorsteveld had not demonstrated that there were significant postjudgment changes in factual circumstances or the law that made prospective application of the injunction inequitable. The court concluded that Vorsteveld's arguments relating to the EPA investigation and changes to the Right-to-Farm law were insufficient to merit relief under Rule 60(b). The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vorsteveld's request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Aerie Point Holdings, LLC v. Vorsteveld Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother and father who appealed an order that declared their daughter, M.M., a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). The State had filed a petition in April 2023, alleging that M.M., then eleven years old, was without proper parental care and that her parents were resisting recommended mental-health services. M.M. was placed in the emergency custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) and then returned to her parents' care under a conditional custody order (CCO). In August 2023, a hearing concluded that M.M. was CHINS at the time the petition was filed. In October 2023, DCF recommended that custody be returned to the parents, and the court vacated the CCO, returned custody to the parents without conditions, and closed the case.The parents appealed the CHINS adjudication, arguing that the factual findings were insufficient to support the conclusion that M.M. was CHINS and that the family division referenced an inapplicable legal standard. The State argued that the appeal was moot because the family division’s jurisdiction terminated with the return of unconditional, unsupervised custody to the parents.The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the State, concluding that the case did not present a live controversy or fall within a recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. The court found that the CHINS adjudication had no current impact on the family division’s authority to make orders regarding M.M.’s legal custody. The court also found that the parents had not shown that the CHINS adjudication subjected them to negative collateral consequences or that the issues were capable of repetition but evading review. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law