Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Fahmi Ahmed Moharam, a dual United States-Yemeni citizen, frequently travels between the two countries. In 2017, he was denied boarding a flight from Saudi Arabia to the U.S. and learned through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) redress process that he was on the No Fly List. The government provided minimal information, citing national security concerns, and stated that his designation was based on his activities in Yemen from 2011 to 2017. After petitioning for review, the government informed him that he was no longer on the No Fly List and would not be relisted based on the currently available information.The TSA is mandated by statute to identify individuals who may pose a threat to civil aviation or national security and prevent them from boarding aircraft. The TSA also manages the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), which allows individuals to appeal their inclusion on the No Fly List. Moharam appealed through TRIP and was initially informed that he was on the list due to concerns about his activities in Yemen. Despite his requests for more information and administrative review, the TSA maintained his status on the list until the government later removed him.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Moharam's removal from the No Fly List rendered his petitions for review moot, as the court could no longer provide effective relief. The court noted that the government’s assurance that Moharam would not be relisted based on the same information addressed the issue of potential recurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, as the relief sought was no longer redressable. View "Moharam v. TSA" on Justia Law

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on March 10, 2025, preventing the Government from terminating various education-related grants. The order also required the Government to pay past-due grant obligations and continue paying future obligations. The District Court concluded that the respondents were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Government filed an application to vacate the District Court's order on March 26, 2025, which was extended on March 24, 2025. The application was presented to Justice Jackson and referred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court's order had characteristics of a preliminary injunction, making it appealable. The Government argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA, as the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims seeking money damages or to orders enforcing contractual obligations to pay money.The Supreme Court of the United States granted the Government's application to stay the District Court's order pending the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court found that the respondents had not refuted the Government's claim that it would be unlikely to recover the grant funds once disbursed and that respondents would not suffer irreparable harm while the TRO is stayed. The stay will terminate automatically if certiorari is denied or upon the sending down of the judgment of the Supreme Court if certiorari is granted. The Chief Justice would have denied the application. View "Department of Education v. California" on Justia Law

Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery D. Milner, a physician, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Baptist Health Montgomery, Prattville Baptist, and Team Health. Milner alleged that while working at a hospital owned by the defendants, he discovered that they were overprescribing opioids and fraudulently billing the government for them. He claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing after reporting the overprescription practices to his superiors.Previously, Milner filed an FCA retaliation lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Milner did not sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected conduct under the FCA or that his termination was due to such conduct. Following this dismissal, Milner filed the current qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The district court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. and Shurick v. Boeing Co.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Milner's qui tam action was barred by res judicata because it involved the same parties and the same cause of action as his earlier retaliation lawsuit. The court found that both lawsuits arose from a common nucleus of operative fact: the defendants' alleged illegal conduct and Milner's discovery of that conduct leading to his discharge. The court also noted that the United States, which did not intervene in the qui tam action, was not barred from pursuing its own action in the future. View "Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery" on Justia Law

Relators Tiffany Montcrief and others filed a False Claims Act suit against Peripheral Vascular Associates, P.A. (PVA), alleging that PVA billed Medicare for vascular ultrasound services that were not completed. The claims were categorized into "Testing Only" and "Double Billing" claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators, concluding that PVA submitted knowingly false claims. A jury found these claims material and awarded approximately $28.7 million in damages against PVA.The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators on the issues of falsity and knowledge of falsity. The jury found that the claims were material and caused the Government to pay out money. The district court entered judgment against PVA, including statutory penalties and treble damages. PVA appealed, challenging the district court's grant of partial summary judgment and certain rulings during and after the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment on the Testing Only claims but remanded for a new trial on damages. The court reversed the partial summary judgment ruling on the Double Billing claims, vacated the final judgment, and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the district court erred in interpreting the CPT–4 Manual and in concluding that the Manual required PVA to create separate, written reports for vascular ultrasounds before billing Medicare. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in relying on Relators' post-trial expert declaration to calculate damages. View "Montcrief v. Peripheral Vascular" on Justia Law

Dennis C. Jackson, a prison inmate, sought judicial review in the district court for Johnson County of an agency’s final decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Jackson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) along with his petition. The district court did not explicitly rule on the IFP application and dismissed Jackson’s APA petition as untimely. Jackson appealed the dismissal.The district court did not grant Jackson’s IFP application, instead deferring its ruling until Jackson filed an amended petition. Jackson complied, but the court dismissed the petition for being untimely, citing incorrect dates. Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court overruled without addressing the IFP application. Jackson then appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, filing another IFP application for the appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the district court implicitly denied Jackson’s IFP application by dismissing the petition without ruling on the application. The Supreme Court determined that the district court erred by not following statutory procedures for IFP applications and by incorrectly calculating the timeliness of Jackson’s petition. The court held that Jackson’s petitions were neither frivolous nor malicious and that the denial of IFP status was plainly erroneous.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Jackson’s IFP application and remanded the case with directions to grant the initial IFP application and proceed with further actions consistent with its opinion. View "Jackson v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law