Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Pennsylvania-based company operating an online marketplace for firearms was sued under New Hampshire law by a former Boston police officer and his wife. Their claims alleged that the company’s website facilitated the sale of a firearm in New Hampshire in 2015, which was later used to shoot the officer in Boston in 2016. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action including negligence, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, public nuisance, loss of consortium, and loss of support, based on the website’s alleged design and operation in encouraging illegal gun sales.Previously, the plaintiffs had filed a similar suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court against the company and other defendants, but that court dismissed the claims against the company based on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, without ruling on personal jurisdiction. After jurisdictional discovery, the Massachusetts Superior Court subsequently dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, which denied their request for jurisdictional discovery and dismissed their claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding the company had not purposefully availed itself of the protections of New Hampshire’s laws.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part and vacated it in part. The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case of purposeful availment based on contacts up to 2016, but concluded that evidence of thousands of “New Hampshire” firearm listings on the website from 2018 onward, when considered with other evidence, sufficed for a prima facie showing of purposeful availment. The court remanded for consideration of relatedness and reasonableness and affirmed denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Stokinger v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on Orlando González Tomasini, who filed civil rights and tort claims against the United States Postal Service, his former employer, alleging that psychological and medical conditions prevented him from working. His then-wife, Juliette Irizarry-Miranda, was initially a co-plaintiff but eventually became a defense witness after a contentious divorce and ongoing custody dispute over their son. On the eve of trial, the Postal Service accused González of witness tampering, specifically of seeking to dissuade Irizarry from testifying by conditioning custody concessions on her refusal to take the stand. Irizarry recorded part of a phone call between them, and the Postal Service submitted this as evidence.Prior to the current appeal, the case was heard in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where a magistrate judge presided by consent of the parties. The magistrate judge held a three-day evidentiary hearing to address the witness tampering allegations. After hearing testimony from González, Irizarry, and a social worker, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that González had engaged in witness tampering. As a sanction for this fraud on the court, the magistrate judge dismissed González’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The First Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects, holding that the evidentiary hearing was appropriately ordered, the finding of witness tampering was not clearly erroneous, and the sanction of dismissal was within the court’s discretion. The appellate court found that González’s conduct constituted a fraud on the court, justifying dismissal, especially given the egregiousness of the witness tampering and its potential impact on the integrity of judicial proceedings. Judgment was affirmed for the Postal Service. View "Gonzalez Tomasini v. Steiner" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought claims against her former employer alleging violations of federal and state wage and hour laws. After removal to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, some claims were resolved at summary judgment, leaving the federal wage claims for trial. Before trial, the parties participated in a court-ordered mediation before a magistrate judge, during which they reached an oral settlement agreement whose terms were recited on the record. The agreement included payment to the plaintiff, confidentiality, non-defamation, and no-rehire clauses, as well as dismissal of the action with prejudice. Both parties, including the plaintiff and her counsel, confirmed their assent to the agreement.Following the mediation, the defendant prepared written settlement documents and a stipulation of dismissal. However, the plaintiff refused to sign, asserting she felt pressured and that certain terms were ambiguous or not sufficiently definite. The district court reviewed these objections after the defendant moved to enforce the settlement. The court found the agreement enforceable, denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing on alleged undue influence due to lack of factual support, and ordered her to execute the documents. After the plaintiff failed to comply, the court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court did not err in enforcing the oral settlement agreement or in denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and request for an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court found no genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence or terms of the settlement and affirmed the district court’s judgment, awarding costs and attorney fees to the defendant. View "Maccarone v. Siemens Industry, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two siblings, Wayne Orkin and Lisa Albert, over the operation and ownership of a business called Boost Web SEO, Inc. Orkin managed the day-to-day business and generated all of its revenue, while Albert incorporated the company and was listed as its registered agent and officer. No written agreements clarified their roles, profit sharing, or compensation. In 2014, residual income from a payment processing arrangement was assigned to Boost Web, which both parties treated as company revenue for years. In 2021, after a breakdown in their relationship, Albert cut Orkin’s access to company funds and accused him of fraudulent activities in communications with a third-party vendor. Orkin then redirected company revenues to an account he controlled, prompting legal action.The litigation began in Massachusetts Superior Court, where Orkin (and his father) sued Albert and her son for various state-law claims, and Albert removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Boost Web intervened with a crossclaim against Orkin. After partial summary judgment, the remaining claims—Orkin’s defamation and related claims against Albert, and Boost Web’s conversion claim against Orkin—proceeded to a bench trial. The district court ruled for Albert on the defamation claim, finding her email was not defamatory or was protected as true, and for Boost Web on conversion, awarding it damages for funds Orkin took as personal expenses and for redirected residuals. The court also found Orkin in contempt for interfering with its orders and permanently enjoined him from pursuing related litigation in Florida.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in dismissing Orkin’s defamation claim, finding that Albert’s email could be defamatory per se and remanded for further proceedings on truthfulness. It affirmed the conversion judgment regarding the redirected residuals but vacated the judgment concerning personal expenses, holding that Orkin was entitled to some compensation and remanded to determine the appropriate amount. The court vacated the contempt order and the permanent injunction, finding the previous orders did not unambiguously decide Boost Web’s ownership. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Orkin v. Albert" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

A cannabis entrepreneur based in California sought to challenge specific provisions of Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act, which governs the licensing of retail cannabis businesses. The Act requires applicants for all retail cannabis business licenses to be Rhode Island residents or entities with a principal place of business in Rhode Island and majority ownership by Rhode Island residents. It also establishes criteria for “social equity applicants,” reserving certain licenses for individuals with past marijuana-related convictions eligible for expungement or for those who have resided in disproportionately impacted areas. The plaintiff, not a Rhode Island resident, intended to apply for a license but alleged that these requirements violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the plaintiff’s action without prejudice, concluding that her claims were not ripe for judicial review. The court cited several cases but provided no substantive analysis, noting that the Commission had yet to promulgate final rules and regulations for licensing and declining to speculate on the timeline for their adoption. This order was issued just before the public comment period on the proposed regulations closed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing on ripeness grounds. The appellate court determined that the claims were ripe, not moot, and that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit. The court found that the plaintiff faced imminent harm under the statutory requirements and that judicial intervention was warranted. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, instructing the lower court to issue its rulings before the planned issuance of retail cannabis licenses. View "Jensen v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Riverdale Mills Corporation operates a wire mesh manufacturing facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts. In 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted two investigations at Riverdale’s facility, which resulted in citations alleging violations of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Riverdale contested these citations, and after a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in 2021, the ALJ affirmed three citation items while vacating or withdrawing the others.Subsequently, in December 2023, Riverdale applied to the ALJ for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). To establish eligibility for this recovery, Riverdale submitted its 2019 balance sheet as evidence, along with a motion to seal the document due to alleged confidential business information. The Secretary of Labor opposed the motion, arguing Riverdale had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for sealing. After considering submissions from both parties, the ALJ denied Riverdale’s motion to seal, applying balancing tests from D.C. Circuit and First Circuit case law and concluding Riverdale had not shown compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of public access. Riverdale attempted to appeal this denial to the OSHRC Commission, but the Commission automatically dismissed the appeal for lack of quorum.Riverdale then sought interlocutory review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit assumed interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and reviewed the ALJ’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that Riverdale had waived certain arguments by not raising them earlier and determined the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal, finding Riverdale failed to meet its burden to justify sealing the balance sheet. The petition for review was denied. View "Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez-DeRemer" on Justia Law

Rebecca Blakesley, a nurse, ended her marriage with Andrew Blakesley in early 2021 after a tumultuous relationship marked by alleged abuse. Shortly after she obtained a protective order and filed for divorce, Andrew’s mother, Colleen Marcus, and his sister-in-law, Jennifer Marcus, reported Rebecca to various public and private organizations. They accused her of violating patient confidentiality, fraudulent billing, academic dishonesty, and faking a COVID test. These reports led to investigations, the loss of Rebecca’s employment, and the suspension of her application for a professional license.Rebecca filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging defamation and intentional interference with business relations. She claimed the Marcuses’ actions were motivated by retaliation for her divorce. The Marcuses responded with a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to protect individuals from lawsuits intended to chill their right to petition the government. The district court denied the motion, finding that Rebecca’s claims were not based solely on petitioning activity because the Marcuses’ reports to private employers and a nursing school did not qualify as protected petitioning under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied. The court held that the Marcuses failed to show their conduct was solely petitioning activity, as required by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent clarification in Bristol Asphalt, Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, holding that mixed claims involving both petitioning and non-petitioning conduct are not subject to dismissal under the statute, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Blakesley v. Marcus" on Justia Law

The case concerns multiple petitions for review challenging a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order that established new rate caps for communications services provided to incarcerated individuals. The FCC’s order, issued pursuant to the Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2022, also dismissed as moot certain petitions for clarification and waiver filed by Securus Technologies, LLC, a provider of these services. After the FCC published portions of the order in the Federal Register, several parties—including service providers, advocacy organizations, and state governments—filed petitions for review in various federal appellate courts, contesting different aspects of the order.Following the filing of these petitions, the FCC notified the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), which randomly selected the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to hear the consolidated petitions. The administrative record was filed in the First Circuit, and subsequent petitions filed in other circuits were transferred there pursuant to statute. Some petitioners, notably Securus and Pay Tel Communications, Inc., argued that the petitions should be transferred to the Fifth Circuit, asserting that it was the proper venue based on the timing and nature of the initial filings. The First Circuit denied these transfer motions, and a request for mandamus to the Supreme Court was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the petitions for review are properly before it, as the administrative record was filed there pursuant to the JPML’s direction. The court rejected arguments for mandatory transfer to the Fifth Circuit, finding no legal basis to override the JPML’s selection or to collaterally attack its determination. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the petitions elsewhere. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Giovanni Irizarry Sierra worked as an Attorney Advisor for the Social Security Administration (SSA) in Puerto Rico and was terminated in March 2019 for unsatisfactory performance. He subsequently filed a complaint with the SSA’s Office of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity (OCREO), alleging that his termination was the result of discrimination and retaliation. The OCREO reorganized his allegations, dismissing one as untimely and bifurcating the remainder into pre-termination and termination discrimination claims. The termination claim was treated as a “mixed case” because it involved both discrimination and an adverse personnel action.After receiving a report of investigation, Irizarry requested a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ dismissed the termination claim for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that mixed cases must proceed through the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), not the EEOC. Irizarry then appealed his termination claim to the MSPB, which sustained his removal and notified him that he had thirty days from the final decision to seek judicial review in federal district court. Irizarry did not file within that period. Later, the OCREO erroneously issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD) on the termination claim, which was subsequently rescinded.Irizarry filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, relying on the rescinded FAD. The SSA moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was untimely and the FAD was issued in error. The district court granted the motion, finding the claims time-barred and rejecting Irizarry’s arguments for equitable tolling and estoppel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Irizarry’s claim was untimely because he failed to file within thirty days of the MSPB’s final decision, and equitable relief was not warranted. View "Irizarry Sierra v. Bisignano" on Justia Law