Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A marketing and e-commerce company based in Nevada provided services for the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign at the request of a group of Arizona-based political consultants (the Lincoln defendants). The company began work without a written contract, relying on assurances that terms would be formalized later. It created campaign materials, built a website, and managed digital operations, but was never paid for its work. The company sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District of Wyoming found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Lincoln defendants and transferred those claims to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, citing concerns about potential statute of limitations issues. The court dismissed the claims against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim, but did so without prejudice. Kanye 2020 moved for reconsideration, seeking dismissal with prejudice, but the Wyoming court declined, stating it no longer had jurisdiction after the transfer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory transfer order. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims against Kanye 2020, finding the complaint failed to plausibly allege the existence of an oral or implied contract or unjust enrichment, as there were insufficient communications or notice to Kanye 2020 regarding payment expectations. However, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Kanye 2020’s motion for reconsideration. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the dismissal of the claims against Kanye 2020 should be with prejudice. View "SeedX v. Lincoln Strategy" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Mary Timmins worked as general counsel and litigation counsel for the Green Mountain Water and Sanitation District in Colorado. During her employment, she discovered that certain members of the District’s Board were engaging in conduct she believed to be corrupt and potentially unlawful, including violating open meetings laws, improperly communicating with a state-employed attorney, and destroying public records relevant to ongoing litigation. After repeatedly warning the Board internally without effect, Timmins disclosed her concerns to reporters and private citizens, alleging that the Board members were acting against the interests of the District and its residents. She was subsequently terminated from her position.Timmins filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the District and three Board members, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed her claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee. The court reasoned that her statements to the press and private citizens were essentially identical to those made in her official capacity and stemmed from her work responsibilities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that Timmins’s speech to reporters and private citizens was not made pursuant to her official duties, as her job did not ordinarily require her to make such disclosures outside the chain of command. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Timmins’s amended complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for affirmance at this stage. View "Timmins v. Plotkin" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras and her two minor sons fled their home country after the murder of her partner, Arturo Robles, by a man named Jonis, who was associated with a gang. Following the murder, Jonis threatened the woman and her children, specifically targeting those related to Arturo. The woman reported these threats to the police, but they failed to act, which she attributed to their ties with gangs. Fearing for their safety, she and her children entered the United States unlawfully in 2014 and sought asylum, arguing that their persecution was due to their membership in Arturo’s nuclear family.After removal proceedings began, an Immigration Judge (IJ) granted asylum in 2014, finding the woman and her brother credible and concluding that her family relationship was a central reason for the threats. The government appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further factfinding. In 2019, after additional hearings and evidence, the IJ again granted asylum, finding that the threats were motivated by the family relationship, that the woman could not safely relocate within Honduras, and that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her. The government appealed again, and in 2023, a three-judge BIA panel vacated the IJ’s decision, holding that the IJ’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s 2023 order. The court held that the BIA misapplied the clear-error standard required by regulation when reviewing the IJ’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit found that the IJ’s findings on nexus, internal relocation, and government protection were permissible and not clearly erroneous. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s grant of asylum. View "Ramos v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A family from Colombia, consisting of two adults and their minor children, sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States. They had been active members of the Colombian Liberal Party and participated in political campaigning. After receiving threatening phone calls related to their political activities, the family continued their involvement. Subsequently, the father, who was a provisional lawyer and intern at the National Prosecutor’s office, became involved in a property dispute with a man known as Don Rafa, a leader of a narco-trafficking group. Following this, the family received further threats, including armed confrontations and threats against their children, which they attributed to Don Rafa and his associates. The family relocated within Colombia briefly before departing for the United States.After arriving in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security charged the family as removable. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the family credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ concluded that the harm suffered did not amount to past persecution, lacked a nexus to a statutorily protected ground, and that internal relocation within Colombia was reasonably available. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal, also rejecting the family’s due process claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision under a substantial-evidence standard. The court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate past persecution, a nexus to a protected ground, or that the Colombian government was unable or unwilling to protect them. The court also found that the record did not show the family could not safely relocate within Colombia. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Jimenez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2022, a Colorado town enacted an ordinance restricting most vehicles from entering its pedestrian malls, with certain exceptions, including one for high-volume commercial carriers making frequent deliveries. In 2023, the town amended the ordinance to remove this exception, leaving only a provision allowing a town-approved contractor to deliver goods in the pedestrian areas. The Colorado Motor Carriers Association, representing trucking companies, challenged the amended ordinance, arguing it was preempted by federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction to halt its enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted a preliminary injunction against the amended ordinance, finding the Association was likely to succeed on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm. However, the court declined to enjoin the original ordinance, reasoning that the Association had not demonstrated irreparable injury, particularly given its delay in bringing suit after the original ordinance had been in effect for over a year. Both parties appealed: the town challenged the injunction against the amended ordinance, while the Association cross-appealed the denial of relief against the original ordinance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the amended ordinance likely fell within the federal statutory safety exceptions, as it regulated with respect to motor vehicles and was genuinely responsive to safety concerns, based on legislative intent and a logical nexus to pedestrian safety. The court found the district court had erred in concluding the Association was likely to succeed on the merits and thus abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. Regarding the original ordinance, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that the Association’s delay in seeking relief undercut its claim of irreparable harm. The court reversed the injunction against the amended ordinance and remanded with instructions to dissolve it, while affirming the denial of relief as to the original ordinance. View "Colorado Motor v. Town of Vail" on Justia Law

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law

John Snyder, after working for Guardian Life Insurance Company and obtaining a national customer list (the Guardian Broker List), was employed by Beam Technologies, Inc. Snyder claims that Beam induced him to join and disclose the list, promising compensation. While at Beam, Snyder created state-specific broker lists derived from the Guardian Broker List and inadvertently included the full list in emails to several Beam employees. He did not mark the lists as confidential, restrict access, or inform Beam of their confidential nature. After his employment ended, Snyder did not attempt to recover the list or notify Beam of its confidential status, and he later confirmed to Beam’s CEO that the disclosure was intentional.Snyder sued Beam in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and state law, as well as several state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Beam on the trade secret claims, finding Snyder failed to show he “owned” the Guardian Broker List. The court also granted Beam’s motion to exclude Snyder’s damages expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and, in doing so, barred Snyder from presenting any evidence or witnesses on lost wages for his remaining claims. Snyder’s motion to reconsider this order was denied, and the parties settled or dismissed the remaining claims, leading to a final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the trade secret claims, holding that Snyder failed to take reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the Guardian Broker List, a requirement under both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 702 order to the extent it excluded all evidence and witnesses on lost wages, finding that such a dispositive ruling required notice and the procedural protections of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Snyder v. Beam Technologies" on Justia Law

ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River), LLC ("ADA") filed a lawsuit against Atlas Carbon, LLC ("Atlas") in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Wyoming law. ADA claimed that Atlas breached their contract for the sale of activated carbon by improperly invoking the "Force Majeure" clause and failing to supply the agreed-upon quantity of carbon. ADA filed an amended complaint asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).The district court accepted jurisdiction and, after a bench trial, awarded ADA $76,000 in damages. ADA appealed the district court's judgment, dissatisfied with the method for calculating damages. During the appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified potential jurisdictional defects, specifically regarding the complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. The court ordered supplemental briefing to clarify the citizenship of Atlas's members, including trusts and limited partnerships involved.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that it lacked sufficient information to determine whether complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time of filing. The court noted that Atlas's identification of its members, including trusts and limited partnerships, was incomplete and did not provide adequate information about their citizenship. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to make the necessary factual findings to determine whether it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court was instructed to analyze the citizenship of all members of ADA and Atlas, tracing through all layers of ownership to ensure complete diversity. View "ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River) v. Atlas Carbon" on Justia Law