Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Sharon Andersen filed a complaint against the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging hostile-work-environment disability discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). Andersen, who worked for DHHS from 2005 to 2019, claimed that from July 2018 to August 2019, she experienced increased stress and anxiety due to her workload and interactions with her supervisor. She reported panic attacks and was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Andersen requested reasonable accommodations, including reassignment, which were denied. She went on medical leave in January 2019 and resigned in August 2019, claiming constructive discharge.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, concluding that Andersen’s claim was time-barred. The court found that the only actions within the statutory limitations period were DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen and her resignation, neither of which were discriminatory in themselves or indicative of a continuing violation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that Andersen did not make a prima facie showing of a continuing violation. The Court determined that Andersen’s resignation, occurring more than seven months after she went on medical leave, was too disconnected from the alleged hostile work environment to qualify as a constructive discharge. Additionally, the Court noted that DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen was not a required reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the MHRA. Therefore, Andersen’s claim was deemed untimely, and the summary judgment in favor of DHHS was affirmed. View "Andersen v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Monika McCallion, Brandan McCallion, and Old Bears, LLC (collectively, the McCallions) appealed a judgment affirming the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals' decision to uphold the issuance of a 2023 short-term rental registration to W.A.R.M. Management, LLC. The Town of Bar Harbor requires annual registration of short-term rental properties, classifying them as either VR-1 or VR-2. W.A.R.M. Management, LLC owns two VR-2 properties, one of which is central to this dispute. The property in question is in a district where VR-2s are generally prohibited unless they were registered before December 2, 2021. W.A.R.M. submitted renewal applications and fees for both properties in January 2023, but due to a malfunction in the Town's online portal, one application was lost, and the registration was not renewed by the May 31 deadline. The Town's code enforcement officer (CEO) later issued a registration for the property in October 2023 after determining that W.A.R.M. had timely submitted its renewal application.The McCallions filed an administrative appeal with the Bar Harbor Board of Appeals, arguing that the CEO could not renew the registration after the deadline. The Board upheld the CEO's actions after a de novo hearing. The McCallions then filed a Rule 80B complaint in the Superior Court, which affirmed the Board's decision without addressing the Town's mootness argument. While the case was pending, W.A.R.M. received a 2024 registration for the property, which the McCallions did not contest.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was moot because the 2023 registration had been superseded by the 2024 registration, which was not appealed. The court concluded that even if it ruled in favor of the McCallions regarding the 2023 registration, it would have no practical effect since the 2024 registration was final and not subject to review. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "McCallion v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Katherine Fratello loaned Russell A. Mann $60,000 under a secured promissory note, with Mann agreeing to make monthly payments starting October 15, 2023. Mann provided a cashier’s check for $3,500 on September 29, 2023, claiming it covered the first two payments and other loans. Fratello disputed the validity of the check and considered Mann in default for missing the first two payments. She served Mann with a default notice on November 29, 2023, and filed a complaint on January 5, 2024, alleging Mann’s failure to make the required payments.Mann counterclaimed, asserting that Fratello breached their contract by not cashing the cashier’s check, which he claimed covered the first two payments. He argued that Fratello’s refusal to accept the payment and the subsequent default notice were unlawful. Fratello filed a special motion to dismiss Mann’s counterclaim under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the counterclaim was based on her protected petitioning activity, namely the default notice and the complaint.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) denied Fratello’s special motion to dismiss, concluding that the default notice was not petitioning activity and that Mann’s counterclaim was not based on Fratello’s filing of the complaint or any other petitioning activity. Fratello appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Mann’s counterclaim was based on Fratello’s refusal to accept the cashier’s check, not on her petitioning activity. Therefore, Fratello did not meet her burden to demonstrate that Mann’s counterclaim was based on protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Fratello v. Mann" on Justia Law

Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in which the court allocated property between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim challenges the court’s property determinations on multiple grounds, but does not contest the custody determination. The court found that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were acquired during the marriage and through significant effort by both parties. The court allocated just over half of the net value of the parties’ properties to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based largely on Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s LLC’s daily sales.The District Court held a trial with both parties represented by counsel and interpreters present. The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker, Sokunthim’s accountant, and her father. The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment, determining that all the parties’ assets were marital and allocating them accordingly. The court’s judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. Sokunthim filed motions for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and for a new trial, which the court denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s determination of Sokunthim’s income was unsupported by the evidence. The court’s finding as to her income may have influenced other financial aspects of the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the division of property and child support award and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Nou v. Huot" on Justia Law

Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc., and OFLC, Inc. (collectively Moosehead) filed a civil action against Carmen Rebozo Foundation, Inc., alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute arose from a promissory note for $6,350,000 executed by Moosehead and assigned to the Foundation, which allegedly misrepresented the amount due, impacting Moosehead's efforts to sell a ski resort.The Superior Court (Piscataquis County) denied Moosehead’s motion for summary judgment and the Foundation’s motion for relief under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), ordering a judicial settlement conference. The parties reached a settlement, agreeing to dismiss the case with prejudice. However, no docket entries were filed within the court's deadline, leading to the case's dismissal with prejudice. Moosehead then filed a motion for reconsideration and to vacate the settlement agreement, which the court denied. The Foundation's motion to enforce the settlement agreement was granted.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of Moosehead’s motion for reconsideration, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it vacated the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce it after the case was dismissed with prejudice. The court noted that the parties failed to take necessary steps to preserve the court's jurisdiction over the settlement agreement before the dismissal. The case was remanded for an order dismissing the motion to enforce the settlement agreement for want of jurisdiction. View "Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. v. Carmen Rebozo Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

Fair Friend Enterprise Co., Ltd., a Taiwan-based company and majority shareholder of CNC Systems, Inc., sought access to CNC's corporate books and records under Maine law. Fair Friend alleged that CNC had failed to pay for goods worth approximately $4 million and had unilaterally demoted its CEO without approval. Fair Friend made a written demand for access to CNC's records, which CNC ignored, leading Fair Friend to file a complaint in the Maine Superior Court.The Maine Superior Court ordered CNC to produce the requested records and denied CNC's motion to stay the proceedings due to related litigation in California. The court found that Fair Friend had a proper purpose for requesting the records and that CNC's actions warranted concern. CNC continued to delay compliance, prompting further court orders to enforce the production of records and awarding attorney fees to Fair Friend.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. CNC's appeal of the denial of the motion to stay was dismissed as moot because CNC eventually produced the requested records. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees, concluding that CNC had not acted in good faith and had no reasonable basis for doubting Fair Friend's right to inspect the records. The court found that CNC's resistance to producing the documents and filing of serial motions to delay justified the award of attorney fees. The case was remanded for dismissal of all pending motions and entry of final judgment. View "Fair Friend Enterprise Co., Ltd. v. CNC Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law

Juanita and Stephen Clark, Linda and Cliff Trebilcock, and Dan Gurney reside on Fuller Mountain Road in the Town of Phippsburg. Gurney has operated a firewood business from his property for thirty years. In September 2020, the Clarks and the Trebilcocks complained to the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) that Gurney’s business was a nuisance under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). The CEO found no violation, but the Clarks and the Trebilcocks appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which found the business to be a nuisance. The Board of Selectmen (BOS) later found that Gurney had abated the nuisance.The Clarks and the Trebilcocks challenged the BOS’s decision in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County), arguing that the BOS lacked authority to conduct a de novo review and that there were due process violations. The Superior Court affirmed the BOS’s decision, leading to the Clarks’ appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the BOA’s findings were outside the scope of the current appeal but found that the BOS exceeded its authority and violated due process in its review. The Court held that the BOS did not have the authority to review the CEO’s decision and that the BOS’s role was limited to deciding whether a consent agreement could be achieved or if court action was necessary. The Court also found procedural due process violations due to the conduct of BOS Chair Julia House, who exhibited bias and engaged in ex parte communications.The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOS for new proceedings without the participation of Chair Julia House. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, owners of two condominium units, obtained a judgment against Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor Village, LLC for damages due to mismanagement. The judgment awarded Maples $134,900 and Brown $106,801, along with specific performance, declaratory relief, and attorney fees. The judgment prohibited the defendants from imposing special assessments to pay for the judgment. The judgment was affirmed in part by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but specific performance and the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim were vacated.Maples and Brown recorded writs of execution, obtaining liens against the LLC's and Association's properties. However, the LLC's units were foreclosed by The First, N.A., extinguishing the liens. Maples and Brown then filed a new action in the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the judgment against the remaining seven units not owned by them or foreclosed upon. The case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, where the court dismissed their claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and focused on whether the lower court erred in dismissing the claim to enforce the judgment lien against the seven units under the Maine Condominium Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117. The court held that the proper procedure for enforcing such a lien requires a disclosure proceeding in the District Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket did not cure the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Maples and Brown’s claims, as the Superior Court and the Business and Consumer Docket lacked jurisdiction to issue the necessary turnover or sale orders under the disclosure statutes. View "Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association" on Justia Law