Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Matt Roane was involved in litigation with the Archuleta County Board of Commissioners when he submitted a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request to Archuleta County Clerk and Recorder, Kristy Archuleta, seeking a recording of a recent Board meeting. Archuleta denied the request, claiming it circumvented the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Roane had not sought any records through discovery in his civil action against the Board. Roane then sued Archuleta, alleging a violation of CORA.The district court granted Roane's motion to show cause, rejecting Archuleta's argument that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited Roane from obtaining evidence outside of discovery procedures. The court ordered Archuleta to produce the recording. Archuleta appealed, arguing that the district court allowed Roane to bypass discovery rules. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order, holding that CORA allows litigants to inspect public records even if they are relevant to pending litigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a litigant may obtain records under CORA even if those records are relevant to pending litigation and the litigant has not made document requests under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court emphasized that CORA and the Rules of Civil Procedure are distinct legal regimes and that CORA does not limit inspection rights simply because the requester is involved in litigation with the public entity. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Archuleta v. Roane" on Justia Law

Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

Autumn Scardina requested a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop to celebrate her gender transition. The shop, owned by Jack Phillips, refused to make the cake, citing the message as the reason. Scardina filed a discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found probable cause of discrimination. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission took jurisdiction but later dismissed the case as part of a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit filed by Phillips, without Scardina's participation.The district court took up Scardina's case after the Commission's dismissal and found that Phillips had violated Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), imposing a fine. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Phillips then appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court should not have heard Scardina's case. The court concluded that Scardina did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by CADA. Specifically, the court found that Scardina should have appealed the Commission's decision to close the administrative adjudication without issuing the required order. The court vacated the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case, stating that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "In re Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

In this toxic tort action, the plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to a carcinogen emitted from a plant operated by the defendants, Terumo BCT, Inc. and Terumo BCT Sterilization Services, Inc. To support their claim, the plaintiffs' counsel provided an expert with a spreadsheet detailing where each plaintiff lived and worked and when. The defendants demanded that the plaintiffs produce not only the spreadsheet but also any communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel that contained the information used to create the spreadsheet. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that such communications were privileged and beyond the scope of disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants' request and ordered the plaintiffs to produce the information.The plaintiffs sought relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the district court erred in both respects. The court held that the attorney-client privilege does apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Jordan v. Terumo BCT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows trial courts to certify a ruling on a subset of claims as "final" for appeal purposes when there is "no just reason for delay." The dispute arose from a business relationship between Daniel Wolf and Michael J. Brenneman and Jeffrey B. Selby. After Wolf was acquitted of theft charges, he sued Brenneman and Selby for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, false imprisonment, and defamation. The trial court dismissed the first four claims, granting immunity to the defendants, and certified the dismissal for appeal under Rule 54(b).The court of appeals, following its previous decision in Allison v. Engel, ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying the claims under Rule 54(b) without demonstrating that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice. The Allison decision had significantly narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b), asserting that a trial court should only certify an issue for appeal under that rule if it could show that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice that could only be alleviated by an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of Rule 54(b). It emphasized that Rule 54(b) grants trial courts discretion to certify a ruling as final for appeal purposes when there is no just reason for delay. The Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals' decision in Allison v. Engel, stating that it had inappropriately narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying Wolf's claims as final under Rule 54(b). View "Wolf v. Brenneman" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

In November 2015, Mark Kinslow hit Daniala Mohammadi with his car while she was riding her bicycle. Mohammadi, who was a minor at the time of the accident, sued Kinslow in December 2019, more than two years but less than three years after she turned eighteen. Kinslow moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired two years after Mohammadi’s eighteenth birthday. Mohammadi countered that the usual three-year statute of limitations for motor vehicle accidents had not started to run until her eighteenth birthday.The trial court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Mohammadi was required to bring her claim either within three years of the incident, or within two years after she turned eighteen. The court of appeals reversed this decision, agreeing with Mohammadi and concluding that it was bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado providing that statutes of limitations are “tolled” for claims by a minor plaintiff until the minor turns eighteen.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the court of appeals' decision. The court concluded that the plain language of section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (2023), gives a plaintiff who turns eighteen within the three-year limitation period for a motor vehicle accident a statute of limitations that is the longer of (1) the full three years normally accorded an accident victim, or (2) two years from their eighteenth birthday. For Mohammadi, this meant that she was required to bring her claim by January 1, 2019—two years after she turned eighteen. Because her suit was filed after that date, it was untimely. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Kinslow v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has ruled that the notice-prejudice rule applies to occurrence-based, first-party homeowners’ property insurance policies. This rule allows insurance companies to deny coverage based on late notice of a claim only if they can prove they were prejudiced by the delay. The court reached this conclusion after exploring the differences between occurrence policies and claims-made policies, asserting that applying the rule to the former was consistent with precedent. The court's decision was based on three policy considerations: the adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the public policy of compensating victims, and the unfairness of granting the insurer a windfall due to a technicality. This case involved two homeowners, Karyn Gregory and Lisa and Sylvan Runkel, who had filed claims for hail damage to their homes. The insurance companies denied their claims on the grounds that they were filed too late. The court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings, with instructions to allow the insurers an opportunity to establish prejudice from the late notice. View "Gregory v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law