Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Personal Injury
Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District
Maxwell Tillinghast, a 13-year-old student, collapsed from sudden cardiac arrest while jogging during a physical education class at Palms Middle School. Although the school had a defibrillator in the main office, the teachers were unaware of its presence. Despite being trained to use a defibrillator, the teachers could not utilize it, leading to Tillinghast's death. His father sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and several employees, alleging negligence for failing to inform the teachers about the defibrillator.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard the case, where the jury focused on whether Tillinghast's latent heart defect would have been fatal even if the teachers had known about the defibrillator. The jury found the school district negligent and awarded Tillinghast's father $15 million in damages. The jury exonerated the school principal, Dr. Derek Moriuchi, from negligence.The LAUSD appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a specific jury instruction (CACI No. 423) related to public entity liability for failure to perform a mandatory duty. The appellate court found that the school district had forfeited its objections to this instruction by not raising the issue during the trial. Additionally, the court noted that the school district had conceded mistakes were made regarding the defibrillator's availability and training.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the school district's failure to inform the teachers about the defibrillator constituted negligence. The court awarded costs to the respondent, Tillinghast's father. View "Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law
Rochon v. City of Nome
A man was injured in an accident outside city limits and sued a city and an emergency-responder employee for negligently providing assistance and aggravating his injuries. The city and employee offered the man $7,500 to settle the lawsuit, which he did not accept. They also moved for summary judgment, arguing that they could not be sued because AS 09.65.070(d)(4) does not allow lawsuits based on the “gratuitous extension of municipal services” beyond city limits. The superior court granted summary judgment in their favor, ruling that their actions were gratuitous because they were under no legal obligation to take them. The court also granted attorney’s fees to the city and employee based on a court rule that requires a party to pay the other side’s legal fees if the party rejected an offer of judgment to settle the case that was more favorable than the judgment the party ultimately received.The man appealed, arguing that the city’s emergency response was not gratuitous because he was billed a mileage fee for the ambulance service. He also argued that the city and employee were not entitled to attorney’s fees because their pretrial offer of judgment was invalid.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that AS 09.65.070(d)(4) bars the lawsuit because the city and employee’s actions were gratuitous, meaning they were performed without legal obligation and without charging more than the standard fee. The court also held that the offer of judgment was valid and that the superior court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the city and employee. The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Rochon v. City of Nome" on Justia Law
Whitehead v. City of Oakland
Ty Whitehead suffered a serious head injury during a bicycle training ride for a charity fundraiser due to a large pothole on Skyline Boulevard in Oakland. Whitehead alleged that the City of Oakland breached its statutory duty to maintain a safe roadway. Prior to the ride, Whitehead signed a release and waiver of liability, which included a provision discharging the City from any liability for negligence.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the release was valid and enforceable, thus barring Whitehead’s claim. The court reasoned that the release did not affect the public interest, relying on the multifactor test from Tunkl v. Regents of University of California. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, also relying on the Tunkl framework.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the release was against public policy under Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits contracts that exempt a party from responsibility for their own fraud, willful injury, or violation of law. The court held that an agreement to exculpate a party for future violations of a statutory duty designed to protect public safety is unenforceable. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the City to argue the doctrine of primary assumption of risk on remand. View "Whitehead v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law
Seymour v. State
Derik L. Seymour was using a cable crossover exercise machine at the Bulldog Athletic Recreation Center at the University of Montana-Western when the cable snapped, allegedly causing him severe injury. Seymour filed a complaint against the State of Montana and the University of Montana-Western, alleging negligence and negligence-premises liability for improper maintenance of the exercise equipment.The First Judicial District Court found that Seymour failed to present admissible evidence that the State breached its standard of care and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. Seymour's counsel withdrew, and he proceeded pro se. The court extended discovery deadlines multiple times due to Seymour's failure to respond to the State’s discovery requests. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Seymour had not secured a liability expert to testify at trial. The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Seymour had not introduced any admissible evidence that the State breached its duty of care.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Seymour failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the State’s standard of care. The court noted that Seymour did not dispute the necessity of an expert in the District Court and only argued on appeal that an expert was not necessary. The court found that the inspection and maintenance of specialized gym equipment involved technical considerations beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors, requiring expert testimony. The court concluded that Seymour did not present any evidence regarding the State’s standard of care, an essential element of his negligence claims, and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "Seymour v. State" on Justia Law
Berhow v. State
Trent Berhow, while incarcerated at Western Missouri Correctional Center, fell from a ladder and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the state of Missouri, alleging that his supervisor's instructions created a dangerous condition leading to his injury. Berhow filed his suit more than a year after the incident, which brought into question the statute of limitations.Initially, Berhow sued the Missouri Department of Corrections. The department moved to dismiss the petition, citing the statute of limitations. Berhow then amended his petition to dismiss the department and add the state as the defendant. The Circuit Court of DeKalb County overruled the state's first motion for judgment on the pleadings but later sustained the state's renewed motion, which argued both sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations. Berhow's motion for sanctions was also effectively overruled by the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Berhow's claim was barred by the statute of limitations under section 516.145, which requires actions against the Department of Corrections or any entity thereof to be brought within one year. The court reasoned that allowing Berhow to sue the state instead of the department would defeat the purpose of the statute, as the department acts on the state's behalf. The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations barred Berhow's claim. View "Berhow v. State" on Justia Law
Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc.
William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court's decision.CMI then sought attorney's fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court's ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs' ability to assess the offer's value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling CMI's unapportioned offer invalid. View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law
K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law
Jones v. Life Care Centers of America
An elderly woman with severely impaired cognitive functioning was a resident at a skilled nursing facility. While an employee was helping her shower, the employee took a personal video call and propped her phone in a way that displayed the resident’s nude body to the caller. The resident’s conservator sued the facility for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the facility, and the plaintiff appealed. During the appeal, the resident died, and her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the complaint stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion and that the claim did not abate upon the resident’s death. The defendant facility was granted permission to appeal on the issue of abatement.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion does not abate upon the death of the person whose privacy was invaded. The court determined that the statutory exception for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” did not apply to this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the claim for intrusion upon seclusion did not abate upon the resident’s death and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Life Care Centers of America" on Justia Law
Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc.
Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law
Shuford v. City of Montgomery
In December 2021, Officer Shelton Davis of the Montgomery Police Department, while pursuing a fleeing suspect, collided with Madilyn Shuford's vehicle at an intersection in Montgomery. Officer Davis was responding to a woman's plea for help, who claimed a man was trying to kill her. The suspect, Eugene Osborne Jr., fled in a vehicle, prompting Officer Davis to pursue him with activated lights and sirens. During the pursuit, Officer Davis slowed down at a red light but collided with Shuford's vehicle when she pulled into the intersection.Shuford sued the City of Montgomery and Officer Davis, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, and claimed the City was vicariously liable. The City and Officer Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman. They provided evidence, including Officer Davis's affidavit and body camera footage, showing he was performing his duties with activated lights and sirens. Shuford opposed, arguing Officer Davis did not use proper signals and took unreasonable risks.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion without explanation. The City and Officer Davis petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the denial and grant summary judgment based on immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity as he was performing his law enforcement duties and exercising judgment. The court found no substantial evidence from Shuford to refute this. Consequently, the City was also entitled to immunity. The trial court was directed to enter summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer Davis. View "Shuford v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law