Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, Willie Gray, filed a complaint for personal injuries sustained in a fire at a multifamily residential property in Providence on January 12, 2018. The property was allegedly owned by Dexter Jackson, whose negligence was claimed to have caused the fire. The City of Providence was also named as a defendant for being aware of several housing code violations at the property from January 2015 through January 2018. The plaintiff failed to provide adequate responses to the defendant's discovery requests, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders to produce more responsive answers.The Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to compel and later a motion to enter final judgment against the plaintiff due to non-compliance with discovery orders. The plaintiff did not object to these motions and failed to appear at the hearing for the renewed motion for entry of final judgment. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion to vacate the order granting final judgment, citing a lack of objection and failure to comply with discovery requirements.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to comply with discovery obligations and failed to do so. The trial justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief. The appeal was considered interlocutory, but the Court proceeded to evaluate the merits due to the futility of remanding for default judgment against Jackson, who had not participated in the litigation. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Gray v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

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Frank Cushenberry and his family sought damages from Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC, for injuries sustained in a vehicular accident on Interstate 10 in LaPlace, Louisiana. The trial court did not instruct the jury on certain duties and obligations, but this was not considered reversible error. The jury found Barber Brothers solely at fault and awarded significant general and loss of consortium damages to the Cushenberry family.The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reviewed the case and the Louisiana Supreme Court initially reduced the general damages awarded to Mr. Cushenberry from $10,750,000 to $5,000,000, and the loss of consortium awards to his wife and children from $2,500,000 and $1,500,000 each to $400,000 and $100,000 each, respectively. The court also adjusted the fault allocation, assigning 20% fault to Mr. Cushenberry and 80% to Barber Brothers.Upon rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-examined the general damage and loss of consortium awards, considering the particular facts and circumstances of the case and prior awards in similar cases. The court found that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding $10,750,000 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, given the extensive physical and psychological injuries he sustained and their impact on his life and family. The court also amended the loss of consortium awards, increasing them to $1,000,000 for Mrs. Cushenberry and $500,000 each for the children, Noah and Khloe.The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment as amended, maintaining the 20% fault allocation to Mr. Cushenberry and 80% to Barber Brothers. The court emphasized the importance of considering the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances, alongside prior awards, in determining whether a general damage award is an abuse of discretion. View "BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC VS. CAPITOL CITY PRODUCE COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, David Yaffee, was awarded $3,299,455 in damages by a jury for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss due to injuries sustained when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by Joseph Skeen, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The accident occurred in 2015, and Yaffee experienced significant medical issues, including back pain and leg tingling, leading to multiple medical treatments and surgeries.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment on the jury's verdict, which included awards for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, and noneconomic damages. Defendants, including National Liability & Fire Insurance Company, challenged the awards on several grounds, including the reasonableness of past medical expenses, the speculative nature of future medical expenses, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting lost earnings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) regarding the measure of past medical damages, leading to the improper admission of evidence on the reasonable value of services. The court concluded that the HLA only applies to services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or affiliated facility following emergency services. Consequently, the award for past medical expenses was reversed.The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the speculative nature of the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. The court reversed the award for future medical expenses and remanded for a new trial on this issue.The awards for past and future lost earnings were upheld, as the court found sufficient evidence supporting the jury's findings. The award for future noneconomic damages was also upheld, as the evidence established a reasonable certainty of future pain and suffering.The court vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest, as these were based on the reversed portions of the judgment. The case was remanded for a new trial on the issues of past and future medical expenses. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

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Deborah Bradshaw and Chrystal Antao sued American Airlines and Mesa Airlines, alleging injuries and damages from the airlines' negligent handling of an in-flight emergency. During a June 2020 flight, the aircraft experienced a malfunction that led to a loss of cabin pressure, requiring an emergency descent. The plaintiffs claimed the pilot failed to properly inform passengers of the threat and descended too rapidly, while American Airlines failed to provide medical personnel upon landing.The case was initially filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and later removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on diversity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airlines, concluding that federal law preempted Oklahoma's common-carrier standard of care in aviation safety. The court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a state negligence claim using the federal "reckless-or-careless manner" standard but found no evidence that the airlines violated this standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Federal Aviation Act and related regulations preempt state law in the field of aviation safety. The court agreed that the federal "careless or reckless manner" standard of care applies, preempting Oklahoma's common-carrier standard. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of federal regulations by the airlines and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Bradshaw v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

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Dionicio Rodriguez, an employee of SIR Electric LLC (SIR), was injured while working and filed for workers' compensation benefits under SIR's policy with Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford). After receiving benefits, Rodriguez filed a personal injury lawsuit against SIR, alleging negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intentional wrongdoing. SIR requested Hartford to defend against the lawsuit, but Hartford refused, citing policy exclusions. SIR then filed a third-party complaint against Hartford, claiming wrongful disclaimer of defense coverage.The trial court granted Hartford's motion to dismiss SIR's complaint, ruling that the policy excluded intent-based claims. SIR's motion for reconsideration and to amend its complaint, arguing that the policy's enhanced intentional injury exclusion (EII exclusion) violated public policy, was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that Hartford has no duty to defend SIR. The court determined that Rodriguez's claims of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness are subject to the workers' compensation exclusivity bar and are not covered under Part One of the policy. These claims are also excluded from coverage under Part Two of the policy. Additionally, Rodriguez's claims of intentional wrongdoing are excluded under the policy's EII exclusion.The court concluded that the trial judge properly denied SIR's motion to amend its third-party complaint, as the EII exclusion does not violate public policy. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, upholding the dismissal of SIR's third-party complaint against Hartford. View "Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC" on Justia Law

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A group of city and county governments, Indian tribes, and other entities filed actions against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies, alleging they misled medical professionals and the public, leading to widespread addiction. Two Ohio counties, Trumbull and Lake, claimed that national pharmaceutical chains, including Walgreens, CVS, and Walmart, contributed to the opioid epidemic by filling prescriptions without proper controls. They filed a common-law absolute public-nuisance claim seeking equitable relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the pharmacies' motion to dismiss, which argued that the Ohio Product Liability Act (OPLA) abrogated the public-nuisance claims. The court based its decision on a prior ruling in a related case, concluding that the OPLA did not abrogate public-nuisance claims seeking non-compensatory damages. After a jury verdict in favor of the counties, the pharmacies' motion for judgment as a matter of law was also denied. The pharmacies appealed, and the Sixth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Ohio regarding the OPLA's scope.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the OPLA abrogates all common-law public-nuisance claims arising from the sale of a product, including those seeking equitable relief. The court determined that the statutory definition of "product liability claim" includes public-nuisance claims related to the design, manufacture, supply, marketing, distribution, promotion, advertising, labeling, or sale of a product. The court rejected the argument that the OPLA only abrogates claims seeking compensatory damages or involving defective products. The court concluded that the counties' claims, based on the pharmacies' dispensing of opioids, fall within the scope of the OPLA and are therefore abrogated. View "In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation" on Justia Law

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A medical-malpractice action was filed by Kalvyn Stull and his family against Summa Health System and associated parties, alleging that improper medical treatment following a car accident caused severe brain damage to Kalvyn. During discovery, the plaintiffs requested the residency file of Dr. Mazen Elashi, a resident physician involved in the treatment. Summa Health System claimed the file was protected by the peer-review privilege under Ohio law, supported by an affidavit from Dr. Erika Laipply, which stated that the file was used exclusively for peer-review purposes.The trial court in Summit County held that Summa had not sufficiently demonstrated that the peer-review privilege applied, as the affidavit contained ambiguities and lacked specific details. The court granted the motion to compel the production of the residency file. Summa appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the affidavit was insufficient to establish the privilege due to its ambiguities and incomplete information.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the presence of factual ambiguities in affidavit testimony does not alone determine whether the peer-review privilege applies. The court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to conduct further inquiry, including in camera review, to resolve the factual disputes and determine the applicability of the privilege. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the residency file and any other necessary factual inquiry to resolve the legal question of whether the file is privileged. View "Stull v. Summa Health System" on Justia Law

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Michael Boren applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to have an unimproved airstrip on his property recognized as a designated county airstrip. Gary Gadwa, Sarah Michael, and other concerned citizens opposed Boren’s application, but it was ultimately approved. Following the approval, Boren sued Gadwa, Michael, and others for defamation, defamation per se, conspiracy to commit defamation, and declaratory relief, alleging they made false statements about the airstrip and his use of it. Boren filed an amended complaint, and Gadwa and Michael moved to dismiss the claims, arguing their statements were protected by litigation privilege and constitutionally protected petitioning activity.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Boren’s claims, agreeing with Gadwa’s and Michael’s arguments. The court also denied Boren’s motion to file a second amended complaint, concluding it would be futile. Boren appealed the district court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Boren’s civil conspiracy claim and declaratory judgment claim. However, it reversed the dismissal of most of Boren’s defamation claims, finding that the applicability of the absolute and qualified litigation privileges was not evident on the face of the complaint. The court also held that neither the First Amendment nor the Idaho Constitution provides absolute protection for defamatory statements made in the course of protected petitioning activity. The court reversed the district court’s decision denying Boren’s motion to amend his complaint, as the amendment would not be futile. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand and did not award attorney fees to any party. View "Boren v. Gadwa" on Justia Law