Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Richard and Lucia Parks, along with their family real estate business Parks Diversified, L.P. and related entities, became involved in a legal dispute after their son, David Klein, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Parks Diversified. The Parkses asserted that Klein did not have the authority to file the petition and claimed he did so as part of a scheme to take control of family assets. Despite these objections, the parties entered into a stipulation to dismiss the bankruptcy case, with the Parkses waiving certain claims. Later, the Parkses and their entities filed a complaint in California state court against Klein and others, alleging various causes of action related to the alleged unauthorized bankruptcy filing.Following this, the law firm representing some of the defendants requested the bankruptcy court to reopen the case, and the state court complaint was removed to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim and granted special motions to strike. On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of California found that the bankruptcy court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issue of corporate authority to file a bankruptcy petition was not jurisdictional. The district court remanded with instructions to vacate orders where jurisdiction was lacking and to remand remaining claims to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that, consistent with precedents from the Second and Third Circuits, a lack of corporate authority to file a bankruptcy petition does not deprive the bankruptcy court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court clarified that while proper authorization is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional, and thus affirmed the lower court’s conclusion on this point. View "TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC. V. BECKER" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City.Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Dr. Marciano, along with Gritman Medical Center, both based in Idaho near the Washington border, had treated Susan for several years. Although Susan lived in Washington, her medical treatment occurred in Idaho. At Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted to pharmacies in Washington. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate brought a wrongful death and survivor action in the Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Susan’s death resulted from negligent over-prescription of pharmaceuticals.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery regarding general personal jurisdiction over Gritman and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found that Washington’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction and that exercising specific jurisdiction would violate due process, as the defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the Washington forum. The district court did not reach the question of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court of appeals held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants was proper under Washington’s long-arm statute and consistent with the Due Process Clause because the defendants maintained ongoing, deliberate relationships with Washington residents and regularly sent prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with state law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington since a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with dismissal affirmed only for one defendant whom the plaintiffs conceded was properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

Milliman, Inc. operates a service that compiles consumer medical and prescription reports, which are then sold to insurers for underwriting decisions. The named plaintiff, James Healy, applied for life insurance, but Milliman provided a report to the insurer containing another person's medical records and social security number. This erroneous report flagged Healy as high risk for several serious medical conditions he did not actually have, resulting in the denial of his insurance application. Healy attempted to correct the report, but Milliman did not timely investigate or remedy the errors.Healy filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging that Milliman’s procedures violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to ensure maximum possible accuracy. The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” for those whose reports included mismatched social security numbers and risk flags. Milliman moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Healy needed to show class-wide standing at this stage. The district court agreed, finding under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), that Healy had failed to present direct evidence of concrete injury on a class-wide basis, and dismissed the inaccuracy class.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, following class certification in damages actions, both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of standing at summary judgment. However, the court clarified that plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence, and need only show that a rational trier of fact could infer standing, not that standing is conclusively established. The panel reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct summary judgment standard. View "HEALY V. MILLIMAN, INC." on Justia Law

A group of 169 individuals who worked at the Clark County Government Center in Las Vegas brought claims alleging that they suffered serious injuries due to exposure to toxic chemicals, including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), at their workplace. The site of the Government Center had previously been used as a rail yard by Union Pacific Railroad, and plaintiffs alleged that Union Pacific dumped waste, including PCBs manufactured by the former Monsanto Company, at the site. Plaintiffs asserted that Monsanto’s corporate successors inherited liability for harms caused by the production, sale, and distribution of PCBs, which allegedly caused a range of health issues for those exposed.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in Nevada state court against multiple defendants, including Union Pacific, the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, and Monsanto’s successors. The claims sought compensatory and punitive damages for injuries stemming from the alleged contamination. Monsanto’s successors removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court, and the District Court granted the motion, finding that the local controversy exception to CAFA applied since the alleged injuries were localized to Clark County.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CAFA’s local controversy exception did not apply because the principal injuries resulting from Monsanto’s conduct were not shown to have been incurred primarily in Nevada. The court found that plaintiffs’ allegations described nationwide distribution and harm from PCBs, with no facts indicating that Nevada experienced principal or unique injuries. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s order remanding the case and ordered the case to proceed in federal court. View "EMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

Epic Games, a developer and operator of the Epic Games Store, sued Apple over its App Store practices, alleging violations of federal and California competition law. The dispute centered on Apple’s rules requiring developers to use Apple’s in-app payment system, which imposed a 30% commission, and its prohibition of developers directing users to other purchasing options outside the App Store. After a bench trial, the district court found Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by preventing informed consumer choice but upheld Apple’s in-app payment system requirement for digital goods. The court issued an injunction barring Apple from restricting developers from including in their apps buttons, links, or other calls to action that direct users to alternative purchasing mechanisms.Following the injunction, Apple implemented a compliance plan involving a 27% commission on linked-out purchases and a series of restrictions on how developers could present external payment options, including limitations on button design, link placement, and user flow. Epic contested Apple’s compliance, arguing these measures still effectively prohibited alternative purchases. After holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply with the injunction, citing Apple’s bad faith and pretextual justifications. The district court imposed broad sanctions, including prohibiting any commission on linked-out purchases, restricting Apple’s ability to limit external links, and referring Apple for criminal investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s contempt findings and most of the resulting sanctions but found portions of the sanctions—particularly the blanket ban on commissions—overbroad and more punitive than coercive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded those parts for further tailoring, clarified the scope of permissible developer link prominence, and declined to vacate the injunction or reassign the case. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s orders. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

David and Bonnie Faulk, residents of Alaska, purchased over one hundred windows from Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home and alleged that the windows, manufactured by JELD-WEN, were defective in breach of an oral warranty. They filed a class action in Alaska state court against Spenard Builders Supply, an Alaska corporation, and JELD-WEN, a Delaware corporation, asserting state-law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in class actions.After removal, the Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class action allegations and sought to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied their motion to remand, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that held federal jurisdiction under CAFA is determined at the time of removal and is not affected by post-removal amendments. The district court allowed the amendment to eliminate class allegations but ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, finding most claims time-barred and one insufficiently pled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that federal jurisdiction depends on the operative complaint, including post-removal amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, after the Faulks removed their class action allegations, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under CAFA was eliminated, and complete diversity was lacking. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court unless another basis for federal jurisdiction is established. View "FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC." on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

A same-sex married couple, one a U.S. citizen residing in California and the other a Saudi citizen, spent part of each year living together in Saudi Arabia, where homosexuality is punishable by death. In 2021, after U.S. travel restrictions eased, they booked tickets with a German airline to fly from Saudi Arabia to San Francisco. The airline, which operates extensively in California, required them to confirm their marital status for entry into the U.S. During check-in in Riyadh, a senior airline employee publicly disclosed and questioned their relationship, and copies of their marriage certificate and passports were sent electronically to airline headquarters despite their concerns about Saudi government surveillance. After the trip, the Saudi government updated one plaintiff’s official status to “married,” and he feared returning to Saudi Arabia due to potential severe penalties. The couple alleged that the airline’s actions led to significant personal, financial, and health consequences.The couple filed suit in California state court against the airline and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging breach of contract and several torts. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially remanded for clarification of the subsidiary’s citizenship, after which the district court allowed amendment of the removal notice to reflect the correct citizenship.Upon renewed review, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had both specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. The court found that the airline purposefully availed itself of California’s market, the claims arose from the airline’s California-related activities, and exercising jurisdiction was reasonable. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOE V. DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT" on Justia Law

North Mountain Foothills Apartments (NMFA), a company managing a large apartment complex in Phoenix, Arizona, hired Jasper Press as a maintenance technician during a period of increased workload due to a heatwave. Press discussed his compensation and the poor conditions at the complex with several coworkers. Management became aware that other employees knew about Press’s pay and housing benefits, leading to a meeting where Press was reprimanded for these discussions and told not to talk about pest issues with residents. The day after this meeting, Press was terminated, allegedly for failing to complete work orders. Press filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing and found that NMFA violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating Press about his wage discussions, issuing overly broad directives restricting such discussions, threatening reprisals, and discharging Press for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB adopted these findings and ordered remedies including reinstatement and back pay for Press. NMFA appealed, raising for the first time constitutional challenges to the NLRB’s structure and process, and also contested the Board’s factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider NMFA’s unexhausted constitutional claims because such structural challenges are not suited to agency resolution. The court rejected NMFA’s Article II removal protection challenge for lack of demonstrated harm, found no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in NLRB proceedings, and held that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions within the NLRB does not violate due process. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that Press was discharged for protected activity and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. NORTH MOUNTAIN FOOTHILLS APARTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law