Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

John Doe was a motivational speaker who, for nearly thirty years, was featured, promoted, and endorsed by the California Association of Directors of Activities (CADA) to intermediate and high school audiences. In 2022, CADA received an email from a former church youth group member alleging that Doe, under a different name in the 1990s, had engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationship with a 17-year-old student. After an independent investigation, CADA concluded that Doe was likely the person in question and terminated its association with him. CADA notified its members of the termination without disclosing the nature of the accusation.Doe filed suit in Santa Cruz County Superior Court against both CADA and the accuser, asserting tort and contractual claims. Both defendants filed special motions to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the accuser’s motion, finding Doe’s claims against her were protected by the common interest privilege and lacked evidence of malice. Regarding CADA, the trial court found the claims arose from protected activity but denied CADA’s motion to strike most of Doe’s claims, concluding Doe showed a sufficient probability of prevailing, particularly on contract-based claims.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order denying CADA’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court held that all of Doe’s tort claims and contractual claims based on CADA’s communications were subject to the common interest privilege and must be stricken, as Doe did not show CADA acted with malice. However, the court affirmed the denial of the motion as to Doe’s contractual claims based on his termination, concluding Doe demonstrated minimal merit and that public policy did not bar enforcement. The appellate court reversed in part and remanded, directing the lower court to strike the specified claims and allegations. View "Doe v. California Assn. of Directors of Activities" on Justia Law

SoCal Lien Solutions, LLC attempted to serve process on a domestic corporation, BDB Properties, at the address listed in public records for its principal office, executive officers, and agent for service of process. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to serve BDB’s designated agent, SoCal obtained a court order under California Corporations Code section 1702 authorizing service by hand delivery of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State. SoCal delivered the documents to the Secretary on June 10, 2022. The Secretary did not forward notice of service to BDB until October 24, 2022, which was after the court had entered a default and default judgment against BDB.BDB later sought to set aside the default and judgment, first by ex parte application, which was denied, and then by a noticed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found BDB’s motion untimely under section 473.5 but granted relief on the ground that service was not complete until the Secretary mailed notice of the documents to BDB, rendering the judgment void.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the statutory language of Corporations Code section 1702 and determined that service is deemed complete ten days after the documents are delivered to the Secretary, regardless of when the Secretary forwards notice to the corporation. The court held that the lower court erred in ruling that service was incomplete until the Secretary mailed notice. The Court of Appeal reversed the order setting aside the default and default judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting BDB’s motion. The main holding is that service on a corporation via the Secretary of State under section 1702 is complete ten days after delivery, and subsequent mailing of notice by the Secretary is not required to complete service. View "Socal Lien Solutions, LLC v. BDB Properties" on Justia Law

Rebecca Eisenberg, a director of the Santa Clara Valley Water District, was permitted to review two confidential investigation reports at the District’s facility in January 2024. These reports, prepared by outside counsel, addressed allegations of misconduct by Eisenberg and complaints she raised against staff. The District explicitly instructed Board members not to remove the reports from the premises. Eisenberg nevertheless left the facility with the reports, later admitting her actions at Board meetings. After repeated requests for their return and a formal censure by the Board, Eisenberg refused to return the reports.The District filed suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting claims including conversion and seeking prejudgment recovery of the reports. It successfully moved for a writ of possession and a turnover order, which Eisenberg temporarily stayed by posting a statutory undertaking. The District then sought a mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the return of the reports. Eisenberg opposed this, arguing that the claim and delivery law’s remedy (the writ of possession, now stayed) precluded further injunctive relief and that the District did not meet the requirements for an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050 expressly permits a party to seek injunctive relief for possession of personal property, even after pursuing relief under the claim and delivery law. The court further found no abuse of discretion: the District demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on its conversion claim and showed that the harm to the District from denial of the injunction outweighed any harm to Eisenberg. The appellate court affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction, requiring Eisenberg to return the confidential reports. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by defendant and, as a condition of employment, electronically signed both an offer letter containing an arbitration provision and a separate nondisclosure agreement (NDIAA) on the same day. The offer letter required arbitration for most employment-related disputes, while the NDIAA included terms such as a waiver of bond for injunctive relief and a heightened burden of proof for public domain information. Plaintiff’s employment ended in March 2023, after which she sued defendant in Alameda County Superior Court for disability discrimination, retaliation, and related claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as wrongful termination. None of her claims involved confidential information or sought injunctive relief.Defendant moved to compel arbitration, asserting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed and that plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The trial court found the arbitration agreement and NDIAA should be read together under California Civil Code section 1642, determined that certain NDIAA provisions were unconscionable, and concluded that unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement. The court declined to sever the NDIAA’s unconscionable provisions and denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court’s refusal to sever. The appellate court held that the FAA does not preempt section 1642, and even assuming the NDIAA’s challenged provisions were unconscionable and properly considered alongside the arbitration agreement, those provisions were collateral to the arbitration agreement’s central purpose and did not affect the claims at issue. Applying Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., the appellate court determined that the unconscionable terms should have been severed and the arbitration agreement enforced. Consequently, the order denying arbitration was reversed. View "Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who worked as a truck driver for the defendants for approximately nine months in 2018, brought claims alleging that the defendants failed to provide required meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse necessary work-related expenses, and violated California’s unfair competition law. The plaintiff also filed a representative claim for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), all arising from his employment as a driver.The Superior Court of Sutter County denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on the meal break, rest break, expense reimbursement, and unfair competition claims. In particular, the court found that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of a common policy of discouraging breaks or of a community of interest among the proposed class members. The court relied on declarations from other drivers indicating they were not discouraged from taking breaks and noting variability in their experiences. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to strike the PAGA claim on manageability grounds, reasoning that adjudicating the claim would require individual testimony from 75 drivers and would be unmanageable.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the denial of class certification for the rest break and expense reimbursement claims, finding insufficient evidence of commonality. However, it reversed the denial of class certification for the meal break and derivative unfair competition claims, holding that the trial court failed to apply the burden-shifting framework required by Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC when time records show missed or unrecorded meal breaks. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the order striking the PAGA claim, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike PAGA claims solely based on manageability concerns, as clarified in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the PAGA claim is preempted by federal law. View "Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co." on Justia Law

A former hourly employee brought a class action lawsuit against his former employer, a large wood products company, alleging various wage and hour violations under California law. The proposed classes included both employees who had signed arbitration agreements and those who had not. While some nonexempt employees had signed arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration and waiving class actions, the named plaintiffs had not. The employer did not initially assert arbitration as a defense and, when ordered by the court to produce copies of signed arbitration agreements for putative class members, failed to do so for several years.During the course of discovery in the Superior Court of Shasta County, the employer repeatedly resisted requests to identify or produce arbitration agreements for employees who had signed them, leading to multiple discovery sanctions. The employer participated in extensive discovery and mediation involving employees who had signed arbitration agreements, without distinguishing them from other putative class members. Only after class certification did the employer finally produce thousands of signed arbitration agreements and immediately moved to compel arbitration for those employees. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the employer had waived its right to arbitrate by years of litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and sought evidentiary and issue sanctions for delayed production.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Applying the California Supreme Court’s standard from Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc., the appellate court held that the employer waived its right to compel arbitration by clear and convincing evidence. The employer’s prolonged failure to produce arbitration agreements and its conduct throughout litigation was inconsistent with an intention to enforce arbitration. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the appeal from the order granting evidentiary and issue sanctions was dismissed as nonappealable. View "Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old named Elijah Henry was driving with friends in Pleasanton, California, when a police officer, Officer Harvey, entered a parking lot to check for vehicle break-ins. Seeing the officer, Henry and his friends got into their car and left. Officer Harvey, suspecting a burglary, began to follow Henry’s car without activating lights or siren, intending to perform a traffic stop but not initiating a formal pursuit as defined by Pleasanton’s police policy. Henry, fearful of police attention, accelerated and ran a red light, colliding with Melanie Gilliland’s car and causing her serious injuries. Henry was later convicted of felony DUI, but no evidence connected him or his friends to the suspected burglary.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. In Alameda County Superior Court, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from damages caused by suspects fleeing police if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The first judge denied summary judgment, finding neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy. At a later bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, reasoning Henry believed he was being “pursued” in the ordinary sense, even though no formal pursuit was initiated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and held the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for immunity under section 17004.7. The appellate court determined that “pursued” must be defined according to the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy, not by its ordinary meaning. Because the lower court failed to consider evidence that Henry did not believe he was pursued within the meaning of the policy, the judgment in favor of the City was reversed and remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law