Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages.Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization operates several Zen Buddhist temples in California, providing residential training programs where participants, known as Work Practice Apprentices (WPAs), live and work at the temples. Participants perform various tasks, including cleaning, cooking, and guest services, as part of their Zen training. Upon completing the WPA program, individuals may become staff members, continuing similar duties while residing at the temple. The plaintiff participated as a WPA and later as a staff member, performing duties such as guest services, food preparation, and facility maintenance. She received modest monthly stipends and room and board, but ultimately challenged the compensation as inadequate under California wage-and-hour laws.After her affiliation with the organization ended, the plaintiff filed a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner, seeking unpaid regular and overtime wages, meal period premium wages, and liquidated damages. The Labor Commissioner ruled in her favor against the organization and two individual leaders, holding the individuals personally liable as employers under Labor Code section 558.1, and awarded her $149,177.15. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of San Francisco, posting an undertaking only on behalf of the organization, not the individual defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeals by the individuals for lack of undertakings and granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding the ministerial exception under the First Amendment barred the wage-and-hour claims.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed. It held that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers unless such claims would require judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters or religious doctrine. Because there was no evidence that adjudicating the plaintiff’s wage claims would entangle the court in religious concerns, the exception did not apply. The court also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ appeals due to their failure to post the required undertakings. View "Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual at Corcoran State Prison hired an attorney to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, both in state and potentially federal court, for a total fee of $35,000. The attorney did not file the petition as agreed, leading the client to sue for breach of contract. Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff notified the Superior Court of Orange County multiple times that he was incarcerated, requested remote appearances, and actively participated by filing necessary court documents, including a case management statement and fee waiver application. Despite these efforts, the plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled trial, and the attorney attended and testified that the plaintiff was incarcerated.After the plaintiff's failure to appear at trial, the Superior Court of Orange County dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, stating it was unaware of the plaintiff’s incarceration until the day of trial. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal, arguing that the court should have recognized his incarceration and taken additional steps before terminating the case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the dismissal. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the lawsuit without first issuing an order to show cause or ensuring that the plaintiff had meaningful access to the court. The court emphasized that incarcerated, indigent litigants must be afforded meaningful access to civil courts, and that dismissal is a drastic remedy reserved for rare circumstances. The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to provide the plaintiff with meaningful access to the court and to communicate with prison officials as necessary. The plaintiff may recover costs on appeal, subject to further determination by the trial court. View "Park v. Guisti" on Justia Law

OneTaste, Inc., a company founded in 2004 that promoted “orgasmic meditation,” sued Netflix for defamation in 2023. The lawsuit was based on a Netflix documentary that featured allegations from former employee Ayries Blanck, who claimed she was sexually assaulted and abused in connection with her employment and participation in OneTaste’s activities. The documentary included statements from Blanck’s sister and other former associates, as well as references to earlier media investigations and reports about alleged exploitative and abusive practices at OneTaste. OneTaste asserted that Netflix published false statements with actual malice, despite being provided with information it claimed disproved the allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Netflix’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16). Netflix argued its conduct was protected activity and that OneTaste could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing, especially on the element of actual malice. After considering the pleadings and both parties’ evidence, the trial court concluded that OneTaste failed to present sufficient evidence that Netflix published the challenged statements with actual malice. The court also found OneTaste’s additional evidence did not establish that Netflix was aware of probable falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth. As a result, the court granted Netflix’s motion to strike the complaint.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that OneTaste did not meet its burden to show a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim because it failed to produce evidence of actual malice by Netflix. The court also rejected OneTaste’s constitutional and public policy challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute and denied its requests for judicial notice of materials not considered by the trial court. View "Onetaste Incorporated v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

A former employee filed a labor claim against her employer and the employer’s business, seeking unpaid overtime and other compensation. The Labor Commissioner awarded her over $74,000. The decision was served by mail, triggering a 15-day deadline for the employer to appeal to the superior court and to either post an undertaking or seek a waiver of that requirement. The employer retained a third-party filing service, which attempted to file the appeal and waiver motion electronically on the last permissible day. The filing was rejected by the court clerk, and the documents were filed in person the following day, one day late.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco determined that the employer’s appeal and waiver motion were untimely. The court found that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the late filings. The employer argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled due to the filing service’s error, but the trial court rejected this argument.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for seeking a waiver of the undertaking requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be extended for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The only exception is for fraud, which was not alleged. The court also held that the tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 does not apply to notices of appeal from Labor Commissioner decisions. The court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the appeal as untimely. View "Dobarro v. Kim" on Justia Law

After a fatal car accident involving a 2008 Lexus ES350, the driver, whose wife died in the crash, sued Toyota, alleging the vehicle was defective due to unintended acceleration. His case was added to a coordinated group of California state court proceedings (JCCP) involving similar claims against Toyota. The coordinated proceedings had established a Common Benefit Fund, requiring all plaintiffs whose cases resolved after a certain date to pay an 8 percent assessment from their recoveries. This fund compensated lead counsel for work that benefited all plaintiffs, such as shared discovery and expert work.The plaintiff’s case was coordinated with the JCCP in 2018. After settling with Toyota, he moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to exempt his case from the 8 percent assessment, arguing he did not use or benefit from the shared work product and that his case was factually distinct. The Committee overseeing the fund opposed, submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s original attorney had relied on common benefit materials and that the issues in his case overlapped with those in the coordinated proceedings. The trial court found the plaintiff had not met his burden to show he was entitled to an exemption and denied his motion for relief from the assessment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the order denying relief was appealable as a collateral order. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that neither he nor his counsel benefited from the common work product. The court found the assessment applied, as the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of the coordination order and he did not prove entitlement to an exemption. The order requiring the 8 percent assessment was affirmed. View "Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee" on Justia Law

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The case involves a long-running dispute between two parties, Baer and Tedder, stemming from Baer's lawsuit against Tedder for malicious prosecution. During the course of this litigation, Baer filed a motion to compel production of documents and requested sanctions against Tedder and his counsel, Kent, for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that Tedder and Kent had engaged in evasive and unjustified conduct during discovery, which hindered Baer's ability to prepare his case. As a result, the court imposed $10,475 in monetary sanctions against both Tedder and Kent, jointly and severally.Tedder and Kent appealed the sanctions order to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. In a prior opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s sanctions order, finding that Tedder and Kent’s actions were not substantially justified and that their arguments on appeal were largely frivolous. Following the remittitur, Baer moved in the trial court to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, arguing that the relevant discovery statutes authorized such an award. The trial court agreed, awarding Baer $113,532.50 in appellate attorney’s fees, but imposed liability only on Tedder.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to a party who successfully defends an order imposing monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The appellate court found the amount of fees reasonable with one reduction and concluded that both Tedder and Kent should be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount. The order was modified to reduce the fee award to $101,805 and to impose joint and several liability on both Tedder and Kent, and as modified, the order was affirmed and remanded for entry of the revised order. View "Baer v. Tedder" on Justia Law

A company filed a lawsuit against another corporate entity, seeking damages for breach of a sublease. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant corporation by leaving the summons and complaint with an individual named Roberto Molina at the defendant’s business address, followed by mailing copies to the defendant’s chief executive officer. Molina was later identified as a bus washer employed by a related but separate company, not as an employee or officer of the defendant. The defendant did not initially respond to the lawsuit, resulting in the entry of default and a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.Subsequently, the defendant moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to quash service and vacate the default judgment, arguing that service of process was improper because Molina was not a person “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s office as required by California law. The plaintiff opposed, relying on the process server’s declaration and standard procedures. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that substituted service was valid and refusing to vacate the default judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court held that the substituted service was not valid because there was insufficient evidence that Molina was “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s business office, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20. The court found that the process server’s declaration lacked necessary facts to support such a conclusion, and the defendant’s evidence rebutted any presumption of proper service. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, vacated the entry of default and the default judgment, and remanded with directions to grant the defendant’s motion and allow time to respond to the complaint. View "Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc." on Justia Law