Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by defendant and, as a condition of employment, electronically signed both an offer letter containing an arbitration provision and a separate nondisclosure agreement (NDIAA) on the same day. The offer letter required arbitration for most employment-related disputes, while the NDIAA included terms such as a waiver of bond for injunctive relief and a heightened burden of proof for public domain information. Plaintiff’s employment ended in March 2023, after which she sued defendant in Alameda County Superior Court for disability discrimination, retaliation, and related claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, as well as wrongful termination. None of her claims involved confidential information or sought injunctive relief.Defendant moved to compel arbitration, asserting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed and that plaintiff’s claims fell within the arbitration agreement’s scope. The trial court found the arbitration agreement and NDIAA should be read together under California Civil Code section 1642, determined that certain NDIAA provisions were unconscionable, and concluded that unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement. The court declined to sever the NDIAA’s unconscionable provisions and denied the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court’s refusal to sever. The appellate court held that the FAA does not preempt section 1642, and even assuming the NDIAA’s challenged provisions were unconscionable and properly considered alongside the arbitration agreement, those provisions were collateral to the arbitration agreement’s central purpose and did not affect the claims at issue. Applying Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., the appellate court determined that the unconscionable terms should have been severed and the arbitration agreement enforced. Consequently, the order denying arbitration was reversed. View "Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who worked as a truck driver for the defendants for approximately nine months in 2018, brought claims alleging that the defendants failed to provide required meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse necessary work-related expenses, and violated California’s unfair competition law. The plaintiff also filed a representative claim for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), all arising from his employment as a driver.The Superior Court of Sutter County denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on the meal break, rest break, expense reimbursement, and unfair competition claims. In particular, the court found that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of a common policy of discouraging breaks or of a community of interest among the proposed class members. The court relied on declarations from other drivers indicating they were not discouraged from taking breaks and noting variability in their experiences. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to strike the PAGA claim on manageability grounds, reasoning that adjudicating the claim would require individual testimony from 75 drivers and would be unmanageable.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the denial of class certification for the rest break and expense reimbursement claims, finding insufficient evidence of commonality. However, it reversed the denial of class certification for the meal break and derivative unfair competition claims, holding that the trial court failed to apply the burden-shifting framework required by Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC when time records show missed or unrecorded meal breaks. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the order striking the PAGA claim, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike PAGA claims solely based on manageability concerns, as clarified in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the PAGA claim is preempted by federal law. View "Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co." on Justia Law

A former hourly employee brought a class action lawsuit against his former employer, a large wood products company, alleging various wage and hour violations under California law. The proposed classes included both employees who had signed arbitration agreements and those who had not. While some nonexempt employees had signed arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration and waiving class actions, the named plaintiffs had not. The employer did not initially assert arbitration as a defense and, when ordered by the court to produce copies of signed arbitration agreements for putative class members, failed to do so for several years.During the course of discovery in the Superior Court of Shasta County, the employer repeatedly resisted requests to identify or produce arbitration agreements for employees who had signed them, leading to multiple discovery sanctions. The employer participated in extensive discovery and mediation involving employees who had signed arbitration agreements, without distinguishing them from other putative class members. Only after class certification did the employer finally produce thousands of signed arbitration agreements and immediately moved to compel arbitration for those employees. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the employer had waived its right to arbitrate by years of litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and sought evidentiary and issue sanctions for delayed production.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Applying the California Supreme Court’s standard from Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc., the appellate court held that the employer waived its right to compel arbitration by clear and convincing evidence. The employer’s prolonged failure to produce arbitration agreements and its conduct throughout litigation was inconsistent with an intention to enforce arbitration. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the appeal from the order granting evidentiary and issue sanctions was dismissed as nonappealable. View "Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old named Elijah Henry was driving with friends in Pleasanton, California, when a police officer, Officer Harvey, entered a parking lot to check for vehicle break-ins. Seeing the officer, Henry and his friends got into their car and left. Officer Harvey, suspecting a burglary, began to follow Henry’s car without activating lights or siren, intending to perform a traffic stop but not initiating a formal pursuit as defined by Pleasanton’s police policy. Henry, fearful of police attention, accelerated and ran a red light, colliding with Melanie Gilliland’s car and causing her serious injuries. Henry was later convicted of felony DUI, but no evidence connected him or his friends to the suspected burglary.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. In Alameda County Superior Court, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from damages caused by suspects fleeing police if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The first judge denied summary judgment, finding neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy. At a later bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, reasoning Henry believed he was being “pursued” in the ordinary sense, even though no formal pursuit was initiated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and held the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for immunity under section 17004.7. The appellate court determined that “pursued” must be defined according to the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy, not by its ordinary meaning. Because the lower court failed to consider evidence that Henry did not believe he was pursued within the meaning of the policy, the judgment in favor of the City was reversed and remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

Two neighbors in a residential community disagreed about a tree branch that obstructed one neighbor’s view. Jinshu Zhang, the owner seeking the view, used his homeowners association’s dispute resolution process, which included mediation and arbitration services provided by Charles Peterson, an independent mediator. When the association dismissed Zhang’s application, Zhang sued Peterson for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Peterson was a director or officer of the association and thus owed him such a duty. However, Peterson was neither a director nor an officer, but an independent contractor. Zhang lost his lawsuit against Peterson following a nonsuit at trial, and did not appeal.After that case concluded, Peterson filed a malicious prosecution action against Zhang, alleging Zhang’s earlier suit was baseless and continued without probable cause once Zhang had evidence Peterson was not an officer or director. In response, Zhang filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), seeking to dismiss Peterson’s malicious prosecution claim. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding Peterson’s case had at least minimal merit based on evidence showing Zhang lacked probable cause and may have acted with malice in pursuing the prior suit.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed Zhang’s appeal. The court affirmed the denial of Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the denial of a discretionary sanctions motion in the underlying suit did not establish probable cause under the “interim adverse judgment rule,” and did not bar the malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that Peterson’s evidence on lack of probable cause and malice was sufficient to allow his case to proceed, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Zhang" on Justia Law

In 2016, the City of Los Angeles established new tiered water rates for residential customers of its Department of Water and Power (LADWP). These rates included a charge that funded a low-income subsidy, which was paid by customers who did not qualify for the subsidy, and utilized progressively increasing charges based on water usage tiers. Stephen and Melinda Dreher, LADWP customers, challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of these rates under article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution: (1) the inclusion of a low-income subsidy charge in the rates of non-subsidized customers, and (2) the structure of the tiered rates themselves, arguing they exceeded the proportional cost of water service to each parcel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the Drehers regarding the low-income subsidy charge, finding it unconstitutional and issuing a writ to prevent the City from including this charge in future rates. However, the court denied the Drehers’ request for a refund of previously paid charges, concluding that such a claim was barred because the Drehers had not paid under protest, as required by Health and Safety Code section 5472. The court also found that, aside from the invalid low-income subsidy, the City’s tiered rates complied with constitutional proportionality requirements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the payment under protest requirement of Health and Safety Code section 5472 applies to claims seeking refunds of water delivery charges fixed by city ordinance, and that the Drehers’ failure to comply with this requirement barred their retrospective refund claim. The court further held that the City met its burden to demonstrate that its tiered water rates (excluding the invalid subsidy) did not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to each parcel, as required by article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "Dreher v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law