Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, 640 Octavia LLC and Edward Kountze, owned an apartment building in San Francisco and hired Walston Law Group to represent them in a federal unlawful detainer action against a tenant. During the trial, it was discovered that Walston's attorney had created a document with new house rules during the trial, which led to the federal judge excluding the document and giving a curative instruction to the jury. The jury found in favor of the tenant, and plaintiffs subsequently sued Walston for legal malpractice, alleging various breaches and negligence.The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to comply with discovery orders, and the case proceeded to trial on Walston's cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. The jury awarded Walston $78,905.43 in damages plus $29,826.25 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court's pretrial order excluding evidence of their malpractice allegations was erroneous and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion to exclude evidence supporting plaintiffs' malpractice allegations. The appellate court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was interlocutory and not a final judgment, thus preclusion doctrines did not apply. The court found that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, as it prevented the jury from properly considering plaintiffs' defense that Walston's alleged malpractice excused them from paying the fees.The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of Walston's alleged malpractice. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Walston" on Justia Law

R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. (R&J) appealed an order directing it to pay contribution to W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California (WEO), Continental Casualty Company (Continental), and Western Surety Company (Western) (collectively, the WEO defendants). R&J and the WEO defendants were co-debtors on a joint and several judgment in favor of Joseph Karscig, Inc., doing business as Architectural Systems, Inc. (ASI). R&J appealed the judgment, while the WEO defendants satisfied it and sought contribution from R&J. The trial court initially took the motion off calendar due to R&J’s pending appeal. After the appeal was resolved, the WEO defendants filed a second contribution motion, including postjudgment interest, which the trial court granted, ordering R&J to pay one-half of the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the WEO defendants' motion for contribution, deeming them a single entity for liability purposes and ordering R&J to pay one-half of the judgment. R&J argued the motion was untimely and that the trial court should not have allocated liability pro rata without taking evidence on the judgment debtors’ proportionate liability. R&J also contended that Western should not have been included as a single entity with WEO and Continental.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the original contribution motion was valid despite being filed during the pendency of R&J’s appeal, as taking the motion off calendar did not affect the appeal’s status quo. The court also found that the second motion was a permissible update of the original motion to include postjudgment interest. The court rejected R&J’s argument that the trial court should have determined the judgment debtors’ proportionate liability through an evidentiary hearing, holding that pro rata contribution was proper in the absence of a judgment or underlying instrument allocating liability. The court also found that R&J had forfeited its argument regarding Western’s inclusion in a single entity with WEO and Continental by failing to raise it below. View "R & J Sheet Metal v. W.E. O'Neil Construction" on Justia Law

In June 2018, Leslie Davies and volunteers from the Animal Protection and Rescue League, Inc. protested against a pet store in a Temecula shopping mall, alleging the store sourced dogs from puppy mills. They were asked by mall officials to move their protest due to a table reservation conflict. When Davies refused, Riverside Sheriff’s Deputy Rudy Leso threatened her with arrest if she did not comply. Davies requested a citation instead, but Leso insisted on arrest. Consequently, Davies and the volunteers left the area.The plaintiffs, Davies and the League, filed a lawsuit against the County of Riverside and Deputy Leso in August 2019. The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers without leave to amend for several causes of action, including negligence, Bane Act, and Ralph Act claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining cause of action for declaratory relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decisions, finding no error. It held that Davies’s negligence claim failed because she did not allege physical injury or a breach of duty. The Ralph Act claim was dismissed as the threat of arrest did not constitute violence. The Bane Act claim was also dismissed because the threat of arrest alone did not amount to coercion or intimidation. Lastly, the court upheld the summary judgment on the declaratory relief claim, noting there was no actual controversy since the County agreed that mall rules are not laws and cannot provide probable cause for arrest. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the County and Deputy Leso. View "Animal Protection and Rescue v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, had a daughter in August 2019, and separated in April 2023. A.M. filed for divorce and they signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into a judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a DVTRO on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 6, 2024, which was later continued to August 2025. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings pending the appeal, which was denied.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and supporting evidence. The court held that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO based on the context of dissolution and custody disputes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending a noticed hearing, but this must be explicitly stated.The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the case for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances, including any events since the original ruling. The court expressed no view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand. View "In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y." on Justia Law

In 2007, Osman Yunus Guracar took out a private student loan from Bank of America but stopped making payments in 2009. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased the loan and sued Guracar for non-payment in 2022. Guracar filed cross-claims against SLS and others, alleging violations of state and federal debt collection statutes. The cross-defendants moved to strike the cross-claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.The Santa Clara County Superior Court ruled that Guracar's cross-claims arose from protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that Guracar failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claims, holding that the loan was an installment debt and that SLS had timely accelerated the loan in June 2022. The court did not address Guracar's argument that the loan had been accelerated in February 2010.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Guracar had standing to assert his claims under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA without showing concrete harm. On the merits, the court found that Guracar established a probability of prevailing on his cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt, making false and misleading representations, and failing to comply with certain PSLCRA requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, reinstating these cross-claims but affirmed the striking of Guracar’s other cross-claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions" on Justia Law

Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, alleging it breached mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of a child abuse referral against him. Holman claimed the County failed to conduct an in-person investigation or cross-report the abuse allegations, leading to years of abuse and subsequent psychological issues. The County argued its employee exercised discretion in deciding to "evaluate out" the referral without further investigation, thus invoking discretionary immunity.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County's employee was exercising discretion protected by immunity when deciding to close the referral without an in-person investigation or cross-reporting. The court found no mandatory duty was breached, and the County was not liable under Government Code section 815.6.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County had a mandatory duty under section 11166, subdivision (j), to cross-report the child abuse referral to law enforcement and other agencies. The court determined that the duty to cross-report is triggered by the receipt of a mandated child abuse report and does not involve discretionary judgment. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the County breached this mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the referral, thus reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

A mother was shot and killed by a deputy sheriff while her young children watched. The mother, who had been acting erratically and wielding a knife, advanced towards the deputies despite repeated requests to drop the weapon. The lead deputy fired his service pistol after a backup deputy's taser failed to stop her. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the deputies and Nevada County, claiming the use of force was unreasonable.The trial court ruled that the lead deputy acted reasonably and granted summary judgment in his favor, but allowed the claims against the backup deputy to proceed, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude his actions were unreasonable. The backup deputy and the County petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have granted their summary judgment motion as well.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court emphasized the need to assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering the split-second decisions officers must make. The court concluded that the backup deputy acted reasonably as a matter of law, noting that the mother advanced towards the deputies with a deadly weapon and that the backup deputy's use of a taser was a reasonable response under the circumstances.The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its partial denial of the summary judgment motion and to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety, thus ruling in favor of the backup deputy and the County. View "County of Nevada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services) for alleged childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.The trial court overruled Family Services' demurrer, which argued that Plaintiffs' claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal (Family Services) was "litigated to finality" under section 340.1, subdivision (q), where a previous suit against an agent (Dowell) for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts supporting liability based on conduct other than that of Dowell. View "Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court" on Justia Law