Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Zoning, Planning & Land Use
Teachers’ Retirement System of Alabama and Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department
The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law
Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson
The case involves the Mississippi Apartment Association (MAA) and other property owners challenging an ordinance adopted by the Jackson City Council. The ordinance imposed registration and inspection requirements on rental housing units in Jackson. MAA appealed the city council's decision in the Hinds County Circuit Court but did not request a stay of the ordinance's implementation. Subsequently, MAA filed a separate action in the Hinds County Chancery Court seeking injunctions against the ordinance's enforcement, arguing that the planning department's interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance were unlawful.The Hinds County Chancery Court dismissed MAA's claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The chancery court found that the circuit court also had pendent jurisdiction over MAA's equitable claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision and pendent jurisdiction over related claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement. The court emphasized that allowing a separate action in the chancery court could lead to contradictory rulings and confusion. The court also noted that MAA had an adequate remedy at law in the circuit court and could have requested a stay of the ordinance's implementation under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62. View "Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law
1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors
A county board of supervisors approved a nonprofit entity’s application to rezone a parcel of land in rural Polk County. Another nonprofit entity and several nearby landowners filed a lawsuit challenging the rezoning decision. The plaintiffs argued that the rezoning violated the county’s comprehensive land use plan, zoning ordinances, and constituted illegal spot zoning. The board of supervisors moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming the plaintiffs lacked standing and were subject to heightened pleading requirements under Iowa’s Municipal Tort Claims Act.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing and were subject to the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. The court found that the individual plaintiffs did not adequately allege their proximity to the rezoned property or their personal concerns, and that the nonprofit organization did not sufficiently allege that its members had a specific and personal interest in the rezoning. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs could not amend their petition due to the Act’s requirements.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the heightened pleading requirements and penalties under Iowa Code § 670.4A(3) did not apply because the plaintiffs were not seeking monetary damages. The court found that the individual plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged standing based on their proximity to the rezoned property and the nature of the proposed changes. However, the court concluded that the nonprofit organization had not established standing but should be allowed to amend its petition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law
Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs.
A property owner applied for a conditional use permit to build a commercial hog facility on its land in rural Cherry County, Nebraska. The facility was intended to provide manure for fertilizing the owner's crops. Neighboring landowners objected to the issuance of the permit, arguing that the owner, not being the operator of the facility, could not establish compliance with zoning regulations regarding odor mitigation and water contamination.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners issued the permit, and the neighboring landowners appealed to the district court, seeking a trial de novo. The district court held a trial and determined that the owner's application complied with the relevant zoning regulations, affirming the issuance of the permit. The neighboring landowners then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, while the Board cross-appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the neighboring landowners' appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal, as the relevant statutes did not limit the right to appeal to applicants only. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the property owner demonstrated compliance with the zoning regulations. The court held that the property owner, not the operator, was responsible for showing compliance with the regulations and that the odor and water contamination mitigation plans submitted by the owner were sufficient. The court affirmed the district court's decision to uphold the issuance of the conditional use permit. View "Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs." on Justia Law
Clark v. Town of Phippsburg
Juanita and Stephen Clark, Linda and Cliff Trebilcock, and Dan Gurney reside on Fuller Mountain Road in the Town of Phippsburg. Gurney has operated a firewood business from his property for thirty years. In September 2020, the Clarks and the Trebilcocks complained to the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) that Gurney’s business was a nuisance under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). The CEO found no violation, but the Clarks and the Trebilcocks appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which found the business to be a nuisance. The Board of Selectmen (BOS) later found that Gurney had abated the nuisance.The Clarks and the Trebilcocks challenged the BOS’s decision in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County), arguing that the BOS lacked authority to conduct a de novo review and that there were due process violations. The Superior Court affirmed the BOS’s decision, leading to the Clarks’ appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the BOA’s findings were outside the scope of the current appeal but found that the BOS exceeded its authority and violated due process in its review. The Court held that the BOS did not have the authority to review the CEO’s decision and that the BOS’s role was limited to deciding whether a consent agreement could be achieved or if court action was necessary. The Court also found procedural due process violations due to the conduct of BOS Chair Julia House, who exhibited bias and engaged in ex parte communications.The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOS for new proceedings without the participation of Chair Julia House. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law
29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton
A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law
WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY
Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law
Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise
Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law
15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport
15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law
Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster
The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law