Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

The incumbent candidate, Vern Gavin, lost the election to challenger Wanda Evers. Gavin filed a petition for judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming Evers was an unqualified elector due to her residency outside the district and citing several voting irregularities. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Gavin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to his appeal.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case. Gavin challenged Evers's residency, noting her voting address was transferred outside the district and back within it, and she claimed a homestead exemption at a Jackson address. The Hinds County Executive Committee certified Evers as a candidate despite Gavin's challenge. Evers defeated Gavin in the runoff election. Gavin filed a contest of the election and a petition for judicial review, requesting a special election due to alleged irregularities and disputing Evers's residency qualification. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim, finding Evers met the two-year residency requirement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's rulings, finding no error. The court held that Gavin received proper notice of the summary judgment motion and that the circuit court did not err in considering both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain affidavits as hearsay and irrelevant. The court found that Gavin failed to present evidence of election irregularities affecting the outcome and that Evers met the residency requirement. The court also affirmed the denial of Gavin's motion for reconsideration, finding the new evidence presented was cumulative and for impeachment purposes only. View "Gavin v. Evers" on Justia Law

Kenneth Brown filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging that the in-person absentee voting procedures in Racine during the August 2022 primary election violated the law. Brown observed voting at City Hall and a local mall and believed the procedures were unlawful. WEC found no probable cause of a violation and declined to take action. Brown then appealed WEC’s decision to the Racine County Circuit Court.The circuit court determined that Brown had standing to bring the action, as the alleged invalid voting procedures impacted his right to vote. The court partially ruled in Brown’s favor, concluding that the Racine City Clerk’s choice of alternate voting sites violated statutory requirements and that the use of a mobile election unit was unlawful. WEC sought to appeal this decision, and the case was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court via a bypass petition.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Brown had standing to seek judicial review of WEC’s decision. The court interpreted Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8), which allows for appeals from WEC’s decisions, and determined that to be “aggrieved” by a decision, an individual must suffer an injury to a legally recognized interest. The court found that Brown did not demonstrate any personal injury resulting from WEC’s decision, as he did not allege that the decision made it more difficult for him to vote or affected him personally.The court held that Brown was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute and therefore did not have standing to seek judicial review. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Brown’s complaint. View "Brown v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles E. Wilson filed a lawsuit against the District of Columbia Board of Elections, Mayor Muriel E. Bowser, and the District of Columbia, challenging the proposed ballot Initiative 83, also known as the “Make All Votes Count Act of 2024.” Wilson objected to the initiative’s summary statement, short title, and legislative form, and raised several challenges to the Board’s determination that the initiative was a “proper subject” for an initiative. The initiative, which proposed ranked-choice voting and changes to primary election rules, was approved by voters on November 5, 2024.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Wilson’s complaint, ruling it was untimely because it was filed the day before the ten-day period described in D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(e)(1)(A) began. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the complaint was not filed within the specified timeframe.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the ten-day period described in Subsection (e)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. The court determined that the ten-day period is a deadline by which any suit must be filed, rather than a time window during which a suit must be brought. The court also held that the Superior Court had general equity jurisdiction to hear Wilson’s substantive challenges to the Board’s “proper subject” determination. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the Mayor and the District of Columbia, as they were not proper defendants in this case.The Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Wilson’s claims against the Board of Elections. View "Wilson v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a Maryland LLC and a Missouri nonprofit corporation, alleged that the Maryland State Board of Elections mismanaged state electoral operations in violation of state and federal laws during the 2020 and 2022 general elections. They claimed inaccuracies in voter registration records, excessive error rates in voting systems, improper certification of voting machines, use of uncertified machines, and failure to provide requested audit logs and configuration reports. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the appointment of a Special Master to supervise changes before the November 2024 election.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs had not alleged injuries sufficiently concrete and particularized to support Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements for organizational standing, as they failed to allege any injury to their organizational activities or to their members that was concrete and particularized. The court also held that the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act did not constitute a redressable injury in fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked representational standing to assert claims on behalf of their individual members. The court found that the alleged vote dilution and the possibility that members' ballots were cast blank were generalized grievances that did not constitute concrete, particularized injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that any of their members made the public records requests, thus failing to establish standing for the alleged violations of the Maryland Public Information Act. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and the denial of the motion for injunctive relief as moot. View "Maryland Election Integrity, LLC v. Maryland State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A group of Baltimore City registered voters, led by Anthony J. Ambridge, filed a petition seeking judicial review of a proposed amendment to the Baltimore City Charter, known as "Question F," which was to appear on the 2024 general election ballot. The petitioners argued that the proposed charter amendment was not proper "charter material" and that the ballot language was not understandable. The Maryland State Board of Elections opposed the petition, arguing that the claims were barred by laches and that the judicial review mechanism used by the petitioners was inappropriate.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ruled in favor of the petitioners, determining that the claims were not barred by laches and could be raised under the judicial review mechanism. The court found that Question F violated Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution as it was not proper charter material and that the ballot language was not easily understandable by voters. The court ordered that the results of Question F should not be certified.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that EL § 9-209(a) is not a proper mechanism to challenge whether a proposed charter amendment is proper charter material or whether the ballot language meets the standards for understandability. The Court also held that the petitioners' claims were barred by laches due to the unreasonable delay in filing the petition, which caused prejudice to the State Board, the City, and the electorate. The Court further concluded that the ballot language conveyed, with minimum reasonable clarity, the actual scope and effect of the measure, allowing voters to make an informed choice. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants. View "State Bd. of Elections v. Ambridge" on Justia Law

Henry Strickland contested the results of a city commissioner election in Waycross, Georgia, after losing to Alvin Nelson. Strickland argued that the election used an outdated 2005 map of voting districts instead of the correct 2011 map, resulting in 32 voters casting ballots in the wrong districts. The trial court agreed, finding that the use of the 2005 map could have affected the election outcome, which Nelson won by 18 votes. Consequently, the court vacated the election and ordered a new one to be held in November 2024 using the 2011 map.The trial court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss Strickland's petition for insufficient process and service of process and rejected Nelson's argument that the petition should be dismissed for lack of expeditious pursuit. The court found irregularities in the election due to the use of the 2005 map and ordered a new election. Nelson appealed the trial court's decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted his request for a stay pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court held that the 2011 map was never effective because the required filings with the Secretary of State and the clerk of the superior court, as mandated by OCGA § 36-35-5, were never made. Since the 2011 map was not effective at the time of the election, there was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that enough illegal or irregular votes were counted to change or cast doubt on the election outcome. Therefore, Strickland's petition was rejected, and the trial court's order vacating the election was reversed. View "NELSON v. STRICKLAND" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts in Wisconsin, seeking access to Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms under Wisconsin’s public records law. These forms document when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote. The Alliance argued that they needed this information to ensure the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) was updating voter records accurately.The Walworth County Circuit Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition, agreeing with the register in probate, Kristina Secord, that the NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75. The Alliance appealed to the Court of Appeals, District II. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, District IV, had already ruled in a similar case (Reynolds) that NVE forms were exempt from disclosure under the same statute, affirming the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition.In the current case, the Court of Appeals, District II, issued a split opinion. The majority held that the Alliance was entitled to the NVE forms, possibly with redactions, and reversed the circuit court’s dismissal. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that District II violated the precedent set by Cook v. Cook, which mandates that the Court of Appeals must follow prior published opinions unless overruled by the Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that District II was bound by the Reynolds decision and should have either certified the appeal to the Supreme Court or adhered to the prior opinion while expressing its disagreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, District II, and remanded the case with instructions to follow the precedent established in Reynolds. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Irva E. Reed sought to run for a seat on the Montgomery County Commission in 2024. She submitted her qualifying papers to the Montgomery County Democratic Party in November 2023 and confirmed she would submit a "Statement of Economic Interests" (SEI) to the Alabama Ethics Commission within five days, as required by Alabama law. However, she filed her SEI 41 days late. The Director of the Commission informed the Party that Reed was not qualified to appear on the ballot. Reed requested a five-day extension due to illness, but the Commission denied her request.Reed then sued the Director, the Chairman of the Commission, and the Secretary of State in their official capacities in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring her illness as a valid reason for the delay and an injunction to place her name on the ballot. The trial court granted her request for a preliminary injunction, ordering the Commission and the Party to certify Reed as a candidate. The defendants appealed the trial court's order, and the Supreme Court of Alabama stayed the injunction while addressing the appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and found that Reed's claim was moot because the election had already occurred. The court held that a judgment in Reed's favor would not affect the rights of the parties. The court also determined that none of the exceptions to mootness cited by Reed—capable of repetition but evading review, public interest, and collateral rights—applied in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal and instructed the trial court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss Reed's complaint. View "Plunk v. Reed" on Justia Law

Christina Peterson, representing herself, challenged the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a candidate for probate court judge in Douglas County, Georgia. Peterson claimed that Vie had not been a resident of Douglas County for the required time to run for the office. Peterson initially filed a challenge with the local Board of Elections, which was denied. She then filed a petition for review in superior court, which was also denied. After the primary election, which Vie won, Peterson filed a second petition in superior court challenging the election results on the same grounds.The local Board of Elections held a hearing and denied Peterson's challenge. Peterson then filed a petition for review in the superior court, which was also denied. Peterson did not seek to stay the primary election and filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was denied. Subsequently, Peterson filed a post-primary petition in superior court, which was dismissed on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and mootness due to her failure to seek a stay of the primary election.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and dismissed Peterson's appeal. The court held that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with dispatch to resolve disputes before the election occurs. Peterson failed to expedite her challenges and did not seek a stay of the primary election. The court emphasized the importance of resolving election disputes promptly to avoid unnecessary expenses and ensure the finality of election results. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of Peterson's claims. View "Peterson v. Vie" on Justia Law