Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
USA v Cargo
Matthew Cargo, a federal prisoner, attempted to file a notice of appeal after being sentenced on July 20, 2020. He had until August 3, 2020, to file the notice, with a possible extension to September 2, 2020. Cargo, while temporarily held in an Oklahoma jail, prepared the notice on July 22, 2020, and handed it to a correctional officer. However, he incorrectly addressed the envelope, leading to its return by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable. Cargo did not learn of the error until November 2024, after which he promptly resent the notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois received the notice in November 2024, four years after the deadline. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, and Cargo argued that he had complied with the prison-mailbox rule, which deems a notice of appeal filed when handed to prison officials for mailing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Cargo's addressing error precluded him from benefiting from the prison-mailbox rule. The rule requires that the notice be properly addressed to ensure it reaches the district court. Since Cargo's notice was returned as undeliverable, it did not meet the requirements of the rule. Consequently, the court dismissed Cargo's appeal as untimely, emphasizing that proper addressing is crucial for the prison-mailbox rule to apply. The court also noted that Cargo could have avoided this outcome by instructing his counsel to file the notice of appeal. View "USA v Cargo" on Justia Law
Starstone Insurance SE v City of Chicago
Jacques Rivera, after being released from over 20 years in prison for a wrongful murder conviction, sued the City of Chicago and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for civil rights violations. A jury awarded him over $17 million, and his attorneys sought more than $6 million in fees and costs. The case was settled for $18.75 million, including at least $3.75 million for attorneys' fees and costs. Chicago, which had an insurance policy with Starstone Insurance SE covering liabilities between $15 and $20 million, sought indemnity for the $3.75 million. Starstone refused, claiming their policy only covered damages, not attorneys' fees and costs, and filed for a declaratory judgment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of Chicago, determining that the insurance policy covered the entire $18.75 million settlement as an "ultimate net loss" that Chicago was legally obligated to pay. Starstone appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Starstone, a Societas Europaea (SE) based in Liechtenstein, qualified as a "corporation" under 28 U.S.C. §1332 for diversity jurisdiction purposes and concluded that it did. On the merits, the court found that the insurance policy's language covered the entire settlement amount, including attorneys' fees and costs, as part of the "ultimate net loss" Chicago was legally obligated to pay. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the policy's terms included indemnity for attorneys' fees and costs awarded under statutory provisions. View "Starstone Insurance SE v City of Chicago" on Justia Law
Nawara v Cook County Municipality
John Nawara, a former correctional officer at Cook County Jail, had several altercations with other county employees. As a result, the Cook County Sheriff's Office required him to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination and sign medical information release forms. Nawara initially resisted but eventually complied. Before doing so, he sued Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart, alleging that the examination requirement and inquiry into his mental health violated § 12112(d)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of Nawara, but the jury awarded him zero damages. Nawara filed a post-trial motion requesting back pay, lost pension benefits, and restoration of his seniority. The court granted the restoration of seniority but denied the request for back pay, concluding that the violation of § 12112(d)(4) could not support an award of back pay. Nawara appealed the denial of back pay, and the Sheriff cross-appealed the restoration of seniority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to restore Nawara's seniority, finding that it could still benefit him in his current role as a police officer within the Sheriff's Office. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of back pay. The Seventh Circuit held that a violation of § 12112(d)(4) of the ADA constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability, thus entitling Nawara to request back pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nawara v Cook County Municipality" on Justia Law
Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor’s Office
Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law
Thomas v LVNV Funding, LLC
Valerie Thomas received a notice claiming she owed $187, which she disputed. Resurgent Capital Services notified TransUnion about the debt before opening Thomas's letter and reported the dispute 29 days later. Thomas sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, seeking statutory damages for the delay. A jury awarded her $250. The clerk delayed entering the judgment, which was eventually entered on June 11, 2024. Resurgent filed a notice of appeal four days earlier, narrowly avoiding missing the appeal deadline.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Resurgent should have notified TransUnion earlier. Resurgent appealed, arguing that Thomas lacked standing because the delay did not injure her. District Judge Bucklo initially ruled that Thomas was injured as a matter of law, referencing Ewing v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, which treated the absence of a dispute notice as defamation. However, the court noted that injury must be proven and not assumed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Thomas did not provide evidence of injury before or during the trial. She did not attempt to show that her credit score or insurance costs were affected by the delay. Judge Bucklo had precluded Thomas from introducing evidence of actual injury, and Thomas did not challenge this ruling or seek a new trial. The appellate court held that Thomas lacked standing to sue due to the absence of evidence showing injury. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. View "Thomas v LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law
Wolf v. Riverport Insurance Company
Suzanne Wolf suffered multiple pelvic fractures in a car accident caused by an underinsured motorist. After receiving $100,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurance, she filed claims for underinsured motorist benefits with her personal automobile insurer and her employer’s general commercial liability insurer, Riverport Insurance Company. Wolf settled with her personal insurer for $150,000 and eventually settled with Riverport after four years of negotiations and arbitration, which awarded her $905,000. Riverport paid the award, less the amounts received from the other insurers.Wolf filed a lawsuit against Riverport in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging unreasonable delay in payment under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. Riverport removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Riverport’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that Wolf lacked a viable legal theory to support her claim. The court also denied Wolf’s discovery request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the insurance policy did not impose a duty on Riverport to investigate and settle Wolf’s claim in good faith. The court found that the policy’s provision granting Riverport discretion to investigate and settle claims applied only to defending insureds against third-party claims, not to first-party claims by insureds against Riverport. Consequently, Wolf’s breach-of-contract theory failed, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s discovery decision, as Wolf could not show actual and substantial prejudice from the denial of additional discovery. View "Wolf v. Riverport Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Taylor v. Schwarzhuber
In December 2015, sixteen-year-old Isaiah Taylor was stopped by Milwaukee police officers Justin Schwarzhuber and Jasen Rydzewski while running through his neighborhood to deliver a turkey. The officers frisked him, searched his bag, and detained him in their police car to check for outstanding warrants and recent robberies. Taylor later sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted qualified immunity and summary judgment to the officers on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and on the Fourth Amendment claim regarding the initial stop and frisk. However, the court denied qualified immunity on the issue of Taylor’s continued detention, sending it to trial. The jury found the officers not liable, and the court denied Taylor’s motion for post-trial relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, finding insufficient evidence of racial profiling. However, it vacated the summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims related to the initial stop and frisk, concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk based on clearly established law. The court also vacated the jury verdict on the continued detention issue, as it was intertwined with the initial stop's constitutionality, and remanded the case for a new trial on all Fourth Amendment claims. View "Taylor v. Schwarzhuber" on Justia Law
Brooks v. Richardson
Kevin Brooks, an inmate at a federal prison camp, suffered from appendicitis, which was misdiagnosed by medical personnel as constipation and COVID-19. Despite his worsening condition, he was not sent to a hospital for over ten days, resulting in a ruptured appendix and peritonitis. Brooks eventually recovered but experienced severe pain during the ordeal. He filed a lawsuit seeking damages from five federal employees, three of whom treated him and two who were supervisors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Brooks's suit, ruling that it presented a new context to which the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics does not extend. The court reasoned that Brooks's case differed from previous Bivens cases, particularly Carlson v. Green, due to the duration of his medical issue and the involvement of supervisory personnel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The Seventh Circuit held that Brooks's claim did not present a new context, as it was similar to Carlson v. Green, where a prisoner alleged constitutionally inadequate medical care. The court found that the distinctions made by the district court regarding the duration of the medical issue and the involvement of supervisors were not sufficient to create a new context. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the two supervisors but vacated the dismissal of claims against the three treating personnel, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Richardson" on Justia Law
Evans v United States
Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law
Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710
A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law