Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Military Law
by
Seven plaintiffs, all members of the Air Force, challenged the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, arguing it violated their religious beliefs. They sought religious exemptions, which were denied, leading to administrative discharge proceedings. One plaintiff, Byron O. Starks, Jr., was separated from service, allegedly for a preexisting medical condition, though he claimed it was due to his refusal to get vaccinated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed the case as moot after the Air Force rescinded the vaccine mandate. The court also dismissed Starks’s claims for lack of standing, citing his separation from service and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the rescission of the mandate did not address all alleged harms, particularly the claim that the Air Force’s religious exemption process was a sham. The court held that Starks had standing because his separation caused ongoing harm, such as ineligibility for certain veteran benefits. The court also clarified that RFRA claims are not subject to the Mindes exhaustion requirement, allowing Starks to proceed without exhausting intraservice remedies.The Fifth Circuit determined that the claims of the six still-serving plaintiffs were not moot, as they alleged ongoing harm from the Air Force’s religious exemption process. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to continue their challenge against the Air Force’s broader vaccination policies and religious accommodations process. View "Crocker v. Austin" on Justia Law

by
The case revolves around the murder of Sallie Copeland Evans by her grandson, Isaiah Evans Ceasar, a lance corporal in the United States Marine Corps. Sallie's son, Mitchell Garnet Evans, acting as the executor of her estate, filed a wrongful death claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Marine Corps was negligent in its handling of Ceasar, who had previously expressed suicidal intentions and violent tendencies. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court had erred in dismissing the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the jurisdictional question and the merits of the case were inextricably intertwined. However, the court also found that Evans failed to state a wrongful death claim under North Carolina law. The court concluded that even if the Marine Corps had a duty to Sallie, her murder was not foreseeable under the circumstances. Therefore, while the district court's decision was procedurally incorrect, it was substantively proper. The court affirmed the district court's decision on alternative grounds and dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Evans v. US" on Justia Law

by
The case involves four veterans who appealed from judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed their petitions for writs of mandamus due to lack of jurisdiction. The veterans' disability ratings were reduced, and they sought to have their original ratings continue pending the final resolution of the validity of the reduction. The veterans argued that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) could not lawfully decrease or discontinue their payments until their appeals challenging the reduction were exhausted.The Veterans Court found that there was no basis on which it could issue a writ under the All Writs Act in aid of its jurisdiction. The Veterans Court dismissed the veterans' petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The veterans then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The court held that mandamus relief was not available for the veterans under the All Writs Act because there was an adequate remedy by appeal that the veterans had chosen not to invoke. The court concluded that when there is a remedy by appeal, mandamus is unavailable. The court found that the veterans could have requested relief from the VA, and if a decision had been obtained from the Board denying the requested relief, a remedy by appeal would have been available to the veterans. The court also noted that an appeal is available if three conditions are satisfied: a clear and final decision of a legal issue, the resolution of the legal issues adversely affects the party seeking review, and there is a substantial risk that the decision would not survive a remand. The court found that these conditions would have been satisfied if the veterans had appealed the question of their entitlement to interim payments while the merits of their reductions were still pending. View "LOVE v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

by
The case involves Benito R. Chavez, a Vietnam War veteran who sought service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After being diagnosed with chronic, moderately severe PTSD, he was granted a 100 percent disability evaluation by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). However, after a subsequent medical examination, his disability rating was reduced to 50 percent, and later increased to 70 percent, as it was determined that his condition did not result in total occupational impairment. Chavez disagreed with this decision and appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the reduction.Chavez then appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board's decision should be reversed and his 100 percent rating reinstated. The Veterans Court agreed that the Board may have improperly relied on evidence developed after the rating reduction, but instead of reversing the Board’s decision, it remanded the case back to the Board for further examination.Chavez appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Veterans Court should have reversed the Board’s decision rather than remanding the case. The government contended that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over Chavez's appeal. The Federal Circuit rejected the government's jurisdictional argument but affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court on the merits. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court was fully entitled to remand the case to the Board for clarification, and therefore, the decision of the Veterans Court was affirmed. View "Chavez v. McDonough" on Justia Law

by
A veteran, Robert Stinson, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging the decision made by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The lower court affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ denial of Mr. Stinson’s request for service connection for his blastic plasmacytoid dendritic cell neoplasm, a rare and aggressive form of cancer. Mr. Stinson argued that the Veterans Court improperly found facts in the first instance when reviewing the Board’s decision and also argued that the Veterans Court incorrectly applied the doctrine of issue exhaustion.The Federal Circuit found that the Veterans Court exceeded its statutory authority by finding facts and weighing evidence in the first instance. Specifically, the Veterans Court determined that Mr. Stinson's in-service symptoms and the location of the lesion giving rise to his BPDCN diagnosis were not relevant to his claim for service connection. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court's conclusion required impermissible factual determinations.The Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the Veterans Court and remanded the case. On remand, the Veterans Court was instructed to remand the case to the Board for further factual development, including whether Mr. Stinson’s in-service symptoms support a manifestation of BPDCN earlier than 2011. This decision serves as a reminder to the Veterans Court to refrain from making factual determinations in the first instance and to focus on reviewing the Board's factual determinations. View "STINSON v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

by
The case revolves around a class-action lawsuit brought by Simon A. Soto, a retired Marine Corps member, against the United States government. The dispute concerned the application of a six-year statute of limitations under the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) to claims for unpaid combat-related special compensation (CRSC) under 10 U.S.C. § 1413a. Soto argued that the Barring Act's limitations did not apply to CRSC claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with Soto, leading the government to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Barring Act's six-year statute of limitations applies to CRSC settlement claims. The court reasoned that the CRSC statute does not provide its own settlement mechanism, so these claims are subject to the Barring Act's settlement procedures, including its six-year statute of limitations. The court also rejected Soto's argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the continuous state of war since 1990, stating that this provision only applies to service members on active duty during times of war. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "SOTO v. US " on Justia Law

by
A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

by
Appellant brought an action against the Army in district court, challenging the Secretary’s assignment of a 20% disability rating. According to Appellant the Secretary should have given him a 30% rating, consistent with the rating he had received from the Department of Veterans Affairs in a separate assessment conducted by the VA to determine his eligibility for veterans’ disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army.   The DC Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment to the Army and remanded. The court concluded that the Secretary’s approach when determining Appellant’s disability rating was inconsistent with the applicable statute and regulations. The court explained that to the extent the Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR) concluded that Appellant’s leg condition rendered him collectively unfit when considered together with his back condition, it was obligated to assign a rating to the leg condition. By extension, the Secretary, in accepting the PDBR’s recommendation to give no rating to Appellant’s leg condition, acted contrary to law insofar as the PDBR concluded that his leg condition was collectively unfitting together with his back condition. The court further explained that the fact that a condition contributes to a soldier’s unfitness is enough, and the Secretary’s apparent addition of a “significantly” criterion naturally raises questions about what degree and manner of contribution is thought to suffice, questions that the terms of the statute and regulations do not make salient. Any assumption that a medical condition, to receive a rating, must contribute “significantly” to unfitness thus is contrary to law. View "Jason Sissel v. Christine Wormuth" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff worked at Huntington Ingalls Incorporated as a sheet-metal mechanic. After leaving the company, Plaintiff complained of hearing loss. Plaintiff selected and met with an audiologist. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. The Board reversed its initial decision on whether Plaintiff could choose his own audiologist. The Company timely petitioned for review. The question is whether audiologists are “physicians” under Section 907(b) of LHWCA.   The Fifth Circuit denied the Company’s petition for review. The court reasoned that based on the education they receive and the role that they play in identifying and treating hearing disorders, audiologists can fairly be described as “skilled in the art of healing.” However, audiologists are not themselves medical doctors. Their work complements that of a medical doctor. But, the court wrote, Optometrists, despite lacking a medical degree, are able to administer and interpret vision tests. And based on the results of those tests, optometrists can prescribe the appropriate corrective lenses that someone with impaired vision can use to bolster his or her ability to see. Audiologists are similarly able to administer hearing tests, evaluate the resulting audiograms, and then use that information to fit a patient with hearing aids that are appropriately calibrated to the individual’s level of auditory impairment. Because the plain meaning of the regulation includes audiologists, and because that regulation is entitled to Chevron deference, audiologists are included in Section 907(b) of the LHWCA’s use of the word “physician.” View "Huntington Ingalls v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs – issuers of collateralized debt obligations secured by certificates in residential-mortgage-backed securities trusts – appealed from three separate judgments dismissing actions brought against The Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas. In each case, the district courts assumed that Plaintiffs had Article III standing but found that Plaintiffs were precluded from relitigating the issue of prudential standing due to a prior case Plaintiffs had brought against U.S. Bank National Association.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court explained that it joined the Ninth Circuit in concluding that the district courts permissibly bypassed the question of Article III standing to address issue preclusion, which offered a threshold, non-merits basis for dismissal. The court also concluded that the district courts’ application of issue preclusion was correct. The court wrote that it fully agreed with the district courts that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a second bite at the prudential-standing apple after the U.S. Bank Action. The district courts, therefore, did not err in taking this straightforward, if not “textbook,” path to dismissal. View "Phx. Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon; Phx. Light SF DAC v. Bank of N." on Justia Law