Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law

Rachel Moniz and Paola Correa filed separate lawsuits against Adecco USA, Inc. under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the Labor Code. Moniz and Adecco settled their case, but Correa challenged the fairness of the settlement. The trial court approved the revised settlement over Correa's objections and awarded attorney’s fees to Moniz’s counsel. Correa's request for a service award and attorney’s fees for her own work was largely denied. Correa appealed, arguing the trial court's analysis of the revised settlement was flawed and that her request for attorney’s fees and a service award should have been granted.The San Mateo County Superior Court overruled Adecco's demurrer in Moniz's case, while the San Francisco Superior Court sustained Adecco's demurrer in Correa's case. Correa's motion to intervene in Moniz's suit was denied, and her subsequent appeal was also denied. The trial court approved Moniz's settlement with Adecco, awarding Moniz a service award and attorney’s fees, but denied Correa’s requests. Correa's motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment were denied, leading to her appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., which disapproved of the reasoning in Moniz II regarding Correa’s standing. The Court of Appeal concluded that Correa and her counsel lacked standing to challenge the judgment based on the Supreme Court's decision in Turrieta. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Virginia drivers whose licenses were suspended for failing to pay court fines challenged the constitutionality of the statute under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the statute. Before the case reached final judgment, the Virginia General Assembly repealed the statute, requiring reinstatement of the suspended licenses. The parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot.The District Court declined to award attorney’s fees to the drivers under §1988(b), reasoning that obtaining a preliminary injunction did not qualify them as “prevailing parties.” A Fourth Circuit panel affirmed this decision, but the Fourth Circuit en banc reversed, holding that some preliminary injunctions can provide lasting, merits-based relief, qualifying plaintiffs as prevailing parties even if the case becomes moot before final judgment.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the drivers, who only obtained preliminary injunctive relief before the action became moot, do not qualify as “prevailing parties” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b). The Court reasoned that no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lackey v. Stinnie" on Justia Law

A Texas attorney, Robert M. Roach, claimed to have an oral agreement with Fred Schrader, the former owner of Schrader Cellars, LLC, regarding the creation of another company, RBS LLC, which Roach asserted had an ownership interest in Schrader Cellars. After Fred Schrader sold Schrader Cellars to Constellation Brands, Roach sued Fred and Constellation in Texas state court, claiming the sale was improper. Schrader Cellars then filed the current action, seeking declaratory relief that Roach had no ownership interest in Schrader Cellars, and Roach counterclaimed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and dismissed Roach’s counterclaims. The court concluded that the oral agreement violated California Rule of Professional Responsibility 3-300 and that Roach did not rebut the presumption of undue influence. The case proceeded to trial on Schrader Cellars’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, where the jury found that Roach’s breach caused harm but did not award damages due to the litigation privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and Roach’s counterclaims, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether Roach rebutted the presumption of undue influence. The appellate court also held that the district court erred in concluding and instructing the jury that Roach breached his fiduciary duties. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after trial, concluding that the erroneous jury instruction had no effect on the outcome because the jury found that the gravamen of the breach of fiduciary duty claim was based on Roach’s filing of the Texas lawsuit, which was barred by the California litigation privilege. View "SCHRADER CELLARS, LLC V. ROACH" on Justia Law

Frankie Greer filed a lawsuit against the County of San Diego under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he suffered serious injuries while incarcerated in the San Diego Central Jail. During discovery, Greer requested documents from the County’s Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) meetings related to in-custody deaths. The CIRB’s purpose is to consult with legal counsel on incidents that may lead to litigation, assess civil exposure, and recommend remedial actions. The district court ruled that the CIRB documents were not protected by attorney-client privilege, as the CIRB served multiple purposes beyond obtaining legal advice. After Greer settled his claims, several media organizations intervened to unseal the CIRB documents.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the County’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the production of the CIRB documents, which were then produced under an attorneys’-eyes-only protective order. The district court also granted the media organizations' motion to intervene and unseal the documents, leading to the County’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the appeal was not moot, as effective relief could still be provided by ordering the return or destruction of the CIRB documents. The court determined that the attorney-client privilege applied to the CIRB documents, as the primary purpose of the CIRB meetings was to obtain legal advice regarding potential litigation and to avoid future liability. The court found that the district court had made significant legal errors in its determination and that the County had not waived the privilege. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to require the return and/or destruction of the privileged documents. View "GREER V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law