Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters, challenged the constitutionality of a 2011 Medicare Ordinance enacted by the City of Providence, which required retirees to enroll in Medicare upon eligibility and terminated city-paid health care coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. The plaintiffs, who opted out of a settlement agreement that provided certain Medicare-related benefits, sought retroactive reimbursement for out-of-pocket health care expenses incurred during the litigation.The Superior Court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, denied relief on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews II remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the specific provisions of the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not include retroactive reimbursement for health care expenses.Upon remand, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, but the Superior Court denied this request, concluding that such relief was outside the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate in Andrews II. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that the mandate in Andrews II did not contemplate or include retroactive relief for health care expenses. The Court emphasized that the mandate was prospective in nature and aligned with the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not provide for reimbursement of past expenses. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had waived claims for individual damages during the trial and had not sought such damages in their amended complaint. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System and David Freundlich, filed a consolidated securities action against CVS Health Corporation. They alleged that CVS's offering documents related to its 2018 merger with Aetna contained false statements and omissions, violating sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. The plaintiffs claimed that CVS overstated the value of its goodwill and failed to disclose significant issues with its Long Term Care (LTC) business, which it acquired through Omnicare, Inc. in 2015.The Superior Court of Rhode Island dismissed the plaintiffs' Revised Amended Consolidated Complaint (RACC), finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Securities Act. The court also noted that similar claims had been dismissed in related cases in New York and the First Circuit. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Superior Court improperly applied collateral estoppel and failed to consider the merits of their claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the merits of the dismissal by not adequately addressing it in their initial brief. The court also found that the Superior Court's decision to dismiss the case was supported by principles of judicial economy and comity, given the similar rulings in related cases. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs' appeal was without merit and upheld the lower court's judgment. View "In re CVS Health Corporation Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Willie Gray, filed a complaint for personal injuries sustained in a fire at a multifamily residential property in Providence on January 12, 2018. The property was allegedly owned by Dexter Jackson, whose negligence was claimed to have caused the fire. The City of Providence was also named as a defendant for being aware of several housing code violations at the property from January 2015 through January 2018. The plaintiff failed to provide adequate responses to the defendant's discovery requests, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders to produce more responsive answers.The Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to compel and later a motion to enter final judgment against the plaintiff due to non-compliance with discovery orders. The plaintiff did not object to these motions and failed to appear at the hearing for the renewed motion for entry of final judgment. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion to vacate the order granting final judgment, citing a lack of objection and failure to comply with discovery requirements.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to comply with discovery obligations and failed to do so. The trial justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief. The appeal was considered interlocutory, but the Court proceeded to evaluate the merits due to the futility of remanding for default judgment against Jackson, who had not participated in the litigation. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Gray v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

The case involves a partition action concerning two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The properties were inherited from their mother’s estate in 2017. After failed negotiations to sell the properties to Puchalski, Karasuk and Ingley filed a partition action on May 3, 2021. Numerous continuances were granted due to Puchalski's complaints of hearing impairment. Despite accommodations, Puchalski expressed dissatisfaction and failed to appear at several hearings.The Superior Court dismissed Puchalski’s appeals, approved the commissioner’s petition for instructions, and quashed a statement she filed in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. Puchalski appealed these decisions. The Superior Court had granted plaintiffs' motion to sell the properties, appointed a commissioner, and issued a temporary restraining order against Puchalski. Puchalski failed to appear at critical hearings, leading to the dismissal of her appeals.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Puchalski received adequate notice of the motions and hearings. The court determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory and not subject to review under the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions, including the dismissal of Puchalski’s appeals and the orders related to the partition and sale of the properties. The court emphasized that Puchalski’s continued attempts to delay the proceedings were unavailing and that the matter should proceed to finality. View "Karasuk v. Puchalski" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Noah Gabriel, owns an undeveloped parcel of real estate in Narragansett, Rhode Island. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) received a notification of potential wetland violations on the property and investigated, finding that the property had been altered by clearing vegetation, applying fill soil, installing a culvert, and expanding a driveway. CRMC issued a cease-and-desist order and later an order to restore the property. Gabriel disputed CRMC's jurisdiction and filed a complaint in Washington County Superior Court, asserting that CRMC lacked jurisdiction and had committed various illegal actions.The Superior Court granted CRMC's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ordering Gabriel to cease all activities on the property. Gabriel appealed, arguing that CRMC did not have the authority to enforce wetland regulations on his property and cited the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Court determined that CRMC had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, as there was evidence of wetland violations. The Court also found that CRMC would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, as continued alterations to the property would harm the environment. The balance of equities favored CRMC, and the issuance of the injunction would preserve the status quo by protecting the wetland. View "Gabriel v. Willis" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Louis Paolino and Marie E. Issa, own property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to a site operated as an automobile recycling business. The neighboring property, owned by J.F. Realty, LLC and operated by LKQ Route 16 Used Auto Parts, Inc., was found to be contaminated. The Department of Environmental Management (DEM) required remediation, leading the defendants, Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., to design a stormwater remediation system. Plaintiffs alleged that this system discharged contaminated water onto their property and encroached on it.In prior litigation, the plaintiffs sued the Ferreira defendants in state court for trespass due to contamination. The case was removed to federal court, where federal claims were dismissed, and state claims were remanded. A jury found encroachment but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, which was partially granted. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the encroachment, deeming it de minimis, but ordered a new trial on other issues. In a subsequent trial, the jury found no continuing trespass. Plaintiffs also pursued a Clean Water Act claim in federal court, which was dismissed after a bench trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the issues in the current case were precluded by collateral estoppel. The court found that the issue of contamination had been litigated and decided in prior state and federal actions, and the encroachment was previously determined to be de minimis. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating these issues. View "Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gail M. McCormick, filed a personal injury lawsuit against Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc. (NICO) for injuries she sustained in a motorcycle accident on May 29, 2010. McCormick alleged that she lost control of her motorcycle due to unguarded manhole covers on a road in Cranston, Rhode Island, which NICO was contracted to repair. NICO failed to respond to the lawsuit, and a default judgment was entered against them on November 18, 2011. However, NICO later sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that they had not begun repairs on the road until after the accident occurred.The Superior Court granted NICO's motion to vacate the default judgment. The case proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in March 2022, which resulted in a verdict in favor of NICO. McCormick subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial justice.McCormick appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating the default judgment and in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment without requiring NICO to provide evidence explaining their failure to respond to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for a hearing on the assessment of damages. View "McCormick v. Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the will of the late Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, is the testator’s former wife. She appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul Doucette, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The Superior Court affirmed an order of the Newport Probate Court denying the plaintiff’s petition for leave to file a claim out of time against the estate. The denied claim would have alleged a breach of contract, based on the plaintiff’s contention that a key provision of the testator’s will violated the terms of the couple’s property-settlement agreement.The plaintiff and the testator were married in 1986, had three children, and were divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement (PSA), the testator was to execute a will that would not only treat his obligations under the PSA as “a claim against any assets in [his] [e]state” but also “specifically bequest to [plaintiff] an amount equal to said obligations.” A dispute soon unfolded over what the PSA required of the testator’s will.In 2017, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Superior Court judgment on multiple grounds. Relevant to the present appeal, the court determined “that the disputed provision in the will is ambiguous” because it “does not clearly specify under what circumstances plaintiff is to receive the sum of $2,000,000 or the circumstances under which she is to receive such other amount necessary to satisfy all of [the testator’s] remaining obligations.” Because “a proper resolution of this matter require[d] factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to [the] testator’s intent,” the court remanded the case to the Superior Court.Back in Superior Court, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint with a claim for breach of contract. The Superior Court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, in part because she did not first submit the claim to the probate court, and also because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition in the Newport Probate Court for leave to file a claim out of time and, after the court denied her petition, she appealed that denial to the Superior Court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to timely present her claim for breach of contract was not due to excusable neglect and, therefore, her claim must be denied. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law