Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Fredrick filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement in Vermont on a governor’s warrant pending extradition to New York for a second-degree murder charge. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the extradition process requirements were met. On appeal, Fredrick argued that the governor’s warrant and New York’s extradition application lacked an authenticated copy of the indictment as required by Vermont law.The Caledonia Superior Court, Civil Division, held a hearing and denied Fredrick’s request, reasoning that the governor’s warrant was prima facie evidence that the extradition requirements were satisfied. The court found that the documents showed Fredrick was lawfully charged by indictment. Fredrick appealed the decision on January 9, 2025.During the appeal, Governor Scott recalled the original governor’s warrant and issued a new one, including a copy of the indictment signed by the grand jury foreperson. Fredrick filed another habeas corpus petition challenging the new warrant, which was also denied, and an appeal is pending.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the original governor’s warrant was withdrawn and Fredrick’s confinement is now based on a new warrant. The court found no applicable exceptions to mootness, as Fredrick did not demonstrate that the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review, nor did he show negative collateral consequences. The court concluded that there was no longer an actual controversy, and the appeal was dismissed. View "In re James Fredrick" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Aleksandra Veljovic, filed a lawsuit against TD Bank, N.A. and its former employee, Zlata Cavka, alleging negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior. Veljovic claimed that Cavka negligently notarized a fraudulent document used by her ex-husband to secure a divorce order in Serbia, which resulted in the loss of her marital property. Veljovic argued that TD Bank should be held liable for Cavka's actions. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Veljovic's complaint with prejudice, concluding that she could not recover for purely economic losses and failed to demonstrate a special relationship between the parties. The court also denied her post-judgment request to amend her complaint.TD Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Veljovic's claims were barred by the economic-loss rule, that neither TD Bank nor Cavka owed her an independent duty of care, and that she failed to plead facts establishing necessary causation. The court granted the motion, finding that Veljovic sought compensation solely for economic losses and did not establish a special relationship with the defendants. The court also dismissed the claims against Cavka after Veljovic failed to respond to a show-cause order.Veljovic appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and denying her motion to amend. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Veljovic did not allege sufficient facts to show a special relationship with the defendants and that her claims were barred by the economic-loss rule. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have established a special relationship or overcome the economic-loss rule. View "Veljovic v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristina and Stephen Polak, and defendants, Felipe Ramirez-Diaz and Yesica Sanchez de Ramirez, are neighbors in St. Albans. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after defendants allegedly made false reports to police and the court accusing plaintiffs of criminal activity. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants falsely reported an assault and a gun threat, leading to anti-stalking complaints and an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) petition against Kristina Polak, which were ultimately denied. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants repeated these false claims to neighbors and community members.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, granted defendants’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ claims under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that defendants’ statements were protected petitioning activity in connection with public issues. The court also imposed a discovery sanction on plaintiffs for failing to respond to defendants’ interrogatories and requests for production, prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing evidence that should have been disclosed. The court subsequently awarded summary judgment to defendants on the remaining defamation claim, noting plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific defamatory statements or produce evidence of actual harm.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in granting the special motion to strike. The Supreme Court held that defendants’ statements were not made in connection with a public issue, as they concerned a private dispute between neighbors and did not affect a large number of people or involve a matter of widespread public interest. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings on the stricken claims. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the discovery sanction and the award of summary judgment on the remaining defamation claim, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz" on Justia Law

M.R., a minor, was substantiated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for sexual abuse of another minor. DCF sent the notice of substantiation to M.R.'s father, who requested an administrative review but did not participate in it. The review upheld the substantiation, and M.R.'s father did not appeal further. M.R. later sought a second review from the Human Services Board after the appeal period had expired, claiming he was unaware of the substantiation and the review. The Board dismissed his appeal as untimely.The Human Services Board found that M.R.'s appeal was not filed within the required 30-day period after the administrative review decision. M.R. argued that he was entitled to personal notice under the statute, that the lack of direct notice deprived him of due process, and that there was good cause for his delay in filing the appeal. The Board rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The Court held that the statutory requirement to send notice to the minor's parents or guardian was sufficient and did not violate due process. The Court found that the procedures in place were reasonably calculated to apprise the minor and their parents of the substantiation decision and their rights to request reviews. The Court also held that there was no good cause for M.R.'s untimely appeal, as the failure to appeal was due to factors within his father's control. Therefore, the Board's dismissal of the appeal as untimely was upheld. View "In re Appeal of M.R." on Justia Law