Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. (Phoenix) sued Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C. (DCO) and obtained a jury verdict for tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. The jury awarded Phoenix compensatory and punitive damages, as well as reasonable attorney fees. The trial court awarded additional punitive damages for the misappropriation claim and enhanced the attorney fees by a multiplier of two.The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in part but reversed the application of the punitive-damages cap for the conspiracy claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. Phoenix requested postjudgment attorney fees, which the Ninth District did not specifically address but remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction over DCO's challenge to the enhancement of the attorney-fee award. The court reversed the Ninth District's affirmation of the enhanced attorney fees and remanded the case to the trial court to issue a final judgment granting Phoenix attorney fees in the amount of $1,991,507.On remand, the trial court awarded Phoenix postjudgment attorney fees and expenses. The Ninth District affirmed this award, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider postjudgment attorney fees and did not exceed its authority.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the trial court exceeded its authority by considering and granting Phoenix's motion for postjudgment attorney fees and expenses. The court reversed the Ninth District's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its award of postjudgment attorney fees and expenses and to enter final judgment. View "Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd. sought discovery from Apple Inc. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for use in a prospective patent infringement lawsuit in Germany. CPC aimed to obtain documents describing the functionality of Apple’s biometric security technology. The district court granted CPC’s application, allowing them to serve a subpoena on Apple, but the scope of the discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce remained unresolved.Initially, a magistrate judge denied CPC’s application, finding the discovery requests unduly burdensome. CPC sought review, and the district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision under a clear error standard. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court should have reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision de novo, as the ruling on a § 1782 application is dispositive. The case was remanded, and the district court, applying de novo review, granted CPC’s application. Apple objected, particularly concerned about the potential requirement to produce source code, but the district court’s order did not definitively resolve these objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the district court’s decision was not final because the scope of discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce were still undetermined. The lack of a final judgment meant that the Ninth Circuit could not evaluate the Intel factors used to determine whether discovery was warranted under § 1782. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the district court to resolve the remaining discovery issues. View "CPC PATENT TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

NexStep, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, alleging infringement of nine patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 8,885,802 and 8,280,009. The District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment of non-infringement for the '802 patent after construing the term "VoIP" to require two-way voice communication, which NexStep's infringement theory did not meet. The '009 patent proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court granted Comcast's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding NexStep's proof inadequate.The district court's summary judgment for the '802 patent was based on the construction of "VoIP" as requiring two-way voice communication, supported by technical dictionaries and the agreed industry standard meaning. NexStep's argument that VoIP should include one-way audio transmission was rejected. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and granted summary judgment of non-infringement.For the '009 patent, the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court set aside this verdict, ruling that NexStep failed to provide the required particularized testimony and linking argument to support the doctrine of equivalents. The court found that NexStep's expert testimony was too conclusory and lacked specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court agreed with the district court's construction of "VoIP" and its grant of summary judgment for the '802 patent. For the '009 patent, the appellate court found that NexStep's expert testimony did not meet the evidentiary requirements for the doctrine of equivalents, as it lacked particularized testimony and linking argument. The court dismissed Comcast's conditional cross-appeal related to the validity of the '009 patent. View "NEXSTEP, INC. v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law

Provisur Technologies, Inc. owns patents related to food-processing machinery, specifically high-speed mechanical slicers and a fill and packaging apparatus. Provisur sued Weber, Inc. and its affiliates, alleging that Weber's food slicers and SmartLoader products infringed on these patents. The case was tried before a jury, which found that Weber willfully infringed several claims of Provisur's patents and awarded Provisur approximately $10.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Weber's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on noninfringement and willfulness, as well as a motion for a new trial on infringement, willfulness, and damages. Weber appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement regarding the '812 and '436 patents, as Weber conceded its noninfringement arguments were no longer available due to an intervening decision. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of JMOL for noninfringement of the '936 patent, finding that Provisur failed to provide sufficient evidence that Weber's SmartLoader could be readily configured to infringe the patent.The court also reversed the district court's denial of JMOL on willfulness, ruling that the evidence presented, including testimony about Weber's failure to consult a third party, was insufficient to establish willful infringement. Additionally, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Provisur to use the entire market value rule for calculating damages without sufficient evidence that the patented features drove customer demand for the entire slicing line. Consequently, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on damages.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Federal Circuit's decision. View "PROVISUR TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. WEBER, INC. " on Justia Law

American Girl, LLC, a manufacturer of dolls and related products, sued Zembrka, a Chinese entity operating through websites, for selling counterfeit American Girl products. American Girl alleged that Zembrka's websites sold and shipped counterfeit products to New York, using American Girl's trademarks. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.The District Court granted Zembrka's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing that American Girl failed to show that Zembrka shipped the counterfeit products to New York. The court concluded that without evidence of shipment, the "transacting business" requirement under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), was not met. American Girl's motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence of New York customers purchasing counterfeit products, was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that American Girl had adequately demonstrated that Zembrka transacted business in New York. Evidence showed that Zembrka accepted orders from New York, sent order confirmations, and received payments, which constituted purposeful activity within the state. The court held that actual shipment of goods was not necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). The court also determined that exercising jurisdiction over Zembrka was consistent with due process, given New York's strong interest in protecting its consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods.The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka" on Justia Law

Wanda Bowling entered into a contract with the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission to manage its information technology functions. When the contract ended, Bowling allegedly withheld login information for three online accounts, leading the Commission to sue for breach of contract. Bowling counterclaimed for libel and misclassification of her employment status. The district court dismissed the misclassification counterclaim and granted summary judgment to the Commission on all other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Bowling's counterclaim for misclassification and denied her motion to amend it, citing untimeliness. The court also granted summary judgment to the Commission on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Bowling's login information constituted intellectual property and that she had breached the contract by not certifying the erasure of confidential information. The court awarded the Commission $956.67 in damages. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment on Bowling's libel counterclaim, citing a qualified privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission had adequately alleged damages exceeding $75,000. However, the appellate court found that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether the login information constituted intellectual property or other materials covered by the contract, and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the damages. Therefore, it reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Bowling's motion to amend her counterclaim for misclassification, finding no abuse of discretion.On the libel counterclaim, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on a qualified privilege without giving Bowling notice. However, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the Commission's statements were substantially true. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission v. Bowling" on Justia Law

A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a "sham."The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Salas Rushford's claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) and Apple Inc. WARF accused Apple of infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,781,752 (the '752 patent) with its A7 and A8 processors in a lawsuit filed in 2014 (WARF I). WARF later filed a second lawsuit (WARF II) accusing Apple's A9 and A10 processors of infringing the same patent. In WARF I, the jury found that Apple’s A7 and A8 processors literally infringed the '752 patent. However, Apple appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict, finding that no reasonable jury could find literal infringement under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "particular" as used in the patent claims.In the district court for WARF I, WARF had abandoned its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in exchange for Apple not presenting certain evidence at trial. After the Federal Circuit's reversal, WARF sought to reassert the doctrine-of-equivalents theory, but the district court denied this request, citing WARF's prior abandonment and the preclusive effect of the Federal Circuit's interpretation of "particular."In WARF II, the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal in WARF I. After the Federal Circuit's decision, WARF attempted to continue WARF II under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court found that WARF I precluded WARF from proceeding in WARF II, citing issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, which prevents repeated litigation of the same issue against the same party.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in both WARF I and WARF II. The court held that WARF had waived its doctrine-of-equivalents theory in WARF I and that issue preclusion and the Kessler doctrine barred WARF II. The court concluded that the A7/A8 and A9/A10 processors were essentially the same for the purposes of preclusion and that literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents are part of the same overall issue of infringement. View "WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, sued DISH and related Sling entities for alleged infringement of three patents related to digital data compression. The district court found the asserted claims of one patent ineligible as abstract under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court denied, opting to rehear invalidity arguments after claim construction. The district court later stayed the case pending inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, which resulted in some claims being found unpatentable. The stay was lifted after the IPR proceedings concluded, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment of invalidity for the remaining patent claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants, citing six "red flags" that should have warned Realtime that its case was flawed. These included prior court decisions finding similar claims ineligible, Board decisions invalidating related patent claims, non-final office actions rejecting claims in the reexamination of the patent at issue, a notice letter from DISH warning of potential fees, and expert opinions from DISH’s witness. The district court found that the totality of these circumstances rendered the case exceptional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. The appellate court found that some of the red flags cited by the district court should not have been given weight, such as the Adaptive Streaming decision and the Board’s decisions on different patents. The court also noted that the district court failed to adequately explain how certain factors, like the notice letter and expert opinions, constituted red flags. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the attorneys’ fees award in light of the appellate court’s findings. View "REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING LLC v. SLING TV, L.L.C. " on Justia Law