Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in District of Columbia Court of Appeals
In re G.W.
G.W. was taken into custody in the District of Columbia on a delinquency matter. Although released in that matter, the trial court ordered his detention under the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) to be picked up by Virginia authorities on a different juvenile matter. When Virginia authorities did not take custody, the trial court dismissed the ICJ matter, but the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) continued to detain G.W., interpreting the ICJ to require detention until all of G.W.'s juvenile matters in the District were resolved or until Virginia took custody or consented to his release.G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that DYRS had no authority under the ICJ to detain him once Virginia failed to take custody. DYRS opposed the petition, citing ICJ rules and an advisory opinion by the Interstate Commission for Juveniles. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the petition, relying on the advisory opinion that interpreted the ICJ rules to require detention until charges in the holding state were resolved or there was consent from the demanding state.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Since the trial court's ruling, the Commission withdrew the advisory opinion, and both the Commission and the District of Columbia conceded that the ICJ rules did not require G.W.'s detention. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ICJ Rule 7-103 did not address detention and that ICJ Rule 6-102.2 required detention only until the demanding state returned the juvenile or the time period for doing so expired. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law
Bare v. Rainforest Alliance, Inc.
Matthew Bare sued his former employer, Rainforest Alliance, Inc., in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that the company failed to pay him a redundancy settlement after his position was made redundant due to a reorganization. Bare claimed that he had agreed to resign in exchange for the settlement, which was contingent upon his execution of a release-of-claims agreement. However, after Bare made critical comments about the company, Rainforest Alliance terminated him and refused to pay the settlement, leading to claims of breach of contract and violation of the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law.The Superior Court dismissed Bare's complaint with prejudice, agreeing with Rainforest Alliance that Bare had failed to allege the occurrence of a condition precedent—specifically, the execution of a release agreement. The court found that without alleging this, Bare could not claim he had earned the redundancy payment under the contract or the wage law. Bare had argued that the issue of the condition precedent was a factual matter for summary judgment or trial and that Rainforest Alliance had waived the condition by not providing a release agreement. He also requested leave to amend his complaint if the motion to dismiss was granted.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court should have granted Bare's request to amend his complaint. The appellate court found that Bare's request to amend was his first, the case had been pending for a short time, there was no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motives, and there was no prejudice to Rainforest Alliance. The court also determined that Bare's proposed amendment, which would include allegations that Rainforest Alliance waived the condition precedent by not providing a release agreement, was not futile. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bare v. Rainforest Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law
Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA
The case involves Ma Shun Bell, who filed a lawsuit against the law firm Friedman, Framme & Thrush (FFT), formerly known as Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, alleging unfair trade practices and abuse of process. Bell claimed that FFT, representing First Investors Servicing Corporation (FISC), pursued a deficiency debt from her despite knowing it was not lawfully recoverable due to procedural defects in the vehicle repossession process.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Bell's second amended complaint was dismissed. The court ruled that the complaint failed to allege the elements of a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) violation, that FFT was immune from suit under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) and the D.C. Automobile Financing and Repossession Act (AFRA) due to its role as litigation attorneys, and that the complaint did not articulate how FFT’s conduct violated the Debt Collection Law (DCL). Additionally, the court found that Bell’s claims were barred by res judicata based on a Small Claims Court judgment in favor of FISC, with which FFT was found to be in privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that Bell’s DCL cause of action could proceed, but her other causes of action were properly dismissed. The court held that the Superior Court erred in finding privity between FFT and FISC solely based on their attorney-client relationship and a contingency-fee arrangement. The court determined that the DCL claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and that Bell had sufficiently alleged that FFT misrepresented the amount of the debt and charged excessive fees. The court affirmed the dismissal of the UCC, CPPA, and abuse of process claims but reversed the dismissal of the DCL claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA" on Justia Law
District of Columbia v. Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP
A public interest law firm, TPM, requested certain budget-request documents from the Mayor of the District of Columbia under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act (D.C. FOIA). TPM sought documents related to the budget requests of the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) for fiscal year 2019, as well as other related documents. The Mayor refused to produce the draft submissions, claiming they were protected by executive privilege. TPM then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking the documents and their online publication.The Superior Court denied the Mayor's motion to dismiss and granted TPM's motion for summary judgment. The court ordered the Mayor to produce the requested documents and to comply with the publication requirements of D.C. Code § 2-536. The Mayor appealed, arguing that the documents were protected by executive privilege and that TPM lacked standing to enforce the publication provision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court rejected the Mayor's claim of executive privilege, stating that the budgetary process involves overlapping responsibilities between the Mayor and the Council, and thus does not fall under the exclusive purview of the executive branch. The court also found that TPM had standing to seek enforcement of the publication provision, as the failure to disclose the documents caused a concrete and particularized injury to TPM.The court affirmed the Superior Court's order requiring the production and online publication of the requested budget documents for fiscal years 2019 to the present. However, it vacated and remanded the portion of the order requiring the publication of other documents under D.C. Code § 2-536, instructing the lower court to clarify the scope of the required publication. View "District of Columbia v. Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP" on Justia Law
Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation
Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law
McFarland v. District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources
John T. McFarland, a Program Support Specialist with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), requested a reclassification of his Grade 9 position to Grade 11 in 2011. The desk audit for this request was delayed, and the initial reviewer, Peter Delate, was replaced by Lewis Norman, who completed the audit in 2013 and concluded that the Grade 9 classification was correct. McFarland appealed this decision, but the Director of the District of Columbia’s Department of Human Resources (DCHR) upheld it. McFarland then petitioned for review in Superior Court, which affirmed DCHR’s decision. McFarland appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the decision.In 2017, McFarland filed another petition in Superior Court, presenting new documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request that suggested Delate had initially supported a Grade 11 classification. The Superior Court vacated DCHR’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, a new specialist reviewed the entire record and concluded that McFarland’s position was correctly classified as Grade 9. McFarland again petitioned for review in Superior Court, which denied his petition and his motion for sanctions against the District of Columbia.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain McFarland’s petition for review under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), as the classification decision did not involve a reduction in grade. The court also found that McFarland had not shown that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case for dismissal of the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "McFarland v. District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law
Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered
In 2003, Sarah Ramey underwent a urethral dilation performed by Dr. Edward Dunne, which resulted in severe pain and subsequent debilitating medical conditions. Over the next fourteen years, Ramey sought medical advice from numerous doctors to determine the cause of her ailments. In 2017, Drs. Mario Castellanos and Lee Arnold Dellon linked her symptoms to the 2003 procedure. Ramey filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dunne and Foxhall Urology in 2019.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bifurcated trial to determine if Ramey’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The jury found that Ramey failed to file her suit within the three-year statute of limitations. Ramey then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its rulings and jury instructions. The trial court denied her motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ramey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ramey had received medical opinions linking her symptoms to the urethral dilation before 2017. The court also found that Ramey waived her claim regarding the jury instructions by affirmatively agreeing to them during the trial.However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the improper invocation of inquiry notice by appellees’ counsel during rebuttal closing arguments. The court found that the trial court’s corrective instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the improper argument. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered" on Justia Law
Bromfield-Thompson v. McNally
Barbara McNally sued Debbie-Ann Bromfield and her husband Everald Thompson in the Superior Court for multiple claims related to a property dispute. After Thompson filed for bankruptcy, McNally and Thompson reached a settlement agreement, which included dismissing McNally's pending lawsuit. McNally filed a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(a)(2), which Bromfield opposed, seeking a decision on the merits through her own summary judgment motion. The trial court granted McNally’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and denied Bromfield’s summary judgment motion as moot, reasoning that Bromfield would not suffer any legal detriment from the dismissal.Bromfield appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting McNally’s motion for voluntary dismissal, claiming it caused her legal prejudice. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court noted that Bromfield was not "aggrieved" by the dismissal with prejudice of the claims against her, as she had effectively prevailed in all relevant respects. The court emphasized that it has an independent obligation to ensure its jurisdiction and that Bromfield did not suffer an infringement or denial of legal rights.The court held that Bromfield’s desire for vindication did not constitute a cognizable legal injury and that her potential future claims, such as a malicious prosecution suit, did not provide grounds for appeal. The court concluded that Bromfield had secured an unmitigated victory in the underlying proceedings and dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bromfield-Thompson v. McNally" on Justia Law
Kelecha v. Menghesha
Asegedech Kelecha rented a room in her house to Sara Menghesha starting in 2019. On May 1, 2020, Kelecha changed the locks without giving Menghesha a key, leaving her homeless during the COVID-19 pandemic. Menghesha sued Kelecha for unlawful eviction and obtained injunctive relief to regain access to the property. She then won a partial motion for summary judgment on liability for unlawful eviction. At a jury trial on damages, Menghesha was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.After the trial, a juror emailed stating disagreement with the decisions made during deliberations. Kelecha filed a motion for a new trial based on this email. The Superior Court initially ordered an evidentiary hearing but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding that such an inquiry would impermissibly intrude into the jury’s deliberative process.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Kelecha argued that the Superior Court should have held a hearing before denying her new trial motion and that the punitive damages were unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of malice and were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, stating that jurors generally cannot impeach their own verdicts under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court found that any inquiry into the juror’s email would fall under the no-impeachment rule and that no exceptions applied. Additionally, Kelecha’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages and the excessiveness of the award were deemed forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict and the Superior Court’s rulings. View "Kelecha v. Menghesha" on Justia Law
Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC
Salvador Rivas purchased a condominium unit with a mortgage loan from Flagstar Bank, secured by a deed of trust. Rivas fell behind on his condo association dues, leading the New Hampshire House Condominium Unit Owners Association (NHH) to foreclose on the unit in 2014. The foreclosure sale terms indicated the unit was sold subject to Flagstar’s first deed of trust of approximately $256,632. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC (AFI) bought the unit for $26,000, despite its tax-assessed value of $237,930. Flagstar later filed for judicial foreclosure, claiming its lien was extinguished by NHH’s foreclosure sale.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Flagstar’s judicial foreclosure claim, reasoning that the lien was extinguished by the prior foreclosure sale. The court also dismissed Flagstar’s claims for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment as time-barred, as they were raised for the first time in an amended complaint filed almost four years after the foreclosure sale.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Flagstar that its judicial foreclosure claim was improperly dismissed, as rebuttals to affirmative defenses are not subject to any statute of limitations. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the alternative ground that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the judicial foreclosure claim. The court held that the 2014 foreclosure sale was not unconscionable as a matter of law, given the legal uncertainty at the time regarding whether Flagstar’s lien would survive the sale.The court also rejected Flagstar’s remaining arguments, except for the unjust enrichment claim against AFI. The court found that this claim should not have been dismissed as time-barred and could not be resolved on summary judgment. The case was remanded for trial on the unjust enrichment claim against AFI, while the trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC" on Justia Law