Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

M.H.W. has been involuntarily committed to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center (NCC) since June 16, 2020, due to paranoid schizophrenia and an inability to manage his diabetes. The Tenth Judicial District Court extended his commitment several times, with the most recent extension being on January 6, 2022. On December 14, 2022, a petition was filed to extend his commitment for another year. Notice was served, indicating that if a hearing was requested less than 10 days before the termination of the previous commitment, the commitment would be extended until the hearing. However, the court did not issue an order extending the commitment beyond January 6, 2023.On February 8, 2023, M.H.W.'s counsel requested a contested hearing, which was scheduled for April 6, 2023, and later rescheduled to June 1, 2023. The District Court ordered that M.H.W. remain committed until the hearing. At the hearing, the court found that M.H.W. continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia and could not manage his basic needs, including his diabetes. The court ordered his recommitment to NCC for up to one year.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the expiration of M.H.W.'s commitment did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction, as the commitment was extended by operation of law when no hearing was requested before January 6, 2023. The court also held that the District Court's failure to enter an order extending the commitment did not constitute plain error, as M.H.W. received due process through the contested hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order of recommitment. View "In re M.H.W." on Justia Law

Broc Waltermeyer, an incarcerated federal inmate, alleged that he received inadequate medical treatment for his chronic knee pain while at the Federal Correctional Institute in Berlin, New Hampshire. He claimed that despite receiving various non-surgical treatments, including cortisone injections, pain medication, special shoes, knee braces, access to a low bunk, and a cane, he continued to experience pain. Waltermeyer argued that he should have been provided with knee replacement surgery, which was recommended to be deferred by an outside specialist until he was older.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed Waltermeyer's complaint, holding that his claims failed because he had an alternative administrative remedy. The district court also denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, as he had been transferred to a different facility, making the defendants no longer responsible for his care. Waltermeyer then amended his complaint to seek only money damages, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Waltermeyer's claims were meaningfully different from those in Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens-type Eighth Amendment claim against federal prison officials for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The court found that Waltermeyer received substantial treatment, albeit not the treatment he preferred, and that the medical procedures administered were in accordance with doctors' recommendations. The court concluded that the differences in the nature of the medical care provided and the absence of gross inadequacy or deliberate indifference made Waltermeyer's case distinct from Carlson, thus precluding the extension of a Bivens remedy. View "Waltermeyer v. Hazlewood" on Justia Law

In January 2023, J.F., a 39-year-old woman with a history of substance abuse, began experiencing severe delusions and paranoia, believing her parents wanted to kill her and her children. After a series of incidents, including living in her car and being admitted to the St. Vincent Stress Center, J.F. was temporarily committed by a trial court for up to ninety days due to her mental illness and inability to keep herself safe.J.F. appealed the commitment, arguing insufficient evidence supported the order. The Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal as moot, stating it did not present a novel issue or particularized harmful consequence. J.F. then petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court held that temporary commitment appeals are not moot upon expiration unless the appellee proves no collateral consequences exist. The court emphasized the significant liberty interests and lifelong collateral consequences involved in such commitments, warranting appellate review. The court found sufficient evidence to support J.F.'s commitment, noting her impaired reasoning, inability to function independently, and the danger she posed to herself. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's temporary commitment order. View "In re Commitment of J.F." on Justia Law

Mark Eugene Ricks, a Texas state prisoner, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against employees of the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Ricks claimed that he was denied treatment for chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) based on nonmedical reasons and that the TDCJ HCV Policy was the driving force behind this unconstitutional denial of treatment. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Ricks's complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that his allegations did not support a claim for deliberate indifference. The district court also denied Ricks's motion for appointment of counsel. Ricks filed a timely appeal, and the district court denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, certifying that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in dismissing Ricks's complaint without allowing him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. The appellate court held that Ricks's allegations, when liberally construed, could potentially raise a viable claim of deliberate indifference. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ricks's motion for appointment of counsel without considering the relevant factors set out in Ulmer v. Chancellor.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's orders granting the motion to dismiss and denying the appointment of counsel. The case was remanded with instructions for the district court to allow Ricks to amend his pleadings and to appoint counsel to represent him. View "Ricks v. Khan" on Justia Law

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery D. Milner, a physician, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Baptist Health Montgomery, Prattville Baptist, and Team Health. Milner alleged that while working at a hospital owned by the defendants, he discovered that they were overprescribing opioids and fraudulently billing the government for them. He claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing after reporting the overprescription practices to his superiors.Previously, Milner filed an FCA retaliation lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Milner did not sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected conduct under the FCA or that his termination was due to such conduct. Following this dismissal, Milner filed the current qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The district court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. and Shurick v. Boeing Co.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Milner's qui tam action was barred by res judicata because it involved the same parties and the same cause of action as his earlier retaliation lawsuit. The court found that both lawsuits arose from a common nucleus of operative fact: the defendants' alleged illegal conduct and Milner's discovery of that conduct leading to his discharge. The court also noted that the United States, which did not intervene in the qui tam action, was not barred from pursuing its own action in the future. View "Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery" on Justia Law

Relators Tiffany Montcrief and others filed a False Claims Act suit against Peripheral Vascular Associates, P.A. (PVA), alleging that PVA billed Medicare for vascular ultrasound services that were not completed. The claims were categorized into "Testing Only" and "Double Billing" claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators, concluding that PVA submitted knowingly false claims. A jury found these claims material and awarded approximately $28.7 million in damages against PVA.The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators on the issues of falsity and knowledge of falsity. The jury found that the claims were material and caused the Government to pay out money. The district court entered judgment against PVA, including statutory penalties and treble damages. PVA appealed, challenging the district court's grant of partial summary judgment and certain rulings during and after the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment on the Testing Only claims but remanded for a new trial on damages. The court reversed the partial summary judgment ruling on the Double Billing claims, vacated the final judgment, and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the district court erred in interpreting the CPT–4 Manual and in concluding that the Manual required PVA to create separate, written reports for vascular ultrasounds before billing Medicare. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in relying on Relators' post-trial expert declaration to calculate damages. View "Montcrief v. Peripheral Vascular" on Justia Law

In the 1950s, Bert and Donna Miller sought fertility treatment at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. Dr. John H. Randall, the head of the department, assisted them, resulting in the birth of three children. Decades later, DNA testing revealed that Dr. Randall, not Bert Miller, was the biological father of two of the children. The plaintiffs, Bert Miller and Nancy Duffner, sued the State of Iowa under the Fraud in Assisted Reproduction Act (FARA), alleging that Dr. Randall used his own sperm without their parents' knowledge or consent.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the case, ruling that FARA, enacted in 2022, does not apply retroactively to actions taken decades earlier. The court found that FARA lacks any express language indicating legislative intent for retrospective application, and thus, it operates only prospectively. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that FARA's provision allowing children to sue "at any time" implies retroactive application.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that FARA does not apply to fertility fraud committed before the statute was enacted. The court emphasized that without an express retroactivity provision, statutes creating new substantive liabilities are presumed to operate only prospectively. The court found no language in FARA that rebuts this presumption and concluded that the statute's provision allowing actions to be brought "at any time" pertains only to future violations. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed with prejudice. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

A.J. began experiencing auditory hallucinations around 2010, leading to multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. Diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, he was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on various charges. The criminal court vacated the incompetency order and directed the Public Guardian to investigate an LPS conservatorship. The Public Guardian filed a petition, citing A.J.'s grave disability due to mental health and substance abuse disorders. A.J.'s psychiatrist and social worker testified about his lack of insight into his illness, unwillingness to take medication, and history of aggressive behavior.The trial court appointed a temporary conservator in 2024. During a jury trial, the social worker and psychiatrist testified about A.J.'s inability to maintain housing due to his mental illness and aggressive behavior. The jury found A.J. gravely disabled. The trial court then appointed the Public Guardian as his conservator, granting the power to place him in a psychiatric or other state-licensed facility.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. A.J. argued that the Public Guardian's closing argument improperly suggested he was unable to provide shelter due to past involuntary detentions and that the trial court improperly delegated the duty to designate the least restrictive placement. The court disagreed with A.J.'s first argument, finding no authority to support his claim and noting that the Public Guardian's argument was based on multiple factors. However, the court agreed that the trial court failed to designate the least restrictive placement, as required by law. The court remanded the case for the trial court to designate the least restrictive placement but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "In re Conservatorship of the Person of A.J." on Justia Law

A hospital in Siskiyou County, California, filed a lawsuit against the County of Siskiyou and other defendants, challenging the practice of bringing individuals with psychiatric emergencies to its emergency department under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. The hospital argued that it was not equipped or licensed to provide the necessary psychiatric care and sought to prevent the county from bringing such patients to its facility unless they had a physical emergency condition. The hospital also sought reimbursement for the costs associated with holding these patients.The Siskiyou County Superior Court denied the hospital's motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to stop the county from bringing psychiatric patients to its emergency department. The court found that the hospital had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that the burden on the county and the potential harm to the patients outweighed the hospital's concerns.The hospital's complaint included several causes of action, including violations of Medicaid laws, disability discrimination laws, mental health parity laws, and section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The hospital also alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract for the costs incurred in providing post-stabilization services to psychiatric patients. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend, finding that the hospital failed to identify any clear legal mandate that the county or the Department of Health Care Services had violated.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. The appellate court concluded that the hospital had not identified any mandatory and ministerial duty that the county or the department had violated, which is necessary to obtain a writ of mandate. The court also found that the hospital's breach of contract claim failed because there were no allegations of mutual consent to an implied contract. Consequently, the hospital's appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "Siskiyou Hospital v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law