Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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A human trafficker victimized Jane Doe, grooming her through Facebook, which lacked sufficient guardrails for minors. The trafficker convinced Doe to meet in person and advertised her for prostitution on Backpage, leading to her sexual assault at the Texas Pearl Hotel in Houston. Doe sued Facebook and Texas Pearl for violations of Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 98, which imposes civil liability on those who benefit from human trafficking.The MDL pretrial court denied Facebook’s motion to remand the case, and the MDL panel upheld this decision. Facebook argued that its case had no common fact questions with the MDL cases, which involved different defendants, plaintiffs, and incidents. The MDL cases named various hotels and Salesforce as defendants, alleging they facilitated human trafficking through their services. Facebook contended that the lack of common parties or events meant there were no shared fact questions.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with Facebook. The court held that the tag-along case did not share any common fact questions with the MDL cases. The MDL cases involved different defendants, criminal perpetrators, and incidents, and there was no connection through common parties or events. The court concluded that general patterns of criminal activity by different perpetrators do not create the required common fact question for MDL inclusion. Consequently, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the MDL panel to remand the tag-along case to its original trial court. View "IN RE JANE DOE CASES" on Justia Law

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Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

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A client sued its lawyer for legal malpractice after losing a case. The client had previously been sued for fraud and lost, resulting in a significant judgment against it. The client then assigned its malpractice claim against its lawyer to the opposing party in the fraud case, hoping to share in any recovery. However, the court had previously held that such assignments are generally not allowed because they can lead to a reversal of positions that is demeaning to the justice system.In the lower courts, the trial court found the lawyer negligent but not grossly negligent, and the jury awarded damages to the client. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim but reversed the directed verdict on gross negligence, remanding the case for a new trial. In the second trial, the jury again found the lawyer negligent and grossly negligent, awarding significant damages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment due to an improper jury instruction and remanded for a third trial.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim despite the arrangement with the opposing party. The court found that while there was evidence of the lawyer's negligence, the evidence that the lawyer's negligence was the sole cause of the fraud judgment was conclusory. The court also held that there was no evidence of gross negligence. Therefore, the court affirmed the remand for a new trial on negligence but reversed the judgment on gross negligence, rendering a take-nothing judgment on that claim. View "HENRY S. MILLER COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. NEWSOM, TERRY & NEWSOM, LLP" on Justia Law

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Several homeowners sued an irrigation district, claiming that the district's refusal to remove over twenty-year-old charges from the tax rolls was an ultra vires act, violating the Tax Code's twenty-year limitations period. The district argued that the charges were Water Code assessments, not taxes, and thus not subject to the limitations period.The trial court granted the district officials' jurisdictional plea without permitting discovery, dismissing the homeowners' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed in part, concluding that the pleadings did not support an ultra vires claim under the Tax Code because the homeowners had not sought a refund from the tax assessor and the district had clarified that the charges were assessments under the Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the homeowners had sufficiently pleaded facts to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over their ultra vires claim. The court held that the homeowners' pleadings, viewed liberally, alleged that the charges were taxes, had been delinquent for more than twenty years, and that no related litigation was pending at the time of the request to remove the charges. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and did not implicate the district's governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the Tax Code ultra vires claim and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Herrera v. Mata" on Justia Law

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In 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, known as the Texas Heartbeat Act, which prohibits physicians from performing abortions if a fetal heartbeat is detected. The Act allows enforcement only through private civil actions. Plaintiffs, including Allison Van Stean and various Planned Parenthood entities, alleged that Texas Right to Life (TRTL) organized efforts to sue those violating the Act. They filed multiple suits challenging the Act's constitutionality and sought injunctions to prevent TRTL from enforcing it. The cases were consolidated, and TRTL filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), both challenging the plaintiffs' standing. The trial court denied both motions.TRTL appealed the denial of the TCPA motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court's order, stating that the TCPA did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims. The court did not address the standing issue raised by TRTL. TRTL then petitioned for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred by not addressing the standing issue, which is a prerequisite for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdictional questions must be resolved before addressing the merits of a case. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. If the plaintiffs lack standing, the case should be dismissed; if they have standing, the Court of Appeals should then address the merits of the TCPA motion. View "TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE v. STEAN" on Justia Law

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Robert Roberson, a death-row inmate, was scheduled for execution on October 17, 2024. On October 16, 2024, the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence issued a subpoena requiring Roberson to testify on October 21, 2024, creating a conflict between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The judicial branch had affirmed Roberson's sentence, and the executive branch had declined clemency. The committee sought to delay the execution to obtain Roberson's testimony, claiming legislative authority to compel testimony superseded the scheduled execution.The committee filed a lawsuit in a state district court, which granted a temporary restraining order to delay the execution. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the department) sought relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which set aside the restraining order. The committee then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus to enforce the subpoena and delay the execution.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the legislative committee's authority to compel testimony does not override the scheduled legal process leading to an execution. The court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that the legislature's investigatory power must be balanced against the judiciary's authority to render judgments and the executive's authority to enforce them. The court held that the committee could have obtained Roberson's testimony earlier and that the legislative subpoena could not disrupt the execution process. Consequently, the court denied the committee's petition for writ of mandamus, allowing the execution to proceed as scheduled. View "IN RE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" on Justia Law

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Richard Wade, the former president, CEO, and director of Vertical Computer Systems, Inc., was sued in April 2020 by the company's chief technical officer and several shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Wade's address was initially listed as "3717 Cole Avenue, Apt. 293, Dallas, Texas 75204." After a year, the claims against Wade were severed into a separate action, and the trial court ordered binding arbitration. Wade's attorney later filed a motion to withdraw, listing Wade's address as "3717 Cole Ave., Apt. 277, Dallas, Texas 75204." Notice of the trial was sent to this incorrect address.The trial court scheduled a bench trial for April 19, 2022, and Wade appeared pro se but did not present any evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them over $21 million. Wade filed a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that he did not receive proper notice of the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and found that Wade did not receive proper notice of the trial setting, which violated his due process rights. The court noted that the notice was sent to an incorrect address and that Wade had informed the trial court of this issue. The court held that proceeding to trial without proper notice was reversible error and that Wade was entitled to a new trial. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wade v. Vertical Computer Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the City of Austin and the Austin Firefighters Association. The provision, known as Article 10, grants 5,600 hours of "Association Business Leave" (ABL) annually for firefighters to conduct union-related activities. The petitioners, including the State of Texas and several individuals, argued that Article 10 violates the "Gift Clauses" of the Texas Constitution, which prohibit governmental entities from making gifts of public resources to private parties. They contended that the ABL provision improperly benefits the union by allowing firefighters to use paid time off for union activities, some of which they alleged were misused for improper purposes.The case was initially dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), with the trial court granting relief to the Association, including the award of fees and sanctions. On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact went unchallenged, and the focus was primarily on whether the agreement itself violated the Gift Clauses.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Article 10 does not violate the Gift Clauses. The court found that the provision is not a gratuitous gift but brings a public benefit, serves a legitimate public purpose, and the government retains control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is achieved. The court emphasized that the ABL must be used for activities that directly support the mission of the Fire Department or the Association and are consistent with the Association’s purposes. The court also reversed the trial court's order granting the Association's TCPA motion to dismiss and its award of sanctions and fees against the original plaintiffs. View "BORGELT v. AUSTIN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, IAFF LOCAL 975" on Justia Law

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The case involves Dianne Hensley, a justice of the peace in Texas, who announced that due to her religious beliefs, she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples but would refer them to others who would. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued her a public warning for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially due to the person's sexual orientation, in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Hensley did not appeal this warning to a Special Court of Review (SCR) but instead sued the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Hensley's suit was not barred by her decision not to appeal the Commission’s Public Warning or by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing one of Hensley's declaratory requests for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the remainder of the judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on appeal. The court found that the SCR could not have finally decided whether Hensley is entitled to the relief sought in this case or awarded the relief TRFRA provides to successful claimants. View "HENSLEY v. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT" on Justia Law

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The case involves Angela Horton and Kevin Houser, who sued the Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KC Southern) for the wrongful death of their mother. They alleged that KC Southern negligently maintained a railroad crossing by raising the crossing grade over time to form a “humped crossing” and by failing to replace a missing yield sign. The jury found both parties negligently caused the accident and assigned equal responsibility to each. The trial court awarded Horton fifty percent of the damages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that federal law preempts a negligence claim based on the humped crossing, but supports a finding that the missing yield sign proximately caused the accident.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on different grounds. The court held that federal law does not preempt the humped-crossing claim and that no evidence supports the jury’s finding that the absence of the yield sign proximately caused the accident. The court concluded that only one of the two allegations could support the jury’s negligence finding, and it could not be certain which of the two allegations the jury relied on. Therefore, the court agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court’s use of a broad-form question to submit the negligence claim constituted harmful error and that a new trial is required. However, the court remanded for a new trial on the humped-crossing allegation rather than on the missing-yield-sign allegation. After further review, the court reversed its previous decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the submission of the broad-form question did not constitute harmful error. View "HORTON v. THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law