Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2018, the Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated neglect proceedings against a mother for leaving her young children unsupervised. The mother consented to a neglect finding, and subsequent permanency hearings were held regarding the placement of two of her children in DSS custody. In 2020, the Family Court trial discharged the children to the mother's custody, but later returned them to DSS after allegations of the mother's non-compliance and further neglect surfaced. In March 2022, the Family Court continued the children's placement with DSS and ordered the mother to participate in various programs and evaluations. The mother appealed this order.During the appeal, another permanency hearing was held, resulting in an October 2022 order that also continued the children's placement with DSS and reiterated the requirements for the mother. The mother appealed this order as well. While these appeals were pending, new permanency hearings and orders were issued, superseding the previous ones. The Appellate Division dismissed the mother's appeals as moot, given that the orders had expired and been replaced.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the appeals were moot because the orders in question had been superseded by subsequent orders, and thus no longer affected the mother's rights. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in declining to invoke the mootness exception, as the issues raised were not sufficiently substantial or novel. Additionally, the Court declined to adopt a blanket mootness exception for all permanency hearing orders, emphasizing that such a rule would be impractical and could undermine the purpose of timely and effective judicial review in child welfare cases. View "Matter of Joshua J." on Justia Law

Ezrasons, Inc., a New York corporation and beneficial owner of Barclays PLC shares, initiated a derivative action on behalf of Barclays against several current and former Barclays directors and officers, as well as Barclays Capital Inc. (BCI). The complaint alleged breaches of fiduciary duties under English law, causing significant harm to Barclays. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that under English law, only registered members of Barclays could maintain such an action, and Ezrasons was not a registered member.The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the internal affairs doctrine required the application of English law, which precluded Ezrasons from having standing. The court rejected the argument that New York's Business Corporation Law (BCL) sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2) overrode the internal affairs doctrine. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the internal affairs doctrine applied and that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the internal affairs doctrine, which mandates that the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes related to corporate internal affairs, was not overridden by BCL sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2). The court found no clear legislative intent to displace the doctrine and concluded that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law to maintain the derivative action. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Ezrasons, Inc. v Rudd" on Justia Law

In 1993, 11-year-old Michael Nellenback was placed in the care of Madison County's Department of Social Services (DSS) and assigned to caseworker Karl Hoch. Over the next three years, Hoch sexually abused Nellenback. Hoch was later convicted of various sex crimes and died in prison in 2001. In 2019, Nellenback filed a lawsuit against Madison County under the Child Victims Act, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Hoch.The Supreme Court granted Madison County's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the County lacked actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensities for abuse and that no further investigation or supervision would have uncovered the abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding the County's liability for negligent supervision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Nellenback failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his negligent supervision claim. The evidence did not show that the County had actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensity for abuse. The Court found that the absence of records documenting Hoch's interactions with Nellenback was not sufficient to establish a triable issue, as the records were routinely destroyed after a certain period. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary role of caseworkers was to transport children, and it was speculative to suggest that increased review of records would have put the County on notice of the abuse. Thus, the Court concluded that Nellenback's claim could not withstand summary judgment. View "Nellenback v Madison County" on Justia Law

Dynamic Logic Inc. (Dynamic) markets products to help clients measure the effectiveness of their advertising campaigns. The product in question, AdIndex, uses a control/exposed methodology to measure the effectiveness of digital advertising. Dynamic surveys individuals exposed to a client's advertisements and a control group, compares the results to broader market data in its MarketNorms database, and generates a report for the client. The data from each AdIndex report is later incorporated into the MarketNorms database for future use.In 2014, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance audited Dynamic and concluded that AdIndex was a taxable information service under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1), assessing additional sales tax. Dynamic challenged the assessment before the Division of Tax Appeals, which upheld the tax imposition. The Tax Appeals Tribunal affirmed, finding that AdIndex's primary function was the collection and analysis of information, and that any recommendations were ancillary to the data collection. The Tribunal also determined that Dynamic was not entitled to an exclusion under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1) because the data collected was furnished to other persons through its incorporation into the MarketNorms database.Dynamic filed a CPLR article 78 petition in the Appellate Division to annul the Tribunal's determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal had rationally determined that AdIndex was an information service and that there was substantial evidence supporting its reasoning. The court also held that the Tribunal rationally concluded that the information provided through AdIndex was substantially incorporated into reports furnished to other persons, disqualifying Dynamic from the exclusion.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, holding that the Tribunal's determination was rational and supported by substantial evidence. The court found that AdIndex fit the definition of a taxable information service and that the data was substantially incorporated into subsequent reports, making Dynamic ineligible for the exclusion under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1). View "Matter of Dynamic Logic, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of New York" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while competing in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit in the eye by a ball from another player teeing off from a nearby hole. He filed a negligence action against the golf club, claiming the course was negligently designed and operated, particularly pointing to the placement of a tee box that increased the risk of such accidents.The Supreme Court denied the golf club's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk of being struck by a golf ball. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, granting summary judgment to the golf club. The court emphasized Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout, concluding that the design did not expose him to risks beyond those inherent in the sport of golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the game, and there was no evidence that the course's design unreasonably enhanced this risk.In a related case, Mary Galante was injured in a parking lot at a golf course before she began playing. The Appellate Division had applied the primary assumption of risk doctrine to dismiss her claim. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the doctrine did not apply because Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted for further proceedings. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Mr. Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) in 2012. The ATR is a pool of teachers whose positions were eliminated but who were not terminated. In 2017, the DOE and UFT created a voluntary severance package for ATR teachers. Mr. Dourdounas, believing he was still in the ATR pool, applied for the severance package but was denied because the DOE claimed he had been permanently hired at Bronx International High School.Mr. Dourdounas followed the grievance process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the DOE and UFT. After exhausting the grievance process, including an internal appeal within the UFT, he commenced an article 78 proceeding against the City, alleging breach of contract for denying him the retirement incentive. The DOE moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, including timeliness and failure to state a cause of action.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the statute of limitations began when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of the denial in July 2017. The Appellate Division held that pursuing the grievance process did not toll the statute of limitations.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. The court held that under the precedent set in Ambach, an employee cannot seek judicial review of a claim arising under a CBA without alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Since Mr. Dourdounas did not allege such a breach, his claim was dismissed. The court also clarified that claims arising solely from a CBA must be brought as a breach of contract action, not through an article 78 proceeding. View "Matter of Dourdounas v City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants of a building in Queens, alleged that the defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate rents unlawfully. The building participated in the Real Property Tax Law § 421-a program, which required compliance with rent stabilization laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the previous owner registered both a preferential rent and a higher legal regulated rent, allowing for illegal rent increases. This scheme allegedly continued for years, affecting many tenants. Plaintiffs also accused the defendant of concealing this conduct by registering a legal regulated rent that matched the preferential rent.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient indicia of fraud to invoke the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because they could not have reasonably relied on the inflated rent figures, which were disclosed in the registration statements and leases.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and clarified that to invoke the fraud exception, a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate each element of common-law fraud, including reliance. Instead, the complaint must allege sufficient indicia of fraud. The Court modified the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case for further proceedings to determine if the plaintiffs' complaint met the established standard for alleging a fraudulent scheme. The Court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff's overcharge claim based on a rent concession, as the defendant's evidence refuted the allegations. View "Burrows v. 75-25 153rd St., LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a student at Stony Brook University, challenged the University's determination that he violated the University's Code of Student Responsibility by committing sexual misconduct against another student, S.G. The University conducted an investigation after receiving a report of the incident, during which S.G. provided a written statement detailing the encounter. P.C. declined to meet with the investigator. He was charged with sexual harassment, nonconsensual sexual contact, and nonconsensual sexual intercourse. A hearing was held, and the Review Panel found P.C. responsible for the charges, leading to his suspension.P.C. appealed the decision, arguing that the evidence did not support the findings and that the Review Panel improperly considered his decision to remain silent. The Appeals Committee upheld the Review Panel's determination and the disciplinary penalty. P.C. then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding, asserting that the determination lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Appellate Division, which granted the petition, annulled the Appeals Committee's determination, dismissed the charges, and directed the University to expunge the matter from P.C.'s academic record. The Appellate Division majority found that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that S.G. did not consent to the sexual activity and that the Review Panel improperly relied on P.C.'s decision not to answer questions.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's order, holding that substantial evidence supported the University's determination that P.C. violated the Code of Student Responsibility. The Court found that S.G.'s testimony and P.C.'s text messages provided sufficient evidence of nonconsensual sexual activity. The Court also rejected P.C.'s argument that the University's determination was arbitrary and capricious, concluding that the University followed its rules and procedures. The petition was dismissed. View "Matter of P.C. v Stony Brook Univ." on Justia Law

Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP sought to recover legal fees from Be In, Inc., a New York corporation, and its investors, including George Koukis. After Be In failed to pay, Gibson Dunn obtained a judgment in California and domesticated it in New York. Unable to recover from Be In, Gibson Dunn filed a lawsuit in New York Supreme Court against the D'Annas and Mr. Koukis, asserting fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims. The defendants, represented by attorney Gil Santamarina, entered a stipulation waiving personal jurisdiction defenses.The New York Supreme Court initially denied Gibson Dunn's motion for default judgment but later granted it upon reargument. Mr. Koukis then moved to strike Mr. Santamarina's appearance, vacate the default judgment, and dismiss the complaint, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service. The Supreme Court vacated the waiver of personal jurisdiction but found jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (2) and set a traverse hearing to determine proper service.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, vacating the default judgment and dismissing the complaint against Mr. Koukis for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Mr. Santamarina was not authorized to waive jurisdictional defenses. Two Justices dissented, arguing for a hearing to determine the validity of Mr. Santamarina's representation.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that there is a material factual dispute regarding whether Mr. Koukis authorized or ratified the waiver of personal jurisdiction. The court emphasized the need for a factual hearing to resolve this issue, citing emails and filings suggesting potential authorization or ratification by Mr. Koukis. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings to determine the validity of the waiver. View "Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v Koukis" on Justia Law