Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2018, the City of Nashua approved a bond resolution to construct a performing arts center. Due to financing complications, the City formed two non-profit corporations to take advantage of a federal tax credit. In 2020, NPAC Corp., a private, for-profit corporation, was formed to aid in the tax credit process. NPAC is wholly owned by one of the non-profits, which is owned by the City. Laurie Ortolano requested NPAC's public records related to the center, but NPAC claimed it was not subject to the Right-to-Know Law (RSA chapter 91-A). Ortolano then filed a complaint seeking access to these records.The Superior Court dismissed Ortolano's complaint, agreeing with NPAC that it was not a public entity subject to RSA chapter 91-A. The court also dismissed the claims against the City, reasoning that the relief sought was derivative of the claim against NPAC. Additionally, the court denied Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint to allege constitutional violations because she failed to attach a proposed amended complaint.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the City, finding that Ortolano's complaint did not state an independent claim against the City. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the claims against NPAC, ruling that the trial court erred by not applying the "government function" test to determine if NPAC was a "public body" under RSA chapter 91-A. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of Ortolano's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendment did not cure the defect in the original pleading.The case was remanded for the trial court to apply the "government function" test to determine whether NPAC is subject to the Right-to-Know Law. View "Ortolano v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

Mark Nelson, operating North Country Weatherization Technologies, provided ice removal services to Pine View First Addition Association, a Minnesota non-profit homeowners' association, in spring 2023. Pine View's property manager, a North Dakota LLC, contacted Nelson for urgent ice removal due to water damage. Nelson completed the work and invoiced Pine View, but payment was delayed, allegedly due to Pine View's attempt to have insurance cover the costs. Nelson filed a lawsuit in North Dakota for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking $79,695 plus interest and attorney’s fees.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Pine View's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that North Dakota did not have jurisdiction over Pine View, as it is a Minnesota entity and the services were performed in Minnesota. The court also denied Pine View's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Nelson and his attorney, as well as Nelson's request for prevailing party attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that North Dakota has specific personal jurisdiction over Pine View because Pine View, through its North Dakota-based property manager, initiated contact with Nelson for the ice removal services. The court found that Pine View's contacts with North Dakota were sufficient to satisfy the state's long-arm provision and due process requirements. The Supreme Court also determined that the district court abused its discretion in denying Nelson's request for prevailing party attorney’s fees under Rule 11(c)(2), as Pine View's motion for sanctions against Nelson violated Rule 11(c)(5)(A). The case was remanded for further proceedings and to determine the amount of attorney’s fees Nelson is owed. View "Nelson v. Pine View First Addition Association" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Joseph Gazal, donated over $1 million to purchase a car and a home for a destitute family. He was inspired to make this donation after hearing a homily delivered by defendant Carlos Echeverry, a deacon at his church. Gazal brought a lawsuit against Echeverry and his wife, Jessica Echeverry, as well as SOFESA, Inc., a nonprofit founded and led by Jessica Echeverry. Gazal claimed he was deceived into believing the car and house would be purchased for and titled to the destitute family, when in fact they were bought and titled to SOFESA.The defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, asserting that the homily and following conversations were protected speech. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the complaint did not rest on protected speech, but rather on private conduct and speech not directed at a wide public audience. Additionally, the court found that the causes of action arose from further communications that took place weeks after the homily.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that while the homily could be considered protected speech, the plaintiff's claims did not arise from the homily but rather from the alleged misconduct that occurred after its delivery. The court also found that the private discussions following the homily did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection as they did not contribute to a public conversation on the issue of homelessness. Furthermore, the court denied a motion for sanctions filed by the plaintiff. View "Gazal v. Echeverry" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina involved a dispute between The Society for the Historical Preservation of the Twentysixth North Carolina Troops, Inc. (plaintiff) and the City of Asheville (defendant). The controversy centered around a monument dedicated to Zebulon Vance, a former North Carolina Governor and Confederate Colonel. The plaintiff, a nonprofit historical preservation organization, raised funds to restore the monument and entered into a donation agreement with the City, whereby the monument was restored and then donated to the City. However, the City later decided to remove the monument, citing it as a public safety threat due to vandalism and threats of toppling.In response, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City breached the 2015 donation agreement and seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment. The plaintiff argued that both parties had entered into a contract with the intent to preserve the monument in perpetuity. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the City's motion, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.When the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had abandoned the merits of its breach of contract claim in its appeal. As such, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory judgment for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to assert any ground for which it has standing to contest the removal of the monument. View "Soc'y for the Hist. Pres. of the Twenty-sixth N.C. Troops, Inc. v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

The case involves the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a nonprofit organization that sought to unseal court filings from federal criminal investigations. The District Court in Minnesota dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, and the case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Reporters Committee's application aimed to unseal electronic-surveillance filings, which were required to be filed under seal by a local rule. The District Court believed the request was too broad since the majority of the materials requested become unsealed after six months. The court suggested negotiations with the United States Attorney’s Office to reach a solution.The Reporters Committee subsequently filed an amended application, seeking an order directing the clerk of the court to presumptively unseal warrants and related documents after 180 days and to begin docketing the government’s applications for electronic surveillance regardless of whether a judge granted them. The Committee claimed these duties arose under the First Amendment and the common-law right of access to public records and documents.The District Court dismissed the application, concluding that the Committee lacked standing because all it had was a “generalized, abstract interest” in unsealing the records. This decision was affirmed by the Appeals Court, which held that the Committee failed to establish it suffered a “concrete” and “particularized” injury. It was also noted that the Committee did not sue anyone who could provide the relief it sought, hence there was a lack of adversity necessary for federal court adjudication. View "Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States" on Justia Law

A Vermont-based non-profit organization and an LLC challenged a superior court's dismissal of their complaint over a grant they did not receive. The plaintiffs, Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. and Lakemont Retirement Community LLC, argued that the grant provided by the Newport Development Fund Grant Committee to another organization was wrongly awarded. The plaintiffs also alleged a conflict of interest in the committee.However, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, reasoning that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the grant award. The court clarified that the plaintiffs had no legal right to receive the grant or to have any specific procedure in the allocation of the grant. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument of specific rules governing the grant process asserting that the grant process was discretionary, and the eligibility criteria did not guarantee any particular process.Consequently, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal for lack of standing, reinforcing that a legal entitlement or right is essential to establish an injury-in-fact for standing. View "Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

In the State of Delaware, a lawsuit was brought by two non-profit organizations against multiple public officials, including tax collectors in Delaware's three counties. The organizations sought increased funding for Delaware’s public schools. The Court of Chancery held that the organizations were entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the "common benefit doctrine" and its expansion of a precedent case, Korn v. New Castle County, beyond taxpayer suits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's award of expenses, but reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that the litigation brought by the organizations was to compel the defendant county governments to comply with the law, a benefit that did not warrant an exception to the "American Rule" which states that each party bears its own attorneys' fees, absent certain exceptions. The Court also held that, even if this case were a taxpayer suit, it does not meet the standard set forth in Korn because there was not a quantifiable, non-speculative monetary benefit for all taxpayers. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

The City and Borough of Sitka, Alaska allowed an independent nonprofit organization to host a public event at a city facility. The nonprofit organization arranged for a volunteer to hang decorations in the facility; a decoration fell, injuring an event participant. The injured participant sued the City, but not the nonprofit organization, for negligence. The City brought a third-party allocation of fault claim against the volunteer. The parties sought summary judgment, and the trial court concluded that, under federal law, the volunteer could not be held financially responsible for the accident and that the City could not be held vicariously liable for the volunteer’s actions. The remaining negligence issues were decided at a jury trial; the jury determined that the volunteer and the city had not been negligent and therefore were not liable for the accident. The event participant appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Sulzbach v. City & Borough of Sitka, et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Alabama Legislature and the citizens of Greene County voted to allow nonprofit organizations in that county to operate bingo games for fundraising purposes. Greenetrack, Inc. ("Greenetrack"), which was not a nonprofit organization, almost immediately began offering live and electronic bingo games at its gambling facility. From 2004 to 2008, Greenetrack reaped vast profits under the guise that its whole casino-style bingo operation was constantly being leased and operated by a revolving slate of local nonprofit organizations, whose nominal role earned them a tiny fraction of the bingo proceeds. Eventually, the Alabama Department of Revenue ("the Department") audited Greenetrack, found that its bingo activities were illegal, and concluded that it owed over $76 million in unpaid taxes and interest. Following a decade of litigation, the Alabama Tax Tribunal voided the assessed taxes on the threshold ground that Greenetrack's bingo business (regardless of its legality) was tax-immune under a statute governing Greenetrack's status as a licensed operator of dog races. The Department appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the statutory analysis offered by the Tax Tribunal and circuit court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the Department. View "Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc." on Justia Law