Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An environmental group, Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), sued Academy Express, LLC (Academy), a transportation company, alleging that Academy violated the Clean Air Act (CAA) by idling its buses beyond state limits in Massachusetts and Connecticut. CLF claimed that its members were harmed by breathing polluted air from Academy's buses. Academy moved for summary judgment, arguing that CLF lacked associational standing. The district court agreed and granted Academy's motion, holding that CLF could not demonstrate that its members suffered a concrete injury traceable to Academy's conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that only two of CLF's members, Wagner and Morelli, had alleged injuries-in-fact, but their injuries were not traceable to Academy's idling due to the presence of other potential pollution sources in the urban environment. The court did not address the standing of additional members disclosed by CLF after the close of fact discovery or the expert testimony submitted by CLF.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's narrow interpretation of injury-in-fact. The appellate court held that breathing polluted air and reasonable fear of health effects from pollution are cognizable injuries. It also found that recreational harms do not require a change in behavior to be considered injuries-in-fact. The court emphasized that traceability does not require a conclusive link but can be established through geographic proximity and expert testimony.The First Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to determine the scope of the record, make necessary factual findings, and apply the correct legal standards for injury-in-fact and traceability. The appellate court did not address redressability, leaving it for the district court to consider if necessary. View "Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Academy Express, LLC" on Justia Law

Atlantic Richfield Company acquired a mine in Colorado, which had been leaking sulfuric acid into a nearby river. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened in 2000 to stabilize the situation, but the leaks persisted. In 2011, the EPA ordered Atlantic Richfield to build water treatment systems, and in 2021, Atlantic Richfield settled with the EPA, agreeing to continue the cleanup and pay $400,000. Six months later, Atlantic Richfield sued NL Industries, Inc. and NL Environmental Management Services for contribution towards the cleanup costs.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted partial summary judgment in favor of the NL entities, ruling that Atlantic Richfield's claims to recoup part of the cleanup costs were time-barred. Atlantic Richfield appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that the action was one for contribution, not cost recovery. The court noted that the Supreme Court has clarified that cost recovery and contribution are distinct actions. The court found that Atlantic Richfield's claim fell under the contribution category because it sought to recoup expenses following a settlement with the EPA, which required Atlantic Richfield to perform a removal action at the site.The Tenth Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations for contribution actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) should apply, even though the specific types of claims listed in that section did not include Atlantic Richfield's situation. The court held that the three-year limitations period for contribution actions applied, making Atlantic Richfield's lawsuit timely. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. NL Industries" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed a lawsuit against several pipeline operators and Entergy New Orleans LLC, alleging that their oil and gas production and transportation activities caused damage to the City's coastal zone. The City claimed that Entergy allowed its pipeline canals to widen and erode, threatening the City's storm buffer. The lawsuit was filed under Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA).The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that Entergy, the only in-state defendant, was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Entergy consented to the removal and argued that it was exempt from SLCRMA’s permit requirements because its activities commenced before the statute's effective date. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the motion, dismissed Entergy as a party, and stayed the case pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Entergy was improperly joined because its activities were exempt under SLCRMA’s Historical-Use Exception, which applies to uses legally commenced before the statute's effective date. The court found no reasonable basis for the City to recover against Entergy, thus disregarding Entergy's citizenship and establishing complete diversity among the parties. The court also rejected the City's argument that it was merely a nominal party representing Louisiana, concluding that the City filed the suit on its own behalf and stood to benefit from a favorable ruling. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion to remand. View "New Orleans City v. Aspect Energy" on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Port City Air Leasing, Inc. (Port City) leases land and buildings at Pease International Tradeport for aircraft-related services. Pease Aviation Partners LLC, doing business as Million Air Portsmouth (Million Air), proposed to lease adjacent land to build a similar facility and applied for a permit to dredge and fill wetlands to construct an access road. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) issued the permit in June 2022. Port City filed an administrative appeal with the New Hampshire Wetlands Council (Council), arguing that the permit issuance was unlawful and unreasonable. Million Air intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming Port City lacked standing.The Hearing Officer ruled that Port City lacked standing because it was not a "person aggrieved" under RSA 482-A:10, I, which includes the applicant and those entitled to notice by mail under RSA 482-A:8 and RSA 482-A:9. The Hearing Officer determined that Port City was not an "abutting landowner" entitled to notice. Port City's motion for reconsideration and rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Council's decision. The court held that Port City is not a "landowner" under RSA 482-A:9 because its lease does not grant interests equivalent to fee ownership. Consequently, Port City is not a "person aggrieved" with standing to appeal under RSA 482-A:10, I. The court also rejected Port City's due process claims, concluding that the absence of an administrative remedy does not violate its state or federal due process rights, as Port City still has potential legal remedies for any injuries. The court affirmed the dismissal of Port City's appeal. View "Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Noah Gabriel, owns an undeveloped parcel of real estate in Narragansett, Rhode Island. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) received a notification of potential wetland violations on the property and investigated, finding that the property had been altered by clearing vegetation, applying fill soil, installing a culvert, and expanding a driveway. CRMC issued a cease-and-desist order and later an order to restore the property. Gabriel disputed CRMC's jurisdiction and filed a complaint in Washington County Superior Court, asserting that CRMC lacked jurisdiction and had committed various illegal actions.The Superior Court granted CRMC's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ordering Gabriel to cease all activities on the property. Gabriel appealed, arguing that CRMC did not have the authority to enforce wetland regulations on his property and cited the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Court determined that CRMC had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, as there was evidence of wetland violations. The Court also found that CRMC would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, as continued alterations to the property would harm the environment. The balance of equities favored CRMC, and the issuance of the injunction would preserve the status quo by protecting the wetland. View "Gabriel v. Willis" on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) challenging the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested multiple extensions and accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, citing his disability. The trial court granted six such requests over eight months but denied a seventh request for further extensions and relief from procedural obligations.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request deprived them of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that granting another extension would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which would not deny them access to judicial services. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Sisters Nikki Mazzocchio and Angela Kraus filed a federal "public liability action" under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) against several defendants, alleging that exposure to radioactive waste caused them to develop cancer. The waste had been handled by various entities over the years, including Mallinckrodt, Cotter Corporation, and Commonwealth Edison Company. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and civil conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law preempted the state-law claims because federal nuclear dosage regulations provide the exclusive standard of care in a public liability action. The district court denied the motions to dismiss, and the defendants appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were not preempted by federal law. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their case under state tort law standards. The defendants then sought and were granted permission to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that state tort law standards of care are not preempted by federal nuclear dosage regulations in a public liability action under the PAA. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., which established that state tort law applies in cases involving nuclear incidents, despite the federal government's exclusive control over nuclear safety regulation. The court also noted that Congress, through the PAA's 1988 amendments, did not repudiate the role of state tort law in such cases. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs' state-law claims to proceed. View "Mazzocchio v. Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law