Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount.After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

A group of local residents and an environmental organization alleged that a nonprofit entity operating a large compound in Deerpark, New York, was discharging stormwater and wastewater containing fecal coliform bacteria into nearby surface waters in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The plaintiffs claimed that these discharges, which they supported with water testing data, exceeded legal limits and were the result of ongoing construction and improper maintenance of the defendant’s wastewater treatment plant. The affected waters are used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes and are part of a larger watershed.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ initial complaint, finding that their pre-suit notice of intent to sue was deficient and thus failed to satisfy the CWA’s notice requirement. The court treated this requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the case without prejudice. After the plaintiffs sent a new, more detailed notice and refiled their claims, the district court again dismissed the case, this time with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the revised notice still lacked sufficient information to enable the defendant to identify the alleged violations and the specific location of the discharges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the CWA’s pre-suit notice requirement is jurisdictional and whether the plaintiffs’ notice was adequate. The Second Circuit held that the notice requirement under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) is not jurisdictional but is instead a mandatory condition precedent to suit. The court further found that the plaintiffs’ notice provided sufficient information to inform the defendant of the alleged violations, including the pollutant, the standards allegedly violated, and the location of the discharges. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mid-New York Environ. v. Dragon Springs" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

The United States government brought suit against several defendants, including EZ Lynk, SEZC, Thomas Wood, and Bradley Gintz, alleging that their product, the EZ Lynk System, violated the Clean Air Act by enabling vehicle owners to bypass or disable emissions controls. The EZ Lynk System consists of a physical device that connects to a vehicle’s diagnostics port, a smartphone app, and a cloud-based service. Through this system, users can download and install “tunes” created by third-party technicians, including “delete tunes” that defeat emissions controls. The complaint detailed how EZ Lynk collaborated with tune creators, provided technical support, and maintained an online forum where users discussed using the system to delete emissions controls.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the EZ Lynk System was a “defeat device” under the Clean Air Act. However, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that EZ Lynk and its principals were immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that EZ Lynk merely published third-party information (the delete tunes) and did not create them, thus qualifying for Section 230 immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the complaint adequately alleged the EZ Lynk System was a defeat device. However, it held that the complaint also sufficiently alleged that EZ Lynk, Wood, and Gintz directly and materially contributed to the creation of the unlawful delete tunes, making them ineligible for Section 230 immunity. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that Section 230 immunity does not apply where a defendant directly and materially contributes to the creation of unlawful content. View "United States v. EZ Lynk" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont brought a lawsuit in state court against 3M Company, alleging that 3M’s production of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), known as “forever chemicals,” had contaminated Vermont’s natural resources, including water, wildlife, soil, and sediment. The case focused on contamination at the Rutland City landfill and a former 3M manufacturing facility in Rutland, Vermont. In 2023, Vermont’s Department of Environmental Conservation sent 3M a letter identifying it as a potentially responsible party for PFAS contamination, and Vermont’s counsel later forwarded this letter to 3M’s counsel in the context of the ongoing litigation.After receiving the letter, 3M conducted an internal investigation and determined that, during its ownership of the Rutland facility, it had manufactured copper-clad laminates in accordance with military specifications that required the use of PFAS. On January 3, 2024, 3M removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting a federal defense based on its compliance with military requirements. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found that 3M’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), reasoning that the thirty-day removal period began when 3M received Vermont’s email with the DEC letter, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s remand order de novo. The Second Circuit held that Vermont’s correspondence did not provide sufficient information for 3M to ascertain that the case was removable under the federal officer removal statute, and thus the thirty-day removal period had not begun when 3M received the email. The court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

In the 1950s, Goodrich Corporation built a vinyl-manufacturing complex in Calvert City, Kentucky, and used unlined ponds for hazardous waste disposal. In 1988, the EPA declared the site a Superfund site. Goodrich sold the complex to Westlake Vinyls, Inc. in the 1990s, agreeing to cover future cleanup costs. In 2000, PolyOne Corporation (now Avient Corporation) assumed Goodrich’s responsibilities. Disputes arose over cleanup costs, leading to a 2007 settlement agreement that included arbitration provisions for future cost allocations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky previously reviewed the case. Avient had twice sought arbitration under the agreement, first in 2010 and again in 2017. In 2018, Avient challenged the arbitration provisions' validity, but the district court held that Avient had waived this argument by initiating arbitration. The court enforced the arbitration award, and Avient did not challenge this decision. In 2022, Westlake demanded arbitration, and Avient again claimed the arbitration provisions were invalid. The district court granted summary judgment to Westlake, holding that Avient’s challenge was waived and barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but on different grounds. The court held that the settlement agreement’s provision for de novo judicial review of arbitration awards was invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act, as established in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. However, the court found that this invalid provision could be severed from the agreement without affecting the economic and legal substance of the transactions contemplated by the parties. Therefore, the arbitration provisions remained valid and enforceable. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Avient Corp. v. Westlake Vinyls, Inc." on Justia Law

The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) sued two landowners, the Schoubroek and Sexton families, alleging that their farms were pumping groundwater originating from the Gila River, infringing on GRIC’s water rights. GRIC sought to stop the pumping and have the wells sealed. The San Carlos Apache Tribe intervened in support of GRIC.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and § 1331, rejecting the defendants' argument that the Arizona state court's Gila River Adjudication had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment for GRIC, concluding that the defendants' wells were pumping subflow from the Gila River and ordered the wells to be shut down. The court also denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, despite a 2007 dismissal with prejudice of a similar complaint by GRIC.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction. It held that the Decree did not provide the district court with prior exclusive jurisdiction over non-parties to the Decree. The court also found that the Arizona state court did not have prior exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion, recognizing that the 2007 dismissal did not preclude GRIC’s current claims due to the specific context of the settlement agreement. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for GRIC, finding that GRIC had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the wells were pumping subflow or were within the subflow zone. The court vacated the district court's remedy of shutting down the wells and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gila River Indian Community v. Schoubroek" on Justia Law

Energy Transfer LP, involved in the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project, filed a lawsuit in North Dakota against Greenpeace International and others, alleging various tort claims related to the 2016 Standing Rock Protests. Unicorn Riot, a Minnesota-based news organization, and its journalist Niko Georgiades, who reported on the protests, were subpoenaed by Energy Transfer for documents and communications related to the protests. Unicorn Riot objected, citing the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act (MFFIA), which protects newsgatherers from disclosing unpublished information.The Hennepin County District Court denied Energy Transfer's motion to compel Unicorn Riot to produce the requested documents but ordered Unicorn Riot to produce a privilege log. Both parties appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to compel but reversed the order requiring a privilege log, concluding that the MFFIA prohibits such an order.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the MFFIA applies to newsgatherers even if they engage in unlawful or tortious conduct, as long as the conduct does not fall within the statutory exceptions of Minn. Stat. §§ 595.024–.025. The court also held that the MFFIA does not prevent district courts from ordering the production of a privilege log, but district courts should consider whether producing such a log would impose an undue burden on the responding party.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the privilege log, considering potential undue burdens. View "Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace International" on Justia Law

ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law