Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Bradley Rodriguez, who applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, claiming a disability due to a traumatic brain injury, bipolar disorder, and depression. His application was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Appeals Council also denied his request for review. Rodriguez then filed a federal lawsuit challenging the denial of benefits, raising several constitutional issues regarding the appointment of SSA ALJs, Appeals Council members, and the Commissioner of the SSA. He also argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the SSA. The court found that the ALJ was properly appointed, the Appeals Council members were not principal officers requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, and the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable. The court also held that Rodriguez was not entitled to a new hearing because he did not show that the unconstitutional removal provision caused him any harm. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Commissioner had the statutory authority to appoint SSA ALJs and properly exercised that authority through ratification in July 2018. The Appeals Council members were deemed inferior officers, not principal officers, and thus did not require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. The court also agreed that the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable, and Rodriguez did not demonstrate entitlement to retrospective relief. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records and vocational expert testimony. View "Rodriguez v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

In 2013, Johnny Ray Penegar, Jr. was diagnosed with mesothelioma, and Medicare partially covered his treatment costs. He filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, UPS, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. After his death, his wife, Carra Jane Penegar, continued the claim and added a death benefits claim. The North Carolina Industrial Commission (NCIC) ruled in her favor, ordering Liberty Mutual to cover all medical expenses related to the mesothelioma and reimburse any third parties, including Medicare. The NCIC's decision was affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied further review. In 2020, Penegar and Liberty Mutual settled, with Liberty Mutual agreeing to pay $18,500 and to handle any Medicare liens.Penegar filed a class action lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSP Act), alleging that Liberty Mutual failed to reimburse Medicare, leading to a collection letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) demanding $18,500. Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss, arguing Penegar lacked standing and that the settlement precluded her claims. The district court agreed, finding Penegar lacked standing and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Penegar did not suffer a cognizable injury in fact at the time she filed the lawsuit. The NCIC had ordered Liberty Mutual to reimburse Medicare directly, not Penegar, distinguishing her case from Netro v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Inc. Additionally, the CMS letter only posed a risk of future harm, which is insufficient for standing in a damages suit. Finally, any out-of-pocket expenses Penegar incurred were already compensated by Liberty Mutual before she filed the lawsuit, negating her claim of monetary injury. View "Penegar v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves the Sandpiper Residents Association and other residents of Sandpiper Cove, a privately owned apartment complex in Texas, subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under its Section 8 project-based rental assistance program. The residents sued HUD, alleging that the agency failed to ensure that Sandpiper Cove was maintained in a habitable condition. They sought to compel HUD to issue Tenant Protection Vouchers, which would allow them to receive rental payment assistance for use at other properties.The District Court dismissed the residents' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that their claims had been mooted by the sale of Sandpiper Cove to a new owner who had not received a Notice of Default. The residents appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in dismissing the residents' claims as moot. The court found that the question of whether the residents were legally entitled to relief after the sale of Sandpiper Cove went to the merits of their case, not mootness. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the residents' complaint because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that the residents had not shown that the new owner of Sandpiper Cove had received a Notice of Default, a condition necessary for the issuance of Tenant Protection Vouchers under the relevant statute. View "Sandpiper Residents Association v. Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over attorney's fees in a Social Security disability benefits case. The plaintiff, Christian Arnold, was represented by the law firm Binder & Binder. After Arnold was determined to be disabled and entitled to past-due benefits, the law firm requested attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), based on a contingency fee agreement Arnold had signed. However, the district court reduced the requested fees by nearly sixty percent, arguing that the full request would result in a "windfall" for the law firm, which was prohibited by statute. Binder & Binder appealed this decision.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ) who concluded that Arnold was not disabled. Arnold appealed this decision to the district court, which remanded the case back to the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ ruled in Arnold's favor, and the Social Security Administration issued a Notice of Award to Arnold for past-due benefits. Binder & Binder then moved for attorney's fees in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), based on their contingency fee agreement with Arnold. The district court, however, reduced the requested fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by not basing its analysis primarily on the contingency agreement before considering the reasonableness of the request. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that the contingency fee agreement should be the starting point for determining reasonableness under § 406(b), and any reduction should be justified based on relevant factors such as the claimant's satisfaction with their attorney's representation, the attorney's expertise and efforts expended, and the uncertainty of recovery and risks of an adverse outcome. View "Arnold v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

The case involves a claimant, Isaac Flowers, who applied for Social Security Disability benefits due to various health issues including back, neck, shoulder, and joint problems, obesity, vision loss in one eye, and depression and opioid dependence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially denied his claim, deeming that he could perform "sedentary work". Later, Flowers applied for benefits again, and the ALJ denied his claim again, this time finding that he could perform "light work", a classification slightly more intensive than "sedentary work".Flowers appealed this decision, arguing that the ALJ's finding that he could perform "light work" wasn't supported by substantial evidence as there was no proof of his condition improving. He also suggested that the ALJ should have considered the previous finding of him only being able to perform "sedentary work".The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Flowers' argument. Firstly, the court found that Flowers hadn't raised this legal issue in the lower courts and they declined to consider it for the first time on appeal. Secondly, the court concluded that even if Flowers had raised the issue in the lower courts, any error would have been harmless because Flowers hadn't shown that he would be entitled to disability benefits even if he was limited to "sedentary work". Lastly, the court found that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Flowers v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

With the onset of COVID-19, the Alabama Department of Labor received a record number of applications for unemployment benefits. The Department struggled to process the additional million-plus applications in a timely fashion. The plaintiffs-appellants in this case were among the many individuals who experienced delays in the handling of their applications. They brought this lawsuit in an effort to jumpstart the administrative-approval process. In their operative joint complaint, each plaintiff raised multiple claims for relief, all of which sought to compel the Alabama Secretary of Labor, Fitzgerald Washington, to improve the speed and manner in which the Department processes their applications for unemployment benefits. Secretary Washington responded to the suit by asking the circuit court to dismiss all claims against him, arguing (among other things) that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. After the circuit court granted that motion, the plaintiffs appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with Secretary Washington that the Legislature prohibited courts from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims at this stage. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court's judgment of dismissal. View "Johnson, et al. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Melonie Staheli appealed the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. She applied for benefits in 2018, alleging disability beginning March 28, 2018. In 2005, an automobile accident caused Staheli to suffer facial damage and other injuries. In March 2015, she suffered a stroke. After the stroke, she reported frequent headaches, memory loss, and vision problems. Medical professionals also diagnosed her with mental health issues including anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Psychologists determined her IQ scores fell within the lowest ten percent of the population. Staheli was eventually terminated from her medical records job because she was unable to perform her work duties. She later obtained part-time work, and by the time of her benefits hearing, she was working 20 hours per week. An ALJ determined Staheli was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s acceptance of the ALJ’s judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Staheli v. Commissioner, SSA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) following the Appeals Council’s remand. He argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred on remand by reconsidering a prior finding of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) after the prior decision had been vacated, in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the mandate rule, which is “a specific application” of the law-of-the-case doctrine, binds a lower court to execute the mandate of the higher court without further examination or variance. The court wrote that even assuming the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule apply, the ALJ was free to reconsider Plaintiff’s RFC because the 2018 Decision was vacated. The court reasoned that the district court order made no findings about how the ALJ erred in his determination on Plaintiff’s disability. Instead, the district court remanded the case on a motion from the Commissioner without making specific factual findings, including whether or not the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s RFC. As a result, the Appeals Council had no factual findings in the remand order from which it could deviate. Additionally, the Appeals Council explained that Plaintiff filed a new SSI claim in 2019, and it consolidated that claim with his initial claims, which stemmed from the same disabilities. The SSA regulations allow an ALJ to consider any issues relating to the claim, whether or not they were raised in earlier administrative proceedings. View "George Weidner, III v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because Plaintiff's state-law claims were based on allegations that his father's health maintenance organization (HMO) plan and healthcare services administrator that managed his father's benefits (collectively, Defendants) breached state-law duties that incorporated and duplicated standards established under Medicare Part C, Part C's preemption provision preempted them.Plaintiff brought this action alleging a state statutory claim under the Elder Abuse Act and common law claims of negligence and wrongful death for the alleged maltreatment of his father, a Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollee who died after being discharged from a skilled nursing facility. Plaintiff alleged that the MA HMO and healthcare services administrator breached a duty to ensure his father received skilled nursing benefits to which he was entitled under his MA plan. Defendants demurred, arguing that the claims were preempted by Part C's preemption provision. The trial court sustained the demurrers, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff's state-law claims were based on allegations that Defendants breached state-law duties that incorporate and duplicate standards established under Part C, the claims were expressly preempted. View "Quishenberry v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. View "VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law