Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Paul Grosz was injured while helping his friend Gregory Kisling hang a crucifix in Kisling’s home. Grosz fell from a homemade scaffolding when the wire holding the crucifix broke, resulting in significant injuries including broken ribs, a spinal fracture, and a traumatic brain injury. Grosz sued Kisling for negligence, and the jury awarded Grosz $1.2 million in noneconomic damages but found Kisling only 25% at fault, attributing 75% of the fault to Grosz.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, presided over by Judge Josie Garton, handled the case. After the jury's verdict, Grosz requested the court to determine if his injuries qualified for a higher statutory cap on noneconomic damages due to severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement. The court denied this request, stating it was a jury issue that Grosz had not properly raised during the trial. The court then applied the comparative fault percentages, reducing the $1.2 million award to $300,000 (25% of $1.2 million). The court found this amount was below the $400,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages and did not reduce it further.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the superior court should have first applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages before apportioning fault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the correct sequence is to first allocate fault and then apply the statutory cap if necessary. The court reasoned that this approach respects the jury’s role in determining the actual loss and aligns with legislative intent to cap a defendant’s exposure without further reducing an already capped amount. Thus, Grosz’s recovery of $300,000 was upheld, as it was below the statutory cap. View "Kisling v. Grosz" on Justia Law

A man on probation was subject to a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) requiring him to give a day's notice to security personnel before visiting the medical center where his former girlfriend worked. The woman alleged that the man violated this notice provision multiple times over three years, causing her severe emotional distress and job loss. The probation officer investigated the alleged violations but decided not to revoke the man's probation or penalize him.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, granted summary judgment for the State, finding no genuine issues of material fact, that the probation officer fulfilled her duty of reasonable care, and that her actions were shielded by discretionary function immunity. The woman appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the State regarding whether the probation officer fulfilled her operational duty to investigate the alleged violations. The court further concluded that the probation officer's subsequent decisions were shielded from suit by discretionary function immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Smith v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

A motorist, a physician, was injured when a truck struck the rear of her car while she was stopped at a construction site. She sued the truck driver and his employer for lost earnings and other damages. The superior court found that her future earning capacity was affected but dismissed her claim for future lost earnings, stating she failed to prove the amount of damages to a reasonable certainty.The superior court awarded her $1,036,491 for future medical and life care expenses, $79,961 for past lost income, and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. However, it dismissed her claim for future lost earning capacity. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, stating that once the fact of damages for future lost earning capacity was established to a reasonable certainty, the court could reasonably estimate the amount from the evidence in the record. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the damages for future lost earning capacity.On remand, the superior court used the evidence in the record to fashion a damages award. It found that the motorist's pre-accident earning capacity was $1,169,554 and estimated her post-accident earning capacity to be $1,018,087.40. The court calculated her annual expected loss of income to be $150,746.60 and determined that she would suffer this loss for 6.3 years, the average remaining work life for a woman her age. The total damages for loss of earning capacity were calculated to be $949,703.58, bringing the total award to $2,566,155.58.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the superior court's estimation of lost earning capacity and found no clear error. The court affirmed the damages award, concluding that the superior court's method of calculating the damages was reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The superior court's order on remand was affirmed. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

A driver, Safet Miftari, was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist while driving his taxi. He filed a claim for coverage under a policy he had for a different vehicle, which was denied by his insurer, Umialik Insurance Co., because the policy excluded uninsured and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for vehicles not insured under the same policy. Miftari then sued the uninsured motorist, who defaulted, and a jury awarded Miftari $1 million in noneconomic damages. Subsequently, Miftari sued Umialik to enforce the judgment.The Superior Court of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, granted Miftari’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Umialik was bound by the prior judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The court also denied Umialik’s motion to prevent Miftari from pursuing economic damages. In a separate order, the court held that the insurance policy’s exclusion of UIM coverage for injuries sustained in any of the policyholder’s vehicles insured under a separate policy was not authorized by Alaska law.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that Alaska law does not authorize excluding UIM coverage for a vehicle not insured under the same insurance policy under which UIM coverage is sought. The court also concluded that res judicata prohibits the parties from relitigating noneconomic damages and litigating economic damages against the insurer. The court affirmed the superior court’s orders on summary judgment, binding Umialik to the jury’s damages verdict and precluding Miftari from seeking economic damages. View "Umialik Insurance Co. v. Miftari" on Justia Law

A construction company chartered a barge and obtained insurance through a broker. Upon returning the barge, the owner discovered damage and sued the construction company in federal court. The construction company requested its insurer to defend it, but the insurer refused, citing lack of coverage. After the federal court awarded damages to the barge owner, the construction company sued the insurer and broker in state court, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and negligence.The Superior Court of Alaska denied the construction company's motion for summary judgment against the broker and insurer. The court granted summary judgment to the broker and insurer, finding that the construction company's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the construction company had not relied on any reassurances from the broker that would have delayed the filing of the lawsuit.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the construction company's claims against the broker were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer first denied coverage. The court also held that the construction company's claims against the insurer were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer refused to defend the construction company in the federal lawsuit. The court concluded that the construction company's claims were untimely and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the broker and insurer. View "Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and son co-owned a property in Kodiak and hired an excavation company to build a retaining wall. The son made a $15,000 payment to the contractor by credit card. Disputes arose over the contract terms, leading both parties to sue each other for breach of contract. The superior court found that the contractor breached the contract and awarded damages to the mother and son, assuming the $15,000 payment would be reversed by the credit card company.The superior court's final judgment was issued on July 13, 2021. The contractor appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed several aspects of the superior court’s decision unrelated to the $15,000 payment. More than a year after the final judgment, the mother and son moved for relief from the judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that the court mistakenly assumed the $15,000 charge would be reversed. The superior court granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1), finding it had made a mistake about the credit card payment and adjusted its damages award accordingly.The contractor appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion was filed more than a year after the final judgment, making the delay unreasonable. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, noting that Rule 60(b)(1) motions must be made within one year of the judgment and that this period cannot be tolled or extended. The court found that the superior court erred in tolling the one-year limitation period and that the Bishops' motion was untimely.The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order granting the Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment and remanded for disbursement of the supersedeas bond consistent with its decision. View "Red Hook Construction, LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law