Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellant, Gregory Smith, challenging the Municipality of Anchorage's decision to abate unauthorized campsites in Davis Park. The Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) outlines procedures for campsite abatement, including posting a notice and allowing for an appeal to the superior court. In June 2022, the Municipality posted a notice in Davis Park, advising that the area was not legal for storage or shelter and that any personal property would be removed and disposed of as waste after ten days. Smith and five others appealed the abatement, arguing it violated due process and the Eighth Amendment.The superior court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Municipality that its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the legal sufficiency of the posted notice, not the abatement decision itself. The court noted that the appellants did not challenge the notice's compliance with the Code, thus leaving no issues for the court to decide. The court also observed that the appellants' claims were not without merit and suggested that a civil suit could address their concerns.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court's jurisdiction was not limited to the notice's legal sufficiency. The court held that the superior court has jurisdiction to review the substantive decision to abate the campsite, including constitutional challenges. The court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the constitutional issues raised by Smith. The court also directed the superior court to determine if the administrative record was sufficient for meaningful appellate review and to take necessary steps to ensure it has an adequate record. View "Smith v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A man was injured in an accident outside city limits and sued a city and an emergency-responder employee for negligently providing assistance and aggravating his injuries. The city and employee offered the man $7,500 to settle the lawsuit, which he did not accept. They also moved for summary judgment, arguing that they could not be sued because AS 09.65.070(d)(4) does not allow lawsuits based on the “gratuitous extension of municipal services” beyond city limits. The superior court granted summary judgment in their favor, ruling that their actions were gratuitous because they were under no legal obligation to take them. The court also granted attorney’s fees to the city and employee based on a court rule that requires a party to pay the other side’s legal fees if the party rejected an offer of judgment to settle the case that was more favorable than the judgment the party ultimately received.The man appealed, arguing that the city’s emergency response was not gratuitous because he was billed a mileage fee for the ambulance service. He also argued that the city and employee were not entitled to attorney’s fees because their pretrial offer of judgment was invalid.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that AS 09.65.070(d)(4) bars the lawsuit because the city and employee’s actions were gratuitous, meaning they were performed without legal obligation and without charging more than the standard fee. The court also held that the offer of judgment was valid and that the superior court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the city and employee. The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Rochon v. City of Nome" on Justia Law

A former landlord sued two commercial tenants and their law firm, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The claims arose from prior litigation where the tenants had successfully counterclaimed for damages against the landlord. The landlord claimed that the tenants' actions during the prior litigation caused him emotional distress and were malicious and abusive.In the prior proceedings, the landlord had filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against the tenants, which resulted in the tenants counterclaiming for breach of contract and other damages. The superior court dismissed the landlord's FED claim and some of the tenants' counterclaims but awarded the tenants damages for breach of contract related to property maintenance. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.The superior court dismissed the landlord's new claims, taking judicial notice of the prior proceedings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed because the prior proceedings did not terminate entirely in the landlord's favor, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose separate from the litigation process.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. It held that the superior court properly took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and did not need to convert the motion to dismiss. The court agreed that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed due to the lack of favorable termination, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose independent from the litigation process. View "Griffith v. Hemphill" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Alaska's statutes that allow local school districts to operate correspondence study programs and provide public funds for educational expenses. Parents of public school students sued the State, arguing that these statutes violated the Alaska Constitution by allowing public funds to be used for private school tuition, which they claimed was unconstitutional.The Superior Court of Alaska ruled that the statutes were facially unconstitutional and invalidated them entirely. The court did not address the narrower question of whether the statutes were unconstitutional when applied to allow public funds to be used for private school tuition. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and determined that the Superior Court's ruling went too far. The Supreme Court noted that the statutes allowed for a substantial number of constitutionally valid uses of allotment funds, such as purchasing books, supplies, and other educational materials. The court emphasized that even if using allotment funds for private school tuition were unconstitutional, it would not justify invalidating the entire statutes.The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that the proper parties must be joined, and the Superior Court must first determine whether the statutes actually permit the use of allotment funds for private school tuition before addressing the constitutionality of such use. The Supreme Court did not decide whether using allotment funds for private school tuition is constitutional, leaving that question open for further consideration. View "State of Alaska, Dept. of Education & Early Development v. Alexander" on Justia Law

A woman sued her former attorneys for malpractice, alleging they failed to advocate for her interests during mediation, resulting in an unfavorable settlement for her and her business. The superior court granted summary judgment to the attorneys, concluding that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations and denied her motion to amend her complaint.The superior court ruled that the statute of limitations for the malpractice claim had expired, as the woman filed her suit more than three years after her injury occurred. The court also rejected her argument for tolling the limitations period under the continuous representation rule, concluding that her communications with the attorneys did not show continued representation in her personal capacity. Additionally, the court rejected her equitable estoppel argument, reasoning that the alleged conflicts of interest did not raise concerns under the Rules of Professional Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the continuous representation rule applies to legal malpractice claims, delaying the accrual of the claim until the attorney's representation in the matter ceases. The court found a genuine factual dispute about when the attorneys' representation ended, vacating the superior court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the attorneys are not barred by the doctrine of fraudulent estoppel from pleading the statute of limitations defense, as the woman failed to present evidence that her delay in filing suit was in reasonable reliance on the nondisclosure. Finally, the court vacated and remanded the superior court's decision to deny leave to amend the complaint, as the claims were not futile and leave to amend should have been granted. View "Sheldon-Lee v. Birch Horton Bittner, Inc." on Justia Law

Paul Grosz was injured while helping his friend Gregory Kisling hang a crucifix in Kisling’s home. Grosz fell from a homemade scaffolding when the wire holding the crucifix broke, resulting in significant injuries including broken ribs, a spinal fracture, and a traumatic brain injury. Grosz sued Kisling for negligence, and the jury awarded Grosz $1.2 million in noneconomic damages but found Kisling only 25% at fault, attributing 75% of the fault to Grosz.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, presided over by Judge Josie Garton, handled the case. After the jury's verdict, Grosz requested the court to determine if his injuries qualified for a higher statutory cap on noneconomic damages due to severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement. The court denied this request, stating it was a jury issue that Grosz had not properly raised during the trial. The court then applied the comparative fault percentages, reducing the $1.2 million award to $300,000 (25% of $1.2 million). The court found this amount was below the $400,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages and did not reduce it further.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the superior court should have first applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages before apportioning fault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the correct sequence is to first allocate fault and then apply the statutory cap if necessary. The court reasoned that this approach respects the jury’s role in determining the actual loss and aligns with legislative intent to cap a defendant’s exposure without further reducing an already capped amount. Thus, Grosz’s recovery of $300,000 was upheld, as it was below the statutory cap. View "Kisling v. Grosz" on Justia Law

A man on probation was subject to a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) requiring him to give a day's notice to security personnel before visiting the medical center where his former girlfriend worked. The woman alleged that the man violated this notice provision multiple times over three years, causing her severe emotional distress and job loss. The probation officer investigated the alleged violations but decided not to revoke the man's probation or penalize him.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, granted summary judgment for the State, finding no genuine issues of material fact, that the probation officer fulfilled her duty of reasonable care, and that her actions were shielded by discretionary function immunity. The woman appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the State regarding whether the probation officer fulfilled her operational duty to investigate the alleged violations. The court further concluded that the probation officer's subsequent decisions were shielded from suit by discretionary function immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Smith v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

A motorist, a physician, was injured when a truck struck the rear of her car while she was stopped at a construction site. She sued the truck driver and his employer for lost earnings and other damages. The superior court found that her future earning capacity was affected but dismissed her claim for future lost earnings, stating she failed to prove the amount of damages to a reasonable certainty.The superior court awarded her $1,036,491 for future medical and life care expenses, $79,961 for past lost income, and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. However, it dismissed her claim for future lost earning capacity. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, stating that once the fact of damages for future lost earning capacity was established to a reasonable certainty, the court could reasonably estimate the amount from the evidence in the record. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the damages for future lost earning capacity.On remand, the superior court used the evidence in the record to fashion a damages award. It found that the motorist's pre-accident earning capacity was $1,169,554 and estimated her post-accident earning capacity to be $1,018,087.40. The court calculated her annual expected loss of income to be $150,746.60 and determined that she would suffer this loss for 6.3 years, the average remaining work life for a woman her age. The total damages for loss of earning capacity were calculated to be $949,703.58, bringing the total award to $2,566,155.58.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the superior court's estimation of lost earning capacity and found no clear error. The court affirmed the damages award, concluding that the superior court's method of calculating the damages was reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The superior court's order on remand was affirmed. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law