Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

A young man died after his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned and operated by a nationwide commercial motor carrier. The victim’s parents and his estate brought a wrongful-death and survival action against the trucking company, its driver, and a customer whose goods were being transported at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the customer was negligent for hiring the trucking company, claiming it should have known the carrier employed reckless drivers due to a history of safety violations. However, the pleadings did not allege that the customer owned, operated, or controlled the truck, employed the driver, influenced how the shipment was conducted, or that the shipment itself involved any unusual risk or hazard.The trucking company and driver were sued for negligence and gross negligence. The plaintiffs later amended their petition to name the customer (a national retailer) as a defendant on the same theories. The customer moved to dismiss the claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing it owed no duty of care to the public as a mere shipper of goods transported by an independent, federally regulated carrier. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on petition for writ of mandamus. It held that Texas law does not impose a duty of care on a passive shipper in these circumstances. The court concluded that because the customer neither created nor controlled the risk, and the allegations did not show any exception to the general rule against liability for acts of independent contractors, the claims against the customer had no basis in law. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its denial and dismiss the claims against the customer. View "IN RE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC." on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident, after which one party sued for damages, alleging a traumatic brain injury and seeking nearly $2 million. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would undergo a neuropsychological examination, but they disagreed on the terms governing the examination. The defendant argued that Nevada’s Rule of Civil Procedure 35 (NRCP 35) should control the process, while the plaintiff asserted that a new statute, NRS 629.620, provided additional rights and should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled that NRCP 35 governed the examination but imposed several conditions, including disclosure of raw test data to the plaintiff’s counsel (with restrictions), permitting non-neuropsychologist experts to review the data, allowing the exam to be audio recorded, and permitting the presence of a court-certified interpreter. The defendant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned for extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional to the extent it governs discovery in civil litigation and conflicts with NRCP 35. The court found that NRCP 35 is a procedural rule within the judiciary’s domain, and legislative attempts to alter its operation via NRS 629.620 violate the separation of powers. Regarding the specific exam conditions, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing disclosure of raw data to counsel with a protective order. However, it found the district court abused its discretion by permitting audio recording and the presence of an interpreter without a showing of good cause. The court granted the writ in part, directing the district court to modify those conditions, and denied relief as to the other challenged conditions. View "POWERS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

The appellant filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence against several healthcare providers and associated entities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, finding it barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim. After the dismissal, the appellant sought to file a notice of appeal but missed the standard thirty-day deadline, asserting that he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order due to administrative errors, including misdirected court communications. He filed a motion for leave to late file his notice of appeal, claiming excusable neglect or good cause due to these circumstances.Upon review of the appellant’s motion, the Superior Court denied the request. The court relied on D.C. App. R. 4(a)(7), which allows reopening the time to appeal under limited circumstances, including a fourteen-day deadline after notice of the judgment. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen days after the appellant learned of the judgment, the trial court found it untimely under this provision. The court also cited potential prejudice to appellees from having to defend a “frivolous” appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the timing requirements of Rule 4(a)(7) when the motion was properly brought under Rule 4(a)(5), which provides a different standard for extensions based on excusable neglect or good cause and does not impose the same fourteen-day limit. The appellate court further clarified that the merits of the underlying case and the ordinary burden of defending an appeal are not relevant factors in assessing such motions. View "Newton v. Grajny" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between an individual and two defendants whom he sued for breach of contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiff then filed multiple post-trial and post-judgment motions, alleging, among other things, that new evidence showed interference in the case by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All of these motions were denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed several motions seeking to disqualify the presiding judge for alleged bias and misconduct, each of which was also denied.Following these filings, the trial court judge issued an order declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and enjoining him from filing further pleadings without first obtaining the court’s permission. The plaintiff appealed, raising issues about the vexatious litigant order, the denial of his motions to disqualify the judge, and the completeness of the record on appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and issuing a pre-filing order without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court vacated the vexatious litigant order and remanded for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to allow the plaintiff a chance to be heard and then, if warranted, issue a substantive order with adequate analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motions for judicial disqualification, finding the motions procedurally deficient, and concluded that the trial court transmitted a sufficient record on appeal. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heaven v. Weber" on Justia Law

A fire at a call center in Davao City, Philippines, resulted in the deaths of twenty-nine individuals who were employees of a Philippine company providing services for a Connecticut-based company. The estates of the deceased and other plaintiffs, most of whom were Philippine citizens or residents, brought a wrongful death and loss of consortium action in Connecticut against the Connecticut company and two of its officers, who were also involved with the Philippine employer.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, finding the Philippines to be an adequate alternative forum. The court considered conflicting affidavits from expert witnesses regarding whether Philippine courts would accept the case, given concerns about the statute of limitations. The dismissal was conditioned on allowing the plaintiffs to reinstate the Connecticut action if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction. The Appellate Court affirmed this decision, concluding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard and meaningfully assessed the adequacy of the Philippine forum.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that the trial court correctly applied the legal standard from Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., and undertook a meaningful assessment of the adequacy of the Philippines as an alternative forum. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not rely solely on the defendants’ consent to jurisdiction but weighed competing affidavits and evidence regarding Philippine law and procedure. The conditional nature of the dismissal, allowing reinstatement in Connecticut if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction, was also deemed appropriate. Thus, the disposition by the Connecticut Supreme Court was to affirm the Appellate Court’s decision. View "DeCicco v. Dynata, LLC" on Justia Law

Elizabeth and Cale Putnam, residents of Massachusetts, traveled to the Hotel Valcartier in Québec, Canada, with their five-year-old son, Anthony. While staying at the hotel, an unsecured Murphy bed fell on Anthony, causing fatal injuries. The Putnams had booked their stay at the hotel and its associated Ice Hotel through the hotel’s website, received receipts and marketing communications at their Massachusetts address, and noticed other Massachusetts vehicles at the hotel during their visit.Following Anthony’s death, the Putnams filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Premier Parks, LLC, which they believed operated the hotel, and EPR Properties, which they believed owned it. Both Premier and EPR moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, submitting affidavits asserting they neither owned nor operated the hotel, nor marketed or contracted with Massachusetts residents regarding the hotel. The Putnams submitted documentary evidence suggesting connections between Premier, EPR, and the hotel, but the district court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied their request for jurisdictional discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that, as to Premier Parks, the Putnams presented enough documentary evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding Premier’s involvement in the hotel’s operations, marketing, and staffing. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery with respect to Premier and reversed the dismissal as to Premier, remanding for discovery. Regarding EPR, the court concluded that the Putnams failed to contradict EPR’s affidavit that it did not own or operate the hotel or market it to Massachusetts residents. The court affirmed the dismissal as to EPR but modified the judgment to be without prejudice. View "Putnam v. EPR Properties" on Justia Law

The case involved a medical negligence and wrongful death claim arising from care provided to a resident at a county-owned skilled nursing facility in Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the decedent’s personal representative and surviving spouse, alleged that substandard care by the facility’s staff caused fatal injuries. The suit was initiated against several entities purportedly associated with the facility, but only two remained as defendants after some were dismissed for procedural reasons.After the complaint was filed in the District Court for Merrick County, the primary remaining defendant, identified as Litzenberg Memorial Long Term Care, moved to dismiss the case. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirement, claiming that notice was not properly served on the appropriate official. Before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual allegations regarding compliance with presuit notice and to correct the defendant’s name. The proposed amendment included details suggesting that the Merrick County clerk was an appropriate recipient for notice, and asserted that the defendant should be estopped from contesting notice due to representations made by the clerk.The district court denied the motion for leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss, finding the amendment would be futile because the notice had not been properly served. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that under the applicable procedural rule, the plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course prior to any responsive pleading. The court held that filing a motion for leave to amend did not waive this right. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Cyboron v. Merrick County" on Justia Law

A former Army specialist was seriously injured in a suicide bombing at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. The attack was carried out by Ahmad Nayeb, a Taliban operative hired by Fluor Corporation, a military contractor, as part of a program encouraging the hiring of Afghan nationals. The Army’s investigation concluded that Fluor was primarily responsible due to negligent supervision and failure to enforce proper security procedures, including allowing Nayeb to check out tools used in the bombing and to move about the base unsupervised. The plaintiff sued Fluor in federal court in South Carolina, seeking damages under state law for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and negligent retention of Nayeb.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment to Fluor, holding that state-law tort claims were preempted under Fourth Circuit precedent whenever they arose out of combatant activities in a wartime setting. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting a broad “battlefield preemption” doctrine. It reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) combatant-activities exception, which preserves government immunity for claims arising out of military combatant activities, reflected an intent to bar all tort suits against contractors connected with those activities, regardless of whether the contractor followed or violated military instructions.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in finding the state-law tort claims preempted where the federal government neither ordered nor authorized the challenged conduct. The Supreme Court clarified that neither the Constitution, federal statutes, nor its precedents support such broad preemption. Preemption applies only if the contractor was following government directives or if there is a significant conflict between federal interests and state law, which was not the case here. View "Hencely v. Fluor Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure involving multiple surgical staplers, one of which was used to create an anastomosis that subsequently leaked. In October 2021, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit against several manufacturers of surgical staplers. Over the course of pretrial proceedings, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued multiple scheduling orders, ultimately extending the plaintiff’s expert disclosure deadline to March 15, 2024. The plaintiff failed to disclose any experts by this deadline. Twenty days later, the plaintiff moved to extend the expert disclosure deadline, citing delays in obtaining discovery and the model number of the stapler at issue.The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order, finding that he had not shown “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), and entered summary judgment for the defendants due to the absence of expert testimony needed to support the plaintiff’s claims. The court noted that the plaintiff had not acted diligently, as required by Rule 16(b)(4), and had not filed a motion to compel or otherwise timely challenged the adequacy of discovery responses. The district court also relied on the plaintiff’s own representations regarding when he learned the model number of the stapler.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard to the request to extend the expert disclosure deadline and did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack of diligence. Because the plaintiff failed to offer expert evidence, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in full. View "Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law