Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Gregory Cohane filed a lawsuit against The Home Missioners of America, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, and Al Behm, alleging child sexual abuse by Behm and negligence by the other defendants. Cohane claimed that Behm, a clergyman employed by Glenmary and supervised by the Diocese, groomed and sexually abused him over several years, starting when he was nine years old. Behm's abuse continued even after he was transferred to different locations due to other allegations of misconduct. Cohane's lawsuit was filed in 2021, invoking the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allows previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be brought within a specific two-year window.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese, ruling that the revival provision only applied to direct abusers, not to institutions that enabled the abuse. Cohane appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the plain language of the revival provision was broad enough to include claims against both direct abusers and enablers.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, applies to claims against both direct abusers and those who enabled the abuse. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish between different types of defendants and that traditional tort principles allow for recovery from both direct tortfeasors and those who contributed to the harm. Thus, Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese were revived under the SAFE Child Act. View "Cohane v. The Home Missioners of America" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiffs sued the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, alleging sexual abuse by priests in the 1970s and 1980s. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Diocese, finding the claims time-barred by the statute of limitations. One plaintiff appealed and lost, while the other did not appeal. Both judgments became final a decade ago.In 2019, the General Assembly passed the SAFE Child Act, which revived previously time-barred claims for child sexual abuse. In 2020, plaintiffs filed new lawsuits asserting the same claims dismissed in the earlier judgments, arguing that the SAFE Child Act allowed them to do so. The trial court dismissed these new lawsuits with prejudice, citing the res judicata effect of the earlier judgments. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the new lawsuits were barred by res judicata because final judgments had already been entered on the same claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decisions. The court held that the General Assembly does not have the power to set aside a final judgment of the judicial branch. The court emphasized that under the North Carolina Constitution, the judicial power belongs exclusively to the judicial branch, and the legislature cannot annul a judgment or decree of a court. The court concluded that the SAFE Child Act, like any other legislative act, cannot overturn a final judgment entered by the judicial branch. View "Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese" on Justia Law

Three former students of East Gaston High School, who were members of the wrestling team, filed a lawsuit against their coach, Gary Scott Goins, and the Gaston County Board of Education. They alleged that Goins subjected them to sexual abuse, physical violence, and psychological harm during the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Goins was criminally convicted in 2014 and sentenced to over thirty-four years in prison. The plaintiffs sought civil damages from the Board of Education, claiming it knew or should have known about the abuse. The claims were initially time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations, which began running on the victims' eighteenth birthdays.The Superior Court of Wake County, in a divided decision, declared the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allowed previously time-barred claims to be filed during a two-year window, unconstitutional. The court held that the expiration of the statute of limitations created a vested right for the defendants, which the legislature could not retroactively alter.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the revival of the statute of limitations did not interfere with vested rights. The court reasoned that statutes of limitations are procedural and do not create property rights. Therefore, the legislature could retroactively alter them without violating the constitution.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the running of a statute of limitations in a tort claim does not create a constitutionally protected vested right. The court emphasized that statutes of limitations are procedural and affect only the remedy, not the underlying right. The court concluded that the General Assembly has the authority to retroactively alter statutes of limitations for tort claims. View "McKinney v. Goins" on Justia Law

In this juvenile proceeding, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) received several reports in 2021 regarding the respondent mother’s interactions with her children, Amanda, Jade, and Juliet. Incidents included the mother breaking a car window to reach Jade, hitting her with a belt, and leaving her outside in cold weather. DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency for the children. The trial court admitted statements from Jade, who did not testify, and concluded that all three children were neglected and that Jade and Juliet were dependent.The District Court of Pitt County entered an order based on these findings. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that many of the trial court’s findings were based on inadmissible hearsay and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the juvenile petitions. The Court of Appeals held that the remaining findings were insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of neglect and dependency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals did not adequately examine whether the remaining findings supported the trial court’s conclusions or whether the record contained sufficient evidence to support necessary findings. The Supreme Court determined that while some findings were unsupported, the record contained clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that could support the necessary findings for neglect and dependency adjudications. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, allowing the trial court to enter a new order based on the existing record or conduct further proceedings as necessary. View "In re A.J., J.C., J.C" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over visitation rights between a mother and her three children, Anna, Chris, and Margaret. The Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had investigated the mother and the father of Anna for maintaining an injurious environment and neglecting the children through improper discipline. The parents admitted to forcing Margaret to stand in a corner for many hours, whipping her with a belt, and making her sleep on a bare floor. The trial court adjudicated Margaret as abused and neglected, and Anna and Chris as neglected. The mother had not entered a case plan with DHHS for reunification with any of her children by the time of the November 2019 disposition order.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, stating that the trial court improperly admitted some hearsay evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's reasoning was so heavily reliant on the hearsay evidence that the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court's order and remand for a new hearing with respect to Margaret. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to dismiss the petitions directed at Margaret's younger siblings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had made numerous errors, including misstating the standard of review, requiring the trial court to make specific findings for each parent regarding unfitness or conduct inconsistent with their parental rights, and addressing the constitutional rights of respondents without any briefing or argument from the parties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case directly to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re A.J.L.H., C.A.L.W., M.J.L.H." on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Askew, Charlie Gordon Wade III, and Curtis Washington, who sued the City of Kinston, North Carolina, alleging that the city's condemnation and demolition of their properties violated their rights under the state constitution. The plaintiffs, who are African American, claimed that the city targeted properties owned by African Americans or located in predominantly African American neighborhoods, while ignoring similarly dilapidated properties owned by Caucasians or located in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods.The Superior Court of Lenoir County granted summary judgment in favor of the city, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's decision, ruling that the plaintiffs had to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a direct action under the state constitution. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies does not dictate jurisdiction over direct actions under the state constitution. The court explained that the authority to hear such claims flows from the constitution itself. The court also found that the Court of Appeals had erred by treating the plaintiffs' separate constitutional claims as the same. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a standard de novo review of the merits of the trial court's summary judgment order. View "Askew v. City of Kinston" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a tract of land in North Carolina. The defendants, Wade and Teresa Cornett, have lived on the property since 1983 and purchased it in 1995. The deed showed a thirty-foot access easement along the western edges of the property, which the Cornetts had used for access to a road. Over the years, the Cornetts made various improvements in the easement, under the belief that they owned the property in the easement. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Joanne and William Hinman, purchased the land from the Churches, who had inherited it from Bennie Church, the Cornetts' former neighbor. The Hinmans commissioned a survey, which confirmed the existence of the easement on their land. They demanded the Cornetts remove the improvements built inside the easement and asserted that the Cornetts could not use the portion of the paved driveway falling outside the easement boundary. The Cornetts refused, and the Hinmans brought suit for trespass and to quiet title.The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hinmans on all claims. The Cornetts appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals opined that the Cornetts’ evidence showed open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious use of the disputed land for over twenty years. The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that the Cornetts’ use was permissive and tolled the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Cornetts’ evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the hostility of their possession of the land. The court found that the Cornetts’ mistaken belief of ownership and their permanent improvements on the property constituted evidence rebutting the presumption of permissive use. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hinman v. Cornett" on Justia Law

A group of media organizations and reporters sought copies of law enforcement recordings of a march in Graham, North Carolina. The Superior Court granted their petition, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order, arguing that the trial court failed to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request copies of the recordings under the statute. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not understand that it could place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, stating that anyone may seek copies of law enforcement recordings under the provision invoked by the petitioners, so the trial court had no reason to question their eligibility. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously believed that it could not condition or restrict the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not need to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request the recordings, but it did err in believing it could not place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings. View "In re The McClatchy Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation lawsuit filed by Louis M. Bouvier, Jr., Karen Andrea Niehans, Samuel R. Niehans, and Joseph D. Golden against William Clark Porter, IV, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky PLLC, Steve Roberts, Erin Clark, Gabriela Fallon, Steven Saxe, and the Pat McCrory Committee Legal Defense Fund. The plaintiffs were accused of voting in two states in an election protest filed by the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed that these accusations, which were later proven to be false, defamed them and damaged their reputations.The case was initially heard in the Superior Court, Guilford County, where the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted as to the defendants' affirmative defenses, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the absolute privilege, which protects individuals from defamation claims for statements made in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, applied to the election protests. However, the court also introduced a "participation" requirement, stating that the privilege only applied to those who participated as a party, counsel, or witness in the proceeding.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The court held that the absolute privilege broadly protects all individuals involved in any aspect of election protests from defamation claims. The court rejected the "participation" requirement introduced by the Court of Appeals, stating that the privilege applies to the occasion, not the individual. The court concluded that the defendants were protected by the absolute privilege and were therefore entitled to summary judgment. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower court for dismissal with prejudice. View "Bouvier v. Porter" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who claimed that the defendant, Bank of America, fraudulently denied them mortgage modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and then foreclosed on their homes. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in May 2018 and their amended complaint in March 2019, alleging claims based on common law fraud, fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and, in the alternative, negligence.However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court held that the statutes of limitations for all of plaintiffs’ claims, except for their unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, started to run at the latest by the date that each plaintiff lost his or her home. Each plaintiff lost his or her home sometime between April 2011 and January 2014. Thus, the latest point in time any plaintiff could have filed a complaint was January 2017, or in the case of an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, January 2018. Plaintiffs did not file their original complaint until May 2018. Therefore, their claims are time-barred.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations for their fraud claims beyond the dates of their foreclosures. The court found that the plaintiffs were on notice of the defendant's alleged fraud by the time they lost their homes, and they should have investigated further. The court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Taylor v. Bank of America, N.A" on Justia Law