Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Mark L. Sadler, a former employee of the United States Army, was suspended and then removed from his position for insubordination. Sadler claimed that these actions were retaliatory under the Whistleblower Protection Act and sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). He also requested sanctions against the government for the destruction of evidence. The Board denied both his motion for sanctions and his request for corrective action.The Merit Systems Protection Board initially dismissed Sadler’s first complaint, finding it did not sufficiently allege protected activity. For his second complaint, the Board acknowledged that Sadler engaged in protected whistleblower activity but concluded that the Army had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions regardless of the protected activity. The Board also denied Sadler’s motion for sanctions, finding that the destruction of evidence was part of the Army’s ordinary procedures and did not warrant sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The court agreed that Sadler’s first complaint did not allege protected activity and that the Army had provided clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. The court also upheld the Board’s decision on the sanctions issue, agreeing that the destruction of evidence was part of routine procedures and did not meet the intent standard required for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "SADLER v. ARMY " on Justia Law

Trudell Medical International Inc. (Trudell) owns U.S. Patent No. 9,808,588, which relates to devices for performing oscillatory positive expiratory pressure (OPEP) therapy. Trudell sued D R Burton Healthcare, LLC (D R Burton) for patent infringement. D R Burton sells OPEP devices, including the vPEP®, vPEP® HC, iPEP®, PocketPEP®, and PocketPEP® Advantage products. Trudell alleged that these products infringed certain claims of the ’588 patent.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina allowed D R Burton to present infringement testimony by Dr. John Collins at trial. After a three-day trial, the jury found that the asserted claims of the ’588 patent were valid but not infringed. Trudell filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on infringement or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Collins to testify on noninfringement because his testimony was untimely and did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Additionally, the court found Dr. Collins' testimony unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s finding of noninfringement and remanded for a new trial, excluding Dr. Collins’ noninfringement testimony. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Trudell’s motion for JMOL of infringement, as the jury could have reasonably found noninfringement based on the evidence presented.The Federal Circuit ordered that the case be reassigned to a different district court judge on remand to preserve the appearance of justice and fairness, given the trial judge’s statements indicating a predisposition to quickly resolve the case. View "TRUDELL MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL INC. v. D R BURTON HEALTHCARE, LLC " on Justia Law

Steuben Foods, Inc. (Steuben) filed a complaint in 2010 in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, alleging that Shibuya Hoppmann Corp. infringed claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,209,591, 6,536,188, and 6,702,985. Shibuya Kogyo Co., Ltd. was added as a defendant in 2012, and a similar complaint was filed against HP Hood LLC. The cases were consolidated and later transferred to the District of Delaware in 2019. The district court issued a claim construction order in 2020 and denied cross-motions for summary judgment in 2021. A five-day jury trial resulted in a verdict that the asserted patents were valid and infringed, awarding Steuben $38,322,283.78 in damages.The district court granted Shibuya’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement for all asserted patents, found the invalidity arguments waived, and conditionally granted a new trial. Steuben appealed the JMOL and the conditional grant of a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’591 and ’188 patents, finding substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement. The court affirmed the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’985 patent, holding that the continuous addition of sterilant could not be equivalent to the claim’s requirement of intermittent addition. The court also reversed the conditional grant of a new trial on noninfringement and vacated the conditional grant of a new trial on invalidity and damages, remanding for further proceedings.The main holdings were: reversing the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’591 and ’188 patents, affirming the JMOL of noninfringement for the ’985 patent, reversing the conditional grant of a new trial on noninfringement, and vacating the conditional grant of a new trial on invalidity and damages. View "STEUBEN FOODS, INC. v. SHIBUYA HOPPMANN CORPORATION " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Nagel in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging 15 state-law claims. Nagel answered the complaint and filed 11 counterclaims under the Declaratory Judgment Act seeking declarations of non-infringement of several patents held by plaintiff Electromagnetics Corporation. Nagel also removed the case to the District of Massachusetts under 28 U.S.C. 1441, the general removal statute, and 28 U.S.C. 1454, the patent removal statute. The federal court remanded to state court, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ state-law claims did not arise under federal law and Nagel’s patent counterclaims did not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal; 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) bars review of the district court’s decision to remand. To the extent the America Invents Act prefers that closely related state-law claims and patent-law counterclaims be heard together, it does not follow that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to review remand decisions that require such claims to be pursued in separate forums. “Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, it is assumed that Congress is aware of the universality of th[e] practice of denying appellate review of remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal.” View "Preston v. Nagel" on Justia Law

A jury found that Pulse directly infringed Halo’s patents with products that it shipped into the U.S. and induced others to infringe those patents with products delivered outside the U.S. that ultimately were imported into the U.S. in finished products; it was highly probable that Pulse’s infringement was willful; and the Halo patents were not invalid. The jury awarded Halo $1.5 million in royalty damages. The court held that Pulse had not willfully infringed and taxed costs. Halo did not seek interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Pulse’s infringement was not willful. In June 2015, in the district court, Halo sought an accounting for supplemental damages and awards of interest. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the enhanced damages test applied by the Federal Circuit was inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. 284. On remand, the Federal Circuit vacated the unenhanced damages award with respect to products delivered in the U.S. and remanded. In the meantime, the district court awarded Halo prejudgment and post-judgment interest and supplemental damages for direct infringement. In November 2016, the court entered a stipulation of satisfaction of judgment for the $1.5 million damages award, including costs, supplemental damages, and post-judgment interest, expressly excluding prejudgment interest, enhanced damages, and attorney fees. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There is no final decision because the district court has not specified the means for determining the amount of prejudgment interest. View "Halo Eelectronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc." on Justia Law

Trade Court abused its discretion in waiving the exhaustion requirement in appeal of antidumping order. The Department Commerce initiated an investigation into whether oil country tubular goods (OCTGs) from Saudi Arabia and other countries were sold for less than fair value in the U.S. Commerce selected Duferco as the mandatory respondent; preliminarily found dumping; determined to treat Duferco and three affiliates as a single entity; and determined that Duferco is affiliated with JESCO, the producer of the OCTGs. Duferco owns 10 percent of JESCO. JESCO participated as a voluntary respondent. Commerce published its final determination, concluding that Saudi OCTGs were being dumped and recalculating the duty margin at 2.69 percent. Following the final determination, JESCO identified an error in Commerce’s calculation of Constructed Value (CV) profit. Correcting this error lowered JESCO’s CV profit, reducing JESCO's dumping margin to 1.37 percent. Commerce issued an amended negative final determination, imposing no duties. U.S. companies appealed, arguing that JESCO’s sales to a Colombian distributor were intra-company transfers within the Duferco entity, not an appropriate basis to construct CV profit--an argument not made during the investigation. The Trade Court affirmed Commerce’s determination, declining to apply the exhaustion requirement because the parties did not know that Commerce was considering using the Colombian sales until the final determination. The Federal Circuit vacated. Commerce need not expressly notify interested parties when it intends to change its methodology between its preliminary and final determinations, given the inclusion of the relevant data in the record and the advancement of arguments related to that data. The parties had an opportunity to raise their single entity objection before Commerce. View "Boomerang Tube LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Comments that the Court of Federal Claims made during a hearing, before the government’s corrective action materially altered the relationship between the parties, were not sufficient to qualify the contractor as a “prevailing party” under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(a), (d)(1)(A). The Federal Circuit remanded the case, which involved Dellew’s post-award bid protest, alleging that the Army improperly awarded TSI a contract because TSI did not accept a material term of the request for proposals when it refused to cap its proposed general and administrative rate, and the contract awarded varied materially from TSI’s proposal. During oral argument, the Claims Court provided “hint[s]” about its views favorable to Dellew on the merits, and repeatedly expressed its belief that corrective action would be appropriate. The Army subsequently terminated the TSI contract. The Claims Court dismissed Dellew’s action, determined that it retained jurisdiction despited mootness, and awarded Dellew $79,456.76 in fees and costs, stating that it made “numerous substantive comments during oral argument regarding the merits,” that “carried a sufficient judicial imprimatur to materially alter the relationship between [Dellew] and [the Government] such that [Dellew] qualifies as a prevailing party under the EAJA.” View "Dellew Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Diaz submitted an unsolicited proposal to the U.S. Department of the Navy’s Indian Head Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (IHEODTD) pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 15.6. An IHEODTD contracting officer conducted an initial review of Diaz’s proposal and determined that it did not satisfy two requirements of FAR 15.606-1: that it be innovative and unique and include sufficient detail to permit a determination that government support could be worthwhile and the proposed work could benefit the agency’s research and development or other mission responsibilities. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Diaz’s complaint for lack of subject matter because he lacked standing under 28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Diaz did not possess the requisite direct economic interest to satisfy his “burden of establishing the elements of standing.” Diaz cannot demonstrate that he “had a substantial chance of winning the contract” because, at the very least, his proposal did not conform to the requirements of FAR Subpart 15.6, which governs unsolicited proposals. View "Diaz v. United States" on Justia Law

Fedora began working for the Postal Service in 1980 and retired in 2012, then filed an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging that his retirement was involuntary and amounted to constructive discharge. He claimed that he was forced to perform work in violation of his medical restrictions, was harassed, and was threatened with loss of his pension. An administrative judge found that Fedora had failed to make a non-frivolous allegation and dismissed. The Board issued a final order affirming the AJ’s decision, stating that the Federal Circuit “must receive [his] request for review no later than 60 calendar days after the date of [the Board’s] order.” . He filed a petition for review on October 20, 2014, within 60 days of his receipt of the order (August 19), but not within 60 days of issuance of the notice (August 15). Fedora argued that the Board’s final order directed him to the court's “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which incorrectly instructed that a petitioner “may file a petition for review in this court within 60 days of receipt of the Board’s decision.” The Federal Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A), stating that it lacks authority to equitably toll the filing requirements. View "Fedora v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Xilinx a Delaware corporation headquartered in California, develops and markets programmable logic devices for electronics systems. Papst, organized and having its principal place of business in Germany, is a nonpracticing entity that does not manufacture or sell products. Papst’s website describes “a global patent licensing and monetization firm specialized in enforcing infringed patents with the goal to conclude a license agreement with the infringer.” Papst has repeatedly filed patent infringement suits in California federal courts. Before acquiring the patents-in-suit, Papst investigated potential infringers and targets for licensing, including 28 companies based, or having significant presence, in California. Papst sent a patent-infringement notice letter and a follow-up letter to Xilinx. Papst’s managing director, its senior counsel, and its Texas-based outside counsel, traveled to California to meet with Xilinx. No agreement was reached. Xilinx sought a declaratory judgment, in the Northern District of California, that Xilinx’s products do not infringe the patents-in-suit and that the patents are invalid. Papst filed an infringement suit against Xilinx in the District of Delaware asserting the same patents. The California court dismissed the declaratory judgment action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed; the court has specific personal jurisdiction over Papst. Considering the totality of circumstances, the court found “sufficient minimum contacts” and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable. View "Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG" on Justia Law