Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A manufacturer of aircraft engines contracted with both the federal government and commercial clients. The contracts at issue were cost-plus agreements, requiring the government to reimburse the manufacturer for a share of overhead costs, calculated under federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), specifically CAS 418. The manufacturer used unique “collaboration agreements” with suppliers, involving payments tied to program revenues rather than direct part costs. A central dispute arose over whether certain costs, known as “Drag”—representing amounts paid by collaborators to compensate the manufacturer for shared expenses—should be included in the pool of overhead costs to be allocated, and over how to measure the material costs of parts for allocation purposes.After protracted disagreements and administrative decisions dating back to the 1990s, a contracting officer in 2013 determined that the manufacturer’s accounting violated CAS 418 and that Drag amounts should be excluded from the overhead pool. The manufacturer appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Board held in part for each side: it found the Drag agreement between the parties valid, so Drag need not be excluded, but rejected the manufacturer’s method for calculating material costs, settling on a “net revenue share” approach. The Board remanded to the parties to negotiate quantum (the amount owed), retaining jurisdiction if they failed to agree.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision on the material cost allocation base (CAS 418 Claim) because no final determination of quantum had been made. However, the court found the Board’s decision on the Drag Claim was final and reviewable. The Federal Circuit held that the Drag agreement was unenforceable against the government because it did not comply with required federal regulations for advance agreements, and therefore reversed the Board’s ruling on that point. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY" on Justia Law

EscapeX IP, LLC brought a patent infringement suit against Google LLC, alleging that Google’s YouTube Music product infringed its ’113 patent. After Google responded, pointing out factual deficiencies in EscapeX’s claims and highlighting that the accused features either did not exist or predated the patent, EscapeX amended its complaint to target a different Google product. Google repeatedly notified EscapeX that its claims were baseless and requested dismissal, but EscapeX did not respond. The case was transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Northern District of California. Meanwhile, a separate court found all claims of the ’113 patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which EscapeX did not appeal.Upon transfer, EscapeX attempted to file a joint stipulation of dismissal without Google’s consent, misstating that both parties would bear their own fees. Google demanded withdrawal, and a corrected stipulation was later filed. Google moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing EscapeX’s claims were frivolous and that EscapeX had unreasonably prolonged litigation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Google to be the prevailing party, determined EscapeX’s case was exceptional due to its lack of adequate pre-suit investigation and frivolous claims, and awarded Google attorneys’ fees and costs. EscapeX then moved to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), presenting new declarations as “new evidence,” but the district court denied the motion, finding the evidence was not newly discovered.Google sought additional attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for costs incurred opposing EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court found EscapeX’s motion frivolous and sanctioned EscapeX and its attorneys jointly and severally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all of the district court’s orders. The main holdings were that the case was exceptional under § 285, supporting an award of attorneys’ fees, and that sanctions under § 1927 for frivolous litigation conduct were appropriate. View "ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations by a manufacturer of semiconductor wafers that it developed a novel porous silicon technology in 2018 and entered into a non-disclosure agreement with a group of semiconductor companies and their executives. The parties discussed a potential collaboration, during which the manufacturer claims it disclosed proprietary trade secrets. While negotiations were ongoing, the semiconductor companies filed a series of patent applications, which the manufacturer alleges incorporated its confidential technology without crediting its inventors. The negotiations ultimately failed, and the manufacturer was not included as an inventor on any of the resulting patents.The manufacturer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting federal claims for trade secret misappropriation and correction of inventorship, as well as several California state law claims, including trade secret misappropriation and interference with economic advantage. The defendants moved to dismiss and also filed a special motion to strike the state law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to quickly dismiss lawsuits targeting protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, and denied the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. The defendants appealed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion to strike is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as a matter of Federal Circuit law. The court found that the district court erred by conflating the two steps of the anti-SLAPP analysis, improperly considering the merits of the trade secret claims at the first step. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "IQE PLC v. NEWPORT FAB, LLC " on Justia Law

A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, owners of bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA), sued the United States, alleging a taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment due to the enactment of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). They claimed that the restructuring of COFINA's debts under PROMESA resulted in a significant loss of the principal and interest value of their bonds and their security interest.The United States Court of Federal Claims determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case but dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court found that the enactment of PROMESA by Congress did not constitute sufficient federal government action to support a takings claim. The court reasoned that the actions of the Puerto Rico Oversight Board, which was created by PROMESA and acted autonomously, could not be attributed to the United States as coercive or as an agency relationship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that PROMESA did not displace Tucker Act jurisdiction, as there was no clear congressional intent to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. The court also agreed with the Claims Court that the United States did not exert coercive control over the Oversight Board's actions, which were necessary to establish a taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish that the United States was liable for the alleged taking of their property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the Claims Court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint. View "DINH v. US " on Justia Law

Super Lighting sued CH Lighting for infringing three patents related to LED tube lamps. CH Lighting conceded infringement of two patents before trial. The district court excluded CH Lighting's evidence on the validity of these two patents and granted Super Lighting's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that the patents were not invalid. A jury found the third patent infringed and not invalid, awarding damages for all three patents. CH Lighting appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court excluded evidence from CH Lighting regarding the validity of the two patents and granted JMOL in favor of Super Lighting. The jury found the third patent infringed and awarded damages. CH Lighting's motions for JMOL on invalidity and for a new trial were denied, and the court doubled the damages award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in granting JMOL on the validity of the two patents because it improperly excluded CH Lighting's evidence. The court held that a new trial was required to determine the validity of these patents. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdicts of infringement and no invalidity for the third patent. Additionally, the court instructed the district court to reassess the reliability of Super Lighting's damages expert's testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC APPLIANCE, CO. v. CH LIGHTING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. " on Justia Law

Future Link Systems, LLC entered into a license agreement with MediaTek, Inc. in 2019, which stipulated that MediaTek would pay Future Link a lump sum if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek Semiconductor Corporation. Future Link subsequently filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) accusing Realtek of patent infringement. During the litigation, Future Link settled with a third party and informed Realtek, leading Realtek to file a motion for sanctions against Future Link before the administrative law judge (ALJ).The ALJ expressed concerns about the legality of the agreement between Future Link and MediaTek but ultimately denied Realtek's motion for sanctions, concluding that the agreement did not influence Future Link's decision to file the complaint. Future Link then withdrew its complaint and moved to terminate the investigation, which the ALJ granted. The ITC terminated the investigation when no petition for review was filed. Realtek petitioned the ITC to review the ALJ's order denying sanctions, but the ITC declined and terminated the sanctions proceeding.Realtek appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking an order for Future Link to pay a fine to the Commission. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Realtek's appeal, as the Commission's decision on sanctions was not a "final determination" under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) that would affect the exclusion or non-exclusion of articles from entry. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that jurisdiction over such matters likely lies with the district courts, not the Federal Circuit. View "Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Mitek Systems, Inc. (Mitek) filed a declaratory judgment action against United Services Automobile Association (USAA) seeking a declaration of non-infringement concerning four patents related to its MiSnap software product. Mitek argued that it faced potential liability for direct, induced, and contributory infringement, as well as indemnification demands from its licensees after USAA sent them letters seeking to sell licenses to USAA patents.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas initially dismissed Mitek’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively declined to exercise jurisdiction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a more detailed analysis. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, finding no subject-matter jurisdiction and reiterating its decision to decline jurisdiction even if it existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court agreed that Mitek did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit for direct, induced, or contributory infringement based on the record evidence, including USAA’s allegations and claim charts from prior litigation. The court also found that Mitek’s potential indemnification liability was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction, as the indemnification agreements contained applicable carve-outs and did not create a reasonable potential for liability. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction, noting that intervention in future litigation involving Mitek’s customers would be a more effective remedy. View "MITEK SYSTEMS, INC. v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION " on Justia Law

Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation (Dolby) owns U.S. Patent No. 10,237,577, which is directed to a prediction method using an in-loop filter. Unified Patents, LLC (Unified) filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims 1, 7, and 8 of the patent as anticipated and obvious. Unified certified it was the sole real party in interest (RPI). Dolby identified nine other entities it believed should also have been named as RPIs. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) declined to adjudicate whether these entities were RPIs and instituted the review with Unified as the sole RPI. The Board ultimately held that Unified failed to show any of the challenged claims were unpatentable.The Board's final written decision did not address the RPI dispute, explaining that there was no evidence any of the alleged RPIs were time-barred or estopped from bringing the IPR, or that Unified purposefully omitted any RPIs to gain an advantage. Dolby appealed the Board's decision, arguing that the Board's refusal to adjudicate the RPI dispute caused various harms, including potential breaches of license agreements, conflicts of interest, improper estoppel in future proceedings, and disincentivizing Unified from filing IPRs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Dolby failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing to appeal. The court found Dolby's claims of harm to be too speculative, noting that Dolby did not provide evidence of any actual or imminent injury. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Dolby's substantive challenges. View "Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC" on Justia Law

Incyte Corporation appealed a post-grant review (PGR) final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) which held that Incyte failed to prove claims 1–7 and 9–21 of U.S. Patent No. 10,561,659 were unpatentable. The '659 patent, owned by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc., discloses a method of treating hair-loss disorders using deuterium-modified ruxolitinib. Incyte petitioned for PGR, arguing the claims were obvious, but the Board found Incyte's arguments unpersuasive and upheld the claims. Incyte's request for rehearing was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Sun argued that Incyte lacked Article III standing to appeal. The court noted that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before reaching the merits of an appeal. To establish standing, Incyte needed to demonstrate an injury in fact, which it attempted to do by claiming potential infringement liability and invoking the competitor standing doctrine.The court found that Incyte's plans to develop a deuterated ruxolitinib product were too speculative to establish concrete plans for future activity that would create a substantial risk of future infringement. The court also determined that Incyte's reliance on the competitor standing doctrine was insufficient because Incyte did not show it was currently engaging in or had nonspeculative plans to engage in conduct covered by the claims of the '659 patent.Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Incyte failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. View "INCYTE CORPORATION v. SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. " on Justia Law