Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Jacob Hollingsworth filed for divorce from Katie Hollingsworth after nearly five years of marriage. They had one child and stipulated to a parenting plan, leaving the division of marital property, spousal support, and attorney’s fees as the issues for trial. Katie entered the marriage with significant debt and a house, while Jacob had a house, personal assets, and business interests. They kept separate finances except for a joint account for shared expenses. Jacob paid off much of Katie’s debt during the marriage.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, heard testimony from both parties, two valuation experts, and Jacob’s father. The court awarded Jacob 92% and Katie 8% of the marital assets, denied Katie’s requests for spousal support and attorney’s fees, and allowed Jacob’s valuation expert to testify despite a late report disclosure. Katie appealed the decisions.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It upheld the district court’s decision to allow the expert testimony, noting that the court offered a continuance, which Katie declined. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the late disclosure.The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court’s valuation and division of the marital estate, finding the valuations were within the range of evidence presented and the unequal distribution was justified by the parties’ financial contributions and spending habits. The court upheld the use of the agreed valuation date for assets and found no error in including interim order funds in the marital estate.The court found no clear error in denying spousal support, as both parties were capable of self-support. It also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, noting Katie’s sufficient income and excessive spending habits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Donna Miller Bruenger, the ex-wife of the late Coleman Miller, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Courtenay Ann Miller, Coleman’s daughter, seeking entitlement to Coleman’s Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) benefits. Coleman had failed to designate a beneficiary for his FEGLI benefits before his death, and MetLife distributed the benefits to Courtenay. Bruenger argued that Coleman’s legal obligation under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to assign her the benefits should prevail.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled against Bruenger, concluding that federal law precluded her claim because Coleman’s employer did not receive the QDRO before his death. Bruenger’s subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely, and the court also imposed sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. Bruenger then sought relief under CR 60.02, which the trial court granted, allowing her to refile the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the refiled appeal as frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to Courtenay.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the CR 60.02 relief. The Supreme Court held that RAP 11(B) authorizes the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous appeals but found that the imposition of sanctions in this case violated due process because Bruenger was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but reversed the sanctions imposed by the Court of Appeals. View "BRUENGER V. MILLER" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife married in 2012 and purchased a home in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2014. They shared the residence and paid the mortgage from a joint account. In 2021, they refinanced the home, and in December 2021, they separated. They discussed the division of their marital property without attorneys and obtained two appraisals for the home. Wife retained counsel to draft a stipulated divorce decree, which both parties signed. The decree awarded the home to Husband, with a provision that Wife would receive half the net proceeds if the home was sold or refinanced.The District Court of Laramie County granted the divorce and entered the Stipulated Decree in June 2022. Husband refinanced the home but did not pay Wife her share of the equity. Wife filed a motion for relief, claiming the decree entitled her to half the equity regardless of whether the home was sold or refinanced. The district court granted Wife relief under Rule 60, correcting the decree to reflect that any equity recognized through sale or refinance was to be equally divided.Husband appealed, and the Wyoming Supreme Court found the decree ambiguous and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The district court held a hearing and found that both parties intended to split the equity in the home equally. The court awarded Wife half the equity, amounting to $106,323.40, and Husband appealed again.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the clarification under Rule 60(a) was appropriate and did not modify the original judgment. The court also found that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficient and supported by the record. View "Van Vlack v. Van Vlack" on Justia Law

Jennie Olson and Jonathan Olson were married on August 22, 2020. Two days before the wedding, Jonathan presented Jennie with a premarital agreement stipulating that in the event of a divorce, each party would retain ownership of their separate property. Jennie signed the agreement the same day. At the time, Jennie had a net worth of $386,917, while Jonathan had a net worth of $11,591,000. The couple separated in July 2022, and Jennie initiated divorce proceedings.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, bifurcated the trial, first addressing the validity of the premarital agreement. The court found the agreement valid and enforceable and determined that the parties had no marital property. Jennie appealed, arguing the district court erred in its findings and abused its discretion in allowing a rebuttal witness to testify and in not admitting a text message as evidence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in finding the premarital agreement valid and enforceable. The court found that Jennie had access to independent legal representation, received adequate financial disclosure, voluntarily consented to the agreement, and that the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the rebuttal witness to testify or in refusing to admit the text message as evidence.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied both parties' requests for attorney’s fees and costs, citing the premarital agreement's provision that each party is responsible for their own legal expenses. View "Olson v. Olson" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff, K, and the defendant, R, with the intervenor, B, also involved due to a related New Jersey litigation. The key marital asset was the couple's home in Greenwich, Connecticut, valued at approximately $11 million, and several investment accounts. The defendant had previously pledged these assets as security in a New Jersey court case, which resulted in a $24.7 million judgment against him and his father. The New Jersey court ordered the forfeiture of the Greenwich property and imposed a constructive trust on the investment accounts due to the defendant's misconduct, including transferring $3 million to Slovakia.The Connecticut trial court found that the defendant had dissipated marital assets by pledging and forfeiting the Greenwich property and investment accounts. The court included these assets in the marital estate and ordered their sale, with proceeds to be divided among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the intervenor. The court also found the defendant's annual earning capacity to be $400,000 and ordered him to pay $749 per week in child support, based on his earning capacity rather than actual income. Additionally, the court allowed the plaintiff to relocate with the children to the Czech Republic and granted her motion for contempt against the defendant for failing to support the family during the pendency of the dissolution action.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in failing to afford full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders, which had removed the Greenwich property and investment accounts from the marital estate. The Supreme Court also found that the trial court improperly calculated child support by not first determining the presumptive amount based on the defendant's actual income. The court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt was reversed due to a lack of clear and unambiguous orders requiring the defendant to provide the support he allegedly withheld. The case was remanded for a new hearing on all financial issues, including the division of the marital assets, giving full faith and credit to the New Jersey court orders. View "K. S. v. R. S." on Justia Law