Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law

S.W., a minor, was placed with foster parents A.E. and Ann.E. by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) shortly after her birth in September 2020. In August 2022, CYF filed a petition to remove S.W. from the foster parents' home. The foster parents attended the hearing but did not seek to intervene. The trial court granted CYF's petition, and S.W. was placed with another foster family. The foster parents later filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied, stating they did not have standing as they had not requested S.W.'s return and had not achieved the status of prospective adoptive parents.The foster parents appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the foster parents had standing as prospective adoptive parents based on the precedent set in Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. However, the Superior Court panel was divided, with one judge expressing doubts about the standing of prospective adoptive parents under the current law and another judge suggesting legislative changes to grant standing to all foster parents.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the issue of standing for prospective adoptive parents was moot, as the foster parents had withdrawn their motion to intervene and for S.W.'s return. Despite this, the court addressed the substantive issue due to its public importance. The court concluded that the legislative enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, which states that foster parents and preadoptive parents do not have legal standing in dependency proceedings unless they have been awarded legal custody, abrogated the judicially created standing for prospective adoptive parents established in Mitch. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that preadoptive parents without legal custody do not have standing in dependency proceedings. View "In the Interest of: S.W." on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Alyssa Baum and Justin Aldava have a child, H.A., born in Texas in June 2019. Baum and H.A. moved to Kentucky in November 2020 to escape domestic violence from Aldava. Baum filed for an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) and temporary custody in Jefferson Family Court, recounting an incident of domestic violence in October 2020. The court granted the EPO and later a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) after a hearing, despite Aldava not being served until April 2021. Aldava filed for custody in Texas, but the Texas court did not assert jurisdiction.The Jefferson Family Court held a hearing in April 2021 and issued a DVO, granting Baum temporary custody and prohibiting Aldava from contacting Baum and H.A. Aldava later moved to dismiss the DVO for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the family court denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over Aldava and that the DVO could not impose affirmative relief, such as temporary custody or firearm restrictions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky courts could issue DVOs protecting petitioners and their children from domestic violence, even without personal jurisdiction over non-resident respondents. The court affirmed that Kentucky had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to grant temporary custody. The court also ruled that the DVO's restrictions on Aldava's firearm possession within Kentucky were valid and that entering the DVO into the Law Information Network of Kentucky (LINK) did not violate due process.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the family court's DVO in part, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BAUM V. ALDAVA" on Justia Law

A mother sought to modify an existing child custody order to change the school district her daughter attends after moving to a new residence. The father objected, arguing that changing schools would be disruptive and limit his time with the daughter. Unable to reach an agreement through mediation, the mother petitioned the court to modify the custody decree.The Iowa District Court for Worth County denied the mother's request, determining that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. The mother appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Frazier. The Court of Appeals, interpreting Frazier, concluded that the district court lacked authority to hear the mother's petition because she was not seeking to alter the parents' status as joint legal custodians. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling without considering the merits of the mother's petition.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Frazier. The Supreme Court held that a court that entered a custody decree has the authority to modify it when requested, even if the modification does not relate to who has legal custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had the authority to rule on the mother's petition since the decree specified the daughter's school district, and the mother sought to modify that based on a change of circumstances.On de novo review, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the district court's determination that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the district court's order denying the modification petition. View "Venechuk v. Landherr" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

An unmarried couple, K.L.T. and M.O.J., filed a petition on September 27, 2024, to adopt three children who had been in their care since early 2022. The Cass County District Court denied their petition on October 8, 2024, citing North Dakota Century Code § 14-15-03(2), which the court interpreted as not permitting unmarried couples to jointly adopt. The case was subsequently dismissed.Following the dismissal, K.L.T. and M.O.J. moved for reconsideration on October 14, 2024. Although the district court found them to be suitable adoptive parents, it denied the motion for reconsideration. The court then certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, asking whether an unmarried couple can adopt children under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(2), noting the absence of controlling precedent in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether to answer the certified question. Under Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court has the discretion to answer certified questions of law if they are determinative of the proceeding and if there is no controlling precedent. However, the court determined that answering the certified question would be purely advisory since the petition had been dismissed and the time to appeal had expired. Consequently, there was no existing case that could be resolved by answering the question.The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the proceeding. View "K.L.T. v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

Christopher Shelton, Vicky Costa, and Todd Costa appealed two orders from the First Judicial District Court dismissing their claims against the State of Montana, Susan Ridgeway, and Axilon Law Group. The case arose from the adoption of L.S., Shelton's biological child, by a Utah couple. Melissa Surbrugg, L.S.'s biological mother, arranged the adoption before L.S. was born. After L.S.'s birth, Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs, leading to a report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). Surbrugg relinquished her parental rights, and the adoptive parents took temporary custody of L.S. The Utah court later terminated Shelton's parental rights and finalized the adoption.The District Court dismissed the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, ruling that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs as they represented Surbrugg, not the plaintiffs. The court also granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Utah courts had already determined that Montana complied with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), thus precluding the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, agreeing that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of the State, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It concluded that the Utah courts had already decided the issue of ICPC compliance, and the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in Utah. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, as the alleged misrepresentation related to a future event, not a past or existing fact. View "Shelton v. State" on Justia Law

Cynthia Maldonado and Martha Amaro, who lived on both sides of the Oklahoma-Kansas border and in Mexico, appealed a trial court's order that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over a juvenile deprived proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The trial court found that Maldonado's child, L.A., had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the commencement of the proceeding, making Oklahoma the child's home state. The court also adjudicated the children deprived as to Maldonado.The Texas County District Court of Oklahoma ordered that N.A. and L.A. be taken into emergency custody by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS) after Maldonado and N.A. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Maldonado filed a motion arguing that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, claiming that Mexico and Kansas were the children's home states. The State argued that Oklahoma had jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Children's Code. The trial court found that L.A. had lived in Oklahoma for six months before the proceeding and adjudicated the children deprived.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's findings. The court held that the Oklahoma district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile deprived proceeding and that the UCCJEA applied to such proceedings. The court found that the trial court's determination that L.A. had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the proceeding was not clearly erroneous. The court also affirmed the trial court's order adjudicating the children deprived as to Maldonado, finding competent evidence to support the order. The appeal was not considered moot due to ongoing collateral consequences. View "IN RE: N.A.; STATE OF OKLAHOMA vs MALDONADO" on Justia Law

H.B., III, a minor, needed a guardian after his father's death. He temporarily lived with his mother, Lasandra K., on the streets of Las Vegas before moving in with his uncle, Marques B. Marques petitioned the district court to be appointed as H.B.'s guardian, disclosing his felony conviction for attempted murder. The district court ordered a criminal background check, which confirmed the conviction. During the hearing, H.B.'s paternal grandmother supported Marques's petition, and Marques claimed Lasandra also supported it via text messages.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, denied the petition, concluding that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from serving as a guardian. Additionally, the court found that Marques failed to serve the petition and citation on all required relatives and interested parties, and did not meet the notice requirements or allege facts to support a waiver of notice. The petition was denied with prejudice, and the matter was closed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify a potential guardian under NRS 159A.061(3). The statute requires the district court to consider various factors, including a felony conviction, but no single factor is dispositive. The district court erred by not considering all relevant factors. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition based on Marques's failure to properly effectuate service. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, and the district court was instructed to amend its order accordingly. View "IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF H.B. III" on Justia Law