Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A grandmother, who was the court-appointed guardian of a minor child since birth, sought to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and adopt the child. After filing petitions for adoption and termination, the grandmother attempted to obtain parental consent, but the documents submitted did not comply with statutory requirements. The grandmother was unable to locate the parents for proper service of process, despite efforts including communication attempts and seeking assistance from child protective agencies.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Probate Division, reviewed the case. It determined that although the grandmother had exercised due diligence, the relevant statute, 15A V.S.A. § 3-403(a), required parents to be “personally served” with process. The probate division interpreted “personal service” to mean only in-hand service or delivery at the parent’s home, excluding service by publication. As a result, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petitions for lack of service.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether “personally served” under § 3-403(a) precluded service by publication. The Court reviewed statutory interpretation and the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. It concluded that the legislative intent was to adopt all forms of “personal service” as defined in Rule 4(d) at the time of enactment, which included service by publication when due diligence to serve by other means fails. The Court found no constitutional bar to service by publication under such circumstances and reversed the probate division’s order dismissing the grandmother’s petition. The Vermont Supreme Court held that service by publication is permitted when the petitioner demonstrates that other forms of service cannot be made with due diligence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re O.R.G." on Justia Law

M.H. is the mother of two children, M.S. and G.H. In 2022, Erie County Department of Social Services initiated abuse proceedings against M.H. and her former boyfriend, D.K., after videos surfaced appearing to show D.K. sexually abusing M.S. The videos, dated from 2019, were not found in the family home but rather on the computer of B.W., an individual in Syracuse who claimed to have hacked into the family's security cameras and who was under investigation for trading child pornography. The FBI recovered the videos, which depicted incidents in the family’s living room. Neither child disclosed abuse during interviews; M.S. denied any sexual contact, and G.H. was unaware of any abuse. The police collected photographs of the home that matched details in the videos, and M.H. identified the people in screenshots as D.K. and M.S.Erie County Family Court admitted the videos into evidence over objection, relying on testimony from the FBI agent who recovered the videos and a police investigator who confirmed the setting matched the family home. The court found that M.H. had abused M.S. by failing to protect her from D.K. and derivatively abused G.H. Both children were placed in foster care, and M.H.’s contact was limited to supervised visits. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that any uncertainty regarding the videos’ authenticity went to their weight and not their admissibility.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The Court held that the videos were not properly authenticated because Erie County failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing their reliability. Unlike in prior cases where authentication was found lacking, here the videos’ chain of custody was more tenuous and the testimony presented did not meet the threshold required for authentication. As a result, the Court reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and dismissed the petitions against M.H. View "Matter of M.S." on Justia Law

An infant girl was discovered severely wounded on an Afghan battlefield by U.S. forces in 2019. With no known surviving family and urgent medical needs, she was transferred to U.S. military care. Joshua and Stephanie Mast, learning of her plight while stationed in Afghanistan, initiated legal proceedings in Virginia, ultimately receiving an adoption order in 2020. The initial court found compelling evidence that the child was stateless, her parents were deceased, and Afghan authorities were unwilling or unable to care for her. The Masts were found credible, and the adoption was supported by the Department of Social Services and a guardian ad litem. Later, A.A. and F.A. filed a petition to vacate the adoption, claiming Afghan law made them the child’s guardians and the adoption was procured by fraud. The Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, and subsequently the Court of Appeals of Virginia, found that Code § 63.2-1216—which bars collateral or direct attacks on adoption orders after six months—did not apply, relying on various legal theories including “de facto parent” status and federal preemption. On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Code § 63.2-1216’s plain language bars all attacks on final adoption orders after six months, including those based on alleged fraud, procedural errors, or lack of jurisdiction, unless the challenger is a legal parent with a fundamental liberty interest. The Court rejected the “de facto parent” constitutional argument, found no federal preemption, and determined that neither the factual record nor law supported exempting the challengers from the statute of repose. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition to vacate the adoption order with prejudice. View "Mast v. A.A." on Justia Law

A young child, Alice, made several allegations of sexual misconduct against her father over the course of multiple years, beginning in 2021. These allegations were investigated on several occasions by county departments of social services, but none found substantiating evidence, and some investigators suspected that Alice’s mother coached her to fabricate accusations. The parents, who never married, were engaged in an ongoing custody dispute. The Carteret County District Court ultimately awarded primary custody to Alice’s father, finding the mother’s denials of visitation willful and her testimony untruthful. Additional reports of abuse were made thereafter, including by Alice’s school counselor and a therapist. These led to further investigations and court actions, but again no evidence of abuse was substantiated.The District Court in Carteret County dismissed a subsequent juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency, relying on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, finding the issues had already been litigated. The Court of Appeals vacated this order, holding that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the previously adjudicated abuse allegations but not new allegations arising after the prior custody and interference proceedings. The appellate court remanded for further proceedings on the new allegations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the application of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department of Social Services’ juvenile petition because the Department was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior child custody or interference proceedings. Additionally, the prior court findings did not “actually determine” the relevant abuse issues for collateral estoppel purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, also noting the Department’s conflict of interest in this matter. View "In re A.D.H" on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were divorced in 2018. Following the divorce, one party, Mr. Dasler, repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters that had already been resolved by final court orders, filing numerous motions for reconsideration and appeals, most of which were denied for lack of new arguments or facts. He also made unsubstantiated allegations against his former spouse, Ms. Knapp, and initiated related litigation in multiple courts over substantially similar issues. Based on this conduct, a trial court found that Mr. Dasler engaged in abusive litigation intended to harass or intimidate Ms. Knapp and issued an order restricting his ability to file further litigation against her without meeting certain conditions.Ms. Knapp then requested attorney’s fees and costs under Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), submitting detailed billing records to support her claim. Mr. Dasler objected, arguing that some fees were unrelated, excessive, and that he could not afford to pay them. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Family Division, reviewed the fees, applied the lodestar method, and limited the award to fees connected to the abusive litigation proceedings. The court found the fees reasonable, declined to adjust the amount based on Mr. Dasler’s financial circumstances, and awarded $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs. Mr. Dasler’s motion for reconsideration, which argued the court was required to make specific findings regarding his ability to pay, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that when awarding attorney’s fees under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the proper standard is reasonableness and there is no requirement for individualized findings regarding the litigant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or fee award. The judgment in favor of Ms. Knapp was affirmed. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

A mother, referred to as D.V., had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took custody of her child, E.D., and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. By the time of trial, the Department had decided to seek termination only as to the mother, but at trial, its designated representative twice stated unequivocally that the Department was not seeking termination of the mother’s rights, but instead sought to limit and restrict her rights, appointing the father as sole managing conservator. The Department’s live pleading still requested termination, but no party at trial treated that as the Department’s actual position.The case was first heard by an associate judge, who conducted a bench trial and ordered termination of the mother’s parental rights. The mother sought a de novo hearing in the district court, which adopted the associate judge’s ruling. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the Department’s abandonment of its termination request was not unequivocal when considering the totality of the circumstances, including recommendations from other parties and the Department’s live pleading.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that in parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights when the Department, through its designated representative, makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement at trial withdrawing termination as a requested form of relief. The Court rendered judgment in accordance with the Department’s stated position at trial and remanded the case to the district court to enter judgment consistent with this holding and to resolve any remaining issues. View "D.V. v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both real estate professionals, were married for 31 years and jointly owned several properties, including two farms, residential homes, and business assets acquired during the marriage. The couple had no children together but each had adult children from prior marriages. During the marriage, they operated a real estate business and were equal shareholders in a grain company that was dissolved before the divorce proceedings. The husband claimed certain assets as nonmarital property, including proceeds from a premarital business and an inheritance, and also sought to have debts incurred during the marriage, such as a COVID-related loan and loans taken to pay temporary spousal support, treated as marital debts. Additionally, a third party, J.E.M. Farms, LLC, intervened, claiming a one-half interest in one of the farms based on a prior agreement and financial contributions.The District Court for Antelope County conducted a bifurcated trial, first addressing the intervenor’s claim and then the dissolution action. The court entered a consent decree quieting title to half of one farm in favor of J.E.M. Farms, with all parties agreeing to pay their own attorney fees and costs. In the dissolution proceedings, the court found that the husband failed to adequately trace most of his claimed nonmarital assets, except for $260,000 from his inheritance that was used to purchase one farm. The court also found insufficient evidence to treat the COVID loan as an outstanding marital debt or to find dissipation by the wife. The court ordered both farms to be sold, with the proceeds divided equally after accounting for the nonmarital inheritance, and denied the husband’s request for attorney fees related to the intervention.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the husband did not meet his burden to trace additional nonmarital property, that the consent decree barred his claim for attorney fees related to the intervention, and that the order to sell the farms was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no error in the treatment of debts or in the division of property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law