Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A mother, referred to as D.V., had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took custody of her child, E.D., and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. By the time of trial, the Department had decided to seek termination only as to the mother, but at trial, its designated representative twice stated unequivocally that the Department was not seeking termination of the mother’s rights, but instead sought to limit and restrict her rights, appointing the father as sole managing conservator. The Department’s live pleading still requested termination, but no party at trial treated that as the Department’s actual position.The case was first heard by an associate judge, who conducted a bench trial and ordered termination of the mother’s parental rights. The mother sought a de novo hearing in the district court, which adopted the associate judge’s ruling. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the Department’s abandonment of its termination request was not unequivocal when considering the totality of the circumstances, including recommendations from other parties and the Department’s live pleading.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that in parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights when the Department, through its designated representative, makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement at trial withdrawing termination as a requested form of relief. The Court rendered judgment in accordance with the Department’s stated position at trial and remanded the case to the district court to enter judgment consistent with this holding and to resolve any remaining issues. View "D.V. v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both real estate professionals, were married for 31 years and jointly owned several properties, including two farms, residential homes, and business assets acquired during the marriage. The couple had no children together but each had adult children from prior marriages. During the marriage, they operated a real estate business and were equal shareholders in a grain company that was dissolved before the divorce proceedings. The husband claimed certain assets as nonmarital property, including proceeds from a premarital business and an inheritance, and also sought to have debts incurred during the marriage, such as a COVID-related loan and loans taken to pay temporary spousal support, treated as marital debts. Additionally, a third party, J.E.M. Farms, LLC, intervened, claiming a one-half interest in one of the farms based on a prior agreement and financial contributions.The District Court for Antelope County conducted a bifurcated trial, first addressing the intervenor’s claim and then the dissolution action. The court entered a consent decree quieting title to half of one farm in favor of J.E.M. Farms, with all parties agreeing to pay their own attorney fees and costs. In the dissolution proceedings, the court found that the husband failed to adequately trace most of his claimed nonmarital assets, except for $260,000 from his inheritance that was used to purchase one farm. The court also found insufficient evidence to treat the COVID loan as an outstanding marital debt or to find dissipation by the wife. The court ordered both farms to be sold, with the proceeds divided equally after accounting for the nonmarital inheritance, and denied the husband’s request for attorney fees related to the intervention.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the husband did not meet his burden to trace additional nonmarital property, that the consent decree barred his claim for attorney fees related to the intervention, and that the order to sell the farms was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no error in the treatment of debts or in the division of property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

A Greek and Australian citizen and a U.S. citizen, who married in Australia, had a child together and lived in Australia before relocating to Greece. In late 2022, the family traveled to Maine for a planned vacation. On the day before their scheduled return to Greece, the mother informed the father that she and the child would not return with him. The father returned to Greece alone, while the mother and child remained in Maine, where the child began receiving developmental services and became integrated into the local community. The child was later diagnosed with autism and enrolled in a therapeutic program. The mother filed for divorce in Maine, and the father subsequently sought the child’s return to Greece under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Maine District Court found that the mother wrongfully retained the child in Maine as of January 4, 2023, but that the father did not file a petition for the child’s return in a Maine court until April 19, 2024—more than one year later. The court also found that the child was well settled in Maine, with significant family support, stable living arrangements, and access to specialized services. Exercising its discretion, the court denied the father’s petition to return the child to Greece. The father appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the order was reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The court held that the District Court did not err in finding the date of wrongful retention, nor in concluding that the father’s petition was untimely under the Hague Convention. The court also affirmed the finding that the child was well settled in Maine and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for return. The judgment was affirmed. View "Xamplas v. Xamplas" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought access to confidential court records from child protective and adoption proceedings involving a young girl who died after being placed in foster care and later adopted. The girl was reported missing in 2021, and her death was confirmed in 2023. The records also contained information about her siblings. The siblings, through their counsel, did not object to disclosure as long as their identities were protected through redactions. The Department of Human Services and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, arguing that the records were confidential and that redactions would not sufficiently protect privacy.The Family Court of the First Circuit denied the request, reasoning that releasing redacted records would be misleading and would not serve the public interest in understanding the response of agencies and the court to child abuse and neglect. The court concluded that the records should remain sealed, citing concerns about the completeness and potential for misunderstanding of the redacted information.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that, under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 587A-40 and 578-15, public access to confidential child protective and adoption records is permitted when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, been critically injured, or has died, provided that information about living siblings is redacted to protect their privacy. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it limited disclosure to only those purposes that further the best interests of the child, clarifying that a “legitimate purpose” for disclosure can exist independently. The court ordered the release of the redacted records and provided guidance for future requests, affirming the family court’s authority to require agencies to prepare redacted versions for public access. View "Public First Law Center v. Viola" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A married couple, who wed in 2020 and share a young child, purchased an engineering business together using loans secured by the wife’s premarital home. After their separation in 2023, the wife petitioned for divorce. The parties entered into interim agreements regarding custody, child support, and business management, but the husband repeatedly violated these orders by failing to make required payments, misusing business funds, and withholding financial disclosures. The wife raised concerns about the husband’s substance abuse and erratic behavior, providing evidence of his alcohol and marijuana use, as well as incidents of intoxication during child exchanges and at work. The husband denied these allegations but admitted to some problematic behavior in written communications.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held multiple hearings, finding the husband in contempt several times for violating court orders. At trial, the court heard testimony and reviewed evidence regarding the husband’s parenting, financial conduct, and the parties’ competing proposals for the business. The court found the wife more credible, sanctioned the husband for discovery violations, and ultimately awarded her primary custody of the child, with the husband’s parenting time to be phased in only after he completed chemical dependency and mental health evaluations. The court also awarded the wife sole ownership of the business and her premarital home, requiring her to assume all related debts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that the finding regarding the husband’s failure to make full financial disclosures was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also found no abuse of discretion in conditioning the husband’s parenting time on completion of evaluations or in awarding the business to the wife, as these decisions were equitable and consistent with Montana law. View "In re Marriage of Boeshans" on Justia Law

K.S. gave birth to her daughter, Jane, in August 2018 and struggled with ongoing methamphetamine abuse before, during, and after her pregnancy. Jane’s early life was marked by instability, with K.S. frequently leaving her in the care of relatives and exposing her to unsafe environments. After a series of rehabilitation attempts and relapses, Jane was adjudicated a neglected child by the Rankin County Youth Court in November 2019, and custody was transferred among family members. By early 2022, Jane was in the durable legal custody of M.F.D. and M.D., K.S.’s cousin and her husband.M.D. and M.F.D. filed a petition in the Rankin County Chancery Court in August 2022 to terminate K.S.’s parental rights and adopt Jane. Before trial, they requested the youth court to transfer jurisdiction to the chancery court, which the youth court granted, finding all matters resolved and the transfer in Jane’s best interest. The chancery court then held a trial, denied K.S.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and terminated her parental rights based on abandonment, desertion, unfitness, and failure to provide for Jane’s needs. The court also found reunification was not in Jane’s best interest and subsequently granted the adoption. K.S. appealed the termination and later filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the adoption, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate K.S.’s parental rights because the youth court had formally relinquished jurisdiction, and no statute prohibited such transfer. The Court also found no manifest error in the termination decision, as substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s findings. Finally, the Court declined to adopt a rule requiring automatic stays of adoption proceedings pending appeals of termination orders. The judgments of the chancery court were affirmed. View "K.S. v. M.D. and M.F.D." on Justia Law

A child was born in 2012 to Kendra and Christopher, but due to concerns about Kendra’s fitness as a parent, the child was placed with her paternal grandmother, Denise, and Denise’s long-term partner, David Lemaster, under a Cabinet safety plan. Denise was later granted permanent custody of the child, and the child lived with Denise and Lemaster for her entire life. Kendra, the child’s mother, was initially denied visitation but later received supervised and then unsupervised visitation. Denise and Lemaster jointly raised and financially supported the child, functioning as a family unit. In 2022, Denise died, and Lemaster sought to intervene in the ongoing custody case, claiming de facto custodian status and seeking custody or visitation.The Greenup Family Court granted emergency custody to Kendra and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, later awarded her full custody, denying Lemaster’s motion to intervene as untimely and finding he could not qualify as a de facto custodian. Lemaster’s motion to alter or amend was denied. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Lemaster’s intervention was untimely and that he could not be a de facto custodian since he co-parented with Denise, the legal custodian.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded. It held that Lemaster had standing to intervene as a “person acting as a parent” under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and had sufficiently alleged a basis for de facto custodian status, even though he was not married to Denise. The Court found that Lemaster’s motion to intervene, filed two days after Denise’s death, was timely, as his interest was previously protected by Denise. The Court ordered the family court to allow Lemaster to intervene and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine his status as a de facto custodian. View "LEMASTER V. STILTNER" on Justia Law