Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition in September 2022 for temporary orders requiring the parents to participate in state-provided services for their child's safety. The trial court granted these temporary orders. In August 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights and obtain conservatorship of the child. The parents responded with motions for sanctions, claiming the Department's actions were frivolous. The Department then moved to nonsuit its claims. The trial court expressed frustration but granted the nonsuit and planned a separate hearing for the sanctions motions.The trial court signed an order on August 21, 2023, dismissing the Department's claims and removing the case from the docket. However, the court later consolidated the cases and held a hearing on the sanctions motions, ultimately granting them and ordering the Department to pay the parents' attorney's fees. The Department appealed the sanctions order. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas vacated the sanctions order, deeming it void because the trial court's dismissal order was considered final, thus ending the court's plenary power before the sanctions order was issued.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal order was not a final judgment as it did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of all claims and parties. Therefore, the trial court retained its plenary power when it issued the sanctions order. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating the sanctions order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re C.K.M." on Justia Law

Kenneth and Jill Swing were involved in a divorce action that included contested issues such as the pre-nuptial agreement, equitable division of property, child custody, visitation, support, and fees. The family court issued a final order on June 8, 2021. Jill filed a motion to alter or amend this order on June 16, 2021, which the family court partially granted on August 27, 2021, issuing an amended final order. Kenneth then filed his own motion to alter or amend on September 10, 2021.The family court denied Kenneth's motion on July 14, 2022, deeming it untimely as it did not address the amended final order but rather the original June 8 order. Jill received notice of this denial on July 21, 2022, and served her notice of appeal on August 22, 2022. Kenneth moved to dismiss Jill's appeal, arguing it was untimely because his own motion did not toll the appeal period. The court of appeals agreed with Kenneth and dismissed Jill's appeal, concluding that Kenneth's motion was untimely and did not stay the time for filing an appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Kenneth's motion was timely as it was served within ten days of receiving notice of the amended final order. The Court clarified that a timely Rule 59(e) motion stays the time for appeal for all parties unless it falls into specific exceptions previously established in case law. The Court found that Kenneth's motion did not fit these exceptions and thus stayed the time for appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of Jill's appeal on its merits. View "Swing v. Swing" on Justia Law

Grant Phillip Poppinga filed a paternity petition seeking custody, visitation, and support for his daughter with Arrianna Monet Wallace. Unable to locate Wallace, Poppinga attempted service by publication. When Wallace did not appear, Poppinga moved for a default judgment, which the district court granted, establishing his paternity and awarding him sole custody. Wallace later sought to vacate the judgment, citing errors in the service by publication and the default judgment. The district court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the sufficiency of the service by publication and the district court's denial of Wallace's motion to vacate. The court found multiple errors in the service by publication, including misspellings, incorrect nature of the suit, and untimely publication. These errors were deemed fatal to the court's jurisdiction over Wallace. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court failed to conduct a proper judicial inquiry into the due diligence of Poppinga's search for Wallace.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the service by publication sufficient and in denying Wallace's motion to vacate the default judgment. The court emphasized the importance of due process, particularly in cases involving fundamental parental rights. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wallace's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, and to conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "POPPINGA v. WALLACE" on Justia Law

Marvin T. Jose Mateo filed a petition in the Hall County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for his 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. The petition also requested immigration-related factual findings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Tomas had been in Marvin's care since 2019, and they had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since January 2022. Tomas was attending high school and planned to join the U.S. Marines after graduation. Marvin testified that Tomas' parents were in Guatemala and did not provide financial support.The county court denied the guardianship petition, noting that Tomas was already 18 years old and that Marvin had a power of attorney from Tomas' parents, which allowed him to care for Tomas without a guardianship. The court did not make the requested factual findings under the UCCJEA. Marvin filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider Tomas' best interests. The court overruled the motion, reiterating that Marvin had been able to care for Tomas without a guardianship and suggesting that the petition was filed primarily to obtain immigration findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the UCCJEA did not apply because Tomas was no longer a "child" under the UCCJEA when the petition was filed. The court determined that other Nebraska statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor guardianship proceeding. However, the court found that the appeal became moot once Tomas reached the age of majority, as the relief of appointing a minor guardian was no longer available. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Guardianship of Tomas J." on Justia Law

Thomas Armenta and Tiffini Pateras began their relationship in 2012 and had a child, M.A., in 2014. They separated in 2017 and entered a child custody and support agreement. Armenta, a Chumash descendant, works at the Chumash tribal office and earns $114,000 annually, plus $5,000 monthly from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program. Pateras filed a petition for child support and attorney fees in 2023. The trial court ordered Armenta to pay $448 monthly for temporary child support and $2,000 in attorney fees. Subsequent hearings led to a final order for Armenta to pay $1,053 monthly in child support and $5,000 in need-based attorney fees.The trial court ruled that the $5,000 monthly payments Armenta receives from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program should be considered as income for calculating child support. Armenta argued that these payments should be excluded as they are not subject to federal income taxation and claimed they were need-based public assistance. However, the court found no evidence that the payments were need-based or restricted to low-income individuals.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the payments from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program are income for child support purposes, regardless of their tax status under federal law. The court emphasized that California’s child support statutes aim to ensure parents support their children according to their financial ability, and income is broadly defined to include various sources. The court also rejected Armenta’s claims regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing and the enforcement of a notice to appear, finding no procedural errors. The orders were affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the respondents. View "Pateras v. Armenta" on Justia Law

In this case, the paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as the temporary guardian of a minor child shortly after the child's birth in 2015, with the father's consent. Over the next five years, the child's parents, Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart, contested the temporary guardianship. The magistrate court found no grounds to grant a permanent guardianship to the grandmother and aimed to reunify the child with the parents through a phased visitation plan. Despite this, the grandmother was held in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with court orders regarding visitation.The grandmother appealed the magistrate court's decisions to the district court. However, neither she nor her attorney, Wm. Breck Seiniger, filed the required opening briefs. The district court dismissed the appeal due to the failure to file timely briefs and found no good cause for the delay. The grandmother then filed a new notice of appeal from a subsequent contempt judgment, but again failed to file the necessary briefs on time, leading to the dismissal of the second appeal as well.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that Seiniger did not have the authority to represent the child, as he was never appointed by the magistrate court. The court also noted that the grandmother failed to challenge the district court's dismissal of her appeals in her briefing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions to dismiss the appeals and struck Seiniger's petition to intervene and notices of joinder. View "Ray v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

A child was born to Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart in 2015. The child's paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as her temporary guardian shortly after birth. Ray was later allowed to intervene in the parents' divorce action to determine custody once the guardianship ended in August 2021. Before the guardianship ended, attorney Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. was asked by Ray to represent the child, which he accepted without court appointment. Seiniger filed a notice of appearance in the divorce action, which the parents objected to. The magistrate court ruled that Seiniger could not represent the child as there was no motion to appoint counsel, it was unnecessary at that stage, and a neutral attorney would be appointed if needed.The parents reached a custody agreement and filed a stipulation for joint custody. Despite the magistrate court's ruling, Seiniger objected to the proposed judgment on behalf of the child. The magistrate court overruled the objections and entered a judgment consistent with the parents' stipulation. Ray appealed the custody judgment to the district court, joined by Seiniger. The district court concluded that Seiniger had no authority to represent the child and dismissed the appeal, characterizing Seiniger as an "officious interloper." Ray's appeal was later dismissed for failure to provide timely briefing.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the magistrate court acted within its discretion in rejecting Seiniger's representation of the child, as there was no motion to appoint counsel and it was unnecessary at that stage. The court also found that Seiniger's arguments were unpreserved and unsupported by sufficient authority. Consequently, the district court's order, including the decision to strike all pleadings filed by Seiniger, was affirmed. View "Lowman v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

Lizette Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order against Ana Valdez-Mendoza, her daughter's stepmother, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924. Aguilar alleged that Valdez-Mendoza physically assaulted her during a visit to drop off her daughter at the home of her ex-husband, Fernando Mendoza, who is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The district court issued an ex parte protection order, which was affirmed after a hearing. Valdez-Mendoza appealed, arguing that the court erred in concluding that she and Aguilar were related by "affinity" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903.The district court for Madison County found that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza had a relationship by "affinity" because Aguilar is related to her daughter, and the daughter's father is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The court overruled Valdez-Mendoza's motion to dismiss and affirmed the protection order, reasoning that the statutory phrase "related by affinity" was broad enough to include their relationship.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of "affinity." The court defined "affinity" as the relationship arising from the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other, not extending to Aguilar herself, who is not related by consanguinity to Mendoza. Therefore, Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were not related by affinity under § 42-903. The court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the protection order. View "Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble divorced in 2022, with custody arrangements for their two minor children outlined in the divorce decree. Gamble later moved to modify custody, and during the proceedings, a press organization requested media access, which the district court granted. Nester moved for reconsideration, seeking to close the hearing to protect sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The district court denied her motion, interpreting a previous case, Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, as precluding closure of family law proceedings.The district court concluded it lacked discretion to close the hearing, stating there was no statute or rule allowing it. Nester then sought writ relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Falconi and failed to consider her privacy interests and those of her children.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its interpretation of Falconi. The court clarified that Falconi does not prohibit the closure of family law proceedings but requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if closure is warranted. The court outlined that closure is permissible if it serves a compelling interest, there is a substantial probability that the interest could be harmed without closure, and no alternatives to closure would adequately protect the interest.The Supreme Court of Nevada granted Nester's petition, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to close the hearing and to reconsider the motion using the test outlined in Falconi. The court emphasized the need for the district court to properly apply the factors to determine whether closure is justified. View "NESTER VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law