Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Peter Lowes and Amy Thompson, formerly Amy Lowes, regarding a nondisparagement clause in their stipulated divorce judgment. Lowes alleged that Thompson breached this clause by describing him as her "abuser" during a political campaign interview. Thompson filed a special motion to strike the breach of contract claim under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to quickly dismiss nonmeritorious claims arising from protected speech. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the nondisparagement clause waived Thompson’s right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.The Deschutes County Circuit Court initially granted Thompson’s special motion to strike, finding that her statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that Lowes failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the nondisparagement clause constituted a waiver of Thompson’s anti-SLAPP protections, thus making it unnecessary to evaluate whether Lowes could prevail on his claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the nondisparagement clause did not clearly indicate an intention to waive the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, the clause alone could not defeat Thompson’s special motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Lowes met his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on his breach of contract claim. View "Lowes v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Pamela J. (Tower) Weinle appealed a divorce judgment from the District Court (Skowhegan), which divided marital property and awarded Alan R. Tower spousal support and attorney fees. Weinle contested the spousal support, property distribution, and attorney fees. Tower died after the judgment and during the appeal process.The District Court awarded Tower $2,000 per month in general spousal support, $500 per month in reimbursement spousal support, and $12,325 in attorney fees. The court found that Weinle had engaged in economic misconduct by purchasing and selling property without Tower's knowledge and failing to comply with discovery obligations, which increased litigation costs. The court also noted that Weinle had a substantial income and financial resources, while Tower had limited income and poor health.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court overruled its previous decision in Panter v. Panter, which required dismissal of an appeal if a party died during its pendency. The court held that the death of a party does not moot the appeal regarding property rights. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding no error in the spousal support award, property distribution, or attorney fees. The court noted that the spousal support obligation ceased upon Tower's death, as the divorce judgment did not specify that the support survived the death of either party. View "Weinle v. Estate of Tower" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Etleva Stratoberdha, filed a lawsuit in Superior Court against Clements Properties, LLC, Robert P. Rucando, and officials from the Town of Portsmouth. They alleged that Clements Properties caused continuous trespass by creating an illegal drainage structure, Rucando failed to disclose flooding issues when selling the property, and the Town neglected to enforce ordinances. During the prolonged litigation, Etleva filed for divorce, and the Family Court issued orders related to the sale of the marital home and the settlement of the Superior Court action.The Family Court appointed a Commissioner to sell the marital home and authorized her to settle the Superior Court action. Robert did not appeal these orders. The Family Court later approved a settlement agreement where Clements Properties would buy the marital home for $870,000, and the Town would pay $75,000 in damages. The Family Court's orders and the settlement agreement were incorporated into the interlocutory decision pending entry of final judgment in the divorce case. Robert's appeal of this decision was dismissed as untimely.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order approving the settlement agreement. The Court held that the Family Court's orders were final and could not be challenged in the Superior Court. The Superior Court's approval of the settlement agreement was a ministerial act based on the Family Court's final decrees. The Court found no merit in Robert's arguments and concluded that the Superior Court properly relied on the Family Court's orders. View "Stratoberdhav. Clements Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

C.C. is the mother of B.F. and I.F. In November 2021, she left the children with their paternal uncle, who provided a stable home. In November 2022, the children came under the protective custody of the Cass County Human Service Zone (CHSZ) due to concerns of parental abandonment. The whereabouts of A.F., the father, were unknown. In March 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as needing protection and placed them in CHSZ custody for nine months, finding aggravating factors and adopting a reunification plan. In December 2023, CHSZ filed a petition to terminate C.C.'s parental rights but later amended it to extend CHSZ custody for nine months due to C.C.'s progress. In February 2024, the court granted CHSZ custody for an additional nine months with concurrent plans of reunification and termination.In October 2024, CHSZ petitioned to terminate C.C. and A.F.'s parental rights, citing C.C.'s failure to maintain progress on the reunification plan. C.C. attended the initial hearing and a status conference in December 2024 but failed to attend the February 2025 status conference. The court found C.C. and A.F. in default and terminated their parental rights, noting C.C.'s continued drug use, failure to secure stable housing and employment, and lack of consistent participation in visitations and services.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order. The court held that the juvenile court did not err in finding C.C. in default and that the evidence supported the termination of parental rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying C.C.'s motion to vacate the default judgment and concluded that the termination did not violate C.C.'s constitutional due process rights. View "Interest of B.F." on Justia Law

James Michael Kahl (James) and Jennifer June Sperano (Jennifer) have a minor daughter, M.A.K., born in May 2019. James filed a dissolution and parenting plan action in January 2020, which continued as a parenting plan matter after the parties agreed they were never married. Initially residing in Gardiner, Montana, both parents moved to Red Lodge, Montana, before separating. Jennifer returned to Gardiner and filed her own petition for a parenting plan. The Park County District Court transferred the case to the Carbon County District Court.At a February 2020 hearing, James requested supervised visitation for Jennifer due to her alleged chemical dependency issues, while Jennifer requested primary custody and supervised visitation for James, citing his allegedly abusive behavior. The District Court denied both requests for supervised visitation and ordered alternating weekly custody. In fall 2024, with M.A.K. starting school, both parents requested amended parenting plans. The District Court found both Red Lodge and Gardiner suitable for M.A.K. and ultimately granted Jennifer primary custody during the school year, with James having alternating weekends and extended summer parenting time.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. James raised four issues on appeal: the admissibility of Judge Brenda R. Gilbert's testimony, the District Court's decision not to follow the Guardian Ad Litem's (GAL) recommendation, an alleged factual error regarding Jennifer's employment, and the workability of the parenting plan. The Court found no error in admitting Judge Gilbert's testimony, as she was not the presiding judge and provided relevant testimony. The Court also held that the District Court properly evaluated the GAL's recommendations and found substantial evidence supporting the District Court's findings regarding Jennifer's employment and the parenting plan's workability. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Marriage of: Kahl & Sperano" on Justia Law

A married couple, with three young children, filed for divorce. The mother requested primary custody, pendente lite child support, and alimony, while the father requested primary custody and child support. A family magistrate found both parents capable of earning significant income and denied the mother's request for pendente lite child support and alimony, recommending shared custody and shared payment of the mortgage and utilities for the marital home.The Circuit Court for Howard County adopted the magistrate's recommendations and denied the mother's exceptions to the magistrate's report. The mother appealed, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-303(3)(v), which allows appeals from interlocutory orders for the payment of money.The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal, holding that an interlocutory order denying pendente lite child support and alimony is not appealable under CJ § 12-303(3)(v) because it does not direct the payment of money. The mother then petitioned the Supreme Court of Maryland for a writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that CJ § 12-303(3)(v) authorizes appeals only from interlocutory orders that direct the payment of money, not from orders denying such requests. The Court concluded that the legislative history and case law support this interpretation, emphasizing that the statute's plain language does not permit appeals from orders denying the payment of money. View "Adelakun v. Adelakun" on Justia Law

Nicholas Roddy Ramlow and Amanda Marie Mitchell share custody of their minor son. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over their child custody case since 2016. In 2020, a temporary order was issued for the child to attend Kindergarten at Winton Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The parents later entered into a custody agreement that did not specify the child's school. In 2021, Mitchell moved to Pinehurst, Idaho, and enrolled the child in Pinehurst Elementary without informing Ramlow, who was under a no-contact order. Ramlow discovered the change in 2023 and attempted to enroll the child in Bryan Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, but the school secretary, Miriam McBenge, refused without both parents' consent or a court order.Ramlow filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus in the district court to allow the child's enrollment in Coeur d'Alene. The district court dismissed the petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), citing the ongoing child custody case in the magistrate court. Ramlow argued that the district court erred in its dismissal. McBenge and Mitchell requested the district court's decision be affirmed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the magistrate court was better positioned to resolve the issue of the child's school enrollment due to its ongoing jurisdiction over the custody case. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion and followed the appropriate legal standards. The case was remanded to the district court to amend the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to Mitchell under Idaho Code section 12-121, as Ramlow's appeal was deemed frivolous and without foundation. View "Ramlow v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

An adoptive mother, J.S., declined to take her teenage son, E.K., back into her home due to his history of violent behavior towards her and his siblings. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) sought a CHINS 1 adjudication, alleging that the mother failed to provide necessary shelter. At the fact-finding hearing, the mother requested alternative CHINS adjudications based on the child endangering himself or others (CHINS 6) or his fetal alcohol syndrome diagnosis (CHINS 10). The trial court deferred to DCS’s filing decision and entered a CHINS 1 adjudication.The Whitley Circuit Court initially awarded DCS emergency custody of E.K. and later adjudicated him under CHINS 1 after the father admitted to the allegations. The mother contested the CHINS 1 adjudication, leading to a fact-finding hearing. The trial court found that E.K. posed a danger to himself and others but still adjudicated him under CHINS 1, citing the mother’s refusal to provide necessary shelter. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the CHINS 1 adjudication, finding insufficient evidence that the mother either had the financial means to provide a safe home or failed to seek other reasonable means to do so. The court held that the trial court should have independently assessed whether a CHINS 6 or 10 adjudication was appropriate, rather than deferring to DCS. Due to procedural shortcomings, including the lack of proper notice and participation for E.K., the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "J.S. v. Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

Tara Gentele and Christopher Gentele were involved in divorce proceedings and attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation. Christopher claimed that a settlement agreement was reached during mediation, but Tara denied this. Christopher then asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court found that a settlement agreement had been reached and entered a dissolution decree based on its terms. The decree required Christopher to make equalization payments to Tara and to divide certain credit card rewards points between them. Christopher made the first payment and transferred the rewards points, which Tara accepted. Tara then filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement.The district court for Lancaster County found that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement during mediation and entered a dissolution decree based on that agreement. Tara accepted the benefits provided by the decree but subsequently filed an appeal challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreement.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that Tara's appeal was precluded by the acceptance of benefits rule. This rule generally prevents an appellant from accepting the benefits of a judgment and then appealing the parts of the judgment that are unfavorable. The court found that Tara's acceptance of the equalization payment and rewards points was inconsistent with her appeal. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the acceptance of benefits rule applied and barred Tara from challenging the decree. View "Gentele v. Gentele" on Justia Law

In September 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that a child, A.O., had visible bruises on his face. A.O. told officers that his mother, F.O., had hit him. DCFS investigated and found multiple injuries on A.O. Mother claimed the injuries were from a ball hitting A.O. at a park. A.O. was removed from Mother's custody and placed in foster care. DCFS filed a petition alleging physical abuse by Mother. Mother denied the allegations but later pleaded "no contest" to an amended petition that alleged inappropriate discipline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.O. from Mother and ordered that visits occur in a therapeutic setting. DCFS faced challenges in arranging these visits due to difficulties in finding a suitable therapist. Despite these efforts, Mother had no contact with A.O. from the time of detention until the six-month review hearing. At this hearing, the court found that DCFS had provided reasonable services and continued reunification services for Mother. Mother appealed, arguing that DCFS had not provided reasonable services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Mother could appeal the reasonable services finding because an erroneous finding could impair her ability to request an extension of reunification services and potentially lead to the termination of her parental rights. The court found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that DCFS had provided reasonable services, despite the lack of visits, due to the efforts made to arrange therapeutic visits and the challenges faced. The court affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "In re A.O." on Justia Law