Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jose and Kirstin Aroca executed a "Note Secured by Deed of Trust" in 2007, agreeing to pay Tang Investment Company $40,000, secured by real property in Pinal County. They made interest-only payments for one year and then stopped. Tang did not initiate foreclosure or any action to enforce the debt, which remains unpaid. In 2022, the Arocas filed a suit to quiet title, claiming the Deed of Trust was invalid as the statute of limitations on the Note had expired.The Superior Court in Pinal County dismissed the Arocas' complaint, agreeing with Tang that under A.R.S. § 33-714, the Deed of Trust lien was valid until 2057. The court of appeals reversed, holding that A.R.S. § 33-714 did not extend the statute of limitations for foreclosure, which was governed by A.R.S. § 33-816 and A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(1), setting a six-year limit. The court concluded that Tang could not foreclose or initiate a trustee’s sale after 2018 and that the Arocas were entitled to quiet title under A.R.S. § 12-1104(B).The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the equitable principles from Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner do not override the statutory rights established in A.R.S. § 12-1104(B). The court determined that an action to quiet title can proceed even if the underlying debt remains unpaid, provided the statute of limitations for enforcing the debt has expired. The court reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Arocas, affirming their right to quiet title. The court also vacated parts of the court of appeals' opinion but left the attorney fees award intact. Tang's request for attorney fees and costs was denied. View "AROCA v TANG INVESTMENT" on Justia Law

A constable, Deborah Martinez-Garibay, was fatally shot while attempting to serve a writ of restitution to a tenant who had threatened a resident with a gun. The tenant also killed Angela Fox, who was accompanying Garibay, and another individual before taking his own life. Angela's surviving spouse, William Fox, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Garibay's spouse, Pima County, and the Arizona Constable Ethics, Standards and Training Board, alleging negligence and gross negligence on Garibay's part.The Superior Court of Pima County denied Garibay's spouse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and owed no duty to Angela. The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that Garibay was judicially immune from liability as her actions did not constitute "misconduct" under A.R.S. § 11-449.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the common law doctrine of judicial immunity shields constables from liability under A.R.S. § 11-449. The court held that § 11-449 limits, rather than abrogates, judicial immunity. It concluded that a constable who engages in "misconduct" in the service or execution of a writ is subject to liability. The court defined "misconduct" as an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm, rather than mere negligence or gross negligence.The court found that Fox's complaint did not allege that Garibay engaged in "misconduct" as defined by the statute, but rather that she was negligent or grossly negligent. Therefore, the court concluded that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GARIBAY v FOX" on Justia Law

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between investigative journalist Amy Silverman and the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES). Silverman requested access to records maintained by the Adult Protective Services (APS), a program within ADES, for her research on issues affecting individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. ADES denied her request, citing a state law that generally shields APS records from public inspection, except for certain exceptions, including one for "bona fide research." Silverman sued ADES, arguing that her journalistic activities qualified as "bona fide research."The Superior Court in Maricopa County ruled in favor of Silverman, finding that her journalistic activities qualified as "bona fide research" and ordered ADES to produce the requested documents after redacting personally identifying information. ADES appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the Superior Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that "research" under the exception must be conducted for "educational, administrative, or scientific purposes" and that ADES still has discretion whether to disclose APS records.Both parties were dissatisfied with the Court of Appeals' decision and filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. The Supreme Court concluded that "bona fide research" under the relevant statute occurs when the researcher engages in a good faith and genuine study to acquire more knowledge, discover new facts, or test new ideas concerning reporting or stopping the abuse, exploitation, or neglect of vulnerable adults. The court also held that anyone, including journalists, can qualify under the bona fide research exception. However, the court found that ADES has discretion whether, and on what conditions, to release APS records for bona fide research. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, affirmed the Superior Court's judgment insofar as it denied ADES's motion to dismiss, but reversed the judgment for Silverman and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "SILVERMAN v ADES" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arizona Republican Party (ARP) and its attorneys, who challenged the manner in which Maricopa County election officials conducted a mandatory hand count of ballots following the 2020 general election. The ARP argued that the hand count should have been based on precincts rather than voting centers, as prescribed by the Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The trial court dismissed the ARP's complaint and awarded attorney fees against the ARP and its attorneys under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1) and (F), which provides for such fees if a claim is groundless and not made in good faith. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the attorney fees award was improper because the ARP's claim was not groundless, thus there was no need to determine whether the claim was made in the absence of good faith. The court found that the ARP's claim was more than "barely" colorable, as there was a plain-language conflict between § 16-602(B), which requires a precinct hand count, and the 2019 EPM, which permits a voting center hand count. The court also disagreed with the lower courts' rulings that the ARP's claim was groundless due to the unavailability of remedies, the applicability of the election-law time bar on post-election challenges to pre-election procedures, and laches. The court vacated the trial court’s and the court of appeals’ attorney fees awards. View "ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY v RICHER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over insurance coverage following a fatal jet ski accident. The owner of A.C. Watercraft Rental, Sayed Mohammed, had sought liability insurance for all his business-owned watercraft through Farm Bureau Property and Casualty Insurance Company, which connected him with Great Divide Insurance Company. However, a Yamaha watercraft involved in a fatal accident was not listed in the policy schedule. Following the accident, Mohammed filed a claim with Great Divide for defense and indemnification, which was denied due to the jet ski not being listed in the policy. Subsequently, the deceased's father, Garbis Satamian, sued A.C. Watercraft, which had to bear its own defense costs.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed Satamian's claims against Great Divide, Farm Bureau, and Risk Placement Services (RPS) on the grounds of statute of limitations. The court found that A.C. Watercraft learned of the negligent procurement of insurance when Great Divide denied coverage in January 2016, and that it “sustained injury in May 2017, when [A.C. Watercraft] incurred attorneys’ fees and costs defending itself.” The court ruled that both the negligent procurement of insurance claim and the promissory estoppel claim were time-barred because each accrued no later than May 2017.Satamian appealed the dismissal, arguing that the discovery rule should have tolled the statute of limitations and that the claims could not have accrued until his underlying action against A.C. Watercraft was final and non-appealable. The Court of Appeals rejected Satamian’s arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the negligent procurement of insurance and promissory estoppel claims accrued when an insured incurs its own litigation costs for defense against a claim due to an insurer’s negligent failure to obtain insurance coverage. The court found that A.C. Watercraft knew or should have known both the “who” and the “what” of the negligent procurement cause of action by May 2017, and expired by May 2019. The promissory estoppel claim began to accrue by May 2017, and expired by May 2020. Because Satamian filed this lawsuit in June 2021, both claims were time-barred. View "Satamian v. Great Divide Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona considered whether the Arizona Legislature repealed or otherwise restricted A.R.S. § 13-3603 by enacting the abortion statutes in Title 36, specifically A.R.S. § 36-2322, which prohibits physicians from performing elective abortions after fifteen weeks’ gestation. The case arose from a motion for relief under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)–(6), seeking to set aside the permanent injunction against § 13-3603 imposed in 1973 following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.Previously, the trial court granted the motion, vacating the judgment in its entirety to allow full enforcement of § 13-3603. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that licensed physicians who perform abortions in compliance with Title 36 are not subject to prosecution under § 13-3603.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that § 36-2322 does not create a right to, or otherwise provide independent statutory authority for, an abortion that repeals or restricts § 13-3603. The court concluded that absent the federal constitutional abortion right, and because § 36-2322 does not independently authorize abortion, there is no provision in federal or state law prohibiting § 13-3603’s operation. Accordingly, § 13-3603 is now enforceable. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment vacating the injunction of § 13-3603, vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and stay of enforcement of § 13-3603, and remanded to the trial court for potential consideration of the remaining constitutional challenges to §13-3603 alleged in Planned Parenthood’s complaint for declaratory relief. View "Planned Parenthood v. Mayes" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona was asked to clarify whether Proposition 209, a voter initiative, repealed or affected the validity of a particular portion of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11)). The Court held that Proposition 209 neither expressly nor implicitly repealed A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), which was enacted by the Arizona legislature after the drafting of Proposition 209 but before it was voted on.The case arose when Erica Riggins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed an exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), which was an exemption for certain types of federal and state tax credits. The Chapter 7 Trustee objected, arguing that Proposition 209, which amended a number of debt collection statutes and was passed by voters after the enactment of A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11), repealed the tax credit exemption.Upon review, the Court found that the voters did not expressly repeal A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) by passing Proposition 209, as the proposition did not contain any language suggesting such a repeal. The Court also found that Proposition 209 did not implicitly repeal A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) because the two did not conflict with each other. Both sought to enhance debtor protections, with Proposition 209 increasing the value of certain exemptions while A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) added a new exemption for tax credits. As such, the Court declared A.R.S. § 33-1126(A)(11) to be still operative. View "In re: RIGGINS" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, the appellant, Yvette Rosenberg, contested the validity of a beneficiary deed executed by her late uncle, Alex Brandt, which left two properties to Marilyn Sanders, Brandt's former girlfriend. Rosenberg claimed that Sanders procured the deed through undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sanders, holding that Rosenberg had not presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sanders unduly influenced Brandt in executing the deed. The court of appeals reversed, adding a new ninth factor to the existing eight-factor test for undue influence, namely the relevance of a grantor's post-execution statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the trial court's decision and held that adding a grantor's post-execution statements as a new ninth factor in the undue influence test was unnecessary. The Court found that Brandt's post-execution statements were not relevant to the claim of undue influence as they did not address his state of mind, mental condition, or the circumstances present at the time of the execution of the deed. The Court concluded that Rosenberg's evidence of susceptibility and the existence of a close relationship between Brandt and Sanders were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Court also found that Rosenberg's inferences did not create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Sanders exerted undue influence at the time of executing the deed, or whether the deed was the product of Sanders' undue influence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders. View "ROSENBERG v SANDERS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court resolved a conflict between Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (ARCAP) 7(a)(4)(A), which instructs courts to include "damages, costs, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest" when setting the amount of a supersedeas bond, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2108(A)(1), which instructs courts only to include damages, in favor of the rule.The superior court entered judgment against Robert Wallace for wrongfully filing a UCC-1 lien and awarded statutory damages plus attorney fees and costs. Wallace appealed, asking the court to set a supersedeas bond at $0 under section 12-2108(A)(1). The court, however, calculated the bond under ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A), including the statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs. Wallace filed a petition for special action in the Supreme Court challenging the rule's validity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A) and section 12-2108(A)(1) are in direct conflict; and (2) section 12-2108(A)(1) regulates a procedural area of law within the purview of the judicial branch and therefore must yield where it conflicts with ARCAP 7(a)(4)(A). View "Wallace v. Honorable Smith" on Justia Law