Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff was arrested after a police officer encountered him near a suspiciously parked car with expired registration in Superior, Wisconsin. Body camera footage documented the arrest, the plaintiff’s argument with officers, and his subsequent booking at the local police station. During the booking process, the plaintiff was agitated and complained of an infection on his wrist, which he said was aggravated by tight handcuffs. After a pat-down search at the booking counter, several officers escorted him to a receiving cell, where an incident occurred as he was moved toward a concrete bunk. The plaintiff alleged that officers used excessive force, causing him to fall face-first onto the bunk, resulting in injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin organized the plaintiff’s claims into three groups: force during the booking (handcuffs and arm twisting), force used while moving him to the receiving cell (“dragging”), and force in the receiving cell (lifting his leg and removing the mattress). The district court allowed only the claims related to handcuff adjustment and arm twisting at the booking area to proceed to a jury. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all other claims, concluding that video evidence contradicted the plaintiff’s account of being dragged or excessive force in the receiving cell. The jury later found for the defendants on the claims that went to trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether summary judgment on the excessive force claim regarding the receiving cell was proper and whether exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the video evidence so clearly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of events that no reasonable jury could find in his favor. The court further determined that the expert testimony issue was moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all matters. View "Raddant v Douglas County" on Justia Law

After a divorce, a former husband and wife entered into a settlement agreement incorporated into their dissolution decree, in which the wife was awarded the marital home and agreed to assume responsibility for a specific home-related debt—a loan with Wells Fargo. The agreement also provided that the husband could seek damages for any harm to his credit if payments were not made on time. Several years later, the wife stopped making payments on the loan and filed for bankruptcy, after which the debt to Wells Fargo was ultimately discharged. The husband did not make any loan payments himself and later filed a contempt petition, claiming that the wife’s failure to pay the loan damaged his credit and caused him financial losses, including increased interest on another loan and a lost opportunity to secure a home-construction loan.The Marion Superior Court held a hearing and found the wife in contempt for willfully failing to pay the loan but did not award the husband damages. The court found the alleged damages to be speculative and unproven due to insufficient supporting evidence. The husband appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals partially reversed, instructing the trial court to award damages. However, the appellate opinion was not certified, and the trial court nevertheless issued a revised order in line with the appellate mandate.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not clearly err in declining to award damages, as the husband’s evidence of financial harm was speculative and inadequately supported. The Court further held that the trial court’s revised order was void because it was issued while the appeal was pending and before the appellate opinion was certified. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s original order and reminded lower courts and parties not to act based on uncertified appellate opinions. View "Norris v. Norris" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a United States Army veteran with disabilities, worked as a table games dealer at a casino operated by Harrah’s NC Casino Company in North Carolina. After being terminated and banned from the property, allegedly due to his emotional distress, veteran status, and health history, he was told he could be rehired after one year. When he reapplied, his job offer was rescinded, and he was denied rehire. The plaintiff claimed that his termination and subsequent denial of reemployment were the result of discrimination and retaliation based on his exercise of rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Harrah’s moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7), arguing that the Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise (TCGE), a wholly owned entity of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, was the plaintiff’s true employer and a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. Because TCGE was protected by tribal sovereign immunity and could not be joined, the district court dismissed the complaint. The district court relied on a declaration from TCGE’s human resources vice president and prior case law to conclude that TCGE’s contractual and economic interests would be prejudiced by the litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of Rule 19 and found that it abused its discretion by determining that TCGE was a necessary party. The appellate court held that the record did not support the conclusion that TCGE’s presence was essential to afford complete relief or protect contractual interests, and that the district court’s analysis was speculative and unsupported. The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Harrah's NC Casino Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A parent, acting on behalf of a minor, filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging sex trafficking of the minor at a hotel in North Little Rock, Arkansas. After the complaint was amended, two national hotel franchisors were added as defendants. When these corporate defendants responded, their answer was signed only by their Arkansas attorney of record, but the pleading also listed three out-of-state attorneys, including two for whom a motion for pro hac vice admission was noted as forthcoming. The out-of-state attorneys did not sign the pleading.Subsequently, the corporate defendants filed petitions for pro hac vice admission for the two out-of-state attorneys, providing the required affidavits and fee payments. The Circuit Court denied the petitions, citing the inclusion of the out-of-state attorneys’ names on the earlier pleading as appearing before admission. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The defendants appealed, arguing that the denial was an abuse of discretion and not supported by any rule. The appellees did not file a response. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a stay of circuit court proceedings pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an order denying pro hac vice admission is immediately appealable since it deprives a party of counsel of choice, functionally equivalent to a disqualification. The court found that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying the petitions based solely on the listing of the out-of-state attorneys’ names with a clear indication of their pending pro hac vice status. The applicable rules did not prohibit such a listing, nor did it constitute an unauthorized appearance. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "RED ROOF INNS, INC. V. DOE" on Justia Law

After his employment with a school bus service was terminated, Christopher Bauer initiated a lawsuit in October 2024 against the company and several current and former employees. He alleged claims such as civil conspiracy, constitutional tortious interference, and defamation. The company intervened and moved to dismiss the case, request sanctions, and to have Bauer declared a vexatious litigant. The District Court of Williams County dismissed most claims except for civil conspiracy and defamation, ordered a more definite statement on the surviving claims, and sanctioned Bauer for filing frivolous claims. Though the court initially declined to declare him a vexatious litigant, it warned that continued conduct might warrant such an order. Bauer amended his complaint and continued filing motions.In July 2025, the presiding judge of the Northwest Judicial District, on her own motion, issued a proposed pre-filing order to restrict Bauer’s ability to file new litigation or documents without court approval, finding his litigation tactics vexatious. Bauer was given notice and an opportunity to respond but did not request a hearing. The pre-filing order was entered, and further sanctions were subsequently imposed. Bauer appealed orders denying his motion for default judgment, sanctioning him, and the pre-filing order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed his appeal. The court dismissed Bauer’s appeal from the denial of default judgment and the sanction order for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as these orders were not appealable. It affirmed the pre-filing order, holding that the presiding judge had jurisdiction and that Bauer received sufficient due process, including notice and an opportunity to respond. It also found the vexatious litigant designation was not an abuse of discretion. The court awarded double costs to all appellees and attorney’s fees of $1,000 to the company for defending against a meritless appeal. View "Bauer v. Adam" on Justia Law

Four individuals alleged that they owned funds subject to Ohio’s unclaimed property regime and that their funds were set to escheat, or transfer, to the state as of January 1, 2026, due to recent amendments to Ohio’s Unclaimed Funds Act. The Act requires holders of unclaimed funds to remit those funds to the state after a period of dormancy, with additional amendments providing that funds held for ten years or more would escheat to the state, although owners would still have ten additional years to claim an equivalent amount, with interest, less expenses.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against state officials responsible for implementing the Act. They argued that the statutory regime violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and various Ohio laws. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the escheatment of their funds, claiming they received insufficient notice and would suffer irreparable harm. The district court denied the request, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm, particularly since they could still claim the funds from the state after escheatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm because they retained a statutory avenue to recover their funds with interest after escheatment and could seek a monetary judgment if their constitutional claims succeeded. The court further determined that the plaintiffs either had actual notice of their funds or failed to identify specific property at risk, so no likelihood of irreparable harm was shown. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Bleick v. Maxfield" on Justia Law

The case centers on a plaintiff who filed a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for unpaid wages and recordkeeping violations against his former employer. The plaintiff’s attorney, who neither resides nor holds an office near the courthouse, failed to appoint local counsel within the required timeframe due to a calendaring error. Pursuant to the district court’s local rule, a notice was issued warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. After the deadline passed without compliance, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice, citing failure to prosecute or comply with court rules.Following the dismissal, the plaintiff promptly moved to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), arguing that his attorney’s oversight constituted excusable neglect, and appointed local counsel. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff had not shown that dismissal without prejudice amounted to dismissal with prejudice, and cited prior Fifth Circuit cases as support. The plaintiff filed a second motion, distinguishing his case from the cited cases and again seeking relief, but the district court denied this motion as well, applying the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court erred by imposing a requirement that the plaintiff show dismissal without prejudice functioned as a dismissal with prejudice before granting relief under Rule 60(b). The Fifth Circuit clarified that neither Campbell v. Wilkinson nor Jones v. Meridian Security Insurance Company established such a standard for Rule 60(b) motions. The appellate court vacated the district court’s denials of the plaintiff’s motions and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider the proper factors for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). View "Deras v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

A two-year-old child was struck and killed by a vehicle in the drive-through lane of a Chick-fil-A in Yukon, Oklahoma. The child’s parents sued Chick-fil-A, alleging that its design for pedestrian access, which required crossing the drive-through lane, created a dangerous condition. They claimed Chick-fil-A breached its duty to provide reasonably safe premises. The parents served discovery requests seeking documents and communications about adverse pedestrian incidents at all Chick-fil-A restaurants nationwide over a ten-year period, later offering to limit the scope to five years and incidents involving pedestrians in parking lots.Chick-fil-A objected, arguing the requests were overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not limited to substantially similar incidents. Chick-fil-A said it would provide information only for substantially similar incidents within Oklahoma in the preceding five years. The District Court of Oklahoma County, presided over by Judge Richard Ogden, granted the parents’ motion to compel but limited the requests to pedestrian incidents in parking lots of any Chick-fil-A with a drive-through in the United States within five years prior to the incident. Chick-fil-A sought extraordinary relief from this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and found the district court abused its discretion by not requiring the parents to show how their overly broad discovery requests were relevant to any claim or defense, as now required by 12 O.S. 2021 § 3226. The Supreme Court emphasized that discovery must be proportional and relevant to a party’s claim or defense, not just to the subject matter. The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition, barring enforcement of the lower court’s order and authorizing reconsideration of the motion to compel in line with its opinion. View "CHICK-FIL-A v. OGDEN" on Justia Law

A plaintiff obtained a default judgment in Texas state court against Hugh D. Dale, Jr. and two companies he controlled. To enforce the judgment, the plaintiff registered it in West Virginia, where the Circuit Court of Calhoun County issued writs of execution and approved a process known as “suggestion” to identify assets belonging to the judgment debtors. Peoples Bank, which held several accounts listing the judgment debtors as co-owners along with various partnerships, was notified and, pursuant to statutory procedure, debited the accounts and sent the funds to the judgment creditor. The partnerships, also named on the accounts, claimed the funds belonged exclusively to them and not to Dale or his companies.The partnerships filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against Peoples Bank and its employees, alleging negligence and conversion. The district court dismissed the negligence claim as untimely and the conversion claim as implausible, concluding the bank had merely complied with the statutory mechanism for judgment enforcement. The partnerships appealed only the dismissal of the conversion claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the conversion claim de novo. It held that Peoples Bank’s actions were authorized by West Virginia law, specifically West Virginia Code § 38-5-14, which allows a bank to turn over property belonging to a judgment debtor upon receipt of a suggestion and provides immunity from liability for doing so. The court found no wrongful exercise of dominion by the bank, as required for conversion, and rejected arguments that the bank acted improperly by not affording the partnerships or Dale prior notice. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the conversion claim. View "Cin Dale 3 v. Peoples Bank Corp." on Justia Law

An employee of a major defense contractor, serving in a senior internal audit role, claimed to have discovered fraudulent activity involving government contracts for military aircraft. The contractor, which assembles aircraft using parts supplied by numerous subcontractors, is subject to detailed regulatory requirements intended to ensure fair pricing, including the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The plaintiff alleged that the contractor systematically ignored and concealed fraudulent inflation of cost and pricing data by its subcontractors, resulting in overbilling the government.The plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), which allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the government. Previously, another relator had filed a separate FCA action against the same contractor, alleging a different fraudulent scheme: obtaining parts in bulk at a discount but charging the government full price. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the FCA’s “first-to-file” bar applied because the earlier action covered the same essential elements of fraud.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the two complaints alleged distinct fraudulent schemes: one involving bulk pricing manipulation, and the other involving the submission of inflated subcontractor cost data. The Fifth Circuit held that the first-to-file bar under the FCA did not apply because the plaintiff’s complaint was based on a different mechanism of fraud, not merely additional details or locations of the same scheme. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ferguson v. Lockheed Martin" on Justia Law