Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Highland Capital Management, L.P., a Dallas-based investment firm, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019 due to numerous unpaid judgments and liabilities. During the bankruptcy proceedings, James Dondero, a co-founder, stepped down as a director and officer but continued as an unpaid portfolio manager. The unsecured creditors' committee and independent directors opposed Dondero's reorganization plans, leading to his resignation in October 2020. The bankruptcy court held Dondero in civil contempt and sanctioned him for obstructing the proceedings. The proposed reorganization plan included provisions to shield Highland Capital and associated entities from liability, including an Exculpation Provision and an Injunction Provision with a Gatekeeper Clause.The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, but on direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the plan in part, striking certain non-debtors from the Exculpation Provision. The investment fund parties requested clarification on whether the same entities should be removed from the Gatekeeper Clause. The bankruptcy court conformed the plan by narrowing the definition of "Exculpated Parties" but did not change the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the bankruptcy court failed to implement its instructions properly. The court held that the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause must be narrowed to include only the Debtor, the Independent Directors for conduct within their duties, the Committee, and the members of the Committee in their official capacities. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision in part and remanded the case for the plan to be revised accordingly. View "Highland Capital Fund Advisors v. Highland Capital Management" on Justia Law

Petitioner Deandre Arnold, an indigent pro se litigant, attempted to file a civil complaint with an affidavit of indigence through the Fulton County Superior Court’s mandatory e-filing system. His complaint was rejected because it lacked an order authorizing him to file using a waiver payment account. The Clerk’s office informed him that he needed to obtain an order authorizing indigent status by presenting the complaint in person before a superior court judge. Arnold, unable to travel the 25 miles to the Clerk’s office, argued that the Clerk’s policy violated OCGA § 9-15-2 and his constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after Arnold filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Clerk. Arnold contended that he had no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in the Supreme Court because he could not appear in person to present a writ of mandanus and affidavit of indigence, and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant the relief Arnold sought, as its authority to issue writs of mandamus is limited to matters related to its appellate jurisdiction. The Court determined that the case did not fall within its appellate jurisdiction and transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals has the authority to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction and will decide whether to require the Clerk to accept Arnold’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint by mail. View "Arnold v. Alexander" on Justia Law

The Hoagland Family Limited Partnership and its partners have been involved in a legal dispute with the Town of Clear Lake regarding a sewage hookup since 2010. This ongoing litigation is under case number 76C01-1006-PL-425 in the Steuben Circuit Court. In 2023, Hoagland filed a new complaint in the Steuben Superior Court (case number 76D01-2305-PL-237) against the Town and various associated parties. The claims in this new case were based on the same facts and circumstances as the ongoing case. Consequently, the superior court dismissed the new complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(8), which addresses the issue of the same action pending in another state court.The Steuben Superior Court dismissed the new case with prejudice, meaning that Hoagland would be precluded from bringing the same claims again. Hoagland did not contest the dismissal itself but argued against the dismissal being with prejudice. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the superior court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court noted that a dismissal with prejudice is akin to a judgment on the merits and precludes relitigation of the claims. The court emphasized that Hoagland should not be prematurely denied the opportunity to litigate its claims. Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. This allows Hoagland the possibility to pursue its claims in the ongoing litigation in the Steuben Circuit Court. View "Hoagland Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Clear Lake" on Justia Law

Kamran Ghadimi, M.D., filed a collection action against his former patient, Eileen Talbott, for unpaid medical bills. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations, and Ghadimi's counsel indicated acceptance of a $9,500 settlement. However, Ghadimi later backed out of the agreement. Talbott filed a cross-complaint to enforce the settlement. Ghadimi missed the deadline to respond, and the trial court entered his default. Ghadimi moved to set aside the default under the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), but the trial court denied the motion, finding the default was due to a calculated litigation strategy by Ghadimi’s lawyers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Ghadimi's motion to set aside the default, concluding that the default was caused by a deliberate litigation strategy rather than neglect or mistake. The court also found that Ghadimi's counsel's declaration seeking an extension to respond to the cross-complaint was not credible and that the default was not due to any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that Ghadimi was entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). The court held that the default was caused by the actions of Ghadimi’s lawyers, not by Ghadimi himself, and that the mandatory relief provision should be applied to relieve the innocent client of the consequences of the attorney’s fault. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment order granting Talbott’s motion for attorneys’ fees, directing the trial court to vacate the default judgment and enter a new order granting Ghadimi’s motion to set aside the default. View "Talbott v. Ghadimi" on Justia Law

Iron Bar Holdings, LLC, a private landowner in Wyoming, owns a checkerboarded ranch interspersed with federal and state public lands. The only way to access these public lands, other than by aircraft, is by corner-crossing, which involves stepping from one public parcel to another at their adjoining corners without touching the private land in between. In 2020 and 2021, a group of hunters from Missouri corner-crossed to hunt elk on the public lands within Iron Bar's ranch. Iron Bar's property manager confronted the hunters, and law enforcement was contacted, but no citations were issued. In 2021, the hunters were prosecuted for criminal trespass but were acquitted. Iron Bar then filed a civil lawsuit for trespassing, seeking $9 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment in favor of the hunters, holding that corner-crossing without physically contacting private land and without causing damage does not constitute unlawful trespass. Iron Bar Holdings appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while Wyoming law recognizes a property owner's right to exclude others from their airspace, federal law, specifically the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) of 1885, overrides state law in this context. The UIA prohibits any inclosure of public lands that obstructs free passage or transit over them. The court found that Iron Bar's actions effectively enclosed public lands and prevented lawful access, which is prohibited by the UIA. The court affirmed the district court's decision, allowing the hunters to corner-cross as long as they did not physically touch Iron Bar's land. View "Iron Bar Holdings v. Cape" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Nike, Inc., alleging gender discrimination and hostile workplace claims. During discovery, a collection of internal workplace complaints, known as the Starfish complaints, was produced under a protective order. Three media organizations, including The Oregonian, intervened in the case to gain access to these documents. Plaintiffs' attorney inadvertently sent confidential documents to a reporter from The Oregonian, who refused to return or destroy them upon request.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially granted a motion to intervene by the media organizations. However, when the inadvertent disclosure occurred, the magistrate judge ordered The Oregonian to return or destroy the documents. The district court vacated this order, reasoning that it lacked authority to compel a non-party to return the documents. The magistrate judge then denied the motion, and the district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court had the inherent authority to order The Oregonian, as an intervenor and thus a party to the case, to return or destroy the confidential documents. The court determined that The Oregonian did not have a First Amendment right to withhold the documents because pretrial discovery proceedings are not public components of the judicial process. The court applied relaxed First Amendment scrutiny and concluded that the district court's exercise of its inherent authority over discovery furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CAHILL V. NIKE, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a seaman, Magnus Aadland, filed a lawsuit in 2017 against Boat Santa Rita II, Inc. (BSR II) and related parties, alleging that he fell ill while working offshore in 2014 and was owed maintenance and cure, which were not provided. Aadland sought compensatory damages for unpaid maintenance and cure, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially ruled in favor of BSR II, finding that Aadland had reached maximum medical recovery (MMR) by the time of the trial in September 2020 and that BSR II had satisfied its duty of cure. The court also denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, finding that the District Court had erred in its application of the law, particularly regarding the duty of cure and the applicability of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service, Inc. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.On remand, the District Court ruled that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and that BSR II owed cure in the amount of $605,338.07, which was the amount paid by Aadland's private insurer, Tufts. The court credited BSR II's $400,000 payment to Tufts and $238,374 in advances to Aadland against this amount, resulting in a credit for BSR II. The court again denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On further appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment regarding emotional distress damages but vacated the judgment regarding punitive damages and attorney's fees, finding that BSR II's breach of its duty of cure was willful. The case was remanded for the District Court to determine whether punitive damages and attorney's fees should be awarded. The First Circuit also affirmed the District Court's finding that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and the setoff amount for BSR II's payment to Tufts. View "Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2015, sixteen-year-old Isaiah Taylor was stopped by Milwaukee police officers Justin Schwarzhuber and Jasen Rydzewski while running through his neighborhood to deliver a turkey. The officers frisked him, searched his bag, and detained him in their police car to check for outstanding warrants and recent robberies. Taylor later sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted qualified immunity and summary judgment to the officers on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and on the Fourth Amendment claim regarding the initial stop and frisk. However, the court denied qualified immunity on the issue of Taylor’s continued detention, sending it to trial. The jury found the officers not liable, and the court denied Taylor’s motion for post-trial relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, finding insufficient evidence of racial profiling. However, it vacated the summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims related to the initial stop and frisk, concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk based on clearly established law. The court also vacated the jury verdict on the continued detention issue, as it was intertwined with the initial stop's constitutionality, and remanded the case for a new trial on all Fourth Amendment claims. View "Taylor v. Schwarzhuber" on Justia Law

Gurparas Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, claiming persecution by members of the ruling BJP party due to his involvement with the Mann political party. Singh recounted two specific incidents of persecution: one in July 2017, where BJP members threatened him while he was placing posters, and another in December 2017, where he was attacked by BJP members while returning from a blood drive. Singh entered the U.S. without valid documents in April 2018 and was charged with removability. He admitted the allegations and applied for asylum and related relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Singh not credible due to significant linguistic and factual similarities between his declaration and those of other asylum applicants from India, suggesting a fabricated claim. The IJ also found that Singh knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and denied his CAT claim, concluding that the remaining evidence did not establish a likelihood of torture upon his return to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's findings and dismissed Singh's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting the identical language and narrative structure in Singh's declaration compared to other applicants. The court also found that the IJ followed proper procedural safeguards in making the frivolous application finding. Additionally, the court concluded that the denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, as Singh failed to provide sufficient individualized evidence of a likelihood of torture. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law