Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

Justin Longworth, a federal inmate, alleged that he faced repeated sexual harassment and abuse by Sherry M. Beck, a correctional officer at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina. Longworth claimed Beck engaged in daily aggressive sexual harassment and abuse, including forced oral sex, fondling, and groping. He did not immediately report Beck's conduct due to fear of retaliation. Other officials at the institution initially did nothing to stop or report Beck's abuse. Eventually, Beck was reported, fired, and Longworth was transferred to another facility, but Beck continued to harass him through letters.Longworth filed two separate lawsuits in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The first lawsuit was a Bivens action against the officials directly involved, alleging violations of his civil rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court dismissed the Bivens claims, finding that they presented new contexts and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending Bivens to this context. Longworth appealed the dismissal of his Bivens claims. The second lawsuit was an FTCA claim against the United States, alleging negligence by the officials. The district court dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Beck was not acting within the scope of her employment during the alleged misconduct. Longworth did not appeal the FTCA judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court's FTCA judgment precluded Longworth's Bivens appeal. The FTCA judgment bar provides that an FTCA judgment is a complete bar to any action by the claimant against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. Since a judgment on the FTCA claim had been entered, Longworth could no longer pursue his Bivens action based on the same conduct. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Longworth v. Mansukhani" on Justia Law

Mesabi Metallics Company LLC (Mesabi) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016 and emerged successfully in 2017. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Mesabi initiated an adversary proceeding against Cleveland-Cliffs, Inc. (Cliffs), alleging tortious interference, antitrust violations, and civil conspiracy. Mesabi claimed Cliffs engaged in anti-competitive conduct to impede Mesabi's business operations. To facilitate discovery, the parties entered a stipulated protective order allowing documents to be designated as confidential. Mesabi later moved to unseal certain documents filed under seal to support a petition in the Minnesota Court of Appeals.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, applying the common law right of access, held that Cliffs had not met the burden to keep the documents sealed. The court relied on the Third Circuit's precedent in In re Avandia, which requires a showing that disclosure would cause a clearly defined and serious injury. Recognizing potential ambiguity in the law, the Bankruptcy Court certified the question for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit clarified that the sealing of documents in bankruptcy cases is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 107, not the common law right of access. Section 107 imposes a distinct burden, requiring protection of trade secrets or confidential commercial information without the need for balancing public and private interests. The court vacated the Bankruptcy Court's decision and remanded for application of the correct standard under § 107. Additionally, the Third Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to grant a third party's motion to intervene and unseal documents while the appeal was pending, vacating those orders as well. View "ESML Holdings Inc v. Mesabi Metallics Compay LLC," on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought to foreclose two municipal tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 on real property owned by the defendant. The city of Bridgeport had purportedly assigned the tax liens to the plaintiff’s predecessor, which then allegedly assigned its interest to the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer and several special defenses, including a claim that the Bridgeport City Council had not validly assigned the liens. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The defendant then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof that the city council had made a resolution to assign the tax liens to the plaintiff.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had met its burden of establishing the validity of the assignments. The court found that the plaintiff submitted certified copies of the city council’s meeting agendas and minutes, which showed that the council had authorized the assignments. The court also noted that the defendant failed to present any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the assignments. The court clarified that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving standing and had satisfied this burden, while the defendant’s mere assertions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court also addressed procedural irregularities but concluded that the defendant had waived any related claims by not objecting. View "Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc." on Justia Law

Carlos and Ana Carachure filed a lawsuit against the City of Azusa, claiming the City violated article XIII D of the California Constitution by charging sewer and trash franchise fees that exceeded the cost of providing those services and using the fees to fund general city services. The City argued that the Carachures failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not follow the statutory procedures for a refund, which require paying the fees under protest and filing a claim for a refund. The trial court agreed with the City and entered judgment in its favor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the Carachures were required to file a claim for a refund with the City before seeking judicial relief, as they claimed the fees were illegally collected or assessed. The court denied the Carachures' petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment for the City. The Carachures filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, arguing the trial court relied on inapplicable property tax cases and the current version of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Carachures' constitutional challenge to the City's collection and use of franchise fees seeks relief outside the scope of the statutory claims procedure for refunds. The court concluded that the Carachures did not have to file a claim for a refund before bringing this action, as their challenge was not an action for a refund governed by section 5472 and Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The judgment was reversed, allowing the Carachures to proceed with their constitutional claims. View "Carachure v. City of Azusa" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Missouri General Assembly enacted sections 67.287 and 479.359.2, which imposed certain standards and revenue caps on municipalities, specifically targeting St. Louis County. The City of Normandy and other municipalities challenged these statutes, claiming they violated the Missouri Constitution's prohibition against local or special laws. In 2016, the Circuit Court of Cole County declared these sections unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed this decision in City of Normandy v. Greitens.Following a shift in legal analysis in City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC, the state sought relief from the 2016 injunction, arguing that the statutes would have survived under the new rational basis review. The circuit court initially granted this relief, but the Missouri Supreme Court vacated that judgment in City of Normandy v. Parson, remanding the case for further proceedings. On remand, the circuit court overruled the state's motion for partial relief from the judgment.The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the change in legal analysis from City of Aurora did not automatically warrant relief from the permanent injunction under Rule 74.06(b)(5). The court emphasized the importance of finality in judgments and found that the state did not demonstrate sufficient inequity to justify lifting the injunction. The court also noted that the state had not sought relief from the declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional, which remained in effect. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the state's motion for relief. View "City of Normandy v. Kehoe" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Two former employees sued Zen Nails Studio LLC and its owners for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a similar Maryland state law. After a five-day bench trial, the plaintiffs won and were awarded approximately 60% of their requested damages. The plaintiffs then sought $343,189.85 in attorney’s fees, but the district court awarded them $167,115.49, which was less than half of what they requested. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision regarding the hourly rates used to calculate the attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt, initially reviewed the case. The district court set the hourly rates for the plaintiffs’ attorneys, paralegals, and paraprofessionals based on the local rules' guidelines, which it treated as presumptively reasonable. The court then calculated the hours reasonably worked and reduced the total by 35% due to the plaintiffs achieving a moderately successful outcome. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s reliance on the local rules' guidelines for setting the hourly rates.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred by treating the hourly rates in the local rules as presumptively correct and requiring special justification for higher rates. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that while fee matrices can be a useful starting point, they should not be treated as setting a baseline that requires special justification to deviate from. The appellate court vacated the fee award and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider all relevant evidence to determine the prevailing market rates without giving undue weight to the local rules' guidelines. View "De Paredes v. Zen Nails Studio LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that an automobile manufacturer designed, manufactured, and sold defective vehicles, specifically Dodge "muscle" cars with defective rear differentials. They filed a complaint asserting state and federal causes of action based on fraud and breach of warranty. The District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After amending, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts again and some warranty counts, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to amend it. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts with prejudice, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed. The plaintiffs then moved to certify the dismissal of their fraud counts for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or for final judgment under Rule 54(b). The District Court denied the request for certification under § 1292(b) but granted the request for final judgment under Rule 54(b) for the fraud counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the District Court's Rule 54(b) judgment was not final. The Court of Appeals held that the fraud and warranty counts constituted a single claim for purposes of Rule 54(b) because they were alternative theories of recovery based on the same factual situation. As a result, the judgment did not dispose of all the rights or liabilities of one or more of the parties. Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and instructed the District Court to vacate its order directing the entry of a partial final judgment. View "Diaz v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law