Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Clinton Mahoney, the sole member and manager of Mahoney & Associates, LLC, signed an agreement obligating the company to contribute to the Railroad Maintenance and Industrial Health and Welfare Fund, an employee benefit fund. When the Fund could not collect delinquent contributions from Mahoney & Associates, it sued Mahoney personally, citing a personal liability clause in the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund, concluding that Mahoney was personally liable based on the clause.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois initially entered judgment on July 31, but it did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Mahoney filed a notice of appeal on September 26, and the district court later entered a corrected judgment on October 11. Mahoney filed a second notice of appeal the same day. The district court had awarded the Fund attorneys’ fees based on the trust agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Mahoney’s intent to be personally bound by the trust agreement, as he signed the memorandum in a representative capacity, which conflicted with the personal liability clause. The court concluded that this issue could not be resolved at summary judgment. The court also addressed Mahoney’s laches defense but found it waived due to his failure to address relevant complications. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Railroad Maintenance and Industrial Health & Welfare Fund v. Mahoney" on Justia Law

Eugene Westmoreland, an Illinois inmate who uses a wheelchair, filed a class action lawsuit seeking prospective relief to make the showers at the Northern Reception and Classification Center (NRC) accessible. He claimed the showers were inaccessible to individuals using mobility aids. Westmoreland filed the suit without first using the prison's internal grievance process as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Six weeks after filing, he was transferred to a different facility with accessible showers, which led to questions about the mootness of his claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Westmoreland's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding his claim moot due to his transfer. The court also determined that no exception to mootness applied, as Westmoreland had not exhausted the internal grievance process, making him an inadequate class representative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Westmoreland's transfer rendered his claim moot and that he did not qualify for any exceptions to mootness. The court also found that Westmoreland's failure to exhaust the grievance process as required by the PLRA made him an inadequate class representative, preventing the class action from proceeding. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. View "Westmoreland v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter Lowes and Amy Thompson, formerly Amy Lowes, regarding a nondisparagement clause in their stipulated divorce judgment. Lowes alleged that Thompson breached this clause by describing him as her "abuser" during a political campaign interview. Thompson filed a special motion to strike the breach of contract claim under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to quickly dismiss nonmeritorious claims arising from protected speech. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the nondisparagement clause waived Thompson’s right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.The Deschutes County Circuit Court initially granted Thompson’s special motion to strike, finding that her statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that Lowes failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the nondisparagement clause constituted a waiver of Thompson’s anti-SLAPP protections, thus making it unnecessary to evaluate whether Lowes could prevail on his claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the nondisparagement clause did not clearly indicate an intention to waive the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, the clause alone could not defeat Thompson’s special motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Lowes met his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on his breach of contract claim. View "Lowes v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Joshua Lapin, acting pro se, filed a complaint against Zeetogroup, LLC and “John Doe Sender” alleging 46 violations of SDCL 37-24-47, which prohibits misleading, falsified, or unauthorized spam emails. Lapin claimed he received these emails between June 15 and July 25, 2021, at his email address, which he argued was a “South Dakota electronic mail address.” The circuit court dismissed Lapin’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Lapin was not a “resident of this state” during the time he received the emails and, therefore, could not prove his email address was a “South Dakota electronic mail address” as required by SDCL 37-24-47. Lapin appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, denied Lapin’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted Zeetogroup’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that Lapin was not a resident of South Dakota when he received the emails because he was traveling internationally as a “digital nomad” and was not physically present in the state. The court also held that SDCL 37-24-41(14) does not impose a durational residency requirement and that Lapin could sue over emails received after he became a physical resident of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the term “resident” in SDCL 37-24-41(14)(c) requires actual residency, not just legal residency or domicile. The court concluded that Lapin’s 30-day stay in an Airbnb in South Dakota and his subsequent travels did not establish him as a resident of South Dakota during the time he received the emails. Therefore, Lapin was not entitled to the protections of SDCL 37-24-47. View "Lapin v. Zeetogroup" on Justia Law

Jessica Paulsen experienced severe bleeding after giving birth on December 13, 2021, at Avera McKennan Hospital. Dr. Amber Saloum performed a hysterectomy and another surgery on December 14, 2021, to stop the bleeding. Paulsen later claimed she did not consent to the hysterectomy and filed a lawsuit against Avera McKennan, Dr. Saloum, and unnamed parties on December 15, 2023. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Paulsen's claims were barred by the two-year repose period under SDCL 15-2-14.1.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Paulsen's lawsuit was filed outside the two-year repose period. Paulsen appealed the decision, arguing that the repose period should be calculated as 730 days and that she should have been allowed additional discovery to potentially establish a continuing tort.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a "year" is defined as a "calendar year" under SDCL 2-14-2(36), meaning the repose period ends at the exact moment the start date reoccurs on the calendar. Therefore, the two-year repose period began on December 15, 2021, and ended on December 14, 2023. Since Paulsen filed her lawsuit on December 15, 2023, it was one day too late.The court also found that Paulsen's request for additional discovery was speculative and did not demonstrate how further discovery would reveal facts essential to opposing the summary judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Paulsen v. Mckennan" on Justia Law

In April 2011, JJJTB, Inc. initiated a foreclosure action against Stephen Schmidt and Schmidt Farms, Inc. in Hillsborough County. In 2015, the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit denied the foreclosure judgment, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed this decision. Over two years later, JJJTB amended its complaint to include new defaults. Schmidt moved to dismiss the amended complaint but did not argue lack of case jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, and Schmidt filed an answer with affirmative defenses and a counterclaim but again did not raise the issue of case jurisdiction. In 2021, the court entered a foreclosure judgment against Schmidt, who then unsuccessfully moved for rehearing, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Schmidt appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Second District reversed the foreclosure judgment, holding that the trial court lacked case jurisdiction and that such objections cannot be waived. The court certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., which held that case jurisdiction is waivable.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case to resolve the conflict. The court held that case jurisdiction is waivable and that objections must be timely raised, or they are waived. The court quashed the Second District's decision and approved the Fourth District's decision in MCR Funding. The Supreme Court concluded that Schmidt waived the objection to the trial court's lack of case jurisdiction by not raising it timely and by seeking affirmative relief. The Second District erred in reversing the foreclosure judgment based on untimely objections to case jurisdiction. View "JJJTB, Inc. v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Patrick Murray and other plaintiffs, who either suffer from brain tumors or represent estates of decedents who died from brain cancer, sued Motorola, Inc. and other telecommunications companies. They alleged that long-term exposure to cell phone radiation caused their health issues. The litigation began in 2001 and has been through multiple appeals. In a previous decision, the court allowed the litigation to proceed, and in another, it changed the evidentiary standard for admitting expert testimony from the "general acceptance" test to the "reliability" test.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, post-remand, denied the plaintiffs' motions for additional discovery and to add new experts, struck portions of their supplemental expert reports, excluded all of their expert testimony under Rule 702, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial judges ruled that the plaintiffs failed to provide admissible expert testimony on general causation, which was necessary to proceed with the case.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judges' rulings on discovery and expert testimony. The court held that the trial judges correctly applied the legal principles and managed the discovery process appropriately. The appellate court also agreed that the plaintiffs failed to meet the standards set out in Rule 702 for their expert testimony, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. View "Murray v. Motorola, Inc." on Justia Law

John and Stacy Bang own several parcels of real property in Dunn County, including the subject property in this dispute. They own both the surface and mineral estates. In May 2004, John Bang executed an oil and gas lease agreement with Diamond Resources, Inc., whose successor, Continental Resources, Inc., is the operator and holds the mineral lease. Continental notified the Bangs of its intent to install oil and gas facilities on the property, which the Bangs objected to. Continental subsequently constructed various facilities on the property.The Bangs filed a lawsuit against Continental in 2022, alleging trespass, seeking an injunction, and claiming damages under North Dakota law. The district court denied the Bangs' motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Continental filed a separate action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction against John Bang, which was consolidated with the Bangs' case. In January 2024, the district court granted Continental partial summary judgment, declaring Continental had the right to install a pipeline corridor and denied the Bangs' claims for trespass and permanent injunction. The court also denied Continental summary judgment on damages. A jury trial in February 2024 awarded the Bangs $97,621.90 for their compensation claims. The Bangs' motions for a new trial and other relief were denied.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's amended judgment and order denying a new trial. The court held that the lease was unambiguous and provided Continental the authority to install pipeline facilities on the subject property. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of certain expert testimony and evidence of settlement agreements, and the exclusion of speculative evidence of future agricultural damages. The court found no error in the jury instructions and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bangs' motions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60. View "Bang v. Continental Resources" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) initiated a civil action against Boechler PC and Jeanette Boechler for unpaid workers' compensation premiums, penalties, and interest for periods ending in mid-August 2019. WSI was awarded a judgment of $11,661.99, mostly penalties, against the corporation, and the claim against Boechler personally was dismissed without prejudice. In May 2022, WSI filed a second action against the corporation and Boechler personally for additional amounts not included in the previous judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of WSI against the corporation for $10,854.53 but identified issues regarding Boechler’s personal liability.The district court found that Boechler, as president of the corporation, was personally liable for unpaid premiums but not for penalties related to the failure to file payroll reports. The court awarded WSI $5,802, holding that Boechler’s personal liability did not extend to penalties for failing to file payroll reports and that personal liability only applied to amounts determined as of the date of WSI’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court correctly interpreted N.D.C.C. § 65-04-26.1 to mean that Boechler’s personal liability does not include penalties for failing to file payroll reports. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in determining that personal liability only applied to amounts existing as of the date of the decision. The Supreme Court concluded that Boechler’s personal liability should include amounts accruing after the WSI determination of her liability. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for entry of a judgment consistent with its opinion. View "WSI v. Boechler" on Justia Law