Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a long-running dispute between two parties, Baer and Tedder, stemming from Baer's lawsuit against Tedder for malicious prosecution. During the course of this litigation, Baer filed a motion to compel production of documents and requested sanctions against Tedder and his counsel, Kent, for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that Tedder and Kent had engaged in evasive and unjustified conduct during discovery, which hindered Baer's ability to prepare his case. As a result, the court imposed $10,475 in monetary sanctions against both Tedder and Kent, jointly and severally.Tedder and Kent appealed the sanctions order to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. In a prior opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s sanctions order, finding that Tedder and Kent’s actions were not substantially justified and that their arguments on appeal were largely frivolous. Following the remittitur, Baer moved in the trial court to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, arguing that the relevant discovery statutes authorized such an award. The trial court agreed, awarding Baer $113,532.50 in appellate attorney’s fees, but imposed liability only on Tedder.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to a party who successfully defends an order imposing monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The appellate court found the amount of fees reasonable with one reduction and concluded that both Tedder and Kent should be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount. The order was modified to reduce the fee award to $101,805 and to impose joint and several liability on both Tedder and Kent, and as modified, the order was affirmed and remanded for entry of the revised order. View "Baer v. Tedder" on Justia Law

A Saudi military officer, Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani, who was a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force, carried out a mass shooting at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida in December 2019, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. servicemembers and injuries to several others. The officer had a documented history of expressing extremist and anti-American views on social media prior to his arrival in the United States for flight training, which was part of a broader U.S.-Saudi military training program. The victims and their families brought suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alleging various tort and contract claims, including gross negligence in vetting and sending Al-Shamrani to the U.S., failure to supervise, vicarious liability for his actions, support for terrorism, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations were facially insufficient to overcome Saudi Arabia’s sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege facts that would support an exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that most claims were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as they either involved discretionary functions, acts of omission, or failed to establish proximate cause or a waiver of immunity. However, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims based on grossly negligent acts of commission by Saudi Arabia in vetting, hiring, and sending Al-Shamrani to the United States were facially sufficient under JASTA to survive a jurisdictional challenge. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" on Justia Law

A marketing and e-commerce company based in Nevada provided services for the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign at the request of a group of Arizona-based political consultants (the Lincoln defendants). The company began work without a written contract, relying on assurances that terms would be formalized later. It created campaign materials, built a website, and managed digital operations, but was never paid for its work. The company sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District of Wyoming found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Lincoln defendants and transferred those claims to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, citing concerns about potential statute of limitations issues. The court dismissed the claims against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim, but did so without prejudice. Kanye 2020 moved for reconsideration, seeking dismissal with prejudice, but the Wyoming court declined, stating it no longer had jurisdiction after the transfer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory transfer order. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims against Kanye 2020, finding the complaint failed to plausibly allege the existence of an oral or implied contract or unjust enrichment, as there were insufficient communications or notice to Kanye 2020 regarding payment expectations. However, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Kanye 2020’s motion for reconsideration. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the dismissal of the claims against Kanye 2020 should be with prejudice. View "SeedX v. Lincoln Strategy" on Justia Law

Donovan Lewis, a twenty-year-old Black man, was fatally shot by a Columbus police officer while in bed at his apartment during an attempted arrest on outstanding warrants. His estate filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Columbus and the police chief, alleging that the city’s police department maintained a policy or custom of racially discriminatory policing and excessive force, which led to Lewis’s death. The complaint sought damages and permanent injunctive relief, including specific reforms to police disciplinary and employment practices that were rooted in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated by the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), Capitol City Lodge #9.After the estate initiated the suit, FOP moved to intervene as of right or, alternatively, permissively, arguing that the proposed reforms would violate the CBA and impact its legal obligations as the exclusive bargaining representative for Columbus police officers. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied FOP’s motion without prejudice, finding that FOP had only a limited interest in the remedial phase and that any liability-phase interest was adequately represented by the City. The court invited FOP to renew its motion if the estate prevailed or if settlement discussions occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention. The Sixth Circuit held that FOP satisfied all requirements for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2): FOP demonstrated a substantial legal interest in the subject matter, impairment of its interests absent intervention, and that the City may not adequately represent those interests. The court concluded that FOP should be allowed to intervene in all phases of the litigation and reversed the district court’s denial of intervention. View "Estate of Lewis v. City of Columbus, Ohio" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a residential property in Vermont after the defendant defaulted on a $365,000 loan originally issued by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff, and the bank alleged it was the holder of the note. However, the copy of the note attached to the complaint was made out to the original lender and lacked any indorsement. Over the years, the case was delayed by mediation, bankruptcy, and various motions. At trial, the plaintiff produced the original note with an undated indorsement in blank, but could not establish when it became the holder of the note.The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff’s initial summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff had not established standing under the Uniform Commercial Code. A later summary judgment was vacated due to procedural errors. After a hearing, the court found the plaintiff was currently a holder of the note and that the defendant had defaulted, but concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, as required by U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Kimball. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff’s post-judgment motion to designate the judgment as without prejudice was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that a foreclosure plaintiff must demonstrate standing by showing it had the right to enforce the note at the time the complaint was filed, declining to overrule or limit Kimball. The Court also declined to address whether the judgment should be designated as without prejudice, leaving preclusion consequences to future proceedings. View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Three organizations—Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, Lake Bomoseen Association, and SOLitude Lake Management—jointly applied for a permit from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to use pesticides in Lake Bomoseen to control an invasive species. Lindsey Waterhouse, who does not own property on the lake but lives nearby and is a board member of one of the applicant organizations, supported the application during public comment. ANR denied the permit, finding the proposed pesticide use posed unacceptable risks to the environment.After the denial, Mr. Waterhouse filed an appeal to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, on his own behalf as a “person aggrieved.” None of the permit applicants appealed the denial. The Environmental Division questioned whether Mr. Waterhouse, who was not an applicant, could maintain the appeal in the absence of the actual applicants. The court also addressed motions from the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust to intervene and to be represented by Mr. Waterhouse, a nonattorney, but denied both, finding he was not authorized or qualified to represent the organization.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Division’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to appeal because he did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public and could not show that the court could redress his alleged injury, especially since the permit applicants were not pursuing the application. The Court also concluded that Mr. Waterhouse lacked standing to challenge the denial of the motions on behalf of the Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust, as he was not authorized to represent the organization’s interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Lake Bomoseen Association and Lake Bomoseen Preservation Trust Denial" on Justia Law

A company filed a lawsuit against another corporate entity, seeking damages for breach of a sublease. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant corporation by leaving the summons and complaint with an individual named Roberto Molina at the defendant’s business address, followed by mailing copies to the defendant’s chief executive officer. Molina was later identified as a bus washer employed by a related but separate company, not as an employee or officer of the defendant. The defendant did not initially respond to the lawsuit, resulting in the entry of default and a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.Subsequently, the defendant moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to quash service and vacate the default judgment, arguing that service of process was improper because Molina was not a person “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s office as required by California law. The plaintiff opposed, relying on the process server’s declaration and standard procedures. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that substituted service was valid and refusing to vacate the default judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court held that the substituted service was not valid because there was insufficient evidence that Molina was “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s business office, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20. The court found that the process server’s declaration lacked necessary facts to support such a conclusion, and the defendant’s evidence rebutted any presumption of proper service. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, vacated the entry of default and the default judgment, and remanded with directions to grant the defendant’s motion and allow time to respond to the complaint. View "Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

A commercial real estate broker and consultant partnered with three brothers who owned an architecture and construction company to develop and lease a commercial property. They planned to form a limited liability company (LLC) as equal members, contributing professional services and cash, but did not formalize their agreement in writing. After a dispute arose over a broker commission, the brothers executed a backdated operating agreement that excluded the broker from LLC membership. The broker alleged he was unfairly cut out of the deal and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The Marshall Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the brothers on the contract claim, finding that Indiana law required written confirmation for LLC membership, which the broker lacked. The court also denied the broker’s request for a jury trial on the unjust enrichment claim, holding that both the claim and the defense of unclean hands were equitable issues for the judge. After a bench trial, the court ruled against the broker on unjust enrichment, finding he failed to prove his claim and that unclean hands barred recovery.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that initial LLC membership could be established by oral agreement and that unjust enrichment claims for money damages were legal claims entitled to a jury trial. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate decision.The Indiana Supreme Court held that LLC membership under the Business Flexibility Act requires either a written operating agreement or written confirmation, and the broker was not a member as a matter of law. However, genuine factual disputes remained regarding whether the brothers breached an agreement to make him a member, precluding summary judgment. The Court also held that unjust enrichment claims for money damages are legal claims subject to a jury trial, and the unclean hands doctrine may be asserted as a defense. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for a jury trial on both claims. View "Andrew Nemeth Properties, LLC v. Panzica" on Justia Law