Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Kattie Boline sustained injuries from a car accident and sued JKC Trucking and driver Jerzy Syrzyna for negligence. During her jury trial, Boline violated a stipulated order in limine by mentioning insurance, which led the district court to declare a mistrial. The court found her violation intentional and sanctioned her by ordering her to pay $62,074.95 in defense attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ruled that no new jury trial would be held until the sanction was paid. When Boline failed to pay, the district court dismissed her case with prejudice and entered judgment against her for the sanction amount.The district court of Sweetwater County initially handled the case, where Boline filed her complaint in 2018. The case experienced several delays before being set for trial in August 2022. During the trial, Boline’s mention of insurance, despite a pretrial order prohibiting such testimony, led to the mistrial. The district court then sanctioned her and conditioned a new trial on the payment of the sanction. Boline’s inability to pay the sanction led to the dismissal of her case with prejudice.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Boline and dismissing her case with prejudice. The court found that the district court properly considered Boline’s mental health condition, financial situation, and the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not violate Boline’s right to open access to the courts under the Wyoming Constitution, as the sanction and subsequent dismissal were appropriate responses to her intentional violation of the court’s order. View "Boline v. JKC Trucking" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Farmers Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action against Dennis Perez, seeking a declaration that it no longer had a duty to defend or indemnify Perez under an auto insurance policy in connection with an automobile accident involving Victor Montez. Perez had been uncooperative in his defense in the underlying state court tort action filed by the Montezes, leading Farmers Direct to claim that Perez breached the policy's cooperation clause. The Montezes intervened and moved to set aside the default judgment entered against Perez, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not meet the statutory requirement.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the Montezes' motion, vacating the default judgment on the grounds that the amount in controversy was limited to the policy's $25,000 face amount, which did not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold of over $75,000. Farmers Direct appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the district court erred in determining that the value of the declaratory judgment action was limited to the policy's $25,000 maximum liability. The Ninth Circuit found that there was at least an arguable basis that the amount in controversy was satisfied by considering either the potential excess liability of the underlying tort claim or Farmers Direct's anticipated future defense fees and costs, or both. The appellate court concluded that the judgment was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "FARMERS DIRECT PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY V. MONTEZ" on Justia Law

Kaufman Lynn Construction was hired to build a corporate campus for JM Family Enterprises in South Florida. Kaufman obtained a commercial general liability policy from Liberty Surplus Insurance to cover itself and its subcontractors. After completing several buildings, Tropical Storm Eta caused significant water damage to the completed structures. Kaufman sought indemnification from Liberty, which denied the claim based on the policy's Course of Construction Exclusion (COCE), stating that coverage did not apply until the entire project was completed. Kaufman disputed this and filed a lawsuit against its subcontractors and initiated a claims process with Liberty.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted Liberty's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the COCE excluded coverage for the water damage because the entire project was not completed. The court also dismissed Kaufman's counterclaim for declaratory relief as duplicative and ruled that Kaufman's breach of contract counterclaim was moot. Additionally, the court dismissed Kaufman's reformation counterclaim for lack of standing, reasoning that Kaufman had not demonstrated a cognizable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Kaufman had Article III standing to seek reformation of the policy, as it suffered a cognizable injury by receiving a policy different from what was bargained for. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the COCE precluded coverage for the water damage, as the entire project was not completed. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Liberty's motion for attorney's fees, as Liberty's settlement proposal did not comply with the requirements of Florida's offer of judgment statute and Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B). The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reformation counterclaim. View "Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

50 Exchange Terrace LLC sought to collect under a property insurance policy with Mount Vernon Specialty Insurance Company for damage to its property in Rhode Island. The insurance policy required an appraisal if the parties disagreed on the amount of loss. After frozen pipes caused water damage, Mount Vernon paid its estimated value but demanded an appraisal. 50 Exchange filed a lawsuit in California state court, alleging wrongful withholding of compensation by Mount Vernon while awaiting the appraisal outcome.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, where Mount Vernon moved to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The district court requested supplemental briefing on ripeness and Article III standing and subsequently dismissed the action for lack of both. 50 Exchange appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the injuries asserted by 50 Exchange were not actual or imminent because the extent of any loss could not be determined until the appraisal process was completed. The court concluded that any alleged injury before the appraisal was too speculative to create an actionable claim, thus failing to meet the requirements for ripeness and Article III standing. The court did not address the parties' arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. View "50 EXCHANGE TERRACE LLC V. MOUNT VERNON SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO." on Justia Law

Cathy L. Stroud sued Ozark National Life Insurance Company and its agent, Stephen Guinn, for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty after her husband, Alan Stroud, converted his term life insurance policy to a whole life policy, reducing the death benefit. Cathy claimed that Guinn's advice led to the conversion, which was against their best interests. Alan had a 20-year term life insurance policy with a $60,000 death benefit, which he converted to a whole life policy with a $30,000 death benefit shortly before his death.The Sedgwick District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ozark and Guinn, concluding that Cathy failed to establish a fiduciary duty and that Guinn did not supply false information. Cathy appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that Cathy did not present sufficient evidence to establish a fiduciary duty or negligent misrepresentation.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Cathy failed to establish a fiduciary relationship because there was no evidence that Guinn consciously assumed fiduciary duties. The court also held that Cathy did not present evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation by Guinn, as required for a negligent misrepresentation claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. The court noted that Cathy's claim was more akin to fraud by silence, which was not pleaded or argued.The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because Cathy did not establish genuine issues of material fact for trial on her claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathy's motion to amend her petition to add a claim for punitive damages. View "Stroud v. Ozark Nat'l Life Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

David Levine, former CEO of Geostellar Inc., was accused of defrauding and bankrupting the company. Geostellar had a directors and officers insurance policy from Philadelphia Indemnity Company, which began providing Levine's defense. The policy had a $3 million coverage limit. Levine and his wife later filed for personal bankruptcy, which stayed the Geostellar adversary action. The Geostellar Trustee moved to lift the stay to proceed against Levine to the extent of the insurance coverage, admitting that Levine's debt to Geostellar was uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage.The bankruptcy court granted the motion to lift the stay. The Trustees then filed an adversary action for declaratory judgment, seeking to establish that the right to settlement under the policy was an asset of the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, for which the Levine Trustee was the exclusive representative. The bankruptcy court dismissed the action, and the district court affirmed, finding that neither Trustee had standing to sue the insurer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Geostellar Trustee had no standing because West Virginia law did not permit a direct action against the insurer under the circumstances, and the policy only provided coverage to Levine, not Geostellar. The Levine Trustee also lacked standing because any judgment in the Geostellar adversary action would not impact the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, as Levine's debt to Geostellar was discharged and uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage. The court concluded that the right to consent to settlement under the policy was not the property of either Trustee. View "Fluharty v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Evanston Insurance Company issued commercial umbrella liability policies to Nooter, LLC, covering the period from July 1, 1981, to July 1, 1985. Evanston sought a declaration in the Eastern District of Missouri that it no longer had a duty to defend or indemnify Nooter in ongoing state court asbestos-related personal injury litigation. Evanston claimed that its policy limits were exhausted as of December 29, 2022, after tendering the remaining available limits to Nooter.Previously, Nooter and Evanston litigated insurance coverage issues in Missouri state court, where it was determined that Evanston had a duty to defend and indemnify Nooter against asbestos exposure claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict against Evanston for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay claims. Nooter filed a motion for contempt in state court, which was denied, but the court noted that Evanston's tender of policy limits did not fulfill its duty to defend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evanston's complaint based on claim preclusion. The court held that Missouri's prohibition on claim splitting applied, as the claims arose from the same contracts and transactions involved in the state court litigation. The court found that Evanston's indemnity and defense obligations had already been decided by Missouri courts, and thus, the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the claims. The court also affirmed the denial of Evanston's motion to amend the complaint and the motion to deposit funds as moot. The dismissal was without prejudice to Evanston's ability to seek relief in state court. View "Evanston Insurance Company v. Nooter, LLC" on Justia Law

Jessenia Burton, a student driver, was involved in a car accident during a drivers' education course on April 30, 2017. Burton and her parents sued several defendants, including West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, which provided coverage for the vehicles used in the course. Burton retained neuropsychologist Dr. Daniel Tranel, who conducted an evaluation and diagnosed her with a concussion, postconcussion syndrome, PTSD, and major depressive disorder. Dr. Tranel's report included summaries of psychological and neuropsychological tests administered to Burton.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted West Bend's motion to compel the production of Dr. Tranel's psychological test material and test data. The court reasoned that since Burton made her mental condition an element of her claim, the information was discoverable under Iowa Code section 228.6(4)(a). The court ordered the information to be produced to West Bend and its attorneys, issuing a protective order to limit further disclosure.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Iowa Code section 228.9 explicitly prohibits the disclosure of psychological test material and test data in a judicial proceeding to anyone other than a licensed psychologist designated by the individual. The court emphasized that the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and the only exception to this prohibition is disclosure to another licensed psychologist. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting the motion to compel and vacated the protective order. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Burton v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law