Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Illinois
by
The appellant, a mother of two minor children, regained custody of her children through a federal district court action in Illinois under the Hague Convention and ICARA after the children were wrongfully removed from Slovakia by their father. Subsequently, she filed a state court action in Cook County against her former mother-in-law and brother-in-law, alleging tortious interference with her custodial rights and aiding and abetting such interference, seeking to recover expenses incurred in the federal action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court concluded that Illinois courts have consistently declined to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a parent’s custodial rights, regardless of the damages claimed.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reiterated its position that Illinois does not recognize the tort of interference with the parent-child relationship, regardless of the damages claimed. The court emphasized that it has consistently deferred the question of whether to recognize such a cause of action to the legislative branch. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, maintaining that the creation of new causes of action is more appropriately addressed by the legislature. The court also noted that the appellant had already obtained a remedy under ICARA, which provided for the recovery of necessary expenses incurred in regaining custody of her children. View "Hulsh v. Hulsh" on Justia Law

by
Elsa M. Tronsrue filed for dissolution of marriage from George M. Tronsrue III, and George filed a counterpetition. In 1992, the Du Page County circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage, incorporating a marital settlement agreement that required George to pay Elsa one-half of the marital portion of his federal veterans’ disability payments. In 2019, George sought to terminate these payments, arguing that the division of his benefits was void under federal law. Elsa moved to dismiss George’s petition, and the circuit court granted her motion, found George in contempt for non-payment, and ordered him to pay Elsa’s attorney fees.The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the marital settlement agreement was not void despite potentially violating federal law, as the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings. The dissenting justice argued that federal law preempted the agreement, rendering it void. In a related order, the appellate court also affirmed the contempt finding, reasoning that George was required to make the payments because the judgment was not void. The dissenting justice again argued that the provision was void, providing George with a compelling justification for non-compliance.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgments. The court held that federal law did not preempt the state law authorizing the marital settlement agreement, as George voluntarily agreed to use his disability benefits to pay Elsa after receiving them. The court also found that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the judgment of dissolution, and thus, the judgment was not void. Consequently, the court upheld the award of attorney fees to Elsa for George’s failure to comply with the agreement. View "In re Marriage of Tronsrue" on Justia Law

by
A firearms dealer in Madison County filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Attorney General, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Firearms Industry Responsibility Act. The plaintiff argued that the statute was preempted by federal law, void for vagueness, violated the Second Amendment, and violated the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule. Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the venue provision, which limited venue to Sangamon and Cook Counties for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to a state statute, was unconstitutional as it violated federal due process rights.The circuit court of Madison County denied the Attorney General's motion to transfer the case to Sangamon County and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the venue issue. The court found that transferring the case to Sangamon County would be inconvenient for the plaintiff and would deprive it of its ability to effectively challenge the statute. The court concluded that the venue provision was unconstitutional as applied to individuals residing or injured outside of Cook or Sangamon Counties.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the venue provision did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights. The court emphasized that the inconvenience of traveling to Sangamon County did not rise to the level of a due process violation, especially considering the availability of remote court proceedings. The court also noted that the legislature has the authority to determine venue and that the state's interest in consolidating actions in certain counties was reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul" on Justia Law

by
Irma Jordan filed a negligence complaint against Esmerelda Macedo in the circuit court of Cook County following a car accident. The case was referred to mandatory arbitration, where the arbitrator awarded Jordan $13,070. Neither party rejected the award, and Jordan submitted it to the circuit court for judgment. Jordan then filed a motion seeking prejudgment interest and statutory costs, which the circuit court denied, stating the arbitration award included the full amount to be reduced to judgment.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's denial of statutory costs but reversed the denial of prejudgment interest. The appellate court held that Jordan should have requested costs during arbitration, referencing the Cruz v. Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. decision. However, it agreed that prejudgment interest could be requested in the circuit court as it is not considered damages.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and held that, according to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 92(e), statutory costs can be sought during arbitration, but failure to do so does not waive the right to seek them in the trial court upon entry of judgment. The court found that Rule 92(e) allows for statutory costs to be requested in the trial court even if not addressed by the arbitrator. The court reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding statutory costs and affirmed the judgment regarding prejudgment interest. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Jordan v. Macedo" on Justia Law

by
Rodney Martin worked for B.F. Goodrich Company from 1966 to 2012 and was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer until 1974. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in December 2019 and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil action in November 2021, alleging that Rodney’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death. She invoked the exception in section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act to avoid its exclusivity provisions.PolyOne filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provisions, arguing that section 1.1 did not apply and that using it would infringe on their due process rights. The district court denied these motions and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which then certified three related questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and answered the certified questions. The court held that section 1(f) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act is a period of repose for purposes of section 1.1. The court also determined that section 1.1 applies prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, meaning it applies to new actions filed after the amendment was enacted. Finally, the court found that applying section 1.1 prospectively does not violate Illinois’s due process guarantee, as defendants did not have a vested right in an exclusivity defense before the employee’s injury was discovered. View "Martin v. Goodrich Corp." on Justia Law

by
Rebecca Petta filed a class-action complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County against Christie Business Holdings Company, P.C., doing business as Christie Clinic. Petta alleged that Christie negligently failed to prevent unauthorized access to its business email account, which potentially exposed patients' private personal data, including Social Security numbers and health insurance information. Christie moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion.The trial court found that Petta had standing due to an inference of injury from unauthorized use of her phone number and city in a loan application. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a valid claim under existing law and due to the economic loss doctrine. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal but on the grounds that Petta lacked standing, as the alleged increased risk of identity theft was too speculative and the unauthorized loan application did not involve her private personal data.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court. The court held that Petta's allegations of increased risk of harm were insufficient to confer standing in a complaint seeking monetary damages. The court also found that the unauthorized loan application, which used only Petta's publicly available phone number and city, was not fairly traceable to Christie's alleged misconduct. Consequently, the court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, concluding that Petta lacked standing to bring her claims. View "Petta v. Christie Business Holding Co., P.C." on Justia Law

by
In June 2019, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Illinois Gambling Act to authorize the Illinois Gaming Board to issue six new casino licenses, including one in Waukegan. Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (Potawatomi Casino) submitted a proposal, but the City of Waukegan certified three other applicants and not Potawatomi Casino. Potawatomi Casino filed a complaint seeking to prohibit the Board from issuing a casino license due to the City's alleged noncompliance with the statute. The Cook County circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing.The appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision, finding that Potawatomi Casino had standing to bring the action. The appellate court concluded that Potawatomi Casino had a legally cognizable interest in competing in a fair and lawful certification process and that the alleged injury was distinct and traceable to the City's actions. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the absence of a private right of action under the Act provided a basis to affirm the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the applications once the City certified the applicants, and the license issued to Full House was not void. The court found that no effectual relief could be granted to Potawatomi Casino, rendering the appeal moot. Additionally, the court determined that Potawatomi Casino lacked standing to bring the suit because it did not have a legally cognizable interest in the casino licensing process when it filed the action. The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

by
The case involves D.H.E., the biological father of V.S., a minor. The Cook County circuit court found V.S. neglected due to an injurious environment and dependent due to his mother's disability. Consequently, V.S. was adjudged a ward of the court, and guardianship was granted to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). D.H.E. appealed, arguing that the neglect finding violated his due process rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the court failed to provide a factual basis for its disposition.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's adjudication and disposition orders. It found that D.H.E.'s challenges related to the neglect finding were moot because he did not also challenge the dependency finding. The appellate court also upheld the disposition order, which granted guardianship and custody to DCFS based on the finding that D.H.E. was unable to care for V.S.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that D.H.E.'s appeal was moot because he failed to challenge the dependency finding, which alone was sufficient to support the wardship and disposition orders. The court also found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness did not apply, as no significant collateral consequences specifically tied to the neglect finding were identified. Therefore, the court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

by
An Illinois attorney, employed by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) from 2000 to 2020, filed a defamation lawsuit against Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, and Tim Novak. The lawsuit stemmed from articles published in February and October 2020, which alleged that the attorney pressured PTAB staff to reduce property taxes on Trump Tower due to political motivations. The articles claimed the attorney was under investigation for these actions, which the attorney contended were false and damaging to his reputation.The Cook County Circuit Court denied the defendants' first motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney had adequately pled the falsity of the statements and special damages. The court also found that the fair report privilege and actual malice were questions of fact. The court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count but allowed the defamation and false light claims to proceed.Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Illinois Citizen Participation Act. The circuit court denied this motion, finding the defendants failed to show the lawsuit was solely based on their protected political speech activities and that the attorney's claims were meritless and retaliatory.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, applying the Sandholm v. Kuecker test. The appellate court found that the defendants did not meet their burden to show the articles were published in furtherance of their rights to participate in government and that the attorney's lawsuit was solely based on these rights.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the articles did not constitute acts in furtherance of government participation and thus were not protected under the Citizen Participation Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the City of Joliet and five commercial truck drivers who were fined for violating city ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways. The drivers challenged the city's jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations, arguing they were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled the drivers' objections and denied their motions to dismiss. The drivers then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed the decisions of the hearing officer.The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing officer, following a previous First District's opinion which held that home rule municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating "traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles," in addition to "reportable offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code." The City of Joliet appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois found that section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt the City of Joliet's home rule authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Therefore, it vacated that part of the appellate court's judgment. However, the court also found that the hearing officer's administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances, and thus affirmed, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court's judgment that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the administrative decisions of the City. The court concluded that the administrative decisions were reversed, and the circuit court judgment was reversed. View "Cammacho v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law