Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An Illinois attorney, employed by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) from 2000 to 2020, filed a defamation lawsuit against Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, and Tim Novak. The lawsuit stemmed from articles published in February and October 2020, which alleged that the attorney pressured PTAB staff to reduce property taxes on Trump Tower due to political motivations. The articles claimed the attorney was under investigation for these actions, which the attorney contended were false and damaging to his reputation.The Cook County Circuit Court denied the defendants' first motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney had adequately pled the falsity of the statements and special damages. The court also found that the fair report privilege and actual malice were questions of fact. The court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count but allowed the defamation and false light claims to proceed.Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Illinois Citizen Participation Act. The circuit court denied this motion, finding the defendants failed to show the lawsuit was solely based on their protected political speech activities and that the attorney's claims were meritless and retaliatory.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, applying the Sandholm v. Kuecker test. The appellate court found that the defendants did not meet their burden to show the articles were published in furtherance of their rights to participate in government and that the attorney's lawsuit was solely based on these rights.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the articles did not constitute acts in furtherance of government participation and thus were not protected under the Citizen Participation Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Joliet and five commercial truck drivers who were fined for violating city ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways. The drivers challenged the city's jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations, arguing they were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled the drivers' objections and denied their motions to dismiss. The drivers then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed the decisions of the hearing officer.The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing officer, following a previous First District's opinion which held that home rule municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating "traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles," in addition to "reportable offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code." The City of Joliet appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois found that section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt the City of Joliet's home rule authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Therefore, it vacated that part of the appellate court's judgment. However, the court also found that the hearing officer's administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances, and thus affirmed, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court's judgment that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the administrative decisions of the City. The court concluded that the administrative decisions were reversed, and the circuit court judgment was reversed. View "Cammacho v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce proceeding in Illinois. The appellant, Masud M. Arjmand, sought to dissolve his marriage to Muneeza R. Arjmand in 2009. In the course of the proceedings, the appellant filed multiple petitions for substitution of judge and a separate complaint against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and the Stogsdill Law Firm. The circuit court dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice, and this dismissal order was affirmed by the appellate court based on the doctrine of res judicata.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the main issue was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider prior orders denying the appellant’s petition and motion for substitution of judge in conjunction with an appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and motion.The Supreme Court clarified that Rule 304(a) applies exclusively to final orders and does not provide jurisdiction to review rulings on requests for substitution of judge. The Court emphasized the policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals and stated that the circuit court’s Rule 304(a) findings were limited to determining the propriety of the dismissal of the appellant’s complaint. The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the appellate court should have considered the rulings on his substitution requests to promote judicial economy, noting that principles of judicial economy may not override the jurisdictional barrier imposed by an Illinois Supreme Court rule. View "In re Marriage of Arjmand" on Justia Law

In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the dismissal of Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC's appeal by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction. Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC filed a notice of appeal five days after the deadline and did not file a motion seeking leave to show good cause or a reasonable excuse for the late filing. Despite the Group's claim that it had electronically submitted the notice of appeal on the due date and that the clerk erroneously rejected it, the Court ruled that the Group failed to seek recourse for its untimely filing as required by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court noted that the record did not support the Group's factual assertions and that the Group did not utilize the remedies available to it, making its claim of due process violation baseless. Therefore, the Court held that the appellate court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Group's appeal. The case originated from a two-count complaint for eviction filed by the Group against Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corporation, in which the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. View "Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC v. Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corp." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, the State of Illinois, represented by the Attorney General, alleged that Elite Staffing, Inc., Metro Staff, Inc., and Midway Staffing, Inc. (collectively, the staffing agencies) violated the Illinois Antitrust Act. The agencies, which supplied temporary workers to a company called Colony Display, were claimed to have agreed to fix wages for their employees at below-market rates and agreed not to hire each other's employees. The staffing agencies argued that the Act did not apply to the charged conduct, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for interlocutory review.The Supreme Court held that the Illinois Antitrust Act does not exempt agreements between competitors to hold down wages and to limit employment opportunities for their employees from antitrust scrutiny. For the purposes of the Act, the court clarified that "service" does not exclude all agreements concerning labor services. It particularly noted that multiemployer agreements concerning wages they will pay their employees and whether they will hire each other's employees may violate the Act unless the agreement arises as part of the bargaining process and the affected employees, through their collective bargaining representatives, have sought to bargain with the multiemployer unit.The court vacated the appellate court’s answer to a question it had formulated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc." on Justia Law

The attorneys represented Doe in a medical malpractice action against a hospital and other medical staff. During that litigation, the evidence established that, after Doe was admitted to the emergency room of the hospital, he attempted suicide by stabbing himself multiple times. The hospital sought a qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d) to gain access to Doe’s protected health information and requested a subpoena pursuant to HIPAA. At trial, Doe testified in detail about his suicide attempt, his injuries therefrom, and his diagnosis., Doe was awarded $4.2 million. Subsequently, the attorneys issued a press release related to the medical malpractice trial describing Doe’s suicide attempt, the resulting injuries, and his diagnoses and commented on the medical malpractice case and Doe’s history for an article published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.Doe alleged that the attorneys violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1). The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of his case. Doe waived his claims of confidentiality under the Act by voluntarily and publicly disclosing his private health information in a public trial; the qualified protective order under HIPAA did not preclude such waiver. The evidence and testimony divulged during Doe’s medical malpractice trial were not records or communications made in the course of mental health services; therefore, the Act does not apply. View "Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC" on Justia Law

The Municipal Code of Chicago included provisions concerning public parking, including parking meters. The fine for exceeding the time purchased at a parking meter differs depending on whether the violation occurs in the “central business district” or the “non-central business district.” At the time of the alleged violation, failure to comply with the parking meter regulations in the central business district resulted in a $65 fine. A $50 fine applied to similar violations outside the central business district.Pinkston filed a class-action, alleging that Chicago had engaged in the routine practice of improperly issuing central business district tickets for parking meter violations. The circuit court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings and voluntarily paying his fine. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The underlying issue—whether Pinkston received an improper parking ticket—is routinely handled at the administrative level; an aggrieved party cannot circumvent administrative remedies “by a class action for declaratory judgment, injunction or other relief.” View "Pinkston v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Lichter filed a personal injury action against Christopher for injuries she suffered in a car accident in February 2016, not knowing that Christopher had died in June 2017. An estate was never opened for Christopher following his death. In April 2018, Lichter successfully moved (735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b)(2)) to appoint Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate for the purpose of defending the lawsuit. Lichter subsequently filed an amended complaint, naming Carroll as the special representative of Christopher’s estate and the defendant. Counsel for Christopher’s insurer, State Farm, appeared on behalf of the defendant. In March 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss Lichter’s complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)), arguing that the action was time-barred because Lichter never moved to appoint a personal representative of Christopher’s estate before the statute of limitations expiring, as required by 735 ILCS 13- 209(c).The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the case; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Subsection (b)(2), relating to the appointment of a special representative is not limited to situations where the plaintiff is aware of the defendant’s death. It was enacted to streamline the court process when there is no personal representative in place to defend a lawsuit. A plaintiff who learns of a defendant’s death after the statute of limitations has expired is not required to move to appoint a personal representative through the probate court. View "Lichter v. Porter Carroll" on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, Donald incurred a cervical cord injury, which left him quadriplegic. To reduce Donald’s involuntary muscle spasms, Dr. Espinosa implanted a Medtronic SynchroMed II Infusion System, a programmable pump that delivered doses of baclofen into the intrathecal space of Donald’s spine. The pump was managed by SIU Neurology and required regular refills. A routine refill went wrong, resulting in holes in the pump. Donald died days later.In a wrongful death action, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-402, to convert a respondent in discovery (Dr. Bakir) to a defendant. Bakir, a pulmonary critical care specialist, was Donald’s supervising physician in the ICU.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff attached a certificate of merit in which a doctor opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Bakir deviated from the standard of care. The affidavit may not have stated the specific standard of care from which Dr. Bakir deviated, but it did provide the court with sufficient information about what Dr. Bakir failed to do based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty—timely recognize that Donald suffered from baclofen withdrawal syndrome, timely order treatment, and timely administer that treatment. The trial court mistakenly required evidence that would establish more than a reasonable probability that the defendant could be liable. View "Cleeton v. SIU Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams obtained a $4 million judgment against Kelly in March 2020 for his physical and sexual abuse of her when she was a minor. Midwest obtained a $3,484,420.70 judgment against Kelly in July 2020 for breach of a commercial real estate lease. Williams and Midwest each sought to satisfy their judgments through royalties Sony paid Kelly. Sony then held $1,544,333 in royalties due to Kelly. Williams sent via registered mail a citation to discover assets to Sony on August 17, 2020, return receipt requested. On August 19, 2020, Midwest e-mailed its citation to discover assets and also sent a copy through the regular mail. Midwest’s e-mail was directed to David Castagna, who was a member of Sony’s legal staff with whom Midwest had dealt on prior, unrelated matters. On August 24, 2020, Williams’s citation was delivered to Sony and Castagna acknowledged receipt of the email citation.The trial court found that Midwest’s lien was entitled to priority. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Email service is not a recognized method for service of a citation to discover assets to a party that has not entered an appearance. Williams’s citation was entitled to priority because it was complete four days after she mailed it based on Illinois Supreme Court Rules. View "Midwest Commercial Funding, LLC v. Kelly" on Justia Law